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ABSTRACT

RUSSELL KIRK AND THE RHETORIC OF ORDER

By
Eric Grabowsky
August 2010

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Janie M. Harden Fritz
The corpus of historically-minded “man of letters” and twentieth century leader
among conservatives, Russell Amos Kirk, prompts one to reflect upon a realist rhetoric of
order for conservative discourse in particular and public argumentation in general. In
view of building a realist rhetoric of order within the present spectrum of modern to
postmodern thought, this dissertation project contains two related layers of study. At one
level, the author both builds and departs from the realist approach to communicative
epistemology known as “rhetorical perspectivism” toward a theoretical framework for the
study of rhetoric that is based upon Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas’s legacy of
classical realism. At another level, in light of the significance of Russell Kirk for the
question of conservatism and postmodernism, from the vantage point of realism, the
author considers Kirk’s view on imagination, language, and life as against certain aspects
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of Hans Georg Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics.” This comparison, next to a
rhetorical theoretical study of The Roots of American Order regarding the essential
constancy of human nature as such through history, points to some avenues by which
Kirk’s imaginative standpoint provides a way of taking the imagination as formative of
communicative perspectives within and across “rhetorical situations.” For conservative
discourse and beyond, within this age of epistemological skepticism and moral
relativism, Kirk’s corpus provides for some ethical prospects for persuasion in terms of
both argument and narrative, inclusive of the natural law as a basis for rhetorical ethics.
In establishing parameters for a realist rhetoric of order, the author relies upon the work
of Richard M. Weaver, who contributed to both movement conservatism and rhetorical
theory during the twentieth century. In particular, the author embraces Weaver’s
connecting of genuine conservatism to philosophical realism, notwithstanding some
necessary correctives toward classical realism regarding reality and ideation. Although
this project in large part operates within the realm of rhetorical theory, some implications
for the practice, criticism, and pedagogy of rhetoric are highlighted along the way with
respect to a realist rhetoric of order.
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Introduction: Russell Kirk and the Rhetoric of Order
As Richard M. Weaver has demonstrated, the ethical use of rhetoric encompasses
the articulation and application of true principles within society through persuasive
discourse in various circumstances (The Ethics; “Language is”; “To Write”; Visions 5572). In both letters and life, Russell Kirk was a scholar and practitioner of a traditional
and principled version of conservatism that was dispositional, yet not ideological, and as
such was an important pioneer and leader of the conservative movement that developed
during the 20th century within the United States of America.1 For Kirk, as against
ideologies, even for conservatism, to be a conservative is to be disposed toward a
consideration of custom, reality, and humanity in view of both preservation and reform
within society.2 His range of work (scholarly, popular, and pedagogical) extended into
such areas as history, literature, politics, society, culture, education, and economics (W.
Campbell; Horowitz; Kirk, “Cooper”; Kirk, Economics; Kirk, “The Foreboding”; Kirk,
The Intelligent; Kirk, The Intemperate; Kirk, John Randolph; Kirk, “Massive Subsidies”;
Kirk, Rev. of; Kirk, “Shelton College”; Kirk, “Social Justice”; Kirk, “The Thought”; Kirk
and McClellan; Regnery, “Russell Kirk: An Appraisal”; Stanlis, “Prophet of”). Kirk’s
most recognizable non-fiction book is probably The Conservative Mind, which was first
published in the early 1950s, yet has continued in print in various editions since that time.
Kirk also was a fiction writer of note, whose ghost stories provided readers with literary
reflections toward the exercise and development of the “moral imagination” (Champ;
Newman; Person, Russell Kirk 109-150; Russello, The Postmodern 33-66).
Because he consistently privileged the importance of principles, Kirk
communicated on social, economic, and environmental issues in ways that can resound
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with contemporary scholarly and political audiences (Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver,
Russell Kirk”; W. Campbell; Russello, The Postmodern; Woods). According to Jeffrey
O. Nelson, “But Kirk was never a passive thinker, his strength of character and sense of
moral obligation elevated the man of letters to its true stature—one who actively ‘points
the way to first principles’” (“Introduction” 3). As a pioneer of contemporary movement
conservatism, Kirk is identified as a “traditional” conservative whose work has
continuing relevance for conservatives who value the importance of moral questions and
humane studies for social continuity, political reform, international affairs, and economic
endeavors—his discourse is a source of both direction and correction.3 As indicated
within the pertinent literature (Frohnen, “Has Conservatism”; Henrie, “Understanding”;
Kirk, Enemies; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Person, Russell Kirk; Russello, The
Postmodern; Stanlis, “Prophet of”; Whitney, “Seven Things”; Whitney, “The Sword”;
Woods), for the discourse of this early 21st century (be this discursive condition either
modern or postmodern), the work of Russell Kirk, because of his emphasis on the
primacy and constancy of principles, continues as a challenge to current progressive
trends regarding the theory and practice of society, morality, politics, and education.
As Father A.G. Sertillanges has written, “The order of the mind must correspond
to the order of things. In the world of reality, everything rises towards the divine,
everything depends on it, because everything springs from it. In the effigy of the real
within us, we can note the same dependence, unless we have turned topsy-turvy the true
relations of things” (29). Communication regarding order has theoretical and practical
importance for a common recognition of reality, an ethical viewpoint toward life, a
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genuine revival of culture, and a foundational approach to politics. In a tribute to Russell
Kirk, T. Kenneth Cribb stated:
In his early work, Dr. Kirk treated modern exemplars of the conservative
tradition from Burke to Eliot, but always with respect to their insights into
timeless truths. Later, he more explicitly traced these eternal verities to
their ancient historical roots, and to their Source beyond history. All along
the way he erected guideposts for those who would follow—all of us here
and so many others—that we too might travel the path he had marked
toward order in the soul and order in the commonwealth; that we too
might discover the Honors of the West. (“Recovering” 7)
Kirk’s communicative efforts within such works as The Conservative Mind: From Burke
to Eliot, The Politics of Prudence, Prospects for Conservatives, and The Roots of
American Order demonstrate that order was a significant theme within the overall scope
of his argumentation. For Kirk, the proper advocacy of order was not to be ideological,
as order entails aspects of custom and reality within and across societies, which as he saw
it, were important points of emphasis for conservatives.4
In summary, Kirk’s view was that adherence to ideologies, which are products of
modernity, encompasses an evasion from and a replacement of religion and philosophy
as historically conceived and practiced (Beer, “Science”; Kirk, The Politics 1-29;
McDonald, Russell Kirk 14-54; Niemeyer, “Russell Kirk”). Relevant to this point, T.
Kenneth Cribb Jr. has recounted the following experience:
As a young man, I once spent time with Dr. Kirk on a walking tour of the
Scottish Borders. One day, I asked him for a succinct definition of
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conservatism, and he, quite politely, flatly refused. Instead, he offered the
insight that conservatism is a disposition of openness to reality—that is to
say, openness toward the world as God has created it, rather than a blind
allegiance to one of those hypothetical worlds in whose name so many
were slaughtered in the twentieth century. In an era diabolically attracted
to the ideological answers of communism, fascism, and all the other
“isms,” Russell Kirk insisted that conservatism is the negation of
ideology. In a mighty labor of moral imagination, he provided the
intellectual tools to defend the common decencies of American life.5
Generally speaking, a principled emphasis on individual, familial, and social order is a
noteworthy attribute of “traditional conservatism,” for this communicative focus, along
with such notions as prudential reform, is prevalent within the work of Russell Kirk
(Canavan; Frohnen, “Russell Kirk”; Henrie, “Understanding”; Kirk, The Politics; Nash,
The Conservative 50-73; Woods). Richard Weaver, a 20th century rhetorical theorist of
note, was a friend of Kirk as well as, by the classification of some, a “traditional
conservative.”6
With an eye toward commencing a larger theoretical conversation regarding a
realist rhetoric of order, this dissertation project opens one door for a rhetorical study of
Kirk’s approach to the human imagination in general and his book The Roots of
American Order in particular. The human imagination was a central theme for Russell
Kirk (Kirk, Enemies; Whitney, “The Swords”), and over his career, he demonstrated a
developed interest in social and individual order, particularly as regards his appropriation
of Edmund Burke to conservatism (Canavan; Eaves; Kirk, “Burke and the Philosophy”;
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Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot 12-70; Kirk, The Conservative Mind:
From Burke to Santayana 11-61; Kirk, Edmund Burke; Stanlis, “Russell Kirk”).
According to W. Wesley McDonald, The Roots of American Order contains Russell
Kirk’s most comprehensive discussion of order (Russell Kirk 116-117). In this book
(first published in 1974), Kirk’s message was that the religious, philosophical, political,
legal, and literary history of the West, especially during a time of disorder, is the business
of every American citizen, for from within an account of Hebraic, Greek, Roman, and
European history, Kirk predicated that the moral and political thought of the United
States entailed an ordered development, not a revolution, from the influence of those
cultures, particularly with respect to the principles that substantiate individual and social
order.7
The theoretical approach taken within this dissertation entails a realist position on
reality and humanity, which provides a positional point of view for the author regarding
rhetorical, ethical, and political questions. Scholars of multiple disciplines, with varying
degrees of distance from particular political standpoints, have articulated and
demonstrated the ongoing significance of realism (regardless of type) for scholarly,
pedagogical, and social questions (Adler, The Four; Calvet de Magalhães; Grabowsky
and Fritz; Hikins, “Realism and”; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly; R. McInerny,
Characters; Pavitt, “The Third”; Ronen; Shively; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”). I stand
within the realist tradition of the Thomistic and Aristotelian variety (classical realism),
and this guides the theoretical approach to rhetorical, ethical, and political analysis and
argumentation in the tasks of scholarly research that define this project.8 In contrast to
many of the realists within my academic discipline who have made important arguments
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regarding human communication and objective reality, this project is consistent with
Mortimer Adler’s contention (consistent with classical realism) that metaphysics is
philosophically prior to epistemology—examining what we know precedes the question
of how we know.9 Adler has argued that the proper starting point in the search for truth
and wisdom (the goal of philosophy) is our “common experience” of reality, for we
exercise our human faculties within and about reality (The Four 9-71; Intellect; Some
Questions; Ten 5-107)—this is relevant to knowledge, opinion, and communication.
As demonstrated by various scholars within the field of communication
(regardless of their given political and philosophical biases) (Bliese, “The Conservative
Rhetoric”; Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and the Rhetoric”; Bliese, “Richard Weaver:
Rhetoric”; Bliese, “Richard Weaver’s Axiology”; T. Clark, “An Analysis” 400-401; T.
Clark, “The Ideological”; S. Crowley; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”;
Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Duffy and Jacobi; Enholm and Gustainis;
Floyd and Adams; Follette; Gilles; Johannesen, “A Reconsideration”; Medhurst, “The
First”; Medhurst, “The Sword”; Prelli; D. White), the conjunction of Richard Weaver’s
rhetorical theorizing and conservative standpoint gives significance to his work for use in
the evaluation of argumentation with respect to conservatism. This project rests in
general agreement with the following statement given by Weaver in “Conservatism and
Libertarianism: The Common Ground”:
[…] A conservative in my view is a man who may be behind the times or
up with the times or ahead of the times. It all depends on how you define
the times. And this brings us at once to the matter of an essential
definition.

xvi

It is my contention that a conservative is a realist, who believes
that there is a structure of reality independent of his own will and desire.
He believes that there is a creation which was here before him, which
exists now not by just his sufferance, and which will be here after he’s
gone. This structure consists not merely of the great physical world but
also of many laws, principles, and regulations which control human
behavior. Though this reality is independent of the individual, it is not
hostile to him. It is in fact amenable by him in many ways, but it cannot be
changed radically and arbitrarily. This is the cardinal point. The
conservative holds that man in the world cannot make his will his law
without any regard to limits and to the fixed nature of things. (477)
Richard Weaver, in the Ethics of Rhetoric, argued that definitional argumentation with
respect to the nature of things is both indicative of and proper to conservatism (55-114).
He related, in terms of both theory and application, the general importance of
philosophical precision for conservative discourse at various points throughout his
corpus, for a major aspect of Weaver’s significance for American conservatism is the
status he gave to definitional argumentation, based on the nature of things, in view of the
argumentation of conservatives (Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and”; Dimock,
“Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Johannesen,
“A Reconsideration”; Weaver, “Conservatism and Liberalism”; Weaver, “Conservatism
and Libertarianism”; Weaver, “How to Argue”; Weaver, “The Prospects”; Weaver,
“Which Ancestors?”). His work, therefore, is relevant for understanding the thought and
rhetoric of conservatism.
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One of Weaver’s major theoretical contributions to the 20th century study of
rhetoric is the direction within his work toward the necessity of objective truth to the
study and practice of persuasive argumentation.10 The Platonic approach of Richard
Weaver, “High Realist” (as Russell Kirk had designated him), is clearly evident in such
works as The Ethics of Rhetoric and Ideas Have Consequences.11 Marion Montgomery
offers a critical assessment of Weaver’s own Platonic assumptions regarding our
countering the impact of nominalist philosophy, embracing the goodness of created
reality, and acquiring a grasp of natural law (“Consequences”). From my own scholarly
standpoint as a realist, “Consequences in the Provinces: Ideas Have Consequences Fifty
Years After,” a presentation turned essay by Montgomery (who identifies with classical
realism) contains some of the most substantive philosophical analysis of the work and
thought of Richard Weaver that is available across academic disciplines. Montgomery,
who has been deeply influenced by Weaver’s work, reminds us of the Thomistic view
that, in the course of philosophical study, our primary goal “‘is not to learn what others
have thought, but to learn how the truth of things stands,’” for we begin with reality in
our common grasp of and academic search for knowledge, which informs our definitions,
analogies, and applications—this we have learned from Aristotle and Aquinas.12
Definitional argumentation, with a basis in the natures of things, as such, is at
some level necessary and pertinent to genuine conservatism. I have here said “as such,”
for an embrace of Platonism is not necessary for this point of view. Weaver’s wider
positive contribution (reflected in his quoted statement above) concerns the general
importance of reality as a primary point of reference for the argumentation of
conservatives. Although a conservative political mindset does not automatically follow
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from one’s acceptance of philosophical realism, realism, generally understood, is at some
level necessary for the rhetoric of genuine conservatism, and the relevance of
metaphysics to the argumentation of conservatism, as affirmed by Richard Weaver and
others, warrants further inquiry within the field, particularly from a realist point of
view.13 Because of the connection of rhetorical theory and political conservatism within
Richard Weaver’s work, there is disciplinary precedent by which to examine the
argumentation of conservatives along with an inquiry into the assumptions about reality
that undergird their arguments. In terms of questions regarding reality, many of the
approaches to liberalism that are prominent encompass sets of assumptions that are based
upon, in varying degrees, philosophical skepticism (of both the modern and postmodern
varieties) regarding knowledge, opinion, and communication (Dunn and Woodard 145182; Shively).
Establishing and defending the primacy of metaphysics with respect to “common
experience” (whether paired with conservative thought or not) is an important yet
challenging task, for the philosophical status of reality has implications for questions
regarding the aim of inquiry, the foundation of morality, and the scope of teleology
(Adler, The Four; Centore, Being; Hayward; R. McInerny, Characters; Shively; E.
Thompson, “Ways Out”). Adler has written:
The conflict between philosophy and common sense is almost entirely
modern. Under the educational institutions of antiquity and the Middle
Ages, the great mass of commonsense individuals in the populations were
not instructed by the philosophy that then existed; today, however, with
going to college or university routine for so many and with current
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philosophical books available to so many, the situation is otherwise. The
commonsense minds of many are corrupted and turned against themselves
by philosophical doctrines that urge them to renounce their common
sense. (Intellect 81)
As realists within the academic field of communication have well highlighted, there are
prominent theoretical biases in the discipline against “objectivist” approaches toward
human communication (metaphysical or otherwise).14 The epistemologies of
philosophical modernism (which have some assumptions of objectivity) along with the
subjectivist and constructivist approaches of postmodernism both encompass skepticism
(at differing methodological points) with respect to the intelligibility and existence of
reality—both tend to dominate within higher education.15 According to Ruth Lessl
Shively:
Those who do not begin from the assumption of correspondence generally
begin from the modern assumption of doubt. That is, they begin by
doubting what is not proven or given certainty according to various
criteria. Even postmodernists who reject the possibility of absolute proof
or certainty generally continue to accept the starting point of doubt. They
differ only in that they end in doubt as well. (53)
As Shively has demonstrated, social constructivism pervades the range of pragmatic,
participatory, and ideological models of political reform at different theoretical levels
with respect to virtues, goods, and practices (3-25). For the classical realist, truth is the
correspondence between the intellect and reality, for this is the condition of knowledge,
even amid the various social, cultural, and linguistic circumstances of life in which
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human beings operate, learn, and communicate (Adler, The Four 21-42; Adler, Intellect
98-101; J. Ryan; Shively 46-58).
Liberalism, in differing versions, has significantly influenced twentieth and
twenty-first century academia; hence, it is arguable that conservatism, generally
understood, has had a lower status within contemporary institutions of scholarly
learning.16 In the various fields of study (including that of communication), liberal
standpoints of various sorts tend to be the measuring points of moral, social, and
economic issues, often accompanied by modern or postmodern epistemologies.17 For the
academic field of history, there has been some discussion of the methodological,
philosophical, and contextual elements of investigation with respect to the adequate depth
at which scholars should appropriate historically the varied thought, argumentation, and
influence of conservatives, notwithstanding one’s political biases.18 The various critiques
of Richard Weaver’s work with respect to his philosophical suppositions or political
opinions demonstrate in multiple ways these trends within the realm of communication
studies.19 For the rhetoric of conservatism, the contemporary spectrum of modern to
postmodern philosophical standpoints entails challenges and opportunities with respect to
the following areas of interest: 1) communicating the truths of foundational principles;20
2) confronting the errors within the present intellectual, moral, and social landscape;21 3)
contending with the continuing implications of the various types of and approaches to
conservatism;22 4) recognizing topical affinities for persuasive impact within the ongoing
academic, cultural, social, and political discourse.23 These four related tiers combine to
constitute the central problem of this dissertation project as it relates to building the case
for a realist rhetoric of order.
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In spite of gradual intellectual ascendancy since the 1950s and significant political
victories since the 1970s, within the midst of what are arguably liberalizing trends within
society, issues of morality and culture continue to be significant areas for potential
communicative impact by American conservatives (Bottum; Dunn and Woodard 145179; Henrie, “Understanding”; Nash, The Conservative 329-341). Amply and
persuasively challenging the suppositions and policies that are connected to
egalitarianism, materialism, individualism, and feminism, for instance, is a controversial
enterprise requiring the communication of real foundations (aspects of order) that are
constant within, across, and among societies.24 The influence of both modern and
postmodern philosophy, in terms of questions regarding truth and error, presents a
difficult yet promising terrain for important philosophical elements of conservative
argumentation such as metaphysics, teleology, and essentialism (Hayward; E. Thompson,
“Postmodernism”; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”). According to some, the suppositions of
modernity present significant limitations for conservatives regarding truth and morality
(Craycraft; Hayward; Mills; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”). Postmodern thought supplies
additional challenges (Dunn and Woodard 145-182; Russello, The Postmodern; E.
Thompson, “Postmodernism”; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”). Steven Hayward has argued
that as conservatives contend with postmodernity, questioning the notion of progress
must precede any revival of premodern philosophy (12). In Ewa M. Thompson’s view,
in light of the influential postmodern attack on essentialism, the primary battle for
conservatives within the humanities is in the realm of language and epistemology, for she
has asserted a defense of essentialism and “logocentrism,” particularly with respect to the
areas of study heretofore of interest to postmodernists.25
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The theological, philosophical, and political components within the arena of
approaches to conservatism continue to provide, as in the past, both alliances and
difficulties (ideational and rhetorical) in terms of conservative argumentation (Berkowitz,
Varieties of; Brown; Carey, “The Future”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”;
Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Dunn and Woodard; Federici, “Russell Kirk”;
Francis; Freund; Gottfried, The Conservative; Hamowy; Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s” 55-56;
Hoeveler; Lewis; Nash, The Conservative; Noble; Rossiter; Russello, The Postmodern;
Smant; H. White; Woods; Zoll, “Philosophical Foundations”). Those within the
American conservative movement that developed in the 20th century, while contending
with the intellectual and political aspects of modernity and liberalism, sought to establish
the parameters of conservatism. Grappling with modern liberalism (generally speaking)
was often at the bottom of the agreements and disagreements among the various types of
conservatives. It was the strong view of some, for instance, that American conservatism
should appropriate some degree of modernity’s liberalism for legitimacy in a modern
nation. This controversy regarding modernity and conservatism has entailed differences
and convergences of viewpoints on issues of culture, morality, politics, and economics
(Berkowitz, Varieties of; Brown; Carey, “The Future”; Dunn and Woodard; Francis;
Freund; Gottfried, The Conservative; Guttmann, The Conservative; Guttmann, “From
Brownson”; Hamowy; Hoeveler; Lewis; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 201-219; Nash, The
Conservative; Noble; Rossiter; Russello, The Postmodern; Smant; H. White; G. Wolfe;
Woods; Zoll, “Philosophical Foundations”), both theoretically and practically.
Scholars such as Marc C. Henrie (“Russell Kirk’s” 55-56) and George H. Nash
(“The Conservative”) have highlighted that a point of unity within this arena of
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approaches to conservatism was the opposition to communism during the Cold War. As
Henrie has explained that the meaning of “the West” was kept ambiguous for the sake of
this coalition, he has emphasized the work of Russell Kirk for a view of Western
Civilization (in terms of principles) that strongly extends back in time before the
Enlightenment.26 According to Nash, since the Cold War, the presently defining task for
conservatives is internal to the United States—what he has identified as “populist
relativism.”27 In view of the work of Russell Kirk, Nash has argued that as conservatives
now work in the very public world of policy and administration, they must not lose site of
the formative aspects of private order, which impacts the order of the state (“The
Conservative” 30). Regarding the current identity and influence of conservatives, it is
arguable that the earlier approaches to conservatism such as that of Russell Kirk, Richard
Weaver, and others (although still deeply influential in many ways) have been eclipsed
by policies and initiatives inspired more by the suppositions of classical liberalism and
neo-conservatism.28 Concerning both rhetorical methodology and conservative discourse,
this spectrum of modern to postmodern thought, as mentioned above, will be of import
within the chapters to follow.
Some words at this point regarding this dissertation project should magnify both
the aspects of my approach and the problems of scholarly interest, particularly in terms of
some specific lines of research within the field of communication. First of all, Kirk is not
unknown within the broader discipline of communication and rhetorical studies,
including his personal and political affiliation with Richard Weaver.29 Most recently, Jim
Kuypers, Megan Hitchner, James Irwin, and Alexander Wilson have argued that
traditional conservatism (particularly the work of Russell Kirk), has informed the rhetoric
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of “compassionate conservatism.”30 In the fifties, Malcolm O. Sillars suggested that the
writings and ideas of the “new conservatives,” such as Russell Kirk, would provide a
corrective balance to the liberal assumptions (which Sillars recognized as a significant
component of American political history) that he saw as predominant within the speech
discipline.31
The goal of this project is not to frame Russell Kirk as a theorist of
communication. Scholars of communication and rhetorical studies have enhanced their
overall disciplinary conversations through constructive reflection upon communicative
practices in light of the theoretical and applied inquiry of others outside of this particular
academic field (Arnett and Arneson; Cherwitz, Rhetoric and; Fritz, Arnett, Ritter, and
Ferrara). Kirk’s corpus can provide such an enhancement. As Gleaves Whitney has
indicated, Kirk’s endeavors point toward the place of rhetoric and language with respect
to the “Permanent Things” (“Recovering Rhetoric”). Although specifically focusing
upon conservatism, Gerald J. Russello has given clear pointers to the significance of
Russell Kirk for rhetoric in general (The Postmodern 52, 104-145, 177-213). From
authors holding various theoretical and political biases, studies of moral inquiry, social
disjuncture, or economic practices are common in the scholarly literature of multiple
disciplines, including communication and rhetorical studies (Arnett and Arneson; Bellah,
Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton; Bracci and Christians; MacIntyre, After Virtue;
Putnam; Sennett)—these were interest areas for Kirk (Russello, The Postmodern;
Woods). The work of Russell Kirk in particular establishes the possibility of topical
affinities for conservatives, especially within the current milieu; these points of affinity
supply communicative occasions for conservatives, particularly with respect to principles
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(Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver, Russell Kirk”; Russello, The Postmodern; Woods). For
example, John Bliese has demonstrated the ways by which the work of both Weaver and
Kirk informs a conservative approach of piety toward and conservation of the natural
world, especially in a time of commercial and consumer excesses (“Richard M. Weaver,
Russell Kirk”; “Richard Weaver and Piety”). Thomas E. Woods, Jr. has argued that the
distinct principles that are of import within the “traditional conservatism” of Russell
Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Robert Nisbet provide a communitarian perspective that is
more conservative in scope than the typically more liberal models of communitarianism.
Particular disciplinary avenues are relevant with respect to both the approach and
topic herein. In terms of the philosophical basis of communication studies, although
constructivism, subjectivism, and inter-subjectivism are quite influential for both
theoretical and applied study, significant scholarship within the discipline is extant
regarding realism.32 Parameters of inquiry established within this scholarly work have
philosophical and practical significance for that which is knowable and communicable
with respect to reality. With some theoretical clarifications along the way, I utilize some
of these parameters within this project. Out of the earlier research in rhetoric and
epistemology that was initiated by Robert Scott (Scott’s work has tended toward the more
constructivist side of the equation), a line of study known as “rhetorical perspectivism”
has been developed by scholars as a realist approach for that area of inquiry.33 Richard A.
Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, two of the main leaders of the “rhetorical perspectivism”
approach, have defined rhetoric as “the art of describing reality through language”
(Communication 62), which leads the “rhetorician […] to investigate both the pragmatic
aspects and the philosophical implications of discourse purporting to describe reality”
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(64). Hence, the “critic would examine the techniques and strategies employed by
speakers or writers in their descriptions of reality” while the “theorist would explore
psychological, ethical, epistemological, ontological, and other implications or
characterizations of reality” (64). Within this dissertation, I both apply and modify
aspects of “rhetorical perspectivism.” Cherwitz and Hikins have also stated:
[…] To rhetorical critics we would issue a challenge. A focus of
rhetorical criticism ought increasingly to be on the ability of rhetors to
describe reality faithfully through language. We suggest increased
attention to what we might term epistemological criticism, criticism that
evaluates discourse, not by some set of internal standards, but as occurring
within the context of an independent reality apart from discourse. This is
not to say that other modes of criticism should be abandoned, or discredit
them in any way. The more traditional modes of criticism can assist an
epistemological critic in his or her evaluation of human discourse. (171)
From the view of classical realism, this project seeks to take up their challenge in
response to scholars of rhetorical epistemology in general (including those of the realist
point of view) who have prompted the blending of epistemological questions with both
rhetorical theory and rhetorical criticism.34
Theoretically, the aim of this project is to build from and onto the overall
disciplinary conversations regarding philosophical realism and communication studies.
In the literature, there are a variety of points of view regarding the theoretical basis of
rhetoric, such as rhetorical aesthetics, communicative praxis, narrative theory, discursive
intersubjectivity, and social constructivism—as the “rhetorical perspectivists” have
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emphasized, many elements of these viewpoints tend toward postmodernist philosophy.35
The work within the field, in general, has demonstrated the overlap between rhetorical
theory and rhetorical criticism, with this overlap extending into the theoretical and
political significance of the speeches and texts examined by rhetorical critics.36 One
example of this overlapping of theory and criticism is the differences of standpoint and
approach between those who have continued the ongoing work of rhetorical criticism and
those who have advocated a disciplinary shift toward “critical rhetoric.”37 Scholars within
the camp of rhetorical criticism have tended toward a framework encompassing the
relevance of stylistic parameters, a focus on particular discourses, and the viability of
modern suppositions, while the critical rhetoricians, led by Raymie E. McKerrow, have
advocated a framework that entails the implementation of postmodern suppositions, a
focus upon multiple discourses, and the criticism of political structures.38 As
demonstrated by the “rhetorical perspectivists,” a realist consideration of the “critical
rhetoric” framework provides an additional philosophical layer of inquiry to the dynamic
of formalism and fragmentation that is often a part of this disciplinary conversation, yet
Kirk’s work as a focus of study points to some of the key items of discussion between
these differing approaches as related to the possibilities for a realist rhetoric of order.39
The theoretical stance taken within in this project corresponds more to the
framework of rhetorical criticism, generally understood. Chapters herein will contain
further clarifications on this matter as pertinent to issues of rhetorical criticism and
“critical rhetoric.” In light of building a case for a realist rhetoric of order, the project’s
methodology encompasses a consideration of the sources, forms, and contexts of
persuasive argumentation in general with respect to the aforementioned elements of
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Kirk’s corpus in particular. For theoretical coordinates, various authors are conducive to
this project—among them, Aristotle. With respect to the significance of realist
philosophy for rhetorical studies, Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins have worked to
correct the disciplinary record regarding the category of probable truth in Aristotle’s
rhetorical theory—Aristotle was a realist.40 They have articulated a compelling case for a
consideration of Aristotelian rhetorical theory that entails the following (Cherwitz and
Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms” 236-237, 239-240; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic” 372-373;
Hikins, “Realism and” 21-52, 21n1; Hikins, “Through the” 169): 1) in terms of reality,
the factual and circumstantial elements surrounding human communication provide the
basis for the connection between occasions of persuasion and degrees of certainty; 2)
questions involving contingency and probability are not detached from factual reality.
Aristotle’s overall corpus is conducive to a realist approach to both rhetorical theory and
rhetorical criticism.41
Martin J. Medhurst has argued that a focus upon “the philosophical grounds of
argument with its concomitant commitments to and reliance upon a detailed
epistemology, axiology, and metaphysics” would supply a more theoretically precise
means of understanding the rhetoric of conservatism (“Resistance, Conservatism” 112).
In terms of direction, Medhurst has suggested that scholars (by means of deeper study of
conservative perspectives), in regards to accuracy, might better evaluate the use of the
term “conservative” by academicians and by speakers (107, 112, 114n19). Medhurst has
referred to and (to some extent) relied upon the work of Russell Kirk (104-106, 113n9,
113-114n12, 114n16) with his challenges to some in the discipline (primarily regarding
conservative resistance rhetoric). In the field of communication, beyond this sort of
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movement criticism under discussion by Medhurst, scholars of multiple biases have
contended with various philosophical and political points of view with respect to the
argumentation of conservatives.42 Because of Russell Kirk’s emphasis on principles, a
substantive look at his work is a contribution to ongoing efforts toward understanding
and classifying conservative communication, for as Kirk was a pioneer and leader of 20th
century conservatism, an extensive treatment of his work can be informative to this larger
conversation.
Russell Kirk did not consider himself a metaphysician by profession or by
disposition, although he did embrace philosophy as a basis for the study of history and
the criticism of society. Kirk’s metaphysical and epistemological viewpoints, as weighed
against religious, moral, legal, political, and social issues, are important aspects of
scholarly examination regarding his work (McDonald, Russell Kirk 55-85; Russello,
“The Jurisprudence”; Russello, The Postmodern; Zoll, “The Social”). A general look at
Russell Kirk’s body of work reveals that he was, in a general sense, a realist of some sort,
for his approach to reality and humanity provided a basis of a conservative perspective
(Federici, “Russell Kirk”; Kirk, Enemies; Kirk, The Politics; McCarthy, “The Pomo
Mind”; Quinn; Zoll, “The Social”). At an overall level, I hope that my rhetorical study of
Kirk’s work from the view of classical realism (beyond the disciplinary implications of
my approach as explained above) will provide some additional insights regarding
conservatism and communication. At another level, the work of Russell Kirk, as a focus
of examination, can enhance disciplinary conversations regarding theory, criticism, and
pedagogy, for Kirk’s overall body of work contains significant and widely-recognized
argumentation about reality, education, society, and communication (Kirk, Decadence;
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Kirk, Enemies; Kirk, The Politics; Whitney, “Seven Things”). The important discussions
in his corpus regarding political, social, and educational matters provide a challenge to
the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment liberalisms that are presently influential
within the field of communication regarding human discourse, democratic governance,
pedagogical practice, and free speech.43 Finally, as Kirk was to some degree both a social
and literary critic, his work within these realms provides some direction regarding the
modes and aims of criticism generally understood.44
In terms of argumentation, John Bliese has suggested that conservatives consider
another point of direction from within the work of Richard Weaver—figurative and
poetic discourse (“Richard M. Weaver and the Rhetoric” 318-321, 323-324). The proper
end and exercise of human imagination, both in theory and in practice, was a significant
area of interest within Russell’s Kirk thought and work (Guroian, Rallying 3-79; Kirk,
Enemies; Whitney, “The Swords”). Ruth Lessl Shively has argued that the “mythic
sensibility” that is manifested among peoples within cultures provides a degree of
evidence for the realist point of view as these elements of human communication portray
objective truth across history.45 She has explained, “This mythic sensibility can be seen
as essentially the imaginative side of realist philosophy: the manner in which the abstract
idea of unconditioned truth in conditioned experience is given concrete significance and
imagery in human life” (111-112). Shively has also written, “Conversely, it would seem
that philosophies that conceive of the self in strictly historical and particular terms cannot
do justice to common moral self-understandings, for in reducing the self to its
conditioned aspects, they present a self that, from most perspectives, is unrecognizable
and uninspiring” (112). Various realists (classical and otherwise) have demonstrated that
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the reality of humanity and of things, in view of both actuality and potentiality, is
pertinent to considerations of the imaginative, poetic, and aesthetic elements of discourse
with respect to subjectivity and objectivity (I. Chapman; Gilby; Hikins, “Nietzsche,
Eristic”; Hikins, “The Seductive”; Montgomery, “Imagination and”; Ramos; Shively
111-112; E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 199, 204-206)—as Hikins has emphasized, “any
artistic performance requires a context of reality” (“Nietzsche, Eristic” 364).
Ewa Thompson has suggested that conservative scholars apply premodern
philosophical suppositions regarding language and epistemology to the topical concerns
of postmodernists who operate within the humanities (“Ways Out”). As has been
indicated within the relevant literature, the discourse of Russell Kirk is a contribution to
this sort of endeavor, particularly in such areas as education, literature, history, and
culture.46 The work of both Gerald Russello (The Postmodern; “Russell Kirk and
Territorial”; “Russell Kirk and the”; “Time and”) and Gleaves Whitney (“Recovering
Rhetoric”; “Seven Things”; “The Swords”), for instance, reveals that the focus on
imagination within Kirk’s corpus, in conjunction with his substantive considerations of
humanity, truth, history, language, locality, and modernity, is indicative of both affinities
with and challenges to postmodernism. As Russello has highlighted, there are scholars
who have worked to frame, as an admixture of confronting modern dilemmas and
cultivating premodern assumptions, the possibilities for a conservative approach to
postmodernism.47 As he has identified aspects of Kirk’s work that are similar to
postmodern inquiry, Russello has emphasized Kirk’s significance for this possible area of
convergence.48
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However, Russello and other scholars who have considered these possibility of a
postmodern conservatism have recognized difficulties with and expressed differences
from the more prevalent approaches to postmodernism (Byrne; Henrie, “The Road”;
Lawler, “Conservative Postmodernism”; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly; McWilliams;
Russello, The Postmodern 177-213). The question of conservatism and postmodernism
is of particular interest to this project, for this entails matters regarding the influence of
modernity on one hand, and the communicability of truth on the other. The work of
“critical rhetoric,” as well as the suppositions of many communication theorists, is from
the vantage point of postmodernism. In terms of the stated problem of this dissertation
project, there is a junction of analysis between the possibility of common concerns and
the pertinence of philosophical suppositions. Subjectivism, intersubjectivism, or
constructivism, as philosophical models of inquiry into human life (which includes the
theory and practice of communication), are inadequate with respect to significant
elements of moral, social, and economic argumentation, such as the constancy of human
nature and the aims of ordered freedom.49
Russell Kirk communicated often regarding order and disorder; this is relevant to
the problems of interest listed above.50 Kirk has explained:
Those of us who aspire to conserve our inherited order and justice and
freedom, our patrimony of wisdom and beauty and lovingkindness, have a
hard row to hoe nowadays—that I confess. Many voices have declared
that life is not worth living. A multitude of writers and publicists and
members of the class of persons commonly styled “intellectuals” gloomily
inform us that we human beings are no better than naked apes, and that
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consciousness itself is an illusion. Such persons insist that life has no
purpose but sensual gratification; that the brief span of one’s physical
existence is the be-all and end-all. Such twentieth-century sophists have
created in the murky caves of the intellect an Underworld; and they
endeavor to convince us all that there exists no sun—that the world of
wonder and of hope exists nowhere, and never did exist. Plato knew just
such sophists in his day. (The Politics 289-290)
Russell Kirk’s argumentation on order was a significant part of the discourse among 20th
century American conservatives with respect to the influence of modernity and the
parameters of conservatism (Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s”; Kirk, Prospects 203-223; W.
McDonald, Russell Kirk 115-138; Woods). He articulated in a distinct way his opinions
concerning the limitations of modern suppositions for conservatives (Kirk, Beyond; Kirk,
The Intelligent; Kirk, The Politics; Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s”; Russello, The Postmodern).
Russell Kirk, in his examination of contentious areas of study such as human progress
and linguistic truth, highlighted the important question of order for individuals and
communities (Kirk, Eliot; Kirk, Enemies; Kirk, The Politics; Lockerd; Niemeyer,
“Knight of”; Whitney, “The Swords”).
With “rhetorical perspectivism” as a theoretical springboard, Chapter One of this
project pertains to philosophical realism and rhetorical studies. From the view there
established, the focus of Chapter Two is Russell Kirk on the human imagination, while
Chapter Three contains a theoretical rhetorical analysis of The Roots of American Order
as regards the essential constancy of human nature. The concluding section of the project
will entail a consideration of some theoretical, practical, and pedagogical implications for
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Kirk on order, inclusive of the question of the natural law as a framework for rhetorical
ethics. Because of the thematic importance of order and the humane generality of
rhetoric, the goal of this project is to be a scholarly contribution to the field of rhetorical
studies with implications for various academic disciplines, given the broad scope of
Kirk’s endeavors. Along the way, for the argumentation of conservatives in the twentyfirst century, I hope to highlight some prospects for persuasion.51
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Notes
1

Please see the following: Boyd; Canavan; East 17-37; Edwards, The

Conservative 3, 76, 81, 117, 240-241, 278, 293; Ericson, “Conservatism”; Frohnen, “Has
Conservatism”; Frohnen, “Russell Kirk on”; Guroian, “The Conservative”; Hart; Henrie,
“Russell Kirk and the”; Henrie, “Understanding” 3-9; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; W.
McDonald, “Russell Kirk”; Nash, “The Conservative”; Niemeyer, “Knight of”;
Niemeyer, “Russell Kirk”; Panichas, “Russell Kirk”; Person, Russell Kirk; Respinti;
Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics”; Russello, “Time and”; Whitney, “Seven
Things”; C. Wilson. Russell Kirk died in 1994 (Person, Russell Kirk 17-19, 215).
Aspects of this dissertation have influenced or have been influenced by my work for the
following conference presentations: “Conservatism in the NCA: The Uncommon
Ground”; “Imagination, History, and Reality: Struggling Before and Beyond Language in
an Age of Technology.” “For Rhetoric: One Realist Study of ‘Performance’ as a Term”;
“Metaphysics and Epistemology for Rhetorical Theory: The Question of Primacy”;
“Mortimer Adler and Communication Ethics: Negotiating Difference through
Similarity”; “Richard M. Weaver and Russell Kirk: The Question of Definition”;
“Richard M. Weaver: The Question of Abraham Lincoln.” This is also the case for my
preface to the book The Philosophical Mathematics of Isaac Barrow (1630-1677):
Conserving the Ancient Greek Geometry of the Euclidian School by Gregory Gillette as
well as my guest lecture, “Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Rhetorical Ethics: The
Question of Natural Law,” at Hillsdale College. Finally, aspects of this dissertation have
influenced or have been influenced by the two presentations that were required of me as a
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Residential Wilbur Fellow at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal in Mecosta,
MI from September 2005 to May 2006.
2

Please see the following: Beer, “Science”; Frohnen, “Russell Kirk on” 64-67;

Kirk, The Politics 1-29; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Respinti; Niemeyer, “Russell Kirk.”
As W. Wesley McDonald has explained, Kirk’s use of the term “ideology” was
controversial, for those of different philosophical and disciplinary points of view
(including conservatives) have utilized the term in a general way so as to refer to
standpoints of some sort (Russell Kirk 34-38, 35-36n33). With Roy C. Macridis’s
Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes (Macridis 1; W. McDonald,
Russell Kirk 35-36n33) in mind, McDonald wrote, “Ideology is any set of beliefs. As the
author of one popular undergraduate college textbook put it—whether they know it or
not, everyone has an ideology. Insofar as people believe in something, value something,
have ideas about things, they possess an ideology” (35). McDonald then argued that to
define “ideology” in this way “is so conceptually vague, so broad” where classifying
modes of thinking is not possible, while “genuine political philosophy” then could not be
distinguished from ideology (35). Implicitly, this also points to “a position of moral
relativism,” as “the proponent is assuming that all moral judgments, and hence all
prescriptive political statements, are equally based upon subjective judgments, or, to put
it another way, all are rationalizations of economic or political interests” (35). Kirk’s
approach, according to McDonald, was to embrace “the existence of an objective
universal moral order” as against “its ideological adversaries of both the Left and the
Right” (35-36). In reference to Kenneth Minougue’s book, The Liberal Mind (W.
McDonald, Russell Kirk 36n34; Minogue 15-16), McDonald further argued, “The
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problem with the term ‘ideology” […] is that it is not only vague but also often used as a
tactic to dunk ‘false’ beliefs. Those who ‘conclude that all thinking is
ideological…destroy the usefulness of the concept.” (W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 36n34;
Minogue 15-16).
3

Please see the following: Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver, Russell Kirk”; Cribb,

“Why”; Edwards, The Conservative; Edwards, Educating for; Frohnen, “Has
Conservatism”; Henrie, “Understanding”; Kirk, The Conservative 8-11, 457-501; Kirk,
The Politics; Kirk, Prospects 36-39, 203-223; Kirk, The Roots; Kuypers, Hitchner, Irwin,
and Wilson; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Nash, “The Conservative”; Russello, The
Postmodern; Russello, “Russell Kirk and Territorial”; Woods. Although similarities
between Kirk’s traditionalism and the views of those known as “paleoconservatives” are
observable, such as on foreign policy, it is important to consider points of difference on
such matters as the theoretical basis of conservatism the practical direction of cultural
reform (Russello, The Postmodern 1-27; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 201-219).
4

Please see the following: Bradford, “A Proper”; Cribb, “Why”; Frohnen,

“Russell Kirk on” 64-67; Henrie, “Opposing”; Henrie, “Understanding”; Kirk, The
Conservative 8-11, 457-501; Kirk, Enemies; Kirk, The Politics 1-29; Kirk, Prospects 3639, 203-223; Kirk, Redeeming; Kirk, The Roots 9; Kirk, The Sword; W. McDonald,
Russell Kirk 115-138; Person, Russell Kirk 68-72; Respinti. An ongoing conversation on
personal and communal order is arguably the most prominent element of Kirk’s corpus.
5

Cribb, “Why” 57. W. Wesley McDonald explained:
A central theme in Kirk’s work was to differentiate conceptually between
conservatism and ideology. Conservatism is not an ideology, he strongly
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repeated and maintained. In fact, conservatism, by its very nature,
constitutes an anti-ideology. In support of this argument, he frequently
cited H. Stuart Hughes’s famous description of conservatism as “the
negation of ideology.” […] (Russell Kirk 34-35)
McDonald pointed the reader (35-36n33) to Kirk’s Enemies of the Permanent Things
(154) and Confessions of a Bohemian Tory (284) for examples of Kirk’s references to
Hughes for this description of conservatism.
6

Please see the following regarding Richard Weaver’s ongoing status for

rhetorical studies: Beale, “Richard M. Weaver” 626-628; Bliese, “The Conservative
Rhetoric” 401-403; Bliese, “Richard Weaver: Rhetoric” 208; S. Crowley; Dimock,
“Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Duffy and
Jacobi 1-18, 93-123, 197-203; Payne, Ratchford, and Wooley; Rahoi 97-98; T. Smith.
There is some variance as to what particular elements of Weaver’s work might be more
or less significant for rhetorical studies, yet regardless, it is clear that his work has
ongoing significance for the contemporary study of rhetoric. With respect to Kirk and
Weaver’s friendship, please see the following: Kirk, Confessions 193-196; Kirk,
Foreword; Kirk, The Politics 74-76; Kirk, The Sword 172-175. As the literature
regarding Weaver’s work indicates, one can more or less categorize Weaver as a
“traditional conservative” depending upon the coordinates used in terms of philosophy,
politics, culture, and custom (Bailey; Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver, Russell Kirk”; De
Maio; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part
Two]”; Henrie, “Understanding” 3-4; Woods). It should be noted that Richard Weaver
expressed, both explicitly and implicitly, certain commonalities with libertarian thought
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and classical liberalism on philosophical and political matters (Bailey; Weaver,
“Conservatism and Libertarianism”; Weaver, “Relativism and” 132-133). Within the
history of 20th century conservatism, Kirk somewhat clearly differentiated his standpoint
from those of the libertarian and classical liberal persuasions, although there were
common points of agreement on policy (Cribb, “Why” 55-57; Kirk, The Politics 156-171;
Nash, The Conservative).
7

Please see the following: Alderfer; Bradford, “A Proper”; Henrie, “Russell

Kirk’s”; Hittinger, “The Unwritten”; Hoffert; Kirk, The Roots 3-10; Lalley; F.
McDonald, Foreword; F. McDonald, “Russell Kirk”; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 116132; Person, Russell Kirk 68-70; Regnery, “Russell Kirk: An Appraisal” 26-27; Respinti
73. In this dissertation project, unless otherwise noted, I am referencing the original 1974
edition of The Roots of American Order. Two notions were influential here in my
formulation of this explanation. Firstly, Mortimer Adler has argued that “philosophy is
everybody’s business” (The Four vii-xxvii). Secondly, Richard Weaver has stated that
“language, which is thus predicative, is for the same cause sermonic” (“Language is”
224).
8

Please see the following as regards classical realism: Adler, “The Bodyguards”;

Adler, The Four; Adler, Intellect; Adler, Ten; Brennan; Centore, Being; Chesterton 45167; Fackenheim; Gilson, Thomist Realism; Gorman; Grabowsky and Fritz; R.
McInerny, Aquinas and; McInerny, Characters; McInerny, Ethica Thomistica; McInerny,
Thomism in; Montgomery, “Consequences”; O’Callaghan; Shively; E. Thompson,
“Ways Out”; Wellmuth; Wilhelmsen, “Faith and”; Wilhelmsen, “Modern Man’s.”
Obviously, with respect to the application of and reliance upon the work of both Aristotle
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and Aquinas, there are variances among these and other authors within this philosophical
tradition, such as the immateriality of sense cognition (Adler, “Sense”; Casey), the merits
of the great books approach to education (Wilhelmsen, “The Great”), the merits of
modern political thought (Adler, Haves Without; Adler, We Hold; Maritain, On The;
Maritain, Scholasticism), and the question of world government (Adler, Haves Without;
Hochschild, “Globalization”; Hutchins). As representative of the suppositions and
approach of classical realism, please see the following from St. Thomas Aquinas: On
Being and Essence, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God, Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book Two: Creation, and Truth, Volume 1: Questions I-IX. I must also mention as
helpful here Dr. Matthew A. Kent’s presentations regarding such topics as classical
realism as “common sense” realism, the immateriality of the human soul, and human
cognition with respect to ideas during our time as Residential Wilbur Fellows at the
Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal.
9

Adler, The Four 17-20, 106-123, 247-248. A general reading of the following

work within the field of communication indicates the primacy of epistemology in regard
to metaphysical and ontological questions: Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond
Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, “Burying the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, Communication; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, “John Stuart Mill’s”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism”; Cherwitz
and Hikins, “Toward a”; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Ellis; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic”;
Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The Rhetoric”; Hikins, “The Seductive”; Hikins,
“Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”; Pavitt, “Answering
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Questions”; Pavitt, “The Third”; Sharkey and Hikins. Discussion on “rhetorical
perspectivism” regarding epistemology and metaphysics will appear in Chapter One.
One can find some coverage of Thomas Reid’s “common sense” realism (along with
others of this Scottish movement) in the literature of communication and rhetorical
studies (Berlin; Kelley), which varies in certain ways from the “common sense” approach
of classical realism (R. McInerny, Characters 52-55, 72, 75). In his articulation of
Aristotle’s realism regarding rhetorical studies (Hikins, “Realism and” 45n12), James W.
Hikins pointed to the scholarship of Fr. William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J. (Grimaldi, Aristotle,
Rhetoric I), whose work supported a realist interpretation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle.
For examples of Fr. Grimaldi’s work, please see the following: “Aristotle Rhetoric”; “A
Note”; “Rhetoric and the Philosophy”; “Rhetoric and Truth”; “Semeion, Tekmerion.”
10

This attenuation of truth is an evident aspect of Weaver’s endeavors within the

relevant primary or secondary literature (Beale, “Richard M. Weaver”; T. Clark, “The
Ideological”; S. Crowley; Cushman and Hauser; Duffy and Jacobi; Einhorn; Haskell and
Hauser; Jacobi, “Using” 280; Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks; Sproule, “Using
Public Rhetoric”; Weaver, The Ethics; Weaver, “Language is”; Weaver, Visions;
Weaver, “To Write”). Although this has often (though not always) been a point of
disagreement with his work among scholars, particularly in the field of communication, I
am standing by this aspect of his work as a contribution to 20th century rhetorical studies.
11

Kirk, The Sword 172-175. Please see the following for discussions (from

various standpoints) of the impact of Platonism on the work of Richard Weaver: Beale,
“Richard M. Weaver”; 631-635; Bostdorff 15-16, 26n8; K. Chase 255-256; Duffy and
Jacobi; Follette; Haskell and Hauser; Johannesen, “Conflicting Philosophies”;
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Johannesen, “A Reconsideration”; Johannesen, “Richard M. Weaver on”; Johannesen,
“Richard Weaver’s View”; Johannesen, “Some Pedagogical” 272-273, 276-278;
Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks; Kendall; Montgomery, “Consequences.”
12

Montgomery, “Consequences” 177-178. Montgomery quotes from St. Thomas

as follows: “The purpose of the study of philosophy is not to learn what others have
thought, but to learn how the truth of things stands” (177). He then explained, “Thomas
explores this concern in Question 166 (‘Of Seriousness’) and 167 (‘Of Curiosity’) in the
Summa Theologica, II-II. It is, however, a prudential principle underlying all his work,
as his careful analysis of ‘what others have thought’ reveals” (Montgomery,
“Consequences” 249n15). Please see the following: Centore, Being 173-205; R.
McInerney, Aquinas and; R. McInerney, Characters; O’Callaghan; Shively 46-85. As
three of the major sources of argumentation discussed across Weaver’s work (The Ethics
55-114; “Language is”; “Responsible”), I here mention definition, analogy, and
circumstance. He also discussed arguments from cause and effect (or the argument from
consequence).
13

Discussions of metaphysical and epistemological matters with respect to

political, social, and moral questions are considerable ingredients of 20th (and now 21st)
century conservative thought and discourse (Beer, “Science”; Byrne; Federici,
“Logophobia”; Gottfried, The Conservative; Hochschild, “The Re-Imagined”; Hoeveler;
Lawler, “Conservative Postmodernism”; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly; Lewis; D.
Livingston; McMahon; Mitchell, “The False”; Mitchell, “The Homeless”; Ryn; Caitlin
Smith). Hoeveler featured Weaver as representative of “a metaphysical conservatism that
has resisted the triumph of Nominalism over Realism in Western philosophy,” which
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“stands averse to subsequent expressions of empiricism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism
that it believes follow from the demise of a transcendent realm of being as a cognitive
reality in human understanding […]” (306). For this, Hoeveler noted (315n1):
The consequences for Weaver were not merely intellectual ones. He
derived from the defeat of Realism the decline of authority, the erosion of
a structured social hierarchy, and the genesis of an overweening
confidence in human reason in its quest to perfect the world—the birth, in
short, of the modern revolutionary temperament. See Ronald Lora,
Conservative Minds in America (Chicago, 1971), 180-81.
I am not saying that realism automatically leads to political conservatism, but I am
arguing that realism is a necessary basis for a genuine conservatism. For example,
Mortimer Adler, who went to great lengths to explain and defend philosophical realism,
embraced various viewpoints and policies that are clearly more liberal or modern in
scope with respect to political questions, although he did not embrace all aspects of
modern political philosophy (Haves Without; Ten 156-177; We Hold). Also, although
Shively provides a helpful study and defense of realism, some of her political
applications with respect to democracy are, in my estimation, debatable in scope.
14

Please see the following for analytical discussions (in support of or in

opposition to) regarding these types of theoretical biases (some of these appear in the
literature of “rhetorical perspectivism,” which is discussed further along in this section):
Bineham; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin,
“Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”;
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Croasmun and Cherwitz; Ellis; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The Seductive”; Hikins,
“Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”; B. McGee; Schiappa, Gross,
McKerrow, and Scott; Sharkey and Hikins 51; Waddell. Please see the following that
more or less portray these biases (again, some of these are discussed in the literature of
“rhetorical perspectivism”): Bineham; Brummett, “On to”; Brummett, “Some
Implications”; Cyphert; B. McGee; McGee and Martin; McKerrow, “Space and”; Scott,
“On Viewing”; Scott, “On Viewing […] Ten Years”; Schiappa; Schiappa, Gross,
McKerrow, and Scott; Craig Smith; Vatz, “The Myth”; Waddell; Zhao. The authors in
the field of communication who have challenged these biases have not necessarily written
from the theoretical vantage point of classical realism, yet their various works are
significant with respect to the pertinence of reality for human communication.
15

Please see the following: Centore, Being; Dunn and Woodard 145-182; Shively

3-85; E. Thompson, “Ways Out.” In regard to challenges to constructivism from the view
of classical realism (54-58), Shively has noted (58):
Actually, it is difficult to say just how the constructionists would respond
to these realist arguments, for they rarely address themselves to the
Aristotelian-Thomistic critique. They tend either to focus on more
internal debates—for example, between liberals and communitarians,
moderns and postmoderns, and so on—or to argue against only longoutworn Enlightenment forms of realism. (152n24)
Apart from Shively’s discussion, one example of something like this might be Steven
Ward’s, “The Revenge of the Humanities: Reality, Rhetoric, and the Politics of
Postmodernism,” where the classical realist view in not even really considered for the
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contest between scientific realism and postmodern relativism in terms of the relationship
between the humanities and the sciences. Relevant here too, within Shively’s comparison
of realism to various philosophical approaches with respect to moral questions (46-82),
Shively has also noted (59):
Of course, some empiricists would say that we cannot make moral claims
at all, or that there is no relationship between empirical truth and moral
conclusions. For example, emotivists generally assume that moral
utterances are merely expressions of subjective feeling or interest, and
logical positivists tend to assume that moral utterances are simply
meaningless or represent confusions of speech. (152n25)
16

Please see the following: Brinkley, “The Problem”; Brinkley, “Response to”;

Kalthoff, “To Tell”; Medhurst, “Resistance, Conservatism”; Nilsen; Ribuffo; Sillars,
“The New Conservatism”; Sillars, “A Reply”; Yohn. The biases against conservatism are
arguably demonstrable. Yet from the left (Henderson) and from the right (Gottfried, The
Conservative 51-77), one can certainly look at some of the dimensions of this matter
(regardless of political points of view) in terms of institutional influences, available
resources, and the quality of scholarship in conjunction with the continuous debates on
ideas and policies that are a part of the life of the modern academy. In the mid-eighties,
Martin J. Medhurst well argued that movement studies of resistance rhetoric within the
field of communication often reflected a lack of knowledge and precision regarding the
philosophical and contextual elements of conservatism (“Resistance, Conservatism”). As
I emphasize the pertinence of realism and metaphysics for genuine conservatism, it
should be noted that some approaches within 20th century movement conservatism are
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explicitly informed by modern philosophical suppositions, such as political or economic
libertarianism and Classical or Enlightenment Liberalism (Berkowitz, Varieties of; Nash,
The Conservative). Inclusive of the implications of these approaches, the influence of
modern thought was significant for Russell Kirk for matters that were internal within and
external to movement conservatism (The Politics).
17

Specifically, in terms of the field of communication, as an example, please see

H. Dan O’Hair’s discussions of voice, community, and responsibility within his
presidential address from the 2006 National Communication Association national
convention. Apart from any epistemological approach specifically, recent disciplinary
conversations regarding liberal biases are relevant. See Richard Vatz’s “Voices from the
Margins: The Conservative Perspective” from Spectra of February of 2009. Related
issues were under discussion on the panel, Whither Ideological Diversity in the NCA, at
the 95th annual convention of the National Communication Association, Chicago, Illinois
on November 12th, 2009. See Chapter Three herein regarding Vatz’s work on “rhetorical
situation,” political standpoints, and social constructivism.
18

Please see the following: Brinkley, “The Problem”; Brinkley, “Response to”;

Ribuffo; Yohn. In reference to this specific discussion from a 1994 issue of The
American Historical Review, William A. Rusher highlighted Brinkley’s argument
regarding the pertinence of carving out a place for the initiatives and ideas of
conservatism (broadly understood) within American historical scholarship (17). Rusher
stated that “this country owes a huge debt of gratitude to Russell Kirk” with respect to
Brinkley’s point for scholars of history that “‘progressive modernism […] may not in fact
be as firmly entrenched as they thought’” (17). The direction of “imagination” for
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scholarly history plays some role within this particular discussion (Brinkley, “The
Problem” 429; Yohn). In terms of a richer understanding of conservative thought,
Brinkley’s advisement to study the various aspects of conservative history (“The
Problem”; “Response to”) parallels that of Medhurst for rhetorical studies of conservative
resistance. In this same discussion, Ribuffo argued that conservatism has received
significant treatment, even amid the complexities and shifts within recent political
history, yet he did conclude that “historians of the United States should seriously consider
both conservative questions and conservative answers to liberal or radical questions”
(449). Perhaps because of Kirk’s historical and philosophical approach to political
questions, his work is conducive to Yohn’s call to examine the social and rhetorical
factors that have been operative within the categorizations of “liberal” and
“conservative,” or “right” and “left” (Ribuffo’s arguments point toward this type of
application). Although his cultural and philosophical parameters might be more
traditionally Western than that of these scholars, because of an emphasis on principles
within a framework of considerable depth, Kirk’s approach fits these types of
conversations in view of such matters as (to borrow a phrase from Ribuffo) “the rhetoric
of national solidarity” (449n22). Gerald Russello’s writings on Kirk and postmodernism
(see Chapters Two and Three herein) certainly put Kirk’s corpus front and center for
these sorts of considerations. Also, one can here look to Ted V. McAllister’s review
essay, “Of Ideas and Politics: The Rich Promise of History De-Centered.” Basically, he
argued there for an empirical approach to conservative history that accounts for
economic, political, social factors to replace the typically “idea-driven” histories of those
like Kirk and Weaver (both of whom he is clearly appreciative of and influenced by)—a
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de-centering of ideas away from “larger narratives.” The case is helpful in terms of
broadening the purview of conservative historiography, yet in light of what will follow in
this project, I would take some caution with the terminology of de-centering (of course,
arguably, other factors in reality besides “ideas” can be at the center of this or that text or
speech—McAllister’s case does not necessarily goes against my realist discussions to
follow). For a discussion of conservative history with regard to institutions, please see
McAllister’s review essay, “Re-Visioning Conservative History.” There is one additional
point to mention here that I will not cover in this project. In light of some of the
philosophical, rhetorical, and political positions favored in this project, discussions of
conservatism as marginalized and/or diverse or accounting for the marginalized and/or
diversity (Henrie, “Rethinking”; Molnar, “Still Pondering”; Potemra; Russello, The
Postmodern) would need to be treated with reflective caution, each in their own ethical
and cultural sphere.
19

Please see the following: Arnett 48-50, 54-55; Bormann; T. Clark, “The

Ideological”; S. Crowley; Duffy and Jacobi; Einhorn; S. Foss, “Abandonment” 369-371;
B. McGee. Within these sources, challenges to Weaver’s work are either philosophical
or political, or both. Brian R. McGee’s critique of Richard Weaver’s emphasis on the
ethicality of essential definitions is in part a defense of the prominence of constructivism,
inclusive of the concept of definition, within the field of communication and rhetorical
studies. In what is likely the most scathing critique of Weaver’s work in the literature,
Sharon Crowley has challenged his canonical status for the contemporary study of
rhetoric as regards various political, social, rhetorical, and philosophical matters.
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20

Please see the following: Craycraft; Dunn and Woodard; Federici,

“Logophobia”; Guroian, Rallying; Hayward; Henrie, “Opposing”; Kirk, The Sword;
Kraynak; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly; D. Livingston; Montgomery, “Consequences”;
Montgomery, “Remembering Who”; Russello, The Postmodern; E. Thompson,
“Postmodernism”; E. Thompson, “Ways Out.”
21

Please see the following: Federici, “Logophobia”; Guroian, Rallying; Henrie,

“Opposing”; Kirk, The Sword; Kraynak; D. Livingston; Nash, “The Conservative”;
Whitney, “Decadence.”
22

Please see the following: P. Berkowitz, Varieties of; Carey, “The Future”;

Chapel; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part
Two]”; Derbyshire; Dunn and Woodard; Eatwell and O’Sullivan; Francis; Frohnen, “Has
Conservatism”; Genovese; Gottfried, The Conservative; Henrie, “Opposing”; Kendall
and Carey; Kraynak; Kuypers, Hitchner, Irwin, and Wilson; McCarthy, “What Would”;
W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Packer; Rowland and Jones; Russello, “How the”; Russello,
The Postmodern; Woods; Zagacki.
23

Please see the following: Ancil; Carey, “The Future”; Chapel; Derbyshire;

Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”;
Dunn and Woodard; Federici, “Russell Kirk”; Francis; Kraynak; Kuypers, Hitchner,
Irwin, and Wilson; D. Livingston; Nash, “The Conservative”; Packer; Russello, The
Postmodern; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”; Woods.
24

Please see the following: Ancil; Bottum; Frohnen, “Has Conservatism”;

Kalthoff, “To Tell”; Kraynak; Ritchie; Roshwald. Please see also Modern Age 49.4 of
2007, which is an issue dedicated to Conservative Reflections on Neglected Questions
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and Ignored Problems. Medhurst has recommended an article by Martha Solomon
(“Stopping ERA”) regarding the STOP ERA movement as an example of a more accurate
analysis that accounts for the philosophical positions pertinent to conservatism
(“Resistance, Conservatism” 106-107). Although Solomon does not necessarily embrace
the particular aspects of conservatism under analysis, the content of her article
operatively demonstrates the philosophical importance of “order” and teleology for the
argumentation of conservatives.
25

In her article, “Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse,” Ewa Thompson

utilized and recommended the work of Mortimer Adler, Jacques Maritain, and Alasdair
MacIntyre to capture the postmodern conversation from a “logocentric” point of view.
26

Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s” 56. Overall, in this article, Henrie provided a

comparative study on various points between the historical approaches of Russell Kirk
and Harry Jaffa with respect to the United States of America. The Roots of American
Order plays a role within his discussion.
27

According to Nash:
This brings us to one of the most formidable barriers to the future success
of American conservatism, particularly the variety espoused so eloquently
by Russell Kirk. I refer to what James Q. Wilson has described as the
growth, especially among baby boomers, of “an ethos that values selfexpression over self-control.” But it goes deeper than that: I refer to the
spread of what might be called populist relativism. […]
Now how does one cope with such invincible ignorance, fortified
as it is by vulgar relativism and the powerful societal values embraced in
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the words “freedom of choice”? I suggest that this is a very real problem,
rhetorically and otherwise, for conservatives. People do not like to be told
that their behavior is wrong or regressive. And there are increasing
numbers of people in our society for whom the doctrine of the “inner
check” has neither meaning nor attraction. (“The Conservative” 29)
28

Please see the following to consider Kirk and/or Weaver in light of

contemporary discussions among conservatives: Ancil; Berkowitz, “The Conservative”;
Frohnen, “Has Conservatism”; Guroian, Rallying; Russello, The Postmodern. Apart
from the efforts of Kirk and Weaver specifically, “The Future of Conservatism” by
George W. Carey and “Conservative Critics of Modernity: Can They Turn Back the
Clock?” by Robert P. Kraynak are here relevant for the matter of the direction of
contemporary conservatism. One must be careful to here differentiate between those
aspects of classical liberalism that have taken hold in “mainstream conservatism” (maybe
unreflectively) and those of the “old right” who stand against this mainstream on certain
points from the vantage point of classical liberalism, libertarianism, etc. Of course, while
Kirk’s corpus could be weighed against the former or latter, as Clyde Wilson has shown,
those libertarians and classical liberals of the “old right” do not hesitate to make known
their differences with the points of view that Kirk expressed over the years
(“Explaining”).
29

Please see the following for references to or uses of the work of Russell Kirk

from those of the discipline of communication and rhetorical studies: Bliese, “The
Conservative Rhetoric” 402, 407, 417n7, 420-421n64; Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and
the Rhetoric” 314n1, 323; Bliese, “Richard Weaver’s Axiology” 285, 285n44; Browne
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498; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: The New” 330-332, 331n5, 331n7; Bryant, Rev. of 76; G.
Burns; James Campbell 157, 169n1; Chapel 359; T. Clark, “An Analysis” 401, 401n7; T.
Clark, “The Ideological” 29n28; S. Crowley 69-70; Hoffman 388, 406-407n93; King
133, 133n25; Kuypers, Hitchner, Irwin, and Wilson; Lee 523; Medhurst, “Resistance,
Conservatism” 104-106, 113n9, 113-114n12, 114n16; Nilsen 31-32; Railsback, “The
Contemporary” 416, 423n58; Rowland and Jones 80n38; Sillars, “The New”; Sproule,
“Using Public Rhetoric” 290, 290n2, 297, 297n33, 308, 308n55; Thomas; Wrage 208,
212. From within the discipline, I have somewhat recently discovered a dissertation
entitled “A Rhetoric of Moral Imagination: The Persuasions of Russell Kirk” by Jonathan
Leamon Jones, which was completed in 2009 at Texas A&M University. This
dissertation by Jones is not consulted for my own dissertational project.
30

Their article is “Compassionate Conservatism: The Rhetorical Reconstruction

of Conservative Rhetoric,” which is from the online American Communication Journal.
Similar analysis on certain communicative points regarding conservatism in general is
available from Dunn and Woodard in their discussion of “Rhetorical Conservatism and
Postmodernism” (165-182). Both selections provide helpful considerations regarding
principles for persuasion with respect to conservative argumentation in particular and
political discourse in general.
31

Sillars (“The New Conservatism”) prompted an exchange (Nilsen; Sillars, “A

Reply”) that is in some ways relevant to the larger theoretical and practical conversation
about the basis and role of conservatism (for both academic and everyday life) in a
country that has been influenced by the liberalism of modernity from the beginning in an
ongoing way. Another interesting selection is, “The Plight of the Conservative in Public
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Discussion,” by James McBurney from the Quarterly Journal of Speech (with no specific
reference to Kirk) of 1950, which was originally a presidential address to what was then
the Speech Association of America. At times, though, it seems that the sort of
conservatism that McBurney was looking to rescue was the sort of standard and
economic type that Kirk, Weaver, and others wanted to get beyond in that time.
32

Please see the following: Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”;

Cherwitz and Darwin, “Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, “Burying the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the”; Cherwitz and Hikins,
Communication; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”; Cherwitz and Hikins,
“John Stuart Mill’s”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, “Toward a”; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Ellis; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic”; Hikins,
“Realism and”; Hikins, “The Rhetoric”; Hikins, “The Seductive”; Hikins, “Through the”;
Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”; Pavitt, “Answering Questions”; Pavitt, “The
Third”; Sharkey and Hikins.
33

Regarding “perspective realism,” or “relational realism,” please see the

following: Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin,
“Toward a”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Burying the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Toward a”;
Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The Rhetoric”; Hikins,
“The Seductive”; Hikins, “Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”;
Sharkey and Hikins. For discussions regarding (both supportive and oppositional)
rhetorical epistemology as a general course of study (inclusive of the various
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philosophical standpoints), please see the following: Bineham; Brummett, “A Eulogy”;
Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Burying the”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, “Climbing the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”; Cherwitz and
Hikins, “John Stuart Mill’s”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Rhetorical Perspectivism”: Cherwitz
and Hikins, “Toward a”; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Cunningham; Farrell, “From the
Parthenon”; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic”; Hikins, “Through the”; McKerrow, “Critical
Rhetoric: Theory” 453-455; Railsback, “Beyond Rhetorical”; Schiappa, Gross,
McKerrow, and Scott; Scott, “Epistemic Rhetoric”; Scott, “On Viewing […] Ten Years”;
Sharkey and Hikins; Zhao. Please see the following from Robert L. Scott to get a sense
of his philosophical approach to reality, knowledge, and communication: “Epistemic
Rhetoric”; “On Viewing”; “On Viewing […] Ten Years.”
34

Please see the following: Brummett, “A Eulogy”; Cherwitz and Hikins,

“Burying the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 64, 171; Cyphert; Farrell, “From
the Parthenon”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, Telephone; Hikins, “Through the” 169;
Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy” 223-224; Scott, “Epistemic Rhetoric”;
Sharkey and Hikins 50-51, 64-65, 66n1.
35

The postmodern biases of these approaches to rhetorical theory are indicated

within the literature of “rhetorical perspectivism” (Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond
Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Cherwitz
and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Toward a”; Croasmun and
Cherwitz; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The Seductive”;
Hikins, “Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”), yet these biases are
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evident upon a reading of the following (many of these sources are discussed or cited by
the “rhetorical perspectivists”): Bineham; Brummett, “Some Implications”; Fisher,
“Narration as”; Hariman, “Status, Marginality”; B. McGee; McGuire, “Dancing in”;
McGuire, “The Ethics”; Poulakos; Scott, “On Viewing”; Scott, “On Viewing […] Ten
Years”; Waddell.
36

Please see the following: Brummett, “A Eulogy”; Cherwitz and Hikins,

“Burying the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 64, 171; Cyphert; Farrell, “From
the Parthenon”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, Telephone; Hikins, “Through the” 169;
Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy” 223-224; J. Murphy, “Critical Rhetoric”:
Scott, “Epistemic Rhetoric”; Sharkey and Hikins 50-51, 64-65, 66n1. One might also
argue that the literature regarding “rhetorical situation” is indicative of this overlapping.
See Chapters Two and Three for my engagement with the literature on “rhetorical
situation.”
37

Although I would depart from some of their philosophical assumptions

regarding rhetorical discourse, Dale Cyphert’s “Ideology, Knowledge and Text: Pulling
at the Knot in Ariadne’s Thread” and John M. Murphy’s “Critical Rhetoric as Political
Discourse” provide some helpful insights regarding this theory/criticism overlapping in
terms of rhetorical criticism and “critical rhetoric.”
38

Please see the following: John Angus Campbell, “Between the Fragment”; John

Angus Campbell, “Introduction”; Condit, “Rhetorical Criticism”; Cox, “On
‘Interpreting’”; Gaonkar; Leff and Sachs; M. McGee, “Text, Context”; McKerrow,
“Critical Rhetoric: Theory”; J. Murphy, “Critical Rhetoric”.
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For instance, please see work by Cherwitz and Darwin that pertains to the

“critical rhetoric” movement (“Beyond Reductionism”; “Toward a”; “Why The”). As
regards this dynamic of formalism and fragmentation, it is to some extent my own
consideration, yet it is informed by the philosophical and epistemological points of
emphasis within the literature of “rhetorical perspectivism.”
40

Please see the following: Cherwitz and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms” 236-

237, 239-240; Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic” 372-373; Hikins, “Realism and” 21-52, 21n1;
Hikins, “Through the” 169. One might read Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or following
Cherwitz and Hikins, Aristotle’s Physica, Book II, Section 1, 192b as translated by W.D.
Ross (“Irreducible Dualisms” 236, 241n19). Again, in an articulation of Aristotle’s
realism as pertaining to rhetoric, Hikins points us to the work of Fr. William M.A.
Grimaldi, S.J. (Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I 23; Hikins, “Realism and” 45n12, 75),
whose extensive work supports a realist interpretation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle
(“Aristotle Rhetoric”; “A Note”; “Rhetoric and the Philosophy”; “Rhetoric and Truth”;
“Semeion, Tekmerion”).
41

A review of Fr. Daniel Fogarty’s explanation of Aristotle’s “philosophy of

rhetoric” in his book, Roots for a New Rhetoric, is here helpful (21-27). Although not
advocating classical realism as such for today, Eugene Garver’s book, Aristotle’s
Rhetoric: An Art of Character, and to some extent, Christopher Lyle Johnstone’s essay,
“Aristotle’s Ethical Theory in the Contemporary World: Logos, Phronesis, and the Moral
Life,” both substantiate my interpretive point here with respect to Aristotle’s corpus,
particularly regarding rhetoric, practicality, and ethics, which will be pertinent within this
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project. One might also look to Garver’s “Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Unintentionally Hitting
the Principles of the Sciences.”
42

With respect to Medhurst, in my estimation, his philosophical and

terminological admonitions were certainly insightful for study of conservative resistance
in particular and conservative discourse in general at that time. However, in the big
picture of the discipline of communication and rhetorical studies, besides this sort of
practice and/or discussion of movement criticism, study, and theorizing (Brummett, “The
Skeptical”; Medhurst, “Resistance, Conservatism”; Medhurst, “The First”; Medhurst,
“The Sword”; Warnick, “Conservative Resistance”; Warnick, “The Rhetoric”), one might
also look to the following: Beale, “Richard M. Weaver”; Bliese, “The Conservative”;
Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and the Rhetoric”; Chapel; S. Crowley; Dimock,
“Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]; Duffy and
Jacobi; Enholm and Gustainis; Johannesen, “A Reconsideration”; Kuypers, Hitchner,
Irwin, and Wilson; Rowland and Jones; Weiler; Zagacki.
43

Please see the following: Kirk, Academic Freedom; Kirk, Decadence; Kirk,

Enemies; Kirk, Rights and 153-208; McDonald, Russell Kirk 170-200; Person, Russell
Kirk 81-95. In terms of the field of communication and rhetorical studies, one might
look to the disciplinary discussions within an issue of The Southern Communication
Journal of 1998 (Ball; Goldzwig; Jablonski; McKerrow, “Corporeality”; McKerrow,
“Rhetoric and”; Medhurst, “Rhetorical Education”; Medhurst, “The Rhetorical
Renaissance”; Turner). Also, as Kirk’s approach to Edmund Burke has been a point of
reference (pro and con) by those interested in rhetoric (Browne 498; Bryant, “Edmund
Burke: A Generation”; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: The New”; Bryant, Rev. of 76), his
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significant scholarly contributions in this area deserve ongoing disciplinary attention.
The discourse of Edmund Burke in general is an area of interest within the field of
communication and rhetorical studies (Bormann; Browne; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: The
New”; John Angus Campbell, “Between the Fragment” 361-365; Condit, “Rhetorical
Criticism” 334-339; Leff and Sachs 260-270; Speer).
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Please see the following for some insights regarding Kirk as cultural, social, or

literary critic: P. Chapman; Person, Russell Kirk 151-200. Relevant to this project, Person
wrote the following:
In his essays of social criticism, then, Kirk offered not a point-by-point
agenda of how to defeat the problems he perceived in society—
widespread indifference or outright contempt for unborn human life,
acceptance of pornography in the name of free expression, a lack of
accountability by school administrators and faculty, a lack of
accountability by the parents of disruptive students in the nation’s schools,
the practice of thinking in slogans instead of thinking, the mistaking of the
newest ideas for the best ideas, the degeneracy of the Christian faith as
practiced within both modern Catholicism and Protestantism, and other
issues—but rather a set of principles grounded in tradition by which social
problems ought to be viewed and the culture strengthened. (Russell Kirk
178)
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Shively 111-112. Shively looked to “the evidence offered by cultural

anthropology and, more particularly, by the study of mythology within that field,” which
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“offers special insights into the most persistent and common understandings of the self as
these hold across cultures […]” (111, 158n63, 158n64).
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Please see the following: McAllister, “The Particular and”; Malvasi; Quinn;

Russello, The Postmodern; Russello, “Russell Kirk and Territorial”: Russello, “Russell
Kirk and the Critics”; Russello, “Time and”; Whitney, “Recovering Rhetoric”; Whitney,
“Seven Things.” As has been indicated, Thompson argued specifically for an approach
that tends to be grounded in classical realism. Although that approach as such does not
predominate these discussions regarding Kirk (excepting discussions on the natural law),
on the table there are the possibilities for truth with respect to the trends and suppositions
of postmodern thought. In “Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse,” Thompson made
no reference to Kirk’s work.
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Please see the following: Byrne; Hayward; Henrie, “The Road” 17-19; Lawler,

“Conservative Postmodernism”; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly; McWilliams; Russello,
The Postmodern; Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics” 10-11; Ryn. As this segment
of the literature contains conversations about various philosophical approaches, such as
historicism and realism, I use this term “premodern” very generally here with respect to
knowable and applicable truth. For instance, Claes Ryn has argued for “value-centered
historicism” as a pertinent philosophical model for conversations about culture, morality,
diversity, etc (79-117). Ryn’s work contains departures from certain aspects of
modernity such as the Enlightenment, yet his considerations regarding philosophy,
history, and truth are arguably reliant upon other elements of modern thought. Ryn does
not necessarily foreground conservatism at all points along the way, yet Ryn’s
involvement with conservative thought warrants his place in this sort of discussion
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(Byrne). Lawler does argue for a “return to realism,” for although not always
foregrounding the question of conservatism, Lawler’s work is placed within this larger
discussion because of his reputation as a conservative scholar (McWilliams 45; Russello,
“Russell Kirk and the Critics” 10).
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Please see the following: Russello, The Postmodern; Russello, “Russell Kirk

and Territorial”; Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics” 9-11; Russello, “Time and”
217-218. Russello has certainly recognized that Russell Kirk, in terms of philosophical
suppositions, was not a postmodernist as is generally understood. Thanks to Gerald J.
Russello for some help discussion previous to the publication of his book, The
Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk (Telephone).
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My statement here of course indicates my own realist biases throughout this

project in terms of philosophy, rhetoric, and society. “Ordered freedom” was a consistent
theme within Kirk’s corpus. Although I am on record for disagreeing with Dimock’s
interpretation of Weaver’s book, The Ethics of Rhetoric (“Rediscovering […] [Part
One]”; “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”), he has in my view done a valuable service by
pointing to the pertinence of human nature for Weaver’s stances on conservative
argumentation (specific discussion of this will follow in Chapter Three).
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Please see the following: Aeschliman; Beer, “Science”; Bliese, “Richard M.

Weaver, Russell Kirk”; Bradford, “A Proper”; W. Campbell; Cribb, “Why”; Frohnen,
“Has Conservatism”; Frohnen, “Russell Kirk”; Guroian, Rallying; Henrie, “Russell
Kirk’s”; Hittinger, “The Unwritten”; F. McDonald, Foreword; F. McDonald, “Russell
Kirk”; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; W. McDonald, “Russell Kirk and the Prospects”;
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Nash, The Conservative; Nash, “The Conservative”; Person, Russell Kirk; Russello, The
Postmodern; Whitney, “The Swords”; Woods.
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I take the word “prospects” of course from Kirk’s book, Prospects for

Conservatives, from the 1950s.
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Chapter One
Rhetoric, Realism, and Reality
For the field of communication and rhetorical studies, the “rhetorical
perspectivists” have provided noteworthy theoretical, critical, and practical parameters
with regard to language, thought, and reality. The following statement by James Hikins
is indicative of their overall point of view:
[…] Humans are conscious, intention-imbued entities invested with the
ability to know at least some aspects of the natural world in which they
live. They also possess the ability to communicate that knowledge by use
of symbol systems. Symbols systems have the capacity to embody both
physical and nonphysical dimensions of experience, based on meaning,
which is in turn grounded in the ontological properties of relations. Thus
human experiences, physical, mental, ethical, and aesthetic, are as much a
part of the real world as are the human communicators who populate it.
Confident that reality is at least in part knowable, humans weave such
knowledge, in the guise of facticity, into their efforts to persuade others,
even on contingent issues where the ultimate truth is as yet unattainable.
Because rhetoric is in this way anchored in reality, humans are assured at
least minimally objective criteria with which to compose discourse,
evaluate rhetorical praxis, and generate theory. […] (“Realism and” 67)
These scholars have highlighted that the stylistic, aesthetic, contextual, linguistic, and
practical aspects of discourse (in deliberative, forensic, and epideictic circumstances) are
best understood and resolved with respect to reality, for the knowledge and application of
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objective truth are viable and worthy goals of both inquiry and communication. Such
insights have challenged and enhanced the variety of disciplinary considerations
pertaining to intersubjectivity, constructivism, praxis, aesthetics, narration, and
hermeneutics as theoretical frameworks of rhetoric. Informed by “rhetorical
perspectivism” and toward a realist rhetoric of order, this project offers a study of
particular aspects of Russell Kirk’s corpus regarding order both with respect to and as an
account of reality in terms of argumentation and persuasion in general, for the approach
taken herein is (to some degree) compatible with the suggestions of Cherwitz and Hikins
toward what they have termed the “epistemological criticism” of speeches and texts.1 The
project utilizes many of the parameters provided by Cherwitz, Hikins, and others, yet
builds toward some alternative coordinates of study.
The “rhetorical perspectivists” have affirmed and defended the assumption that
reality is, to some degree, both knowable and communicable by human beings—this is a
distinctive assumption of realism generally understood. They have made arguments for
philosophical realism that are normative for realists (Adler, The Four; Adler, Intellect;
Adler, Ten; Centore, Being 71-74, 173-227; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing the” 380383; Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Gorman 83-142;
Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”; Hikins and Zagacki,
“Rhetoric, Objectivism”; Shively), such as the visible commonalities among cultures and
across languages, the objective sense of academic and everyday discourse, and the
historical significance of reality before human existence. The scholarly work of this
disciplinary movement has shed light upon the relevance of questions pertaining to the
epistemological and ontological status of reality with respect to political, moral, and
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pedagogical issues (Croasmun and Cherwitz 3-4; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The
Rhetoric”; Sharkey and Hikins). Like other realists (Adler, The Four; Gorman 83-142;
Shively), these scholars have expressed concerns regarding the adequacy of
argumentation, analysis, and evidence within the various realms of human thought and
discourse with respect to knowledge, opinion, and communication (Cherwitz and Hikins,
“Climbing the”; Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Hikins,
“Nietzsche, Eristic”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki,
“Rhetoric, Philosophy”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Objectivism”; Sharkey and
Hikins).
For matters related to the ongoing work of academia and the everyday life of
humanity, although metaphysical suppositions are certainly given significance, the
“rhetorical perspectivists” have generally favored the primacy of epistemology over
metaphysics.2 This project’s departure on this particular theoretical point does not, as
such, imply that rhetorical endeavors do not in many ways facilitate our knowledge and
opinions about reality—the primacy of epistemology is not necessary for this type of
consideration.3 That which follows provides an overview of the pertinent elements of this
approach to realism primarily by means of Cherwitz and Hikins’s book, Communication
and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology, as their philosophical
suppositions are generally representative of the theoretical biases found within the
literature of “rhetorical perspectivism.”4
Cherwitz and Hikins have articulated an epistemological framework entailing the
classification of various levels of opinion and belief weighed against reality, reason,
criticism, and argumentation (Communication 18-48). With a review of ample evidence
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that is “sufficient” for and “relevant” to a given question of focus, the knowledge of truth
(attainable by means of language) is “justified true belief,” which encompasses
“persistent justification” (20-35). Although they counter contemporary theories that
reality is either represented to or created by human beings, Cherwitz and Hikins have
departed from the views (held in various ways since the time of Aristotle) that distinguish
between empirical and non-empirical issues with respect to contingent and scientific truth
(22-25). Cautioning against a personal sense of certainty, Cherwitz and Hikins have
argued that “justified true belief” as such is of “analytical certainty” in terms of truth (3537). They have stated, “When we speak of knowledge as justified true belief, we refer to
a reflective (as opposed to a reflexive) activity that is dependent on language and that
stands in contrast to less sophisticated varieties of cognition and affection” (43). A
significant, yet not equivalent, basis of their approach to rhetorical epistemology is “that
all knowledge is linguistic” (44-45). In an endeavor to frame the challenges to and
benefits of rhetoric, Cherwitz and Hikins have worked to build upon and depart from
previous definitions of rhetoric (49-61). Of particular interest here is their situating of
Aristotle’s rhetorical theory.
Within their body of work, Cherwitz and Hikins have highlighted the important
legacy of Aristotle with respect to rhetoric and realism (Cherwitz and Hikins,
Communication 49-70; Hikins, “Realism and” 21-52), which is one of their distinctive
contributions to contemporary rhetorical theory. Cherwitz and Hikins have, to some
extent, departed from Aristotle’s rhetorical theorizing, for they have argued that as
various dialectical (emphasized by them as more academic) areas of study are now
contained within the rhetorical discourse of the general public (extending beyond
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deliberative, judicial, and epideictic discourse), the approach within the work of Aristotle
is limited and limiting in scope (Communication 50-52). Cherwitz and Hikins have
defined rhetoric as the “art of describing reality through language,” where rhetorical
studies entail “an effort to understand how humans, in various capacities and in a variety
of situations, describe reality through language,” such as with scholarly, literary, and
political audiences (61-62). A communicator’s degree of factual accuracy, scope of
persuasive intention , and level of effective success do not determine the rhetorical
character of a given discourse (spoken or written) as such, for persuasive potential is
derived from the consistency or coherence between the view of reality of the
communicator and the views of the reality among the audience (62-64).
According to Cherwitz and Hikins, as with human communication in general, the
various fields of study such as philosophy, history, science, poetry, and fiction (although
like rhetoric, distinct disciplinary areas) often contain discourse that is rhetorical
(Communication 63-66). Of note, as against such scholars as Weaver and Adler,
Cherwitz and Hikins have contended “that dialectic is a kind or form of rhetoric” (as
consisting of linguistic “descriptions of reality” that are potentially or operatively
persuasive).5 In their approach, “dialectical rhetoric” then entails a presentation of “those
descriptions of reality” that are “intentionally faithful to the rhetor’s own conception of
reality” (67). This framing of “rhetoric as description of reality through language”
situates rhetoric as both distinct from and involved with the various dimensions of human
life, both academic and common (66-67).
From the standpoint of Cherwitz and Hikins, meaning is not referential,
ideational, behavioral, or operative—meaning is “relational” (that is, of relations)
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(Communication 71-91). In referring “with” instead of “to,” language “embodies”
relationships among human communicators, audience members, and “extralinguistic
phenomena,” as “thought is inherently linguistic” (78-91). Knowing is rhetorical, yet not
“all instances of rhetorical discourse are necessarily epistemic,” as particular criteria are
needed (resting upon this “relational” basis upon meaning) for “the greatest possible
assurance” of the attainment of knowledge (the elevation of opinion to the “goal” of
“persistently justified true belief”) (92). There are five “constituents,” or “functions,” of
rhetoric with respect to epistemology: “differentiative,” “associative,” “preservative,”
“evaluative,” and “perspectival” (92-108). Since these “constituents” will be modified
and applied as coordinates throughout the course of this project, they are treated here in
an overview fashion.
According to Cherwitz and Hikins, regarding rhetoric as “differentiative,” human
beings intrapersonally differentiate relations linguistically with respect to “extralinguistic
phenomena” (including one’s own relations to such phenomena) through dialectical and
reflexive rhetoric that “constitutes a search for knowledge as justified true belief”
(Communication 93-94). They have explained, “The processes can, of course, occur
interpersonally, but intrapersonal searching for knowledge as persistently justified true
belief provides the most perspicuous instances of the basic processes” (94). By means of
description, persons associate various differentiations internally to themselves
(intrapersonally) or externally to audiences (interpersonally and beyond) (94-96). This
“associative constituent” provides an avenue to “persistently justified true belief” through
rhetoric, for audience members potentially contribute knowledge to pertinent discussions
and possibly supply knowledge for rhetorical argumentation.6
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They have framed the third “constituent” of rhetoric as “preservative” (Cherwitz
and Hikins, Communication 98-102). So then, “rhetorical discourse also functions
epistemically as preservative” so as “to insure that epistemic judgments are maintained in
the marketplace of ideas where they may be subjected to the scrutiny of arguers,” which
can keep “alive ideas whose time has not yet come,” as in the case of heliocentricity if
one were to consider scientific discourse (98). Within the literature of “rhetorical
perspectivism” (Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 98-102; Sharkey and Hikins), the
framing of this “preservative constituent” departs at times from Aristotle’s rhetorical
theory.
For example, William F. Sharkey and James W. Hikins have argued that
Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric “rarely considers that in certain extreme rhetorical situations
there may be no effective means of persuasion available, this despite the fact that there
appears to be an audience, a message, and constraints” (58). In view of deliberative
speech, Sharkey and Hikins have written:
The conventional sense is that a speaker debates now with an audience
capable of being moved to change their mind about future events, for
example, passing legislation to change policy. Can oratory also be
thought of, in the light of the preservative function of rhetoric, as having
the potential of changing an audience’s mind in the future about a present
controversy? (58)
With this “preservative constituent,” Cherwitz and Hikins in Communication and
Knowledge have departed from Aristotle’s assumptions regarding the persistence of truth
and the place of rhetoric toward a consideration of rhetorical discourse as ongoing
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rational argumentation in the more modern sense of the matter.7 By means of
preservation and differentiation, rhetorical discourse facilitates the standing of ideas with
respect to knowledge and falsity, while at the same time (with the passage of time)
sustaining the role of false notions for the expansion and appropriation of knowledge, as
in the cases of both science and mythology (Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 99100). In this particular epistemic model, the “preservative constituent” of rhetoric allows
for the ongoing refinement of ideas toward possible rejection or justification with respect
to the “relations” contained within language.8
The “evaluative constituent” of rhetoric, according to Cherwitz and Hikins, is
intrapersonal, interpersonal, and communal in scope in terms of persuasion and
epistemology (Communication 102-105). It is tied to our “critical evaluation” that is
either implicitly or explicitly contained within the usage of language toward the possible
attainment of knowledge and truth (102). To be both genuinely evaluative and epistemic
in scope, rhetorical discourse must encompass “bilateralism, correction, and self-risk,”
which also, in their view, is indicative of genuine dialectic.9 Evaluation, then, makes
possible “persistently justified true belief” through argumentation by “intersubjective
validation” or by intrapersonal rhetoric, which can take one beyond subjectivity into “the
more epistemologically productive realm of intersubjectivity,” which could be more
likely productive of “knowledge, as opposed to belief, true belief, or rational belief.”10
According to Cherwitz and Hikins, with the various disagreements among people
on significant issues, the “perspectival constituent” of rhetoric, while not eclipsing the
possibility of knowledge, is a point of reference in explaining these instances of
disagreement (Communication 105-106). With their “relational” view of an independent
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reality in mind, Cherwitz and Hikins have argued that as human beings employ the
preceding four “constituents” of rhetoric, “they do so from a particular and unique
perspective […]” as related to other persons, things, actions, and ideas, which provides
for the contexts of particulars in which both professional academicians and everyday
people live and communicate.11 Rhetors might or might not portray elements of reality in
the same way, which might account for “‘arguing on two different levels’” or “‘not
achieving stasis,’” yet the achievement of “persistently justified true belief” is not
impossible (107-108). Cherwitz and Hikins have stated, “Rhetoric describes in language
the way the world is from the perspective of an individual rhetor” (108). Human beings
can gain some knowledge of the world, and this is particularly enhanced by our accepting
the perspectives of other human beings, particularly those perspectives that are relevant
to given questions under discussion (108). Rhetorical discourse that is genuinely
epistemic as a means by which we explore and discover the world will encompass these
five “constituents” or “functions” of rhetoric (109-111).
Cherwitz and Hikins, in their discussions of ontology (Communication 115-160),
have argued that “relationality” is the basis of reality and consciousness, which then
provides for the various contexts of particulars within the real world (124). They have
accepted the “relational” approach to realism as explanatory for our epistemological
participation within a real world, for with this approach, objects, as points of reference,
are the intersections of relations, which is in their view pertinent to rhetorical studies, as
these relations are made manifest in communication (124-127). Important for realist
theorizing in general, Cherwitz and Hikins have highlighted that we can be confident
(among other aspects of consciousness) “that when we are conscious, we are always
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conscious of something,” such as “sights, sounds, tastes, smells, memories, fantasies,
illusions, our own intentions, and so on” (130). Consciousness, in their approach, is
naturally constituted as human beings perceive multiple sets of relations (inclusive of the
perceiver) within contexts of reality (131-137). The use of language (meaning is
relational) provides a means of categorization toward the various levels of belief—hence,
the epistemological function of communication (135-136).
In their departures from empiricism, positivism, subjectivism, and constructivism,
it is important to note that Cherwitz and Hikins (from their standpoint of “relational
realism”) have framed as significant for considerations of language, thought, and reality
the possibility of truth in both the empirical and abstract realms.12 They have accepted the
view of “relational realism” pertaining to the ontological similarity between the perceiver
and the perceived (subject and object); hence, in their view, this approach to realism
minimizes the ongoing problems with respect to the question of dualism and
knowledge.13 Also significant, recognizing the challenges entailed, Cherwitz and Hikins
have kept on the table the question of universality as important to both learning and
communication, for from their point of view universals are produced by relations that are
identical.14 From their standpoint, the “relational” account of reality provides for the
significance of a wide range of issues for human beings so as to illustrate (from the view
of “perspectivism”) the significance of rhetorical endeavors for epistemology toward the
possibilities and instances of knowledge and truth, both contingent and certain
(Communication 149-157, 159n49, 160n50, 160n51).
According to Sharkey and Hikins, from the view of “rhetorical perspectivism,” as
framed within the field of communication, rhetoric is an art with an aim toward
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describing, discovering, and predicting reality toward the expansion of human knowledge
in a variety of areas, particularly by means of argumentation.15 Rhetorical criticism, with
realist rhetorical epistemology, entails the examination of discourse as a vehicle of
advocacy by description of reality or realities, which is, of course, is of consequence for
ethical, political, and pedagogical questions (Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication;
Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “Through the” 169; Sharkey and Hikins 64-66). Sharkey
and Hikins have written that rhetorical portrayals of reality can always vary “with the
way the world is,” which in their epistemic view can take one beyond Aristotelian
theorizing to consider “that discourse can describe a future reality” to “predict how the
future might and should be” (65). Using these aforementioned five “constituents” for
criticism provides “an understanding of how such rhetorical visions can be created” along
with “a means for assessing discourse’s success or failure, both in the short term and in
times subsequent to discourse” (65). Significant for realism in general, “rhetorical
perspectivism” brings to the table for critics a dynamic of “description, evaluation, and
prescription” regarding both the relevance of reality and the “rationality of argument,”
which “can help ‘keep the conversation going’” in a constructive and additive way (224).
As they give have given primacy to epistemology (yet have challenged both empiricism
and positivism), the viewpoint of the “rhetorical perspectivists” regarding rhetoric,
generally considered, encompasses the fact that human speech is a part of and an
expression of reality in both a descriptive and advocatory sense—the use of language
entails predication and persuasion with reference to reality (Cherwitz and Hikins,
Communication; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “Through the” 169; Sharkey and Hikins
51-53, 64-66). To build a realist rhetoric of order, the corpus of “rhetorical
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perspectivism” provides a substantive avenue for realist into the larger philosophical
framework within the academic field of communication and rhetorical studies.
Richard Weaver (cited by “rhetorical perspectivists” regarding linguistic
advocacy) argued that the “predicative” aspects of language provide for the “sermonic”
elements of communication, demonstrating this provision, for instance, as a grounding
point for our consideration of definitional, analogical, circumstantial, causal, and
testimonial argumentation from the view of metaphysics.16 In his becoming “a principle
foil for anti-objectivist critics” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic” 370), Weaver’s contribution
to rhetorical theory, from my standpoint, was his emphasis on metaphysics, for he
mapped out the scope of rhetoric in its subjective aspects with respect to objective truth
(The Ethics; “Language is”; Visions 55-72). However, for our quest to remedy the errors
that Weaver identified, Marion Montgomery has argued that Weaver’s biases against
natural reality (evident within Ideas Have Consequences and The Ethics of Rhetoric)
have not, in some respects, supplied an adequate philosophical basis, particularly as we
contend with the subjectivisms of both the individualistic and transcendental varieties.17
According to Montgomery, with the modern appropriation of Platonic Idealism toward a
type of subjectivist universalism (or universal subjectivism), the dangers of contemporary
philosophy in large part rest on a “shadow wedge” between the transcendental and
material realms—problematically, thought precedes reality.18
For what he has seen in Weaver’s writings that advocates this separation as
derived from the work of Plato (Weaver had clearly proposed a “wedge”) and privileges
the “universal” in a way indicative of contemporary philosophy, Montgomery has
directed those who would share the concerns expressed Ideas Have Consequences to both
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“the truth of things” as primary and “the reality of man in nature”19 With Montgomery’s
contentions that these biases of Richard Weaver point away from the important primacy
of reality as regards the dangers of contemporary philosophical standpoints, from the
view of classical realism, the proper challenges and correctives to either Weaver’s overall
work or rhetorical theory are not to be found in the skepticism, subjectivism, or
constructivism that rest within the spectrum of modern to postmodern philosophy.20
Toward a realist rhetoric of order, the primacy of things (reality that is) will guide a
targeted study of Kirk’s corpus, even with an applied consideration of Weaver’s theories
of rhetorical argumentation and commentaries on political conservatism.
Within the work of “rhetorical perspectivism,” there has been a clear recognition
of the legacy of classical realism as significant for the status and knowledge of reality in
regards to the study and practice of rhetoric (Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication;
Hikins, “Realism and”). For example, although not embracing “formal realism,” Hikins
has looked to the medieval controversy between the realists and the nominalists for
contemporary theorizing on language and meaning, as nominalism is relevant to modernday theorists who “seem obligated to address at some point the existence and use of
common general terms,” particularly as regards “some viable alternative theory” to
realism—“the question of the ontological status of universals,” although philosophically
significant, is absent within present day rhetorical studies.21 According to Hikins, “It
should be readily apparent, then, that formal realism has important consequences for the
theory of meaning and, by implication, for the language arts” (“Realism and” 27). Of
course, Hikins took his discussion toward the “relational” realism of “rhetorical
perspectivism.”
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This project departs from the “rhetorical perspectivists” on the question of
metaphysics and epistemology, yet does not address their “relational” view of ontology,
which would entail an extended discussion concerning the question of the metaphysical
and ontological distinctions within reality.22 In giving a strong status to our common
sense of reality at the “pedestrian” level, these realists have established a clearer link
between academic and everyday life, such as the general and particular factuality of
communication, than either the “critical” rhetoricians or existentialists.23 To be fair, there
are times in their work where they seem to come close to, if not outright embracing, some
sort of “common sense” realism when discussing the “pedestrian world.”24 However, for
“rhetorical perspectivism,” epistemology is preliminary to metaphysics and, in my view,
to some extent, common sense, even if not intended, which is indicated straight away in
Communication and Knowledge (the book is foundational to the movement), where the
independence of reality is assumed and defended, yet as “justified true belief” is the
standard of knowledge, realism is rested upon an inquiry of “how we know.”25 The
disciplinary “doubt” that has been the significant concern of the “rhetorical
perspectivists” has an historical basis in the intensive focus upon epistemology that has,
along with the idealist movement from “thought to things,” guided the modern quest of
skepticism (Adler, The Four 28-48, 224-261; Adler, Intellect 79-139; Adler, Ten 5-107,
191-200; Gilson, Methodical; Gilson, Thomist Realism; R. McInerny, Characters;
Montgomery, “Consequences”) toward a still-skeptical postmodern response (Centore,
Being; Shively). For a targeted study of Kirk’s corpus toward a realist rhetoric of order,
coordinates will be derived from “rhetorical perspectivism” toward a framework that is
based upon classical realism.
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As Mortimer Adler has demonstrated, philosophy properly begins with the
common human experience of reality, and with respect to this view, he has drawn the
following pertinent implications: 1) throughout time and place, human minds are the
same and human nature is the same; 2) our minds permit us to know, understand, and
opine with respect to the same reality that is independent of the various human minds; 3)
the common experience of reality is adequate for intelligible communication among
human beings within and across multiple languages and cultures.26 In regards to the
idealism and skepticism of ancient and contemporary times, F.F. Centore has argued:
[…] Knowledge is a fact of human experience. It means knowing what
something is in a definite way. If Cratylus, and the Sophists in general, for
all their “humanism,” were right, there would be no possibility of knowing
anything. There would be no essences; that is, there would be nothing to
know. But everyone knows this is not the case.
Even ordinary people realize that there is a difference between a
real physician, who really knows something, and a quack who does not.
People might argue, because of different lighting, about the color of a
wine bottle and, because of some variation in the condition of their health,
about the sweetness of the wine, but the wine, the bottle, the table, the
chairs, and so on, are there, and are known to be there.
Moreover, they can be defined and discussed in a public way.
Communication and discussion is a fact of public life. The world is not an
amorphous mass of non-things, in which everything ends up being
everything else. If this is not true, there’s no possibility for any sort of
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conversation, social or otherwise, in order to solve any problems, whether
speculative or practical.27
Ruth Lessl Shively has emphasized that when constructionists theorize and argue, they
fail to consider the presuppositions of truth reflected within their thought and discourse,
for as they proficiently employ “rational methods of persuasion”, “they must at least
implicitly recognize common, supracontextual […] standards of argumentation.”28 Her
relevant theoretical point for realism and argument here is that with argumentation,
people have expectations of empirical consistency, logical coherence, and evidentiary
adequacy, which “reflect the utterly commonsensical fact that, to be persuasive, our ideas
must be intelligible and connected to our audience’s ideas and experiences.”29 From the
view of classical realism, truth is defined as the correspondence, or conformity, between
the mind and reality, for from this view, generally speaking, the following are
possibilities with respect to truth: 1) knowledge with certainty of self-evident truths (this
possibility does not require belief); 2) probable truths with the possibility of doubt or
revision (opinion more or less corresponding to reality); 3) multiple opinions that lack
adequate grounding in various degrees with respect to reality; 4) belief regarding
something that is true (this possibility might overlap with something that is demonstrably
true as knowledge or rationally true as opinion).30
In particular, the primary place of metaphysics (which starts from our common
sense of things) with regard to epistemology is a significant attribute of classical
realism.31 According to Adler:
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[…] A sound approach to the examination of knowledge should
acknowledge the existence of some knowledge to be examined. Knowing
what can be known is prior to asking how we know what we know.
Using the word “epistemology” for the theory of knowledge—
especially for inquiries concerning the “origin, certainty, and extent” of
our knowledge—I have two things to say about this part of the
philosophical enterprise.
First, it should be reflexive; that is, it should examine the
knowledge that we do have; it should be a knowing about our knowing.
Second, being reflexive, epistemology should be posterior to
metaphysics, the philosophy of nature, ethics, and political theory—these
and all other branches of first-order philosophical knowledge; in other
words, our knowing what can be known should take precedence over our
knowing about our knowing.32
Adler has explained elsewhere that the puzzling of philosophers regarding our knowledge
of reality as “do not invalidate our claim to know something or alter our assessment of
the probability of that knowledge” (Intellect 87-88). Although the commonsensical
observation “that reality is not always what it appears to be” might need “philosophical
refinement” for the assessment of reality as such and as experienced, “philosophy goes
astray when in modern times its idealist tendency leads it to deny that reality in itself and
apart from us exists and is knowable, or to deny that our experience of reality gives rise
to knowledge about it” (87-88).
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For Etienne Gilson, as “realism starts with knowledge, that is, with an act of the
intellect which consists essentially in grasping an object,” it is an approach clearly
divergent from contemporary idealism, which “makes knowing the condition of being”
while going “from thought to things” (Methodical 128-132). Gilson has written:
The realists of the Middle-Ages opposed the nominalists on a ground
noticeably different from that which the problem of knowledge occupies
today. The nominalists themselves, Ockham for example, opted for a
sensualist empiricism of the crassest kind; by comparison with it the
teaching of St. Thomas looks more like idealism than anything else. The
fact is, we are concerned with a different problem. The Middle-Ages were
long pre-occupied with the nature of the concept, or of the notion which
the intellect abstracts from the object; but they never doubted that its
content was borrowed from the content of the object, still less that the
object really existed.
[…] As used today, the word realism means in the first place the
opposite to idealism when it claims that it is possible to pass from the
subject to the object. Applied to medieval metaphysics it means a doctrine
in which the real existence of the object is taken for granted, either
because one denies there is a problem to be solved here, or because one is
as yet unaware of such a problem. (25-26)
According to Montgomery, with Weaver’s challenges to the legacy of nominalism and to
the “scientism” of modernity, while he overlooked Thomism for Platonism in considering
the departures of the nominalists, Weaver also approached the workings of natural world
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in a way that is problematic from the view of classical realism (“Consequences”). From
this, as indicated by Montgomery’s analysis (which was informed by Gilson’s work), in
Weaver’s tending toward the true “ideal” as separate from nature, perhaps at some levels
he had failed to consider the both the historical and present scope of philosophical
contentions with respect to the order of thought and reality.33
In emphasizing that “realism takes sense experience to be the medium, not the
limit, of in intelligible reality,” Shively has made the important clarification between the
realist and empiricist approaches, for with the former, knowledge does not end at the
level of sense as if “it is a passive aggregation of sense impressions or that it is limited to
what can be determined by the senses” (51-52). She has explained, “Rather, realism
posits an active intelligence that organizes and gleans the truth from the data of
experience, and the truth it gleans there is not limited to what can be empirically observed
or demonstrated” (52). Shively has highlighted the significance of the activity of the
intellect for providing meaning to that which is sensed by “the powers of
conceptualization,” for as this “is an active power that is nourished or actualized by the
senses,” knowledge is integrative “of the whole self”—this is here pertinent to the
Thomistic account of intellectuality.34
As against certain lines of modern philosophy, Adler has emphasized the various
implications of the contrasting theoretical standpoints of “mind” as material or
immaterial—classical realism holds to the immateriality of the human intellect.35 St.
Thomas has explained:
Moreover, any cognitive faculty exercises its power of knowing in accord
with the way the species of the object known is in it, for this is its
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principle of knowing. But the intellect knows things in an immaterial
fashion, even those things that are by nature material; it abstracts a
universal form from its individuating material conditions. Therefore the
species of the object known cannot exist in the intellect materially; and so
it is not received into a bodily organ, seeing that every bodily organ is
material. (Light 74)
According to St. Thomas, human beings are at first “potentially intelligent,” for as “this
potency is gradually reduced to act in the course of time,” “the faculty whereby man
understands is called the possible intellect. […]”36
As human beings are not God (Who “is pure act”), “sensible things” are pertinent
to the “possible intellect,” for it “has forms of the least universality” (Aquinas, Light 76).
Aquinas has stated, “[…] forms in corporeal things are particular, and have a material
existence. But in the intellect they are universal and immaterial. Our manner of
understanding brings this out. That is, we apprehend things universally and immaterially.
This way of understanding must conform to the intelligible species whereby we
understand” (77). “Certain media” are necessary for the “traversing” of these forms from
the realm of materiality to the intellect (77). St. Thomas has written, “These are the sense
faculties, which receive the forms of material things without their matter; what lodges in
the eye is the species of the stone, but not its matter. However, the forms of things
received into the sense faculties are particular, for we know only particular objects with
our sense faculties” (77). The senses are a precondition of understanding, for a person
who has been blind since birth “can have no knowledge of colors” (77). Aquinas has
explained:
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This discussion brings out the truth that knowledge of things in our
intellect is not caused by any participation or influence of forms that are
intelligible in act and that subsist by themselves, as was taught by the
Platonists […] and certain other philosophers who followed them in this
doctrine. No, the intellect acquires such knowledge from sensible objects,
through the intermediacy of the senses. However, since the forms of
objects in the sense faculties are particular, as we just said, […] they are
intelligible not in act, but only in potency. For the intellect understands
nothing but universals. But what is in potency is not reduced to act except
by some agent. Hence there must be some agent that causes the species
existing in the sense faculties to be intelligible in act. The possible
intellect cannot perform this service, for it is in potency with respect to
intelligible objects rather than active in rendering them intelligible.
Therefore we must assume some other intellect which will cause species
that are intelligible in potency to become intelligible in act, just as light
causes colors that are potentially visible to be actually visible. This
faculty we call the agent intellect, which we would not have to postulate if
the forms of things were intelligible in act, as the Platonists held.
To understand, therefore, we have need, first, of the possible
intellect which receives intelligible species, and secondly, of the agent
intellect which renders things intelligible in act. Once the possible
intellect has been perfected by the intelligible species, it is called the
habitual intellect (intellectus in habitu), for then it possesses intelligible
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species in such a way that it can use them at will; in other words, it
possesses them in a fashion that is midway between pure potency and
complete act. But when it has these species in full actuality, it is called the
intellect in act. That is, the intellect actually understands a thing when the
species of the thing is made the form of the possible intellect. This is why
we say that the intellect in act is the object actually understood.37
All human beings (sharing the same nature) have their own distinct “potential” and
“agent” intellects (both of “the same essence of the soul” for each person), yet “the same
thing may be understood by all” (79-97). According to St. Thomas:
[…] By the thing understood I mean that which is the object of the
intellect. However, the object of the intellect is not the intelligible species,
but the quiddity of the thing. The intellectual sciences are all concerned
with the natures of things, not with intelligible species (just as the object
of sight is color, not the species of color in the eye). Thus, although there
may be many intellects belonging to different men, the thing understood
by all may be but one (just as a colored object which many look at is but
one).38
As Adler has argued, the genuine perception of something corresponds to its existence in
reality, yet even with discrepancies between appearance and reality (a matter of common
sense that has been an element of “philosophical sophistication”), we should “avoid the
extreme of regarding all appearances as illusory,” for apart from the cases of human
error, “the chair, the dog, or tree that we perceive not only really exists and not only has
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the appearance of a chair, dog, or tree, but in fact, that is what those perceived objects
really are” (Intellect 116-125).
In view of the work of both Aristotle and Aquinas, Shively has emphasized that
within our experiences of sense, we mentally grasp “nonempirical or self-evident truths”
such as those pertaining to ethics and logic, for within contexts of experience, yet
irrespective of any particular context, we mentally recognize “that which is necessary and
supracontextual—meaning unconditional or true in all contexts […]”39 Two persons
might have differing perceptions and feelings about a given slice of pie, yet they “both
see the same necessary truth in it: the piece is always less than the whole” (52). These
truths are not “known innately or through a mysterious, nonempirical sense,” but at a
basic level, as “self-evident,” or “immediately evident in, or necessary to, our thinking
and yet are not susceptible to empirical proof” (52). Shively has pointed to our assuming
“of the validity of inference,” for “to make sense of our experience or attain knowledge in
any way, we must assume that inference works […] that the process is valid, not that any
particular inference is valid,” which “is necessary to our thinking” (52-53). However,
this assumption “cannot be proven (or, for that matter, disproven), since any proof would
have to assume the validity of inference and so would be circular […]”—it “must be
assumed a priori.”40 She has continued:
In addition to being implied in proofs, some principles must be taken as
self-evident because they posit an unconditionality that cannot be
observed or demonstrated through our conditional senses. For example,
we cannot observe or demonstrate that every whole is greater than any one
of its parts because we are finite beings who cannot observe every whole
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that ever did or will exist […] we simply take the part-whole relation as
self-evident: we see that it must be so.
The idea of self-evidence is important to our discussion of realism
because the starting point of this approach is the self-evident assumption
of correspondence, or the intelligibility of reality, and it is this assumption
which separates realism from all other epistemologies. To say that this
assumption is self-evident is, as above, to say that it is evident in our
experience and yet cannot be empirically demonstrated. For like the
assumption of the validity of inference, any proof of the validity of the
senses would itself require the assumption of the validity of the senses;
any test for the intelligibility of reality has meaning only if there is an
intelligible reality (i.e., if the test will tell us some truth). Thus the
assumption is either taken as self-evident or it is not taken at all; and if it is
not taken, argument ceases […] 41
As Shively has emphasized (drawing off of Gilson’s work), either “the intelligibility of
reality” is “taken as self-evident,” and one starts with being, or this a matter to be proven
empirically or rationally and one starts “‘with knowledge [or doubt]’” where one “‘will
never come in contact with being.’”42 These suppositions have implications regarding the
question “of objective moral truth,” which are connected to a variety of practical issues,
for “to reject correspondence” is a rejection of the basis of knowledge that while leading
to incoherence, necessitates the use of “distorted forms” within the work of theorizing
(53-54).
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According to F.F. Centore, while continuing the modern tendency to privilege
thought to reality, as a challenge to or extension of the philosophical and general
conditions of modernity, postmodern philosophy dwells within the realm of becoming at
the expense of considering that which is fixed and objective with respect to being
(Being). Generally speaking, the account of reality and intellectuality by classical realists
runs counter to contemporary philosophy (modern or postmodern) in a variety of areas
regarding logic, language, and life (Adler, The Four; Adler, How to Think; Adler, Ten;
Centore, Being; R. McInerny, Characters; Shively). Adler has argued (surrounding his
discussion metaphysics, etc. as primary from above) that within a “context of an
otherwise sound critical reaction to the dogmatism and pretentiousness” of 17th century
philosophy, the focus on epistemology led to what one could term “‘suicidal
epistemologzing’” along with what one could term “‘suicidal physchologizing,’” which
“is sometimes less picturesquely described as ‘the way of ideas’”—both a “retreat from
reality” (Adler, The Four 245-250). He has written, “Epistemology, fashioned by
philosophers as a scalpel to cut away the cancer of dogmatism, was turned into a dagger
and plunged into philosophy’s vitals” (248). This “psychologizing of common
experience deserves to be called suicidal,” cutting “away the very ground on which the
philosopher stands” and making “experience subjective, rather than objective” (248).
Some scholars within modernity confused the scope and methodology of philosophy with
respect to mathematics and science (248-251). Finally, Adler has explained that idealistic
“system building,” which was a reaction to “epistemologizing and psychologizing,” had
itself led to (reactively) the various existentialist, positivist, analytic, and linguistic
approaches to philosophy (251-255).
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Drawing from Aquinas, Adler has often emphasized (contrary to Locke’s
“philosophical mistake”) that ideas (concepts, memories, percepts, and imaginings) are
not “that which,” but “that by which” human beings apprehend “objects of thought,” for
this has implications for questions of objectivity, subjectivity, language, and meaning as
against contemporary philosophy—in Ewa Thompson’s view, this is one way “out of the
postmodern discourse.”43 According to Adler (situated in his account that is given above),
“It is this error that makes our common experience subjective rather than objective—
introspectively observable, which it is not” (The Four 249). As connected to our
“common experience” of reality as a starting point, it is here important to mention this
significant theoretical aspect of classical realism, for although Cherwitz and Hikins have
also contended with the influence of Locke and others from the view of “relationality” (in
terms of both meaning and consciousness) (Communication 7-48; 115-160), they and
other “rhetorical perspectivists” have, for the most part, conceded “how we know” as
primary. For instance, related to this at some level, from the vantage point of classical
realism, the “principle of noncontradiction” (pertinent to coherence and extending into
logic) is primarily grounded in reality, or being, and is not at first a “law of thought,” as
Croasmun and Cherwitz and Cherwitz and Hikins have seemed to suggest.44 McInerny
has written:
[…] The first and foundational judgment of human thinking can be
expressed in terms of the fact that the things we know, in rerum naturae,
are such that they cannot simultaneously exist and not exist. Since our
knowledge is of reality—we do not first know our thinking or our
expression of it—propositions will reflect this, and contradictories cannot
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simultaneously be true because this would involve the assertion that a
thing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.
That is why we cannot hold contrary opinions. […] Logic and
epistemology recapitulate ontology. […] 45
To weigh the movement from reality to thought (classical realism) alongside of a
working from “how we know” to “what we know” toward “justified true belief” as
knowledge (“rhetorical perspectivism”), if realists are to relegate “what we know” in
reality as secondary, even if not fully intended, the continuum of modern skepticism to
postmodern subjectivism is an impassible challenge, for they will be left (albeit
unwillingly) in a theoretical realm where human consciousness either determines or
constructs reality.46
For some clarifications that pertain to my journey toward a realist rhetoric of
order, at this juncture, I should situate my own approach with respect to rhetorical
criticism and “critical rhetoric” as related to some of the epistemological items presently
under discussion. As James Hikins has argued, the rhetorical critic, in order to ascertain
with adequacy the various communicative elements of focus, must, at some level,
consider discursive occurrences and aesthetic aspects in terms of reality, knowledge,
truth, and facts (“Nietzsche, Eristic”; “Realism and”; “The Seductive”). Raymie E.
McKerrow, with a strong leaning toward postmodern philosophy, has framed as central to
“critical rhetoric” the exercise and perpetuation of power throughout the various elements
of societies, even as these are revealed in the communication of “freedom,” which has
prompted some interesting and important points of reflection regarding the relationship
between the critic and the community.47 As realists of various types would affirm,
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academic theorists live within and work from the same reality as that of all human
beings; hence, the concerns of scholars are of potential import for the community and the
concerns of communities are of potential import for the academy. Questions of authority
and freedom are certainly significant areas of critical focus (especially as regards order),
yet I would argue, from a realist point of view, that these questions are best considered
from the view of the proper exercises and ends of both with respect to reality and reason,
which certainly anticipates the targeted study of Russell Kirk to follow in this project.
For McKerrow, the critical rhetorician’s role is to interpretively gather elements
of symbolic discourse, from within and among the fragmented spheres of human
communication, which are aimed at various audiences.48 As Michael Calvin McGee has
ascertained this matter, “critical rhetoric” is helpful in considering a disciplinary shift
from a focus on “criticism” to a focus on “rhetoric”—“rhetoric is what rhetoricians
do.”49 It seems to me that the wider discussion regarding rhetorical criticism and “critical
rhetoric” demonstrates (rhetorically and philosophically) both the significance of formal
and rational aspects of particular discourses and the pertinence of political and social
issues across multiple discourses. Without granting absolute status to democratic
modernism on one hand and without subsuming human inquiry into discursive
fragmentation on the other, the modes of criticism employed by Russell Kirk (social and
literary) and Richard Weaver (social, rhetorical, and literary), for instance, indicate the
common theoretical importance of content, form, context, conceptualization, and
community.50
McKerrow has explained that “critical rhetoric” is a “practice” or “orientation,”
not a “methodology” (“Critical Rhetoric” 450-452). The sense of praxis for “critical
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rhetoric” is aimed at social transformation, not ethical standardization, for McKerrow
argues that power and ideology, as articulated and shaped through discourse, are
manifested through rhetorically constructed social relations (452-459). While he has
challenged the various epistemic notions of rhetoric (he phrased these as inseparably
“neo-Kantian”), he has argued that critical rhetoricians should consider doxa with respect
to the use of symbols and the maintenance of power.51 Coupled with this injunction, he
has framed rhetorical studies as a nominalist endeavor, for from this viewpoint, the basis
and status of both opinions and words are culturally and academically dominant, yet
philosophically contingent (455-456). Questions of focus regarding doxa and episteme
with respect to rhetorical studies are significant, yet discussions of knowledge, opinion,
and belief in the discussions of rhetorical criticism and “critical rhetoric” within the
literature generally occur within the boundaries of modern and postmodern philosophical
suppositions regarding these particular matters.52
In their own theoretical work, the “rhetorical perspectivists” have put forth some
important challenges to the work of “critical rhetoric” that are of philosophical
significance to issues of communication and reality.53 For instance, as Cherwitz and
Hikins have explained, McKerrow has utilized argumentation that encompasses scholarly
claims regarding factuality and morality, even with his movements away from concrete
methodology and rhetorical epistemology (“Climbing the”). Also, according to Cherwitz
and Darwin, the work of “critical rhetoric,” by escaping the significant question of the
influential relationship between language and objects, has implicitly expressed a
positional viewpoint regarding meaning and epistemology (“Beyond Reductionism” 324327). They have classified McKerrow’s skepticism as pragmatic—the question of truth
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impedes the ongoing criticism of power (“Why The” 195). Yet “if power were
understood in purely linguistic terms,” one is not able to take on the political aim of
“critical rhetoric” toward the unmasking of the abuse of power, for within our “ordinary
discourse” we must be able to investigate “the extralinguistic manifestations and
symptoms of domination” (Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism” 325).
Epistemological decisions and suppositions underlie any type of ideological criticism
(325). To offer adequate critique of the dynamics of language with respect to instances of
power, in order to accuse of “domination” with justification, one must understand what
power is (in terms of “extralinguistic phenomena”) in order to identify aspects of power
in given circumstances (“Beyond Reductionism” 324-327; “Why The” 197-199). This
addition of an epistemological layer to criticism would strengthen the potential for
“critical rhetoric” toward genuinely recognizing power (“Why The” 198-199).
In light of the significance of epistemological and ontological considerations
prompted by Cherwitz and Hikins for rhetorical studies (“Climbing the”; “Burying the”
76), I will take this discussion of the philosophical basis of rhetoric in terms of
knowledge in the direction of classical realism. Their insistence upon the pertinence of
philosophy guides this project with respect to rhetorical theorizing toward a realist
rhetoric of order. It is appropriate here to consider the work of “rhetorical perspectivism”
in light of Aristotle and rhetoric. This dissertation project retains the basic components
of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric.54 As indicated, the “rhetorical perspectivists” both
build and depart from Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric. However, James Hikins has amply
demonstrated the significance of reality, truth, and factuality for the various elements of
rhetorical argumentation in general and the theoretical mechanics of Aristotle’s Rhetoric
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in particular (“Realism and” 21-52). According to Hikins, a basic study of any rhetorical
artifact points to the following as axiomatic: “Although any given example of persuasive
discourse may or may not contain a particular persuasive device (figures, tropes, other
stylistic devices), every instance of persuasion, without exception, will contain, implicitly
or explicitly, some level of facticity; it will exhibit factual claims about the world.”55 In
terms of the theory and criticism of rhetoric, according to Hikins, the everyday facts of
perception are central to rhetorical discourse for matters of probability and claims of
factuality, for this allows us to weigh issues of coherence, effectiveness, and ethicality
(43-45). Questions of factuality and probability with respect to persuasion have
continued to be of interest since the time of Aristotle (45).
Regarding Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Hikins has provided an explanation of the
significance of factuality to both probabilities and signs (the two basic elements of
enthymemes) in particular and to rhetorical discourse in general (such as with
deliberative, forensic, and epideictic speech).56 According to Hikins, with facts are at the
center of Aristotle’s persuasive theorizing, probabilities should be seen “as the larger
issues of a rhetorical discourse, including principal themes or the general thesis of the
discourse,” which as “questions are not themselves subject to immediate answer” by the
facts or by “simple empiricism”—“one cannot simply ‘look and see’ and find answers to
these macroissues” (“Realism and” 47). However, “one can look and see and collect the
facts to be weighed in favor of or in opposition to these larger issues of probability” as
factuality is “not likely to be problematic beyond the usual tests of veracity one applies to
any simple factual judgment” (47). With this, Hikins has argued:
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[…] Hence, although any one item of facticity may fail to yield a certain
answer to a contingent or probable question, that is, to a macroissue, the
aggregate of individual facts may well offer us such certainty. How else
are we to account for Aristotle’s insistence that rhetoric, properly applied,
yields truth and justice?
I have confined the discussion to simple, day-to-day facticity
because it is just such a tellurian facticity out of which the majority of
rhetorical praxis emerges. Facticity in the vast majority of rhetorical
discourse is generally unproblematic. This is not to say, of course, that we
cannot make a given instance of facticity problematic; it is only to say that
the majority of factual claims in persuasion are rightly taken for granted.
Once the rhetor has collected supporting materials, they are interwoven in
the discourse along with other ingredients of the rhetorical art (stylistic,
prosodic, taxonomic, et cetera). When the persuasive message is
delivered, the rhetor may take Aristotle’s advice and conclude with the
closing words of the Rhetoric: “I have done; you all have heard; you have
the facts; give your judgment.”57
From an Aristotelian standpoint, (and this is implied by Hikins), one could frame the
“macroissues” of rhetoric as problems for which propositions are given toward human
judgment regarding questions of possibility that generally pertain to aspects of reality that
are contingent—this terminology is indicative of the relationship between rhetoric and
dialectic.58

32

From the realist point of view (classical or otherwise), our human capabilities in
terms of certain knowledge, probable truth, and objective communication do not elude us,
even as we engage in adjudicative, deliberative, and ceremonial argumentation—that is,
areas involving rhetorical discourse.59 Hikins has stated:
Of great importance to the understanding of rhetoric, then, is the
realization that answers to factual microissues permit us to draw
conclusions about larger, probable macroissues. For instance, in criminal
trials conducted under contemporary rules of evidence in this country, it is
reasonable to assert that the vast majority of those found guilty of crimes
are, in fact, guilty. In most such cases, factual microissues determine guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Occasional errors in such judgments should
not betray the fact that, with certainty, we can claim most such decisions
are veridical. Likewise with other rhetorical persuasions in other domains
of inquiry where conclusions are based upon facticity and wherein the
facts asserted are subject to rigorous argumentative and evidentiary tests.
All this suggests that issues of probability are, as our analysis of Aristotle
indicates, merely one point on the continuum of facticity; they are not
qualitatively distinct from, for example, empirical, apodictic claims.
[…] By most standards of contemporary rhetorical theory and
criticism, a fact is something to be certified by an audience. Yet if we are
to avoid the dizzying descent from intersubjectivity to subjectivity and,
ultimately, to solipsism, we must grant that some external criteria of
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facticity must be available against which to test the factual claims of any
discourse. […]
Facticity is a necessary component of rhetoric. Without facts,
rhetoric is either nonexistent or devolves into mere style, adornment, and
artifice—“mere rhetoric” in the pejorative sense, divorced from any
connection with the natural world in which humans exist. This analysis of
facticity stands at the heart of a realist theory of rhetoric.60
To apply from Adler’s corpus, rhetorical argumentation does (in large part) operate in the
realm of doxa, which is human opinion with respect to and as weighed against reality,
while the “factual microissues” of discourse and our “common experience” of reality are
significant for the question of probable truths (opinion more or less corresponding to the
reality of the past, present, and future) as regards to legal adjudication, ceremonial
discourse, and political deliberation (areas of problems or “macroissues”).61 The place of
doxa for rhetorical studies, in terms of classical realism, is not conducive to a nominalist
approach (in contrast to “critical rhetoric”), for even with the various degrees of opinion,
human beings communicate about universal “objects of thought” that are actual,
potential, or fictive with respect to particularities and commonalities within the reality of
the past, present, and future (Adler, The Difference 112-190, 340-347n41; Adler, The
Four 28-123; Adler, Some Questions). The role of factuality for rhetoric is pertinent
throughout this project.
As persuasion is a significant realm of human thought and communication, the
reality of our world in general and of human nature in particular (the “facts of human
nature”) are both pertinent to the means and ends of rhetorical discourse (for instance,
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regarding logos, ethos, and pathos) with respect to intellect, desires, credibility, morality,
emotions, and passions.62 According to Fr. Grimaldi, from the view of Aristotle, the art of
rhetoric is integrative of the practical, appetitive, and speculative aspects of human
nature (“Rhetoric and the Philosophy”). Regarding Aristotle and Plato, he has explained:
The one major difference between the two was that Plato put this art at the
exclusive disposition of the speculative intellect as his dialogues reveal to
perfection. Aristotle, on the other hand, recognized the whole arena of
contingent reality, an area which is neither that of Plato’s World of Ideas
nor of his own metaphysics. Herein man is faced not with absolutes but
rather with facts, problems, situations, questions, which admit of probable
knowledge and probable truth and call for deliberation before assent. It is
the area in which the intelligent and prudential course of action which is
most conformable to the concrete reality and truth is determined in a given
instance by the specific circumstances which appear most valid.
Analyzing the rhetorical art at this level Aristotle in terms of his own
philosophy could never divorce intellect from emotions or the appetitive
element in man. Plato’s insight, it may be said in passing, was to perceive
that this complex of emotions and psychological inclinations in persons
can even be put to work in the quest for speculative truth.63
Raymie McKerrow, as he has argued for a doxastic focus for rhetorical criticism, has
(drawing on the work of Robert Hariman) highlighted “reputation” and “regard” as a part
of doxa (Hariman, “Status, Marginality”; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory”). From
the view of classical realism, McKerrow’s sense of “reputation” and “regard,” in
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conjunction with his skepticism and nominalism, is ultimately problematic, in terms of
speakers and writers for example (inferred here from both authors’ discussions of
discourses and institutions), as at some level the “facts of human nature” and the reality
of human actions are theoretically relevant to the question of one’s reputability.
Although he has questioned the applicability of the Aristotelian model for our
time, if one takes Eugene Garver’s interpretation of ethos in the Rhetoric as established
by the speaker’s deliberation within his or her speech (Aristotle’s; “The Ethical”; For the
Sake; “Truth in”), one could still challenge “critical rhetoric” from the view of classical
realism, for as Garver has explained, in Aristotle’s corpus it is practical action that
provides insights into human nature (Aristotle’s 237). Based upon Aristotle’s Ethics,
Adler has written, “The habitual disposition to desire what one ought to desire—to intend
the end one ought to seek and to choose aright the means for seeking it—is the very
essence of a person’s ethos, his admirable moral character.”64 If one takes another
approach to ethos where either the speaker has to directly articulate elements of
credibility, or the audience is aware of the speaker’s “moral character” as such, human
nature is still pertinent.65 In terms of audiences, Adler has identified “good repute” as a
desire that is general to human beings for persuasion by motivation (pathos) toward
reasonable (logos) argumentation (How to Speak 42). Sometimes, according to Adler,
persuaders either have to instill or awaken these types of desires, or they “must try to
create a desire that is novel—generally inoperative until they have aroused it and made it
a driving force” (42-43). Even with Adler’s exceptions regarding persuasion and desires
granted, that which is general to human beings is still the primary point of reference.
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As for the text of the Rhetoric itself, Aristotle’s own treatment of the art is an
examination of rhetoric as a universal with respect to particularities and commonalities in
reality, for rhetoric, as Adler has indicated, it, along with other areas of study, is an
“object of thought” amenable for consideration by various persons.66 Fr. Fogarty has
explained that it was Aristotle’s realism that initially supplied, generally speaking, a
“philosophy of rhetoric” in regard to (“four philosophical elements” applied by Aristotle)
“thought-word-thing relationships,” as connected to “abstraction,” in view of both
“definition” and “argumentation” as pertinent to rhetorical discourse (21-27). Regarding
the theoretical viewpoint expressed within the Rhetoric, as is explicit and implicit in the
text, our common sense, personal subjectivity, and communicative objectivity are
significant factors, even as we argue in the realm of opinions and beliefs.67 In the Summa
Theologica, as part of a general inquiry regarding our powers of appetite, St. Thomas
Aquinas had made reference to Aristotle’s Rhetoric as follows: “that hatred can regard a
universal, as when we hate every kind of thief.”68 In this particular section of the Rhetoric,
Aristotle stated, “Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may
arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their
character. Anger is always concerned with individuals—a Callias or a Socrates—
whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer.”69
From the view of classical realism, all of human communication (including dialectical
and rhetorical discourse) encompasses, in varying degrees, universal “objects of thought”
that are common to human beings.
In a time that seems to be dominated by philosophical skepticism of various types,
the work of “rhetorical perspectivism” has been of immense scholarly value in
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establishing that human beings can communicate about reality toward knowledge. At
this point, so as to establish clear parameters of analysis for this project, I will build from
and depart from the efforts of these scholars, particularly in terms of their “constituents”
of rhetoric as coordinates of analysis, which will be framed herein as “components.”
From the view of classical realism, all of human knowing is not linguistic (this will be
covered in Chapters Two and Three). Regarding the scholarly question of rhetoric as
epistemic, one way of framing the place of rhetorical discourse is as follows: the art of
rhetoric is significant for persuasion toward informed decisions, or judgments, which
often provides opportunities to improve the opinion, knowledge, and understanding that
human beings (both communicators and audiences) bring to communicative contexts.
As we learn in the Rhetoric, contingencies and probabilities are often the focus of
rhetorical discourse in attempting to persuade a person or persons toward judgment in
given cases pertaining to the past, present, and future, yet like Aristotle, we must consider
the art in terms of reality as our primary point of reference. Philosophically, in the
general run of daily life (including that of academicians), as probability is considered
with regards to certainty, necessity is at some level significant for questions of
contingency, even in terms of rhetorical discourse.70 As St. Thomas has explained,
“Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing
some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for
example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is
necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs.”71 As rhetorical endeavors are
about persuasion, speakers and writers communicate (explicitly or implicitly) with
respect to real aspects of human nature, such as reason, passion, emotion, and desire, for
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as both Fr. Grimaldi and Richard Weaver have both demonstrated, rhetoric is directed at
the “whole person.”72
It is with these philosophical suppositions in mind (particularly regarding human
judgment) that we can consider the evaluative component of rhetoric. Shanyang Zhao
has moved the conversation regarding rhetorical epistemology into the realm of
contingent human action with respect to our knowledge of “norms,” which I will return to
later in this dissertational project with the discussion of Kirk.73 According to Fr.
Grimaldi:
[…] For example, the moment Aristotle locates rhetoric in the area of
contingent reality, human activity, deliberation, and judgment, he places it
under the domain of the practical and not the speculative intellect.[…]
This is an essential point, for the difference between the activity of the two
intellects is crucial, a difference due to the different object of each
intellect. The speculative intellect moves toward Being, the practical
intellect towards Being in as far as this Being is to issue in human
action.[…] Because of this difference one might say that the role of the
appetite is comparatively negligible in the activity of the speculative
intellect when compared with its function in the action of the practical
intellect. The speculative intellect receives an initial assist from the
appetite, but the practical intellect demands the appetitive element as an
essential component of its activity. […] (“Rhetoric and the Philosophy”
373)
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To apply Adler’s terminology to rhetorical discourse, the evaluative component of
rhetoric pertains to “prescriptive” rather than “descriptive” judgments, for as Adler has
explained, the truth of practicality entails the conformity of our judgment to proper
desires with respect to human nature (Desires; The Four 124-141; Ten 108-127). Fr.
Grimaldi has stated, “The art or technique of the rhetorician is to perceive and present
those things which make decision, and a definite decision, possible, but to stop with the
presentation. The audience at this point must come in to accept or reject, to makes its
particular judgment to execute or refrain from action. Rhetoric, then, is preparatory for
action” (“Rhetoric and the Philosophy” 374). Because of Kirk’s interest in literary,
imaginative, and political discourse, this notion of rhetoric, preparation, and action is
relevant to Chapter Three of this project, for in emphasizing the place of human activity
in Aristotle’s work, Fr. Grimaldi has made reference to the Poetics of Aristotle.74
Again, to apply Adler’s relevant explanations to the realm of rhetoric, rhetorical
communication (like all of human communication) entails the expression of words
(instrumental signs) that signify formal signs (percepts, concepts, memories, and images)
that signify the following: 1) objects in the reality of the present (which also have
intentional existence as common “objects of thought” and communication) that are
individually apprehended by means of perception; or 2) common “objects of thought”
and communication (which have intentional existence) that might or might not exist in
the reality of the past, present, or future that are individually apprehended by means of
conceptualization, memory, or imagination.75 According to Aristotle:
[…] The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate
upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who
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cannot take in at a glance complicated argument, or follow a long chain of
reasoning.[…] The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present
us with alternative possibilities:[…] about things that could not have been,
and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes
them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.76
In the bigger picture of rhetoric, as we adjudicate, celebrate, and deliberate, we often do
so with reference to reality that was previously actual or to reality that is currently
potential (as common objects of thought and communication, both having intentional
existence), yet never apart from the common objects of thought and communication
(hence, having intentional existence) that do or might actually exist in the present.77
I will consider the differentiative, associative, and preservative components with
respect argumentation, reality, and truth. In Aristotle’s corpus, dialectic and rhetoric are
distinct methodologies of argumentation, yet, as follows, are proximate in consideration:
1) dialectical discourse pertains to probable opinions on various questions, ultimately to
be weighed against philosophical truth; 2) rhetorical discourse, to some degree informed
by dialectic, pertains to potential judgments in particular cases, yet because of existent
reality and human nature, is not exempt from the purview of philosophical truth.78 Fr.
Grimaldi has explained that in framing both the enthymeme and the example as ordering
elements of credibility, emotions, feelings, and logicality toward belief, Aristotle has
brought to the realm of rhetorical discourse “his theory of deductive and inductive
reasoning which for him is absolutely essential for all demonstration” (“A Note”).
Perhaps, as Fr. Grimaldi has argued, because of its deductive value for persuasive
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demonstration as emphasized by Aristotle, the enthymeme “is the container, that which
incorporates, or embodies, the pisteis […]” (192).
In terms of both logic and rhetoric, Edward H. Madden has argued that, in
contrast to Aristotle’s framework, the frequent definition of an enthymeme as syllogistic
argument with an unstated premise is a “regulative or procedural maxim” irrespective of
any particular philosophical standpoint.79 In considering Aristotle’s rhetorical theory,
Madden has explained that as primarily an argument from probabilities entailing that
which is “generally true” or from signs portraying a “knowledge-of-the-fact,” an
enthymeme can be a rhetorical syllogism or not (depending on specificity), yet as such
differing from scientific syllogisms (which provide “knowledge-of-the-reasoned-fact”)
(369-373). In view of Aristotle’s work, Lloyd Bitzer has classified the enthymeme as a
“cooperative” means of argumentation (between speaker and audience) that distinguishes
rhetoric from dialectic (“Aristotle’s Enthymeme”). Similarly, Garver has emphasized the
enthymeme as the “body of persuasion,” for enthymematic argumentation encapsulates a
“shared intention” with an audience with respect to deliberation, which directly impacts
the speaker’s ethos “in argument.”80 As indicated by Fr. Fogerty’s overview, in light of
Aristotle’s realism, regardless of the interpretative approach one takes to the enthymeme,
with the argumentation of rhetorical discourse, reality and reason are still significant.
For the development and communication of arguments, rhetorical activity is
differentiative and associative with respect to the deductive and inductive methodologies
that are encompassed along the way. To here apply here the classical realist view (Adler,
The Four 28-42; J. Ryan), alongside of “descriptive” correspondence to facts and
“prescriptive” conformity to desires, a good rhetorical argument is logically coherent, yet
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coherence is a test or sign (not a definition or cause) of truth because of the ontological
impossibility of contradiction in reality—for a rhetor qua human, “common experience”
is significant. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle has stated:
All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from preexistent knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the
species of such instruction. The mathematical sciences and all other
speculative disciplines are acquired in this way, and so are the two forms
of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic and inductive: for each of these latter
makes use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assuming an
audience that accepts its premises, induction exhibiting the universal as
implicit in the clearly known particular. Again, the persuasion exerted by
rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use either
example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism.81
St. Thomas has explained that circumstances entail those things that surround and touch
human acts.82 Along the way, he has stated:
The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the
substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances of the act.
Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder;
secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed or
at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is
said pointedly that the orator adds strength to his argument, as though this
were something secondary.83
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St. Thomas has also affirmed that “in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of
praise or blame, of excuse or indictment,” these are pertinent to politicians and orators,
yet differently to both, for “where the orator persuades, the politician judges”—as aspects
of reality, circumstances are objective points of reference.84 A rhetor associates and
differentiates for, within, and about circumstances in building an argument toward
“prescriptive” judgments, such as with the enthymeme and example. This is relevant to
the question of “rhetorical situation” as treated in Chapters Two and Three.
Rhetoric, properly understood, is preservative in regards to truth. As Fr. Grimaldi
indicates, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle has explained (from the translation of W. Rhys
Roberts), “Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have
a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not
what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must
be blamed accordingly.”85 Fr. Grimaldi has rendered this passage a bit differently as
follows: “‘rhetoric is useful because truth and justice are naturally stronger than their
opposites, so that as a result, if judgments are not made as they should be, it follows
necessarily that truth and justice are defeated by their opposites [untruth and injustice].
And this merits censure.’”86 With this, he has argued:
What is implicit […] should be noted: rhetoric prevents us from making
wrong judgments and in doing so protects truth and justice. To defend the
usefulness of rhetoric on this ground […] is to attribute to rhetoric an
important and significant position. For what Aristotle is saying quite
pointedly is that rhetoric is mimesis and is supposed to re-present the real
(i.e., truth and justice) in any situation for an auditor. Rhetoric does this in
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the only way it can, namely, through language. […] If truth and justice are
defeated, it is because rhetoric has failed in its function as mimesis. The
defeat of truth and justice is caused by their inadequate articulation in
language. It is the task of rhetoric, and in this task resides its usefulness,
to assure an adequate and competent articulation of truth and justice.
When rhetoric fails to present this articulation, bad judgments are made by
men, and truth and justice are destroyed by their opposites. As Aristotle
remarks, this truly merits censure. Thus it is that in explaining the
usefulness of rhetoric here Aristotle is making a remarkably strong
pronouncement about the importance of rhetoric, a pronouncement that is
usually not even considered as possible for the Rhetoric, and yet one that
is not out of keeping with his other comments in this treatise. […] 87
In terms of the preservative possibilities for rhetorical discourse, from the view of
classical realism, I am affirming that which Cherwitz and Hikins have departed from in
terms of Aristotle’s work in terms of human intellection. The art of rhetoric, properly
enacted with respect to reality and virtue, is preservative.
Virtue entails habit (Adler, Desires; Aquinas, Commentary; R. McInerny, Ethica
Thomistica). So, the preparation of audiences for judgments by means of a virtuous
focus establishes preservative possibilities regarding truth after given instances of
rhetorical discourse. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle has explained that even with exact
knowledge, we must go to “notions possessed by everybody” for persuasion “on opposite
sides of a question,” not so much just to take one side or the other, but toward the just use
of language in relation to “the underlying facts,” yet even as “things that are true and
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things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to
believe in,” the rhetorical art (mirroring in some respects dialectical discourse) entails the
discovery of “the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each
particular case allow.”88 In terms of coherence and factuality, the rhetorician considers
the appropriate and adequate evidence for the case at hand through association and
differentiation, for as regards the proper aim of discourse, this can be (inclusive of style
as emphasized by Cherwitz and Hikins) genuinely preservative in scope in preparing the
audience for practical and ethical evaluative judgments.89
Rhetorical ethics, in this framework of consideration, encompasses both the
purpose of the speaker and the judgment of the audience (the associative, differentiative,
and evaluative components). As mentioned above, we can view rhetoric as “prescriptive”
in terms of human nature and human desires. At this point, I should mention the virtue of
prudence, which is a strong point of discussion within contemporary philosophy and
rhetoric (as phronesis, or practical wisdom) for the deliberation and action of human
beings in the contingencies of life.90 From the view of classical realism, contra the
postmodern turn on phronesis, the sphere of prudence is action and contingency, yet with
respect to universality, opinion, knowledge, understanding, goodness, truth, and reality.91
According to St. Thomas:
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above […] then its parts include
dialectics, rhetoric and physics, according to the three methods of
prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by
demonstration, which belongs to physics (if physics be understood to
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comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at
an opinion though probable premises, and this belongs to dialectics. The
third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain
suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to rhetoric. It may
be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so
called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes
from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.92
Considering McInerny’s description of prudence (as a philosophical and not a theological
virtue) for our “practical knowing” that “aims to guide singular contingent actions”
toward “the proximate judgment” of human action (from Aristotle) and for “the truth of
practical judgment involved in a singular action” deriving from “its conformity with
rectified appetite” (from Aquinas), classical realism is an integrative view, even as
regards the rhetorical realm of adjudication, deliberation, and celebration.93 The question
of virtue in regard to the human aspects of persuasive argumentation is pertinent to the
theoretical development of a realist rhetoric of order.
Finally, at multiple levels, rhetoric is perspectivial, but I do not grant this
component in terms of “appearance realism” as put forth by Hikins.94 As Adler has
explained, we opine regarding numerous issues, and the spectrum of our opinions range
from “probable” to “mere” opinion, yet even as all human beings could communicate on
various matters, we do have differing experiences in terms of nationality and culture
(Adler, Intellect 126-148; Adler, Six 31-71). Sister Gorman has written, “Past
experiences stored in the imagination and memory ‘color’ meanings for individuals”
(141). According to both authors, even as the conventional meanings of words as
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instrumental signs (within languages) vary throughout societies, because of individual
differences in experience, knowledge, and intention, users of the same language face
challenges to communication with respect to meaning (Adler, “Challenges of”; Gorman
83-142). In view of these challenges, with Sister Gorman’s Thomistic emphasis that
“knowledge is in the knower according to the mode of the knower, not of the known”,
along with Adler’s contention regarding the impossibility of inventing “an ideal language
that would be free from ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings,” because of experiential
commonalities and educational possibilities, our linguistic limitations do not warrant
epistemological skepticism.95 Against a backdrop of “a common general education for
everyone,” Adler has proposed the liberal arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric for
improving the communication of meaning.96 Beginning with Chapter Two, toward a
realist rhetoric of order, this project contains an appropriation of the perspectival
component of rhetorical discourse.
Considered in terms of reality and humanity, although it pertains to contingencies
and actions in given contexts, rhetoric is, to some degree, “supracontextual.” As
indicated above, Cherwitz and Hikins have argued that the consistency of views about
reality between speaker and audience provides for the rhetorical character of discourse as
such, over and above accuracy, intention, and success. With their expressed concerns
regarding ethics, they certainly consider consistency, accuracy, and to some extent,
intention. In considering the evaluative, differentiative, associative, preservative, and
perspectival components of rhetoric from the view of Classical Realism, intention
(properly understood), correspondence, and coherence provide for the character, success,
and ethics of rhetoric. More on this will follow throughout the project. With these
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coordinates established, one might now consider how Kirk’s focus on imagination can be
additive for theoretical considerations of a realist rhetoric of order.
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Notes
1

Please see the following as regards my overview of “rhetorical perspectivism” in

this paragraph: Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin,
“Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”; Cherwitz and Hikins, Climbing the”;
Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Burying the”; Cherwitz
and Hikins, “Irreducible Dualisms”; Croasmun and Cherwitz; Hikins, “Nietzsche,
Eristic”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins, “The Rhetoric”; Hikins, “The Seductive”;
Hikins, “Through the”; Hikins and Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy”; Sharkey and Hikins.
James W. Hikins suggested that I approach epistemic criticism as considering Kirk’s
work as a “sketch of reality” (Telephone). My own framing of approach here toward the
rhetorical analysis of speeches and texts is a modification of this advice in view of my
own philosophical suppositions as related in this chapter and beyond. Regarding
“epistemological criticism,” please see Cherwitz and Hikins’s Communication and
Knowledge (171-172). See also Croasmun and Cherwitz regarding epistemology and
criticism.
2

Please see the following: Croasmun and Cherwitz 8-11; Cherwitz and Hikins,

Communication 18-48, 115-160. For example, in their book, Communication and
Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology, Cherwitz and Hikins
theoretically position epistemology prior to ontology, for they have clearly argued that
even with the assumption of an independent reality, scholars must first establish criteria
for knowledge (18-20). This is not to say that the “rhetorical perspectivists” do not put a
helpful emphasis upon common human experience or metaphysics. However, there is a
privileging of epistemology that is more or less visible throughout the years.
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3

Based on the realist scholars cited throughout the project, this is one possible

extension into the “rhetoric as epistemic” discussion. On one hand, the place of the
liberal arts next to realism seems to support this view (Adler, “Challenges of”; Adler,
“What Is”; Fogarty; Joseph; Wise), yet on the other, Eugene Garver’s extensive work on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric in particular and rhetorical discourse in general provides some
challenges for a consideration of the linkage between knowledge, opinion, and rhetoric
(even with Aristotle’s realism) as he places the art of rhetoric squarely within the realm
of human action, especially deliberation (Aristotle’s; For the Sake).
4

The literature of realist rhetorical epistemology encompasses a set of similar

philosophical suppositions with various applications to the realm of human
communication—this book is generally representative of these.
5

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 66-67, 70n43-45. They make reference to

Adler’s book Dialectic, New York, Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1927 (particularly p.75) and
Weaver’s The Ethics of Rhetoric.
6

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 94-98. Cherwitz and Hikins have

identified the various theoretical approaches (ancient and contemporary) regarding
aspects of discourse that are supplied by audiences as pertinent to this “associative”
component of rhetoric (such as enthymemes, etc.). That which is provided by both the
speaker and audience might lead to “persistently justified true belief” (96-97).
7

By means of John Stuart Mill’s book, On Liberty, Cherwitz and Hikins have

advanced a more rationalist rather than classical realist approach in departing from
Aristotle’s view on the question of truth and argumentation (Communication 98-102;
“John Stuart Mill’s”). They make reference to the following from the Rhetoric: “truth
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and justice are by nature more powerful than their opposites; so that, when decisions are
not made as they should be, the speakers with the right on their side have only themselves
to thank for the outcome” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I. 2, 1355a; Cherwitz and Hikins,
Communication 98, 113n13).
8

Cherwitz and Hikins have applied the notion of “‘vivacity’” from George

Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1963, pp. 285-384 (Book III) to this discussion (Communication 100-102, 113n19),
particularly regarding an audience’s understanding and assessment of a communicator’s
argumentation, which demonstrate the pertinence of both content and style for rhetorical
discourse. Richard Weaver, by the way, provided some similar insights (The Ethics 115185; “Language is”). In Eugene Garver’s view (Aristotle’s), style is least significant for
Aristotle and the least tied to Aristotle’s specific political context, which is why, in his
estimation, style persisted as a focus of rhetorical theory later in history beyond
Aristotle’s time.
9

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 102-105, 113n22, 113n24-25. For this

particular discussion, they are applying work from Douglas Ehninger (“Argument as
Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations, and Its Uses,” Speech Monographs 38 [1970], pp.
102-104) for their notions of bilateralism and self-risk. They have explained, “The
conception of ‘dialectic’ herein presented is consistent with Plato’s use of the term. In
Republic, Plato conceives of dialectic as the supreme philosophical method; it is the
highest of the human arts […]” (113n28).
10

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 105. Regarding “belief, true belief, or

rational belief,” please see their discussions from earlier in the book (7-48). Cherwitz
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and Hikins have explicitly differentiated their approach from the constructivist,
consensus, and phenomenological standpoints regarding intersubjectivity (113n29).
Their approach to the question of intersubjectivity differs from these more generally
postmodernist framings of the issue, for it is clear that they hold to some standards of
justification that are objective within what is considered intersubjective discourse
(Communication 105, 113n29, 116-160). Regarding “intrapersonal rhetoric,” Cherwitz
and Hikins have been clear in their situating of this as pertinent to rhetorical
epistemology (92-94, 104-105, 113-114n30). Please see also “Plato’s Rhetorical Theory:
Old Perspectives on the Epistemology of the New Rhetoric” and “The Epistemological
Relevance of Intrapersonal Rhetoric,” both by Hikins.
11

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 106-107. Their explanation of this

“constituent” reflects their adherence to both “relational” and “appearance” realism
(which comprises their approach to “perspective realism”), for from this particular realist
point of view, we perceive some portion of the relations composing at any given time
(Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 114n31, 105-108, 115-160; Hikins, “Realism
and”). Cherwitz and Hikins have written, “We use the term ‘thing’ to denote the
independent objects of reality and not to refer to what have traditionally been described
as ‘physical objects’” (Communication 114n32). References to the various realist
philosophers from whom the “rhetorical perspectivists” derive their “relational” approach
are available across the various published discussions of “rhetorical perspectivism”
(Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Hikins, “Realism and”).
12

Communication 137-149. Along the way, Cherwitz and Hikins have noted,

“The distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ or ‘spiritual’ entities is one that has
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served little useful purpose and that, in fact, cannot be sustained. Again, the reader is
cautioned against taking the term ‘entity,’ which we use frequently, to imply either
physical or nonphysical existents” (158n11). As this project develops, one will see the
differences on this count between their approach and classical realism. However, of
import to their contributions to the disciplinary role of realism, one should emphasize that
in this line of scholarship there is generally a defense of both empirical and abstract truth.
13

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 137-149; Hikins, “Realism and” 59,

59n16. In light of ontologically distinguishing between subjectivity (“perceivers”) and
objectivity (“things perceived”) for rhetorical studies (Cherwitz and Hikins,
Communication 139, 159n44), Cherwitz and Hikins have articulated:
[…] For centuries people have wittingly and unwittingly labored under the
conceptual consequences of this implied dualism, and the problem has
been exacerbated by the growth of science and ensuing conflicts between
science and the arts. In rhetoric, the tendency has been further accentuated
by elevating Aristotle’s contingent/apodictic distinction to the status of an
axiom. The general result has been to treat use of language as either
objectively true or as speculative. (139)
According to Cherwitz and Hikins, the only requirement for epistemic interests “is a
consideration of the relations obtaining between the item of interest and the context of
particulars in which it stands,” which avoids an ontological framework that includes
“such phrases as ‘internal to mind’ and ‘external to mind’” (149). They have argued,
“An account that is both complete and in accordance with our commonsense beliefs
about the world of experience demands only the concepts of: (1) independent relata and
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(2) their relations. The account does not require positing either ‘objects,’ in the
physicalist sense of the term, or reified ‘social realities’ in the subjectivist sense” (149).
14

Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 143-149; Hikins, “Realism and” 27-28,

59-64. Cherwitz and Hikins have well demonstrated the pertinent theoretical connection
between meaning and universals, generally speaking. Cherwitz and Hikins have relied
often upon Aristotle in their case for realism and rhetoric, yet while even mentioning
Aristotle’s departures from Plato regarding this, they have tended, at times, to contrast
their approach to the Platonic account of universals when contending with pre-modern
philosophy. In large part, this has been in response to the general reaction within the
discipline to universality as a Platonic view (Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication 144;
Hikins, “Realism and”). According to Cherwitz and Hikins:
It is important to emphasize that by “universal” we do not mean a
transcendent, ethereal, otherworldly, Platonic form, existing as a paradigm
in which the objects of the world participate and on which their existence
depends. Neither do we take a universal to be a conceptual, minddependent phenomenon. For us, universals are the products of identical
relations. (Communication 143-144)
15

Sharkey and Hikins 51. Sharkey and Hikins contrast “rhetorical perspectivism”

to the work of Thomas Farrell (“Knowledge, Consensus”) as follows:
Unlike Farrell […], these authors do not limit their analysis of the extrahuman nature of reality to scientific or technical issues. For them,
attitudes, beliefs, values—human meaning itself—has an extra-human
component. This extra-human component can become the object of
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discourse. And it is explored most trenchantly when humans engage in
systematic inquiry, most notably argument. (51)
16

Weaver, “Language is”; Weaver, Visions 69-70. In their considerations of

rhetoric, the realist scholars of rhetorical epistemology hold to the persuasive scope of the
use of language in general (as highlighted by some contemporary theorists), and along the
way, they do cite (with agreement) Weaver’s work in this respect in terms of language as
“sermonic.”
17

See the essay, “Consequences in the Provinces: Ideas Have Consequences Fifty

Years After” by Montgomery. Weaver was for Montgomery an important influence.
Please see a review of Weaver’s The Southern Tradition at Bay by Montgomery from
1969 for some similar points where Weaver was insightful from Montgomery’s
viewpoint (“Richard Weaver Against”). This earlier essay does not contain some of these
later specific philosophical critiques of Weaver’s idealism.
18

Montgomery, “Consequences.” The switching of thought and reality in

contemporary thought is a major theme across Montgomery’s corpus when he is
discussing literature, history, politics, and education.
19

Montgomery, “Consequences.” Montgomery looks to Weaver’s specific words

in Ideas Have Consequences along with various implications in and for Ideas Have
Consequences and The Ethics of Rhetoric.
20

Brian R. McGee has offered constructivism as a disciplinary corrective to

Weaver’s essentialist emphasis on definitional argumentation. Weaver’s essentialism is
rarely embraced in the field of communication and rhetorical studies, even as his
rhetorical theory is respected for its importance place in the discipline. Of course, there
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are some exceptions, even if they do not accept all of Weaver’s essentialism or specific
prescriptions. In the academic and popular literature of conservatism, Weaver’s
essentialism is of prime importance to authors of various disciplines and professions,
even if there is some disagreement with his appropriation of definitional argumentation to
conservatism, etc.
21

Hikins, “Realism and” 27-28. Hikins also extends this discussion from the

question of universals into the question of meaning.
22

In a certain way, the ontological framework of “relational realism” and the

question of epistemological primacy are distinct. The “relational” account of reality of
the “rhetorical perspectivists” has been sufficiently provided herein for the purposes of
this project.
23

Although they privilege epistemology, the work of Cherwitz and Hikins

substantiate the pertinence of reality for knowledge, opinion, and communication
(Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Hikins, “Realism and”). They do speak of the
everyday “pedestrian” experience of human beings, including that of academicians, as
theoretically significant. Please see Hikins on Hyde’s “Existentialism as a Basis for the
Theory and Practice of Rhetoric” (“Realism and” 71). Hyde’s essay contains a helpful
discussion of one existentialist approach to rhetorical studies, which does provide a clear
sphere of comparison to other philosophical approaches as related to rhetoric
(“Existentialism”).
24

To be fair, there are times in their work where they seem to come close to, if

not outright embracing, some sort of “common sense” realism when discussing the
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“pedestrian world,” etc. (Cherwitz and Hikins “Irreducible Dualisms”; Hikins, “Realism
and”).
25

Please see the following: Cherwitz and Hikins, Communication; Croasmun and

Cherwitz 8-11.
26

Please see the following: Adler, The Four; Adler, Intellect 79-139; Adler, Ten.

Also relevant at this point in the present chapter, Adler has explained:
The reality that is independent of the human mind, without the existence
of which knowledge and truth would be impossible, is one and the same
reality for all human beings.
Experience is not independent of the human mind. If it were, we
would not speak of it as experience. To speak of reality as human is to
violate an essential feature of it: its independence of the human mind. But
while human experience is mind-dependent as reality is not, it is also, to a
considerable extent, the same for all human beings. The reason why there
is a common core in human experience, the same for all human beings, is
that experience is dependent on reality as well as upon the human mind.
Two factors, not one, enter into the composition of human
experience: reality and the human mind. It is a product of their
interaction—reality acting on our senses and our minds responding
reactively by its perceptual and conceptual activities. The common core
of human experience is the product of that interaction. (Intellect 115-116)
Related to this, within his discussion of universals and meanings (“Realism and” 61-64),
Hikins has written on the possibilities of communication across cultures, even with
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varying terminological distinctions for naming objects within reality for practical or
observational reasons (62-63).
27

Centore, Being 73. For Centore, major points of focus within his philosophical

account are the fundamental skepticism about and an idealist separation from the reality
of the world (Being).
28

Shively 47. As noted by Shively (47), “By supracontextual I mean simply to

say that the standards are not specific to particular contexts or that they are evident in all
forms of argument, regardless of context” (151n3).
29

Shively 47, 151n4. Regarding these standards of argumentation, Shively has

suggested to readers Ethics and Christianity by Keith Ward, London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1970, pp. 201-209. Following this, from within her own account of classical
realism, she provided a helpful discussion of the balance among context, evidence,
argument, and reality (48-49).
30

Please see the following: Adler, The Four 3-105, 224-261; Adler, Intellect 143-

172; Adler, Ten 5-107; Centore, Being 173-205; Gorman; Shively 46-85. Thanks to Dr.
Matthew A. Kent (a philosopher) for reviewing (from a Thomistic standpoint) my
considerations here via E-mail.
31

Please see the following: Adler, The Four 77-78, 106-148, 247; Martin; R.

McInerny, Characters 3-28; Shively 50-54.
32

Adler, The Four 247. Pointing his readers back to Chapter Three of The Four

Dimensions of Philosophy (17-20, 247, 247n6), Adler has explained:
[…] First-order questions occur in the first two dimensions of philosophy,
where we find knowledge about reality, both descriptive and prescriptive.
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Second order questions occur in the third and fourth dimensions of
philosophy, where we find philosophical analysis and the understanding of
ideas and subject matters. Recent linguistic and analytical philosophy is
another type of second-order discipline. (247n6)
For some theoretical contrast here regarding realism, epistemology and learning, one
might compare Cherwitz and Hikins’s emphasis on “languaged reflection” on experience
(Communication 43) next to Shively’s emphasis on “empirical experience” toward
conceptualization for childhood development (51). Also, in light of Adler’s words on
metaphysics and epistemology, one might consider the following from Cherwitz and
Hikins: “When we speak of knowledge as justified true belief, we refer to a reflective (as
opposed to a reflexive) activity that is dependent on language and that stands in contrast
to less sophisticated varieties of cognition and affection” (43)
33

Montgomery, “Consequences.” Montgomery draws at various points from

Gilson’s Methodical Realism.
34

Shively 52, 151n11, 152n12.

35

Although this is a constant theme in Adler’s extensive body of work, see in

particular The Difference of Man and the Difference it Makes.
36

St. Thomas Aquinas, Light 75-76. According to the editor of this particular

book (Chapter 83 in this book is entitled, “Necessity of the agent intellect” [77-78]):
To explain the process of knowledge, scholastic philosophy distinguishes
between two faculties of the intellectual soul: the possible intellect and the
agent intellect. The agent intellect or active intellect (intellectus agens)
illuminates the phantasm, abstracting from it the intelligible species,
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which are spiritual likenesses of objects, disengaged from all
particularizing conditions of matter. See chapter 83 below. According to
St. Thomas, “the agent intellect causes the phantasms received from the
senses to be actually intelligible through a process of abstraction”
(Summa, Ia, q. 84, a. 6). The possible (that is, potential) or passive
intellect (intellectus possibilis) is actuated and informed by the intelligible
species resulting from this abstractive operation, and is thereby enabled to
elicit the act of understanding. (76n77)
37

Light 77-78. The following references are given regarding the Platonists: “[…]

Plato, Phaedo (100 D); Timaeus (28 A; 30 C) […] Aristotle, Metaph., I, 6 (987 b 7); I, 9
(991 b 3)” (77n78). Also, St. Thomas is making reference back to Chapter 82, “Man’s
need of sense faculties for understanding” (77, 78n79).
38

Light 83. St. Thomas is addressing a specific argument here regarding human

intellectuality (80-83).
39

Shively 52, 152n13. Shively referenced St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa

Theologica, Ia, IIae, 51, I.
40

Shively 53. She added to this:
Two similarly undemonstrable assumptions are those of the uniformity of
nature and causality. The uniformity of nature must be assumed because
any test of it assumes the uniformity of nature (i.e., that tests work because
they show us regular occurrences of nature). In like manner, all
demonstrations assume causality—that effects have causes that we can
observe and learn from. […] (152n14)
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On this count, Shively pointed the reader to C.S. Lewis’s Miracles: A Preliminary Study,
New York: MacMillan, 1947, pp. 102-106 (151n2, 152n14).
41

Shively 53. Shively clarified by stating, “Nor can we appeal to probabilistic

thinking, saying that observation shows that wholes tend to be greater than any one of
their parts, for this does not give us the necessity required of the axiom. […] Moreover
the use of probability in itself requires the undemonstrable assumption of a uniform
nature (152n15). She here looked also to C.S. Lewis’s Miracles: A Preliminary Study, p.
20 (152n15). From Gilson, Shively related, “This conviction of the reliability of our
sense is simply the self-evidence of our experience…It is futile to demand a
demonstration” (Gilson, Thomist Realism 181; Shively 152n16).
42

Shively 53, 151n5, 152n17. She referenced here Gilson’s Thomist Realism and

the Critique of Knowledge, pp. 204, 149.
43

E. Thompson, “Ways Out.” In this dissertation project, for discussions of

language, thought, and reality, I rely primarily upon Adler’s corpus (“The Bodyguards”;
The Difference 112-190, 340-347n41; The Four 106-123; How to Think 1-10, 284-293;
Intellect 126-133; Some Questions), while also guided too by O’Callaghan’s Thomist
Realism and the Linguistic Turn and Sister Margaret Gorman’s General Semantics and
Contemporary Thomism. Thanks also to Dr. Matthew A. Kent (a philosopher) for
providing Thomistic insights via E-mail regarding language, thought, and reality.
44

Please see the following: Adler, The Four 32-34; Centore, Being 173-205; R.

McInerny, Characters 43-56; Shively. Please see Communication and Knowledge by
Cherwitz and Hikins. Croasmun and Cherwitz specifically identify this as a law of
thought that is preliminary to metaphysics. Interestingly, Brummett catches Croasmun
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and Cherwitz on the “laws of thought” as regards to Aristotle’s classical metaphysics
(“On to” 427, 427n8).
45

R. McInerny, Characters 49. McInerny is dealing with a specific text from St.

Thomas here in light on contemporary trends in philosophy. He has clarified:
Needless to say, this does not prevent the logical and epistemological from
having characteristics of their own which reflect our way of thinking about
reality rather than the characteristics of the real itself. The seemingly
endless discussion of the Problem of Universals is only resolvable when
one distinguishes first and second intentions. Predicable universality—to
be said of many things—is not a feature of things as they exist, but of
things as we know and speak of them. In grasping the nature of human
individuals, we form a concept which expresses something found in each
of the singulars. The noun expressing the nature is predicable of them all.
Is human nature universal? As conceived and named by us? Yes. In itself?
No. As found in Socrates and Xanthippe and other individuals? No. Logic
rides piggy-back on reality without its elements being in one-to-one
correspondence with the units of reality. But it is because of the
dependence of our knowledge on the real that non-contradiction enters
logic and acquires the antiseptic form ~ (p ~ p). (49; 49n5)
46

I have in mind here notions from Adler’s Intellect: Mind Over Matter,

Centore’s Being and Becoming: A Critique of Postmodernism, and Shively’s
Compromised Goods: A Realist Critique of Constructionist Politics.
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47

In the literature that is cited in this project, issues of objectivity, subjectivity,

meaning, and signification have been relevant to this wider discussion of the scope and
aim of rhetorical criticism and “critical rhetoric.” Please see the following regarding
“critical rhetoric” and related viewpoints: Charland; Cherwitz and Hikins, “Climbing
the”; Cox, “On ‘Interpreting’”; Gaonkar; Hariman, “Critical Rhetoric”; M. McGee,
“Text, Context”; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric and”; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric in”;
McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory”; McKerrow, “Space and.” Of course, among the
various views of “critical rhetoric,” scholars might look to varying postmodern theorists
to support and/or situate the approach. Yet, to some extent, postmodern suppositions are
generally on the table. Although I certainly differ with some of his philosophical
suppositions, I do think that McKerrow has provided a service in terms of having us look
to the relationship between the critic and the community. I mentioned this in my
presentation on the Whither Ideological Diversity panel at 2009 convention of the
National Communication Association, where Raymie McKerrow was, along with Jim
Kuypers, one of the two respondents to that panel.
48

See McKerrow’s “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis” (450-451). McKerrow

made reference (451, 462) to Michael Calvin McGee’s paper presentation, “Public
Address and Culture Studies,” from the annual meeting of the Central States Speech
Association of April 1987 in St. Louis.
49

M. McGee, “Text, Context” 275-279. The aim and scope of rhetoric and

rhetorical studies forms a central aspect of a larger discussion in a forum in which this
article appeared in an issue of the Western Journal of Speech Communication of 1990
(John Angus Campbell, “Between the”; John Angus Campbell, “Introduction”; Condit,
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“Rhetorical Criticism”; Cox, “On ‘Interpreting’”; Gaonkar; Leff and Sachs; M. McGee,
“Text, Context”).
50

Please see the following regarding Kirk and/or Weaver: Beale, “Richard M.

Weaver”; Bradford, “Weaver”; P. Chapman; Duffy and Jacobi; Guroian, Rallying 31-79,
189-200; Person, Russell Kirk 151-200; Kirschke; Reardon. These sources vary in their
appraisals, but I am making a general statement here that reflects the biases of this project
in terms of reality, truth, context, history, tradition, etc.
51

It is interesting the McKerrow has framed the epistemological focus as a

“Platonic, neo-Kantian perception of rhetoric’s ‘true’ role in society” (“Critical Rhetoric:
Theory” 453-454), for to some extent this might be true in some cases. However, I
should note that, from the view of classical realism, the various postmodern philosophical
influences (including that influencing McKerrow’s work) have also been a result of
idealist philosophizing and systematizing.
52

Please see the following: Cox, “On ‘Interpreting’”; N. Clark; Charland 72-74;

Gaonkar; Hariman, “Critical Rhetoric”; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric in”; J. Murphy,
“Critical Rhetoric”; Ono and Sloop. For example, Hariman has appreciatively challenged
McKerrow’s avoidance of certain principles of modernity with respect to social criticism
and political action, for he has argued that doxa and episteme have a linear relationship
rather than an oppositional one (“Critical Rhetoric”). Also, regarding praxis, in his
suggestions toward a critical focus upon phronesis from the view of philosophical
hermeneutics, Charland has linked his discussion of McKerrow’s work to the larger
question of doxa from the view of contemporary hermeneutics with respect to Aristotle’s
work (72-74). In regard to McKerrow’s dismissal (challenged by Charland) of this
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“virtue tied to ‘an ideal life-style’” (Charland 72, 74n3; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric:
Theory”) Charland wrote:
[…] Admittedly phronesis is in Aristotle a virtue tied to an ideal
conception of the good citizen and leader, but the Aristotelian project
entails more than the celebration of virtue. It also includes a seminal
enquiry into the character of doxastic knowledge and of judgment in the
face of contingency […] For Aristotle, better and worse courses of action
do exist even though they cannot be determined through theoretical
knowledge. The implication of this is that the absence of transcendental
foundations to guide praxis does not preclude intelligent judgment. […]
(72)
In light of the big picture of this project, the classical realist would affirm that at some
level, “intelligent judgment” is not possible with “transcendental foundations” at some
level with respect to phronesis. Charland did cite a relevant article from Warnick
regarding Aristotle on knowledge (Charland 72, 74n4; Warnick, “Judgment,
Probability”). However, although Warnick has well explained the various technical
aspects of Aristotle’s work in terms of their distinct categorical scope and overlapping
theoretical proximity, she seems, at certain points, to miss the integrative implications of
Aristotle’s realism with respect to common sense, human nature, moral virtue, and public
discourse (“Judgment, Probability”). With his suggestion of “a hermeneutic moment” for
the critical rhetoric framework (73), Charland has of course pointed to the work of
Gadamer with respect to Phronesis (72-73), whose work will be of particular focus next
to that of Russell Kirk within Chapter Two of this project.
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53

Please see the following: Hikins, “Realism and” 61. Preceding his discussion of

universals and meaning (“Realism and” 61-64), James Hikins has written:
Rhetorical scholars have eschewed extensive discussion of the theory of
universals, except to decry the Platonic variety en passant, and then as
much on ideological grounds as on the basis of any considered theory of
language (see, for example, McKerrow, 1989, pp. 91, 103-104, 105-106).
This is regrettable, for one would assume that a discipline centrally
concerned with language would find it requisite to provide its own
treatment of the problem of universals. In the absence of such a
discussion, the Platonic questions about common general terms in
language will persist. (Hikins, “Realism and” 61; McKerrow, “Critical
Rhetoric”)
54

I am here, in particular, referring to Aristotle’s statements regarding the

definition and scope of rhetorical discourse from Book I, Chapters 1 and 2 of the
Rhetoric. Although dialectic and rhetoric are mutually relevant, I disagree with Cherwitz
and Hikins regarding their conflation of the two.
55

Hikins, “Realism and” 42. Hikins notes the following:
The claim I am making is that “facts”—often in the form of simple
perceptual judgments—that alone have no great importance or that are
even describable as “trivial” when viewed in isolation, are utterly
indispensable to rhetorical discourse. Questions of pedestrian facticity
(basic perceptual claims) will frequently not be, in and of themselves, of
central importance to a given instance of rhetorical discourse, that is, they
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are not sufficient to alone constitute many significant rhetorical issues.
My claim is that they are, however, necessary for the larger issues of a
given discourse to make sense and to be evaluated. In aggregate, they
comprise the hinges of discourse upon which larger issues of, for example,
rhetorical probability turn. (42n11)
56

Hikins, “Realism and” 45-49. Upon a general reading of the Rhetoric, Hikins’s

explanation proves correct and significant with respect to the place of factual reality for
persuasive discourse. For instance, he mentions Aristotle’s emphasis on facts preceding a
discussion of the topics of rhetorical discourse. According to Hikins, “In expiating this
passage, Aristotle provided precise examples of what he had in mind by ‘facts’ for each
of his three genres of speeches: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. And for each one it
is beyond doubt that he meant by facts the sorts of things that come to be known by
common observation of the pedestrian world” (46).
57

Hikins, “Realism and” 47. Hikins has utilized a translation of Aristotle’s

Rhetoric by L. Cooper of 1932, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
58

One could here consult both Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics along with the

relevant terminological discussions within Aristotle Dictionary by Thomas P. Kiernan.
Please see the following by Fr. Grimaldi: “Aristotle Rhetoric”; “A Note”; “Rhetoric and
the Philosophy.” With respect to argumentation in books, Adler and Van Doren have
emphasized as significant for analytical reading the identification of both the problems
under discussion and the propositions of authors (92-113). The question of judgment and
contingency with respect to Aristotle’s Rhetoric is certainly a focus of those holding to
more postmodern philosophical perspectives, particularly existentialism. One of main
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foci in this line of scholarly work is the place of judgment in rhetoric coupled with their
view of contingency and reality (Hyde, “Existentialism”). For instance, according to
Michael Hyde, “The business of rhetoric is to ‘deal with what is in the main contingent’
(Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1357a15). By informing us about the nature of our certainly
uncertain existence, existentialists hope to call us to responsible action in dealing with
this total contingency. The importance of rhetorical theory and practice is affirmed when
this call is made and understood” (“Existentialism” 214). Although rhetorical matters do
pertain to “‘what is in the main contingent,’” from the realist point of view (inclusive of
Aristotle’s work), because of the integrative scope of humanity, reality, virtue, and
existence, the question of “contingency” would need clarification in terms of the
relationship of contingency to certainty as well as our free will to act within contingent
circumstances (when we have chosen this or that action, we could have chosen
otherwise). The work of both Adler and Maritain are helpful on these matters. Although
I would differ with some of Farrell’s arguments regarding Aristotle’s philosophy with
respect to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (“Philosophy against”), he has helpfully reminded readers
that Aristotle did not have “a radically indeterminate understanding of contingency”
(193). For Farrell, one could “grant, as did Aristotle, that unlikely things happen all the
time without drawing the spurious conclusion that everything necessarily is or should be
treated as radically unlikely,” yet he emphasized as significant “that Aristotle understood
that the realms of the probable and the indefinite only take on being and meaning when
they are placed in opposition to life’s intractable necessities” (193-194). I guess
rhetorically one could consider the “meaning” of contingency for audiences in terms of
“opposition to life’s intractable necessities” in a certain way. Philosophically, though,
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from a realist view, might it be more accurate to say that these contingencies take on
“being” (and probably to some extent meaning) within the context of “life’s intractable
necessities”?
59

Please see the following: Adler, How to Speak; Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the

Philosophy”; Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and Truth”; Shively 46-85, 152n14, 152n15; Wise.
Warnick has provided a thorough and helpful overview of the various elements of
knowledge and practicality in the work of Aristotle, including important clarifications of
scope regarding philosophy, dialectic, and rhetoric (“Judgment, Probability”). Therein,
however, she has challenged Fr. Grimaldi’s interpretation of the Rhetoric regarding truth
and persuasion with respect to Aristotle’s overall corpus (299-302). Regarding this along
with her overall discussion, even as she recognized Aristotle’s realism, I think that there
is more to be said though (in Fr. Grimaldi’s defense) regarding the integrative aspects of
Aristotle’s realism in relation to rhetorical discourse as portrayed by Fr. Grimaldi.
60

Hikins, “Realism and” 48-49. I omitted the following by Hikins: “As Young

and Launer […] noted regarding conspiratist rhetoric, ‘as long as credibility is an
audience-centered rather than a message-centered concept, critics of rhetoric need an
external standard […].” In discussing the issue of probable truth, Adler has utilized the
courtroom example in his challenges to philosophical skepticism. He is referencing M.J.
Young and M.K. Launer’s Flights of Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and SovietAmerican Rhetoric, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
61

Please see the following: Adler, “Challenges of”; Adler, The Four 4-48, 224-

261; Adler, How to Speak; Adler, How to Think 1-50, 204-213, 223-253, 284-293, 329337; Adler, Intellect 79-89, 175-188; Adler, Six 31-63; Adler, Ten 5-107; Adler, “What
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Is”; Adler and Van Doren. Regarding doxa and rhetoric, this is my application of Adler’s
work and it is, as follows: 1) to some extent implied in his use of the courtroom example
regarding opinion, knowledge, perception, and evidence; 2) to some extent indicated
within his discussions of the liberal arts as related to his overall approach to politics,
education, language, and philosophy. Also, in a review of Adler’s Aristotle for
Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy, Halford Ross Ryan (in the Quarterly Journal
of Speech) wrote, “Adler draws from the Rhetoric on three occasions: to discuss the
various goods, the enthymeme, and human opinion. The rhetorical theorist might desire
more explication of the Rhetoric, but Adler treats all of Aristotle’s writings in relative
proportion to Adler’s own objective” (113). The relevant discussion from the book here
on human opinion is Chapter 19, “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” (Adler, Aristotle 160167), for which Adler cited the Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 25 among other works of
Aristotle (204). Robert Hopper’s somewhat critical review of Adler’s Some Questions
About Language would be one entrance point for a larger discussion on Adler’s work
along with classical realism from within the field of communication and rhetorical
studies.
62

Please see the following: Adler, Desires; Adler, How to Speak 21-67; Grimaldi,

“Aristotle Rhetoric”; Grimaldi, “A Note”; Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the Philosophy.”
Books I and II of the Rhetoric by Aristotle indicate this. Like in Haldane’s discussion of
Thomistic ethics for the United States (165), the phrase or notion of the “facts of human
nature” is not uncommon among classical realists.
63

Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the Philosophy” 372. This might point us to one

significant aspects of Richard Weaver’s contribution to 20th century rhetorical theory, as

71

he was under the influence of Plato in his rhetorical theorizing. For this project, I am not
necessarily taking a position on the controversy regarding the similarities or differences
between Plato and Aristotle on the art of rhetoric (Garver, Aristotle’s 21-22; Nichols).
64

Adler, Desires. Adler here was making reference to Aristotle’s Ethics.
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In terms of Aristotle, Garver confronts the question of inferring from a person

as speaker to a person as such in terms of morality (Aristotle’s). For Garver, the
articulation of credibility could be a part of a speech as ethos if it is genuinely attached to
the speech within an argument. His point of differentiation are those instances where
effects are provided by a speaker that do not operate within argument, but are an attempt
to boost one’s ethos outside of an argument.
66

This is clear upon a reading of any of the three books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

See Adler’s The Four Dimensions of Philosophy (145-148) regarding one’s study of
rhetoric as an “object of thought.” An example of this might be the often cited P. Albert
Duhamel’s “The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression.”
67

At one level, my statement here is based upon my biases expressed in this

chapter and in the Introduction regarding Aristotle and realism and rhetoric. Of course,
there are very visible aspects of the Rhetoric that point in this direction.
68

Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Question 29, Article 6
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Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 4, 1382a (269)
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This statement is based on an approach to Aristotle’s Rhetoric from the

standpoint of classical realism of the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition. The
contingency of the sphere of action is affirmed in general, but not apart from
considerations of necessity within reality. It should be noted that Aristotle does indicate
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that many of the facts of rhetoric are those within the sphere of contingency, but again,
this does not mean that necessity is not a consideration in terms of the big picture of
reality.
71

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 86.
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Regarding the art of rhetoric and the “whole person,” please see the following:

Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the Philosophy”; Weaver, “Language is.”
73

Zhao’s “Rhetoric as Praxis: An Alternative to the Epistemic Approach” gives

some helpful angles on the whole rhetoric as epistemic discussion in the discipline, while
looking to move to the realm of “social praxis” for considerations of rhetoric. However,
a realist might ask when reading Zhao’s article, to what extent does rhetoric actually
“generate normative knowledge” (256) for issues of morality, politics, etc.?
74

Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the Philosophy” 374. Fr. Grimaldi referenced

Aristotle’s Poetics, 1449b 35 (374, 365n19).
75

Please see note 43 above. For specific discussion of “signs” in Aristotle’s

Rhetoric, please see Fr. Grimaldi’s “Semeion, Tekmerion, Eikos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.”
76

Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 2, 1357a (111). For Garver, this text is

evidence for the centrality of deliberation in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory (Notes 110).
77

This is a direct adaptation and application by me of Adler’s explanation on

reality, thought, and language (The Four 75-123) to the realm of rhetorical discourse
78

Please see Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics on this matter of course. Also, one

can look to the relevant terminological discussions within Aristotle Dictionary by
Thomas P. Kiernan. One might look to Weaver’s The Ethics of Rhetoric and Natanson’s
“The Limits of Rhetoric” for a discussion on the roles of and relationship between
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rhetoric and dialectic, which was written in part with respect to Weaver’s The Ethics of
Rhetoric. Warnick’s “Judgment, Probability, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric” is helpful here of
course. Please see Garver’s “Comments on ‘Rhetorical Analysis Within a PragmaDialectical Framework: The Case of R.J. Reynolds’” for an interesting discussion of
Aristotle on rhetoric and dialectic in light of contemporary notions of the same two arts
as influenced by modernity.
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The title of Madden’s article is “The Enthymeme: Crossroads of Logic,

Rhetoric, and Metaphysics,” which Fr. Grimaldi referenced in his “Rhetoric and the
Philosophy of Aristotle” (371; 374n1).
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Please see the following from Garver: Aristotle’s; “The Political.” Eugene

Garver has made reference to Fr. Grimaldi’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric
(Aristotle’s 252-253n9, 256n26, 258n32, 258n34, 284n20). Garver’s explanation at
certain points differs some from Fr. Grimaldi regarding aspects of rhetorical
argumentation (76-103, 139-171).
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Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Part 1, Book 1.
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part,

Question 7
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Article
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Article

1
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Grimaldi, “A Note” 173; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, Chapter 1, 1355a (101).

This passage is at the center of Fr. Grimaldi’s article, “Rhetoric and Truth: A Note on
Aristotle. ‘Rhetoric’ 1355a 21-24.”
86

Fr. Grimaldi is building his own translation and interpretation here (“A Note”

174-176).
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Grimaldi, “A Note” 176-177. To conclude the article, Fr. Grimaldi connects

this interpretation to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1172a 35-36): “‘Whenever
language is out of tune with the perceived facts it is despised, and it destroys truth
besides’” (“A Note” 177).
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Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Part 1, 1355a-1355b (101, 103). Garver has

emphasized the discovery aspect here, as persuasive success depends on elements outside
of the rhetor’s artistic control, “including the prejudices of the audience and the strength
of the case” (Notes 102). Garver deals at length in his work with the difference between
rhetoric and sophistic from Aristotle’s view (Aristotle’s; Notes 102), which ultimately for
Garver points to rhetoric as an art that rests in argument in given political contexts about
practical matters.
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My words here were prompted by John Lyne’s response to the panel, In The

Bosom of Metaphysics: The Spaciousness of Weaver’s Rhetoric, at the National
Communication Association convention of 2006 (on which I participated), in which he
emphasized that for Aristotle, one looks for the evidence that is adequate to the
discussion or case at hand.
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Guided by varying philosophical suppositions, discussions of

prudence/practical wisdom are somewhat frequent in various academic disciplines
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(Arthos, “Where There”; Eubanks, “On Rhetoric”; Farrell, “Philosophy against”; Garver,
“Aristotle’s Natural”; Garver, “Eugene Garver’s”; Hariman, “Prudence/Performance”;
Hauser; Jacobi, “Professional” 120-125; Kuypers; Warnick, “Judgment, Probability”).
As will be seen as the project goes forth, prudence was a virtue that Kirk often discussed
(The Politics).
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Please see the following: Adler, Desires; Aquinas, Commentary; Aquinas,

Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Question 47; R. McInerny, Ethica
Thomistica; Montgomery, “Virtue and”; O’Neil. According to Fr. Grimaldi, “[…] The
enthymeme in the field of probable demonstration which is the demonstration of Rhetoric
parallels in a broad sense the role of apodeixis, or the demonstrative syllogism, in the
field of Metaphysics, just as the practical syllogism plays a similar role in his Ethics” (“A
Note” 192). His comparison here indicates the integrative approach of Aristotle’s
realism.
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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q.47, A.2, ad 2.
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Please see the following: R. McInerny, Characters 84-91; R. McInerny, Ethica

Thomistica. McInerny in his work often brings forward implicitly the relationship
between knowledge, action, and the liberal arts. He has done this explicitly too
(“Introduction: ‘A Bracelet’”). I will expand on this a bit more in the project. At this
point, I am applying McInerny’s explanation to the discussion in light of the later
development in the project.
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Hikins provided a discussion of “appearance” realism in general and as it

relates to “rhetorical perspectivism” in “Realism and its Implications for Rhetorical
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Theory” (31-33, 52-59, 71). More specific discussion on my use of perspective will
follow in Chapter Three.
95

Gorman 83-142. Please see Adler’s article, “Challenges of Philosophies in

Communication.” Sister Gorman’s book, General Semantics and Contemporary
Thomism, which was utilized by Johannesen in his discussion of Weaver and Hayakawa
(“Conflicting Philosophies”), provides an outstanding comparison of Thomism to
General Semantics. Along the way, Sister Gorman outlines key elements of the classical
realist view on language, thought, reality, etc. She admits of the challenges of
ascertaining meaning among peoples within and between cultures, but takes a stand
against both epistemological and moral skepticism.
96

Please see Adler’s “Challenges of Philosophies in Communication.” One has to

consider Adler’s views on the liberal arts alongside of his classical realism with respect to
thought, language, and reality (Adler, “Challenges of”; Adler, How to Speak; Adler, How
to Think 233-253, 284-293, 329-337; Adler, “What Is”; Adler and Van Doren). Adler
specifically did tie intention to rhetoric (please note that I end this chapter with intention
“properly understood”). More on the matter of intention from the classical realist view,
along with discussions of understanding and knowledge, will follow in Chapter Two and
in Chapter Three.
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Chapter Two
Rhetoric, Imagination, and the Question of a Postmodern Conservatism
As a spokesperson for American order, Russell Kirk had and has a notable place
among conservatives in the United States. Within such books as The American Cause,
America’s British Culture, and The Roots of American Order, Kirk endeavored to praise
and to defend “the roots of order” in the United States of America.1 As we will see in this
and the next chapter, notions of reality and continuity played a role in Kirk’s attempt to
inform our American “historical consciousness.”2 Kirk once wrote, “The moral
imagination of the man of letters, combining with the political and historical imagination
of the talented statist, may yet lead us back from the fleshpots of abnormity to the altar of
the permanent things” (Enemies 302). In conjunction with a rhetorical study of The
Roots of American Order within Chapter Three regarding human nature, this chapter
develops a realist framework toward a consideration of the theoretical merit of Kirk’s
overall theme of “imagination” beyond conservative discourse. These steps can assist in
thinking about his corpus as it relates to a realist rhetoric of order that is attentive to both
the contextual and “supracontextual” aspects of rhetorical discourse.
Prompted by Kirk’s influence upon conservatism and his focus on order, Gleaves
Whitney has spoken of the forging of “politics, rhetoric, and the Permanent Things into a
powerful unity” within American history in terms of truth, goodness, beauty, and love.3
As will be seen in this and the next chapters, there is a communicative link within Kirk’s
endeavors between the human imagination and the “Permanent Things.” Jeremy Beer
has argued that “[…] fresh studies of Kirk’s thought will have to transcend the limitations
posed when on approaches Kirk on (literally) his own terms,” which will require “prior

78

explication” of the core of Kirk’s endeavors, “not his particular principles and ideas, as
important as these are” (“The Idea”). He explained that “Future Kirk scholars must
attempt to exhume his meanings and illuminate his rhetorical strategies”4 Beer has also
argued that a fresh look at Kirk will go beyond “the conservative political tradition”
while also stepping “outside of Kirk’s own idiom so that one doesn’t get bogged down in
the vagaries of terms like ‘permanent things’ and even the ‘moral imagination,’” which
“perhaps, is the analytical tool that will allow us to destroy Kirk the icon and recover
Kirk the man.”5
For the study of American movement conservatism, Mortimer Adler’s work,
which is extensively employed in this project, provides a bit of critical distance. As
Hyrum Lewis has well highlighted, although Adler was a proponent of metaphysical
realism before and after the WWII era as against cultural relativism, he was no fellowtraveler with the American right as it developed on the political front—he was a
proponent of a type of Aristotelian framework of democratic and economic reform
(consider, for instance, his advocacy of world government).6 From the vantage point of
General Semantics, S.I. Hayakawa recognized a similar cultural and political distinction,
yet he grouped Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler, “the Divine Doctors of the Great
Books Movement,” with Richard Weaver, Russell Kirk, and others for a critique of the
“New Conservatives.”7 However, Frederick Wilhelmsen, who as a Thomist philosopher
was a contributor to the intellectual literature of conservatism, considered the “Great
Books” programs such as that of Adler and Hutchins as “Enemies of Wisdom” for the
study of philosophy, particularly with reference to Catholic institutions of learning in the
United States (“The Great”). For what was arguably similar for Adler and Wilhelmsen
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regarding the necessary distinctions between textual meaning and philosophical truth, he
lamented that an intense educational focus upon books, for instance, eclipses this
important distinction as it relates to the pedagogical and habitual aspects of philosophical
activity.8 Of course, Adler is not the final word on Aristotle or St. Thomas, but he was, as
Ralph McInerny has commemorated, a significant voice for both classical realism and
liberal education in the United States of America throughout the 20th century (“Memento
Mortimer”).
In his book The Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk (preceded by a series of
articles), Gerald J. Russello has provided a layer of study that is conducive to Beer’s
suggestion by placing Kirk’s endeavors within a larger conversation about conservatism
and postmodernism (others have touched upon this with Kirk, but his analysis is more
extensive).9 In a time of popularity for conservative discourse, he has emphasized that the
often celebrated influence of Kirk, whose “‘aesthetic’ conservatism’” (a term applied by
Donald Atwell Zoll in 1972) was a key element in Kirk’s assembling (in Zoll’s analysis)
“‘presumably disparate currents as religious neo-orthodoxy, literary agrarianism, moral
realism, and anti-egalitarianism’” around a “‘prescriptive center’” from the tradition of
Edmund Burke, which in Russello’s view, “seems to have little bearing in the
postmodern political landscape, and the coalition that the center forged is in tatters.”10
Pointing to legitimate doubts as to whether the admirers and allies of Kirk from the past
and present have sufficiently grasped his work, Russello has observed that “Kirk’s
thinking on community, loyalty to region, and imagination find fewer contemporary
echoes in conservative thought, even as they appear with increasing frequency in
mainstream discourse.”11 For the basis of conservatism and “a critique of liberalism,” so
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as to differentiate a “strand of conservative thought” from the various types of
conservatisms, he has focused upon, among other related aspects, the place of
imagination in Kirk’s corpus (5). Russello’s inquiry: Might Kirk’s “aesthetic,
imaginative conservatism” have “anything to say in the contemporary world” (5)?
Russello’s writings are a piece of a larger interdisciplinary literature (including
the field of communication) on the dispersion and direction of movement conservatism
since the time of Kirk and Weaver until the present day, which includes coverage of such
disputations as the dynamics of the “culture wars,” the merits of “democratic capitalism,”
and the aims of foreign policy.12 At bottom, Russello has argued that because of Kirk’s
engagement with such areas of study as community, locality, imagination, sentiment, and
religiosity, his work has a certain congruity with the postmodern critique of and
departure from both modernity and modernism, yet in approach is different in some
theological, philosophical, and political respects from postmodernist thought—hence,
Kirk is a key figure for an emergent postmodern conservatism (The Postmodern; “Russell
Kirk and the Critics”). There is consensus within the relevant literature regarding the
postmodern significance of Kirk’s strong stand against modern liberalism, even with
Kirk’s variance from the more extreme versions of postmodernism.13 However, Daniel
McCarthy, who wrote that “Kirk the symbol had become uncoupled from Kirk the man—
a very postmodern turn of events,” has raised some serious points of regarding Russello’s
book that have significant philosophical merit.14
For McCarthy (a libertarian), Russello’s evidence ultimately shows that Kirk and
the postmodernists share at best a convenient alliance against Enlightenment liberalism.15
In the Epilogue (“Is Life Worth Living?”) of The Sword of Imagination: Memoirs of a
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Half-Century of Literary Conflict, published not long before his death, Kirk wrote that
“he had become in his convictions both pre-modern and post-modern” in light of his
acceptance and affirmation of religiosity and providence alongside of the waning of the
influence of modernist ideology upon “the intellectual world from 1860 to 1960,” as
again “in biology as in physics, the scientific disciplines had begun to enter upon the
realm of mystery.”16 Russello did not utilize this reference, yet it does supply evidence
for his contention that Kirk recognized something postmodern along the way in his career
in relation to the demise of modernity (The Postmodern 1-27, 177-213). Was Kirk’s
recognition of a “postmodern age” primarily about what McCarthy has identified as “the
decay of classical liberalism” (“The Pomo”)? Russello has provided some coordinates
for weighing this question. However, I think that McCarthy has pointed to what should
be at least one major crossroads of consideration for the question of a postmodern
conservatism.
Historians oftentimes operate with a “philosophy of history” or a “theory of
history” regarding the movement of past events, while they might also “talk
philosophically” beyond the purview of their “specialized” historical research (Adler,
The Four 3-71; Adler, How to Think 435-445; Adler, “The Philosopher”; Adler, “The
Philosopher […] Continued”; Adler and Van Doren 234-254). Russello introduced
Kirk’s approach to history as a shaping of the past “through the stories and events a
society deems worthy of repeating,” for “repetition, and the choice of what bears
repeating, becomes tradition” (The Postmodern 6). While for the most part rejecting “the
Enlightenment vision of the objectivity of fact,” Kirk had exhibited sensitivity to the
subjective elements of history where historians participate “in the creation of history, and
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the objects of knowledge cannot be separated fully from those who study them” (6).
Although presently a “‘postmodern’” notion that is common, “Kirk used this
understanding of history for conservative purposes […] to dislodge a seemingly
‘objective’ modern history that seemed merely to confirm liberal premises,” for “[t]he
past changes, and how it changes and why are in the hands of the culture generally and
the historian in particular” (6).
McCarthy has partially confronted Russello’s postmodern explanation of Kirk’s
historical approach history, yet besides objecting to the application of scientific thought
to a field such as history, he has argued that Russello did not give ample discussion to
“power” and “truth” as it relates to the postmodernists and the traditionalists, for “Kirk
was a realist: Objectivity may be elusive, he believed, but the truth is out there, whether
we can grasp it fully or not.”17 Certainly, as McCarthy indicates, Kirk was not attracted to
ideological theorizing (“The Pomo”), yet Russello’s book does point to a dimension of
Kirk’s work that pertains to the abuse of political, economic, and legal power (The
Postmodern 104-176). As I see it, McCarthy’s strong point here is Kirk’s realism. One
might here recall Cherwitz and Darwin’s additive critique of “critical rhetoric” toward the
value of epistemology (“Beyond Reductionism”; “Toward a”): Knowledge of what power
is should underlie the study what power does.
Russello does not necessarily downplay realist assumptions regarding Kirk,
especially in his discussion on natural law, which is probably the most explicit aspect of
the book in terms of realism—Kirk was a realist of some sort and this is assumed in the
book.18 As McCarthy has indicated, even if more depth of theoretical engagement could
have been provided, Russello has valuably opened a door for future Kirk scholarship
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through a closer study of postmodern thought, like that of Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom
Russello discusses along the way in his book (“The Pomo”). Arguably, at least from the
vantage point of this project, realism is a philosophical matter that is in need of more
emphasis as against postmodernism, even as one considers Kirk’s strong stand against
modernity. As Gadamer’s hermeneutics still assumes a historicized view of
philosophical questions amid the changing elements of reality and cultures, it seems that
realists ultimately have to confront the more moderate postmodernisms of scholars such
as Hans Gadamer (Centore, Being 173-227; Centore, “Classical Christian”). How then
does Kirk’s realism square with Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics? At the center of
Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach is not “power” or “truth,” but “understanding”
(Philosophical Hermeneutics 18-43).
Although Russello has clearly placed his arguments within a larger conversation,
scholarly study pertaining to what is now termed “postmodernism” has somewhat of a
history in the literature of conservatism since about the 1950s (for instance, by such
realists as Thomas Molnar, Marion Montgomery, Ewa Thompson, and Frederick
Wilhelmsen).19 As Russello has highlighted, realists such as Peter Augustine Lawler have
explicitly embraced a “postmodern conservatism” that looks to bring forward premodern
and realist assumptions to engage, in light of the limitations and failures of modernity,
what are typically the philosophical biases of postmodernism.20 As stated in the
Introduction, this project rests with Richard Weaver’s contention that “a conservative is a
realist” (“Conservatism and Libertarianism”). My putting of Weaver’s work alongside of
postmodernism is not necessarily an original contribution, yet the rhetorical,
philosophical, and political dynamics of his work are of import to this project,
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particularly for what Walter H. Beale has phrased as “the alienation of language from
reality.”21 One can stand with Montgomery, however, in holding that Weaver needed to
account for more of reality in his stand against the modernism of modernity
(“Consequences”). Weaver’s contributions to both rhetorical theory and conservative
argumentation will be at the forefront at later points in this project, yet this present
chapter also carries his contention that “a conservative is a realist” to the conversation.
From the Introduction herein, one might also here go back to Cribb’s reminder of
Kirk’s view of conservatism as “a disposition of openness to reality” and “the negation of
ideology” (“Why” 57). In view of the relevant literature on conservatism and
postmodernism, these words suggest either a hermeneutical and phenomenological quest
“to the things themselves” or an advisement and exemplification to go from things to
thinking.22 Montgomery, of course, would have us look beyond our present political
categories of “liberal” and “conservative” to both a recognition and a stewardship of our
intellection of things within and across communities (“Consequences”; “Tradition and”;
“Wanted: A Better”). As F.F. Centore has well outlined (not directly with respect these
political categories), there is a “foundational” difference between postmodernism and
realism regarding philosophical assumptions on being and becoming (Being; “Classical
Christian”).
To grapple with the question of a postmodern conservatism, one might borrow
from Michael Calvin McGee (who has informed and furthered the “critical rhetoric”
movement) toward a focus upon “[p]ostmodernity” to keep “attention on the conditions,
situations, and circumstances which determine, influence, prompt postmodernism,” which
allows a consideration the work of scholars as responsive to “rhetorical situations.”23
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Although “[r]eality is more at issue” with this sort of attentiveness, a classical realist
should depart from the following in McGee’s argument:
[…] The possibility of making meaning by attaching social to reality is a
compelling indication that the stuff of Reality is changing. One would not
choose the term if it were not already suspected that Modern accounts of
Reality have failed. Social reality, I mean to say, is Real by virtue of its
Sociality, not by virtue of its Rationality or its simple empirical Being.
Reality is Real just because it is social. […] (“Suffix”)
One classical realist revision might go as follows: The sociality of humanity is real
because it is natural to human beings who, sharing a common human nature, are uniquely
a part of reality as they think and talk about reality.24 The dynamics of epistemology,
idealism, and constructivism, which form a sort of continuum between modernism and
postmodernism, have been covered herein within Chapter One.
Centore, who has used the term “hyper-modern” for the relativism of
postmodernism in both the popular and academic realms, has detailed within his account
what one might call a postmodern condition (Being). Much of the discussion regarding
conservatism and “the postmodern” has centered on the conditions of postmodernity with
respect to either the negatives of modernity or the tenets of postmodernism (or both).
Lawler, when arguing that modernity is now susceptible to judgment, has used that same
term “hypermodern” for the “allegedly postmodern characteristics” of what is typically
postmodernism (“Conservative Postmodernism”)—in his view, it is ultimately a matter of
proper philosophical direction, particularly regarding human nature. Although promoting
more of a studious engagement with postmodernism rather than a explicitly conservative
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embrace of the term “postmodern,” Ewa Thompson’s analyses suggest something like a
postmodern condition (in both the academic and popular realms) because of the influence
of postmodernist philosophy (“Body, Mind”; “Dialectical”; “Postmodernism”; “Ways
Out”). All of these above discussions, from their own angles of entry, magnify the
disintegration and fragmentation of the present day, which reminds one, of course, of the
social and discursive studies that accompany the “critical rhetoric” scholarship where
there is a grappling with postmodern condition along with a favoring of this or that
postmodern line of thought (John Angus Campbell, “Between the Fragment”; Condit,
“Rhetorical Criticism”; Cox, “On ‘Interpreting’”; Cyphert; Gaonkar; Hariman, “Critical
Rhetoric”; M. McGee, “Text, Context”; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric in”; J. Murphy,
“Critical Rhetoric”). However, regardless of how one ascertains a postmodern condition,
the philosophical matter of “postmodernism” hinges on our grasp of, relationship to, and
place within the one real world of practice, discourse, and knowledge, which extends
philosophically, of course, into rhetorical studies.31 Notwithstanding differences on
linguistics, metaphysics, or epistemology, both classical and contemporary realists hold
to the independence of reality as such as assumptive for both everyday and theoretical
discourse (Adler, The Four; Calvet de Magalhães; Casey; Centore, Being; Ellis; Hikins,
“Realism and”; R. McInerny, Characters; Ronen; “Signs in General”; E. Thompson,
“Ways Out.”)—it is an inescapable fact, even in postmodernity and even for
postmodernists.
In The Sword of Imagination: Memoirs of a Half-Century of Literary Conflict,
Kirk recounted his response to President Richard Nixon’s concern about the future of
America:
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“That depends upon public belief, Mr. President,” Kirk suggested.
“Despair feeds upon despair, hope upon hope. If most people believe the
prophets of despair, they will seek out private hidie-holes and cease to
cooperate for the common good. But if most people say, ‘We are in a bad
way, but we still have the resources and the intelligence and the will to
work a renewal’—why, they will be roused by the exigency to common
action and reform. It is all a matter of belief.”32
McGee’s recommendation and Kirk’s words prompt a turn to Lloyd Bitzer’s model of
“rhetorical situation” (“Functional”; “The Rhetorical”). Medhurst has emphasized the
importance of both context and exigency toward adequately studying the argumentation
of conservatism as a movement (“Resistance, Conservatism” 109-111). However, with
the sort of depth that Medhurst has encouraged, one might also look to see if a scholar
such as Kirk can enhance our theoretical understanding of rhetoric beyond conservative
discourse. Although Bitzer’s overall work has been informed by pragmatism, his
situational model is somewhat conducive to a realist approach to rhetorical studies.33
Viewed as either pragmatist or realist, his assumption of an objective reality for both
situational participants and rhetorical critics is a primary point of contention or support,
for the question of “situation,” as Barry Brummett has noted, is at bottom an ontological
one.34
James Hikins has suggested to me an application of the constitutive function of
perspectives for rhetoric to Bitzer’s model of “rhetorical situation,” specifically with
respect to the standard of “fitting response” (Telephone). Drawing from the realist
scholars of “rhetorical perspectivism” (including Hikins) in Chapter One, I granted a
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perspectival component to rhetoric, yet from the view of classical realism. From a
perspective, a rhetor associates and differentiates in view of the evaluative judgments of
audiences within the sphere of “prescriptive” truth, possibly toward the preservation of
virtue. For the bigger picture of developing a realist rhetoric of order, Kirk’s imaginative
standpoint provides one way of taking the human imagination as a formative aspect of
perspectives within and across “rhetorical situations.” Unlike Weaver, he was not a
rhetorical theorist, yet as accentuated by both Russello (The Postmodern) and Whitney
(“Recovering Rhetoric”), Kirk was sensitive to the importance of rhetoric and language.
This is certainly evident in Kirk’s commentaries and commemorations on the “Ethical
Labor” of his friend, Richard Weaver (Confessions 193-196; “Ethical Labor”; Foreword;
The Sword 172-175). Specifically, though, how might Kirk as historian theoretically
inform rhetorical studies with respect to the human imagination? To this I will return in
the next chapter with The Roots of American Order. If Kirk is going to be significant for
building a realist rhetoric of order, one must first begin an account of his realism.
They key question at this point, then, pertains to the congruity between Kirk’s
historical approach and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Russello has written in
his introduction:
Postmodern figures help to throw light on Kirk’s criticism of modernity,
despite their great differences with conservative ideas. Kirk himself
emphasized the social construction of much of our lives by tradition and
custom that rendered the modern “autonomous self” simply no longer
credible. Other postmodern thinkers, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer in his
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Truth and Method, […] have voiced understandings of tradition similar in
some respects to those of Kirk.35
He also emphasized later in the book that Gadamer’s notion of our ongoing relationship
with tradition for knowledge and understanding was similar to Kirk’s traditionalist
view.36 Kirk’s appraisals of modernity in terms technology, science, and communication
do bear a high degree of resemblance to that of Gadamer (Philosophical Hermeneutics
25-26, 107-112). Does he point to the same solution though? Regarding hermeneutics in
relation to “serious historical research” (11-13), Gadamer has written, “It is imagination
[Phantasie] that is the decisive function of the scholar. Imagination naturally has a
hermeneutical function and serves the sense for what is questionable. It serves the ability
to expose real, productive questions, something in which, generally speaking, only he
who masters all the methods of his science succeeds” (12). In Kirk’s parlance, Gadamer
would certainly be under the category of a “scholar” rather than an “intellectual,” as he
was more given to a close study of texts (classical and contemporary) rather than a
proclivity to see the “life-world” primarily in terms of power and economics, although
those terms could possibly be a part of a hermeneutic inquiry within Gadamer’s
approach, at least in application.37
Ewa Thompson has argued that the “centering” of meaning in terms of language
and epistemology is most significant for conservatives as regards areas of academic
contention pertaining to identity, community, and morality—this is more important, in
her view, than disputes about parties and policies (“Ways Out” 196-206). As
postmodernism goes beyond denying religious belief (“blunt atheism”) to challenge what
has been traditionally assumed as given on the natural level, this epistemological task of
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“centering” seems to be even more pressing than a defense of religion (197-200, 204206). According to Thompson, “A feature that distinguishes postmodern discourse from
modernity and pre-modernity is the insistence on a discourse-without-presence […].”38
Recalling her own scholarly experiences of trying “to use the insights of ‘genealogical’
discourse while in fact upholding ‘tradition,’” her own “logocentric concerns” were
countered by “ways of constructing identity,” which “does away with any kind of center
that identity was assumed to possess in traditional discourse,” for “in postmodern
discourse, one can only speak of a process of assembling, without ever reaching the
universal.”39 Yet, if Gadamer’s work puts us back into the realm of appreciating
“tradition,” is it “logocentric,” and if so, in what way?
One must also then ask the same question regarding Kirk. As central to his book,
Russello has written, “[…] Kirk thought that disorder in the imagination was an
inevitable feature of the modern world. People search for individual identity through the
images that surround them, and modern images are based either on the false science of
materialism or a debased sensuality, which Kirk denominated the ‘diabolic imagination’”
(The Postmodern 5). Kirk certainly upheld this basis of “identity” in true and false
imagery (Decadence 220-233), but part of Kirk’s quotation that Russello provides, as
follows, will be germane: “‘Images are representations of mysteries, necessary because
mere words are tools that break in the hand, and it has not pleased God that man should
be saved by abstract reason alone.’”40 For Kirk, according to Russello, conservatism
should entail the fashioning of “the appropriate images to convey this sense of mystery to
each generation” as “an attempt at reconstruction,” while recognizing “that engagement
of the sentiments through an imaginative rendering of history was just as important as an
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appeal to reason” (5-6). To consider Russello’s consequent application, how would this
type of conservatism as “hermeneutic” hold up for both the defense and critique of
“existing institutions” to get beyond, as mentioned by Russello, the sort of “situational
conservatism” articulated years ago by Samuel Huntington?41
One’s evaluating if Kirk and Gadamer were “logocentric” in the same way
matters for this and other questions. To introduce “key substantive areas of Kirk’s
conservative vision,” Russello has written, “A society uses history, law, and politics to
construct its identity, and each of these factors has been a consistent focus of
conservative thought” (The Postmodern 6). Even as he “was sensitive to the importance
of subjectivity in history” while rejecting “the Enlightenment vision of the objectivity of
fact,” did Kirk really hold that “[t]he past changes” (6)? If historians participate “in the
creation of history,” what of the relationship between “the objects of knowledge” and
“those who study them” (6)? In his book, Russello has, at times, employed what I will
call here for this project the language of construction. Although I am not aware of any
point where Kirk utilized the language of construction, it can be discussed from a realist
vantage point. According to Ewa Thompson, “Nationality is a continuous process of
construction, agreed; but that does not mean that nationhood can be reduced to a
construction process” (“Ways Out” 196). Of course, we construct arguments—that is a
common expression. Because of the difficultly of ascertaining the reality of the past,
even Adler and Van Doren discussed the ways in which historical facts as stated
propositionally are conventional to the extent that a matter is in dispute or under study
(185-187). They have even explained that facts are somewhat “culturally determined,”
although factual agreement across cultures is possible (187). To the extent that language
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use is involved in the formation and life of communities, one could also speak in a
certain way of our constructing “social realities,” as both the linguistic and non-linguistic
practices that are expressive of human understanding are a part of our life within reality
(O’Callaghan 292-294).
However, Gadamer did not often utilize a direct language of construction in his
writings.42 Craig Waddell has classified Gadamer as a “contemporary constructivist
philosopher,” yet because of Gadamer’s openness to “prejudices of authority and
tradition” for the possibility of “understanding,” Waddell has concluded that his
“dialectical approach […] draws upon both constructivism and positivism and, thus,
avoids both self-exempting fallacy and the extremes of the two positions” (112-114).
Within a discussion of conservatism as regards “historical imagination” (The Postmodern
67-74), Russello has observed that Kirk did hold to the “evidence of commonality”
among disparate points of view, even as it was understood before the rise of postmodern
thought “that each person ‘reads’ texts and circumstances differently” (74). According to
Russello, “Yet this insight should not diminish the work of the individual or deny the
possibility that other readers may find meaning—even the same meaning—in the same
text or circumstance” (74). To be fair to Russello on the language of construction, he is
making a case for a type of postmodern conservatism, and one can “read” Kirk’s
discourse and life in a particular way to amplify an argument. Scholars have “read”
Edmund Burke, for instance, as exemplary for rhetorical discourse (Bormann 304-305;
Bryant, “Edmund Burke: A Generation”; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: The New”; Leff and
Sachs), as supportive of “value-centered historicism” (Ryn), and as indicative of classical
realism (Pappin, The Metaphysics). So, it is fair to take Russello as engaging (in a non-
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reductionist way) more moderate versions of postmodernism with his use of the language
of construction.
Russello has articulated that Kirk’s appropriation of history as transformative
“into tradition” leads to the notion “that institutions or social practices worth conserving
must be transmitted in new forms if are to survive,” yet he explained that Kirk did not
base his view on “a mild form of utilitarianism,” but “on a perception not of superiority,
but of familiarity” (The Postmodern 6-7). Yet, what of Russello’s statement that “one
cannot escape one’s own tradition”?(7) How does one take that in terms of a realist
epistemology, or in light of Kirk’s sort of realism? Of course, it is difficult to argue with
Russello’s contention that, “[t]he concept of the autonomous individual at the center of
much contemporary liberal political theory is false” (7). In light of certain criticisms of
Kirk’s defense of existing institutions amidst the inevitability of change, Russello pointed
in a helpful direction by stating, “This mischaracterizes Kirk as a reactionary and ignores
his strong assertion that conservatism is an attitude or set of attitudes that define one’s
stance toward reality, not devotion to particular social institutions” (7). Terms such as
“modernity” and “postmodernism” have taken on a degree of complexity, yet Kirk held
that a rationalistic approach to solving “fundamental moral problems arising from
humanity’s fallen nature” along with “a mechanistic view of the human imagination”
were characteristic of the former (9). As Russello highlighted, from Kirk’s standpoint,
lacking imagination, this “liberal order” was failing, while “a new age that had discarded
both liberal rationality and the premodern tradition represented in the writings of Burke”
was emerging as “the Age of Sentiments,” which Kirk likened (in 1980) to a “‘PostModern Age.’”43 However, for the larger argument of this chapter, it is again germane to
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observe that in Kirk’s Modern Age essay, “The Age of Sentiments,” in discussing this
new era against “the Age of Discussion,” he wrote, “Words are tools that break in the
hand; and this word ‘sentiments’ is employed loosely in a variety of ways” (229). I will
return to Russello’s comparative distinction between these two ages within the
concluding section of this project. For now, the matter of words as tools is theoretically
on the table.
Yet with this “Age of Sentiments,” it is recognized “that humanity is moved by
the heart first,” yet this “must be disciplined […] by tradition and imagination to serve as
a coherent basis for an individual or society,” so Kirk’s communicative efforts “intersects
with postmodern thought in surprising ways, although the distinctions are equally sharp”
(Russello, The Postmodern 11-12). In Russello’s account of Kirk’s approach, people
make and re-make tradition through temporal choices, even as tradition pre-exists these
persons, yet the notion “that individuals always act within a tradition, even if they change
it, is an opinion shared by Kirk and the postmoderns.”44 Human beings “are traditionmaking animals and will always seek a stable expression of agree-upon social custom,”
as then “[a]uthority comes into play to make decisions as to” the acceptance of this or
that tradition, yet “given the long time-horizon of tradition, judgments can be made
among particular social practices” (25-26). According to Russello, however, Kirk was
not a “‘postmodern’” in the sense of being a “trendy” relativist,” as he “advocated core
truths based in human nature”—“the ‘Permanent Things’ of human existence (26).
Russello has helpfully emphasized that although both postmodernism and conservatism
can be seen as relying upon historicism for relevant arguments, Kirk was “historically
conscious” while accepting the possibility of truths within and across history, which
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varies from the typically postmodernist evasion from truth or meaning amid symbolic
conflict and ideological politics—prudence was the key for Kirk’s politics (26).
However, the philosophical question of “logocentrism,” as established by Ewa Thompson
(“Dialectical”; “Ways Out”), will impact how we recreate or make tradition, which is a
key point of comparison between Kirk and Gadamer.
Gadamer has inquired as to the centrality of “the problem of language” in relation
to “modern science,” as “the question of how our natural view of the world—the
experience of the world that we have as we simply live out our lives—is related to the
unassailable and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronouncements of
science” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 3). He argued that since the 17th century,
philosophical studies have had the “task” of mediating “this new employment of man’s
cognitive and constructive capacities with the totality of our experience of life,” which
has included an “attempt to bring the topic of language to the center of philosophical
concern” (3-4). According to Gadamer, “Language is the fundamental mode of operation
of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world,”
so, “we always have in view the pronouncements of the sciences, which are fixed in
nonverbal signs (4). He argued, “And our task is to reconnect the objective world of
technology, which the sciences place at our disposal and discretion, with those
fundamental orders of our being that are neither arbitrary nor manipulable by us, but
rather simply demand our respect” (4). Seen from a variety of viewpoints, this dilemma
of “modern science” is indicative of the impact of modernity, which is certainly relevant
to Kirk’s communicative endeavors. Also, Russello’s discussion of Kirk on “place” in
relation to architecture (The Postmodern 47-52) points to a certain congruity with
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Gadamer’s focus upon aesthetics (Philosophical Hermeneutics 3-17, 95-104). However,
Kirk’s criticism of the “rootlessness of much of modern life and the associated loss of
place as a defining characteristic of existence” was more of a notion of “alienation” from
“aesthetic judgment” (as opposed to “into”) as problematic, for Kirk was more inclined
than Gadamer to equate beauty, truth, and goodness at the level of “aesthetic
consciousness.”45
According to Gadamer, the standard of “historical objectivism,” even with the
legitimate quest for rigorous historical accuracy, provides for “our actual encounter with
historical tradition—and it knows only an alienated form of this historical tradition”
(Philosophical Hermeneutics 5-6). He wrote, “Indeed, it could very well be that only
insignificant things in historical scholarship permit us to approximate this ideal of totally
extinguishing individuality, while the great productive achievements of scholarship
always preserve something of the splendid magic of immediately mirroring the present in
the past and the past in the present” (6-7). Gadamer argued that as it had been
approached (especially with theology), in seeking to avoid “misunderstanding,” “the
hermeneutical consciousness” made “alien” that “deep common accord” that is present
among peoples, even as they misunderstand each other (6-8).
In Gadamer’s view, we must get beyond these aesthetic, historical, and
hermeneutical “alienations” to ascertain what has “been left out” as well as “what makes
us so sensitive to the distinctiveness of these experiences” (Philosophical Hermeneutics
8). Relevant herein, he explained the following:
[…] we must certainly admit that there are innumerable tasks of historical
scholarship that have no relation to our own present and to the depths of
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its historical consciousness. But it seems to me there can be no doubt that
the great horizon of the past, out of which our culture and our present live,
influences us in everything we want, hope for, or fear in the future.
History is only present to us in light of our futurity. […] 46
According to Gadamer, “It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that
constitute our being,” which as a “provocative formulation” restores “to its rightful place
a positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the French
and the English Enlightenment,” as prejudice does not “inevitably destroy the truth.”47 He
explained, “[…] the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense
of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience,” which
“are biases of our openness to the world […] simply conditions whereby we experience
something—whereby what we encounter says something to us” (9). Hence, our
framework of “prejudices” toward “the old” provide for our disposition toward openness
to “the new” (9). Prejudice is linked to authority, which “is in need of hermeneutical
rehabilitation,” yet “[t]he nature of the hermeneutical experience is not that something is
outside and desires admission,” for “we are possessed by something and precisely by
means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true” (9). The challenge for
“this hermeneutical conditionedness of our being” is “unbiased” modern science and its
“pronouncements” (10). Regardless of their philosophical differences, Kirk would have
likely agreed with Gadamer’s contention that “we must ask repeatedly if something has
not been omitted” within the discourse of modern science (10).
To some extent mirroring Kirk’s concerns (Decadence; Enemies 153-297;
“Statistics”), the “methodological abstraction” and “effective propaganda” with
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contemporary statistical studies, with its “language of facts,” points to the hermeneutical
view that “[n]o assertion is possible that cannot be understood as an answer to a question,
and assertions can only be understood in this way,” which also pertains to certain trends
in terms of “serious historical research” regarding the details of the past (Philosophical
Hermeneutics 10-12). According to Gadamer, “imagination [Phantasie]” assists in
ascertaining “what is questionable” (the full quotation is provided above) (12). He
argued that “[t]he real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is
questionable” as it relates to the “whole of our experience,” including together art,
history, and science, which then portends the following:
[…] The consciousness that is effected by history has its fulfillment in
what is linguistic. We can learn from the sensitive student of language
that language, in its life and occurrence, must not be thought of as merely
changing, but rather as something that has a teleology operating within it.
This means that the words that are formed, the means of expression that
appear in a language in order to say certain things, are not accidentally
fixed, since they do not once again fall altogether into disuse. Instead, a
definite articulation of the world is built up—a process that works as if
guided and one that we can always observe in children who are learning to
speak.48
This process of language acquisition points to, for Gadamer, “the real mode of operation
of our whole human experience of the world” (13-15). He argued, “There is always a
world already interpreted, already organized in its basic relations, into which experience
steps as something new, upsetting what has led our expectations and undergoing
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reorganization itself in the upheaval” (15). It is “the support of familiar and common
understanding” that “makes possible” an engagement with “the alien,” which provides
“the broadening and enrichment of our own experience of the world” (15).
According to Gadamer, “Understanding is language bound,” yet “linguistic
relativism” does not follow, for as “we live wholly within a language […] there is
absolutely no captivity within a language—not even with our native language” (“The
Universality of” 16). The evidence for this is one’s mastering a foreign language, with
which “we do not constantly consult inwardly our own world and its vocabulary,” for as
one gets better at it, “the less such a side glance at our native language is perceptible, and
only because we never know foreign languages well enough do we always have
something of this feeling” (16). He has argued:
But it is nevertheless already speaking, even if perhaps a stammering
speaking, for stammering is the obstruction of a desire to speak and is thus
opened into the infinite realm of possible expression. Any language in
which we live is infinite in this sense, and it is completely mistaken to
infer that reason is fragmented because there are various languages. Just
the opposite is the case. Precisely through our finitude, the particularity of
our being, which is evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite
dialogue is opened in the direction of the truth that we are. (16)
Gadamer’s contention that “the relation of our modern industrial world, founded by
science” as “mirrored above all on the level of language,” calling for the hermeneutical
“special task for the theologian,” certainly parallels Kirk’s corpus in key areas on the
import of theology, although Kirk might have placed a more equal emphasis on language
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and imagery than did Gadamer.49 Pondering Martin Heidegger on “history” in relation to
“our futurity” (like Gadamer did), Wilhelmsen wrote, “Man organizes his past around the
direction of the future. This discovery has been among the most profound advances
within modern times. […] In fact, the best way to come to understand a man’s future is to
find out what he has forgotten about his own past.”50 In the introduction to a recent
publication of Kirk’s Eliot and His Age: T.S. Eliot’s Moral Imagination in the Twentieth
Century (originally published in 1971), Benjamin G. Lockerd, Jr. has highlighted these
words of Eliot, which were often referenced by Kirk (the two men were correspondents)
(xvii): “‘There is no such thing as a Lost Cause because there is no such thing as a
Gained Cause. We fight for lost causes because we know that our defeat and dismay may
be the preface to our successors’ victory, though that victory itself will be temporary; we
fight rather to keep something alive than in the expectation that anything will triumph.’”
Yet if “‘mere words are tools that break in the hand,’” what of our “centering” for
identity and “the universal” in discourse?
As emphasized in Chapter One, all scholars as humans share a “common
experience” of reality, even if their inquiries go toward the “special experience” of
science or history (Adler, The Four 3-105, 224-226). Philosophy begins with this
“common human experience” in the search for wisdom and truth, regardless of the claims
of scientists or the contexts of philosophers (Adler, The Four 3-105, 224-261; Adler,
Intellect 79-89; Adler, Ten 5-107, 191-200). From the Aristotelian and Thomistic
viewpoints, the “expression of understanding” by language is normative for human
beings for both ordinary usage and scientific enterprises, as both “take place in a
linguistic context” (O’Callaghan 281). Although Gadamer seems to have held that there
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is a real world in which we live and communicate (Philosophical Hermeneutics), he was
insistent on the envelopment of both being and understanding within language as “not
only an object in our hands,” but “the reservoir of tradition and the medium in and
through which we exist and perceive our world” (18-43, 59-68).
For Gadamer, we live within an interpretive give and take of tradition that
“encompasses institutions and life-forms as well as texts,” which is bounded by prejudice
and authority, yet a “hermeneutic consciousness” prompts awareness and attentiveness to
these boundaries in the “task” of understanding.51 Gadamer has explained that in this way
only does one “learn to gain a new understanding” of what has been “seen through eyes
conditioned by prejudice” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 38). According to Gadamer,
“But this implies, too, that the prejudgments that lead my preunderstanding are also
constantly at stake, right up to the moment of surrender—which surrender could also be
called transformation. It is the untiring power of experience, that in the process of being
instructed, man is ceaselessly forming a new preunderstanding” (38). However,
according to O’Callaghan (dealing with the “linguistic turn,” yet not with Gadamer’s),
our “spoken language is but one of the embodied reasonable forms of life,” albeit
significant, that is expressive our understanding of reality for our communal life as
rational and political animals within (and not autonomously above) a real world.52 To
utilize O’Callaghan’s example, for the young child Alice, it is not the instructional
experience of “cat” as a word, but her experience of a real cat that provides the
conceptual basis for her learning about cats, which will certainly intersect into the human
realm of language.53
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According to O’Callaghan, we are political animals, so our “political life, which
necessarily involves communication,” is the flowering of our “more basic vital activities
or forms of life informed by reason,” which connects us to the epistemological and
communicative value of standing within traditions (291). In view of children learning
language, Gadamer has argued, “In truth we are always already at home in language, just
as much as we are in the world” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 63). However, we can only
be “at home in language” if we are at home “in the world.” Notwithstanding Gadamer’s
appropriation of an Aristotelian example to illustrate our acquiring language and grasping
universals, one could only comprehend that army taking a “stand” with either a real or a
pictorial experience of war that preceded one’s reading of an essay by Gadamer.54 We are
beings in a world of being, according to O’Callaghan, who actualize our “potential
being” through acts that include (but are not limited to) “the manipulation of verbal or
written symbols,” all expressive of human understanding, toward “the more perfect form
of existence embodied in the expression of understanding in speech which is the fruit of
understanding shared with the community.”55 O’Callaghan has explained, “Thus, the
Aristotelian is leaving enough room for Alice, through her experience of all the forms of
life, to genuinely develop, transform, and even correct what she has gained from the
community in learning language” (292). Human beings write and they speak, which as
significant aspects of “social reality” are indicative of how “social communities and their
languages shape the acquisition of knowledge” (292-295).
With Maurice Charland’s recommended addition of “a hermeneutic moment” for
“critical rhetoric” (73), Gadamer’s suggestion that the variety of human languages does
not indicate “that reason is fragmented” is a valuable insight for one’s grappling with the
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question of the “fragmentation” even within the English speaking history of Britain and
America, which stills remains a point of contest regarding both rhetorical criticism and
rhetorical pedagogy (John Angus Campbell, “Between the Fragment”; Condit,
“Rhetorical Criticism”; Leff and Sachs). However, one is here reminded of Adler’s
contention that because of our “common human experience” of reality, peoples of very
distinct languages, even if the help of a translator is needed, can communicate (Intellect
126-139). This “common human experience” is precursory to and informative of the
educational and political “dialogue” that can be bolstered within and across cultures by
such studies as poetry and history, both of which engage the imagination through terms
and texts, which are also experienced in reality (Adler, The Common; Adler, How to
Think 204-213, 223-243, 284-293, 329-337; Montgomery, Romantic). According to
Montgomery, “Indeed, the imagination has sometimes become a substitute Lord and
Giver of Life, not only for the poet but for a range of would-be makers of being; the
imagination, liberated from its responsible grounding in reality, creates a variety of
coloring books to tempt our happy greens” (“Imagination and” 120). Specialization and
“technique” in both society and science “shift […] our vision of man in nature” as “mind
is enabled to believe itself the ultimate cause and value of being” (120-122). Did Kirk, as
Ted McAllister has suggested, “in some tension with his more reified label ‘mind,’” use
“‘imagination’ to bridge the gap” for “the the partial and the whole, the particular and the
universal”56? Regardless, is there some link in reality between what is in our mind and
what we can imagine?
Russello has featured Kirk’s definition of “sentiment” as “‘a moving conviction
[…] derived from some other source than pure reason,’” which is linked, of course, to the
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human imagination along with a “qualified respect for reason.”57 Kirk once wrote, “All
great systems, ethical or political, attain their ascendancy over the minds of men by virtue
of their appeal to the imagination; and when they cease to touch the chords of wonder and
mystery and hope, their power is lost, and men look elsewhere for some set of principles
by which they may be guided” (“The Dissolution” 32). Russello has rightly observed,
“Imagination appears with great frequency in Kirk’s essays, and knowing how used the
term is key to understanding his thought” (The Postmodern 53). In helpfully setting
“Imagination against Ideology” (drawn from Kirk’s corpus), he has referenced Whitney’s
“five types of imagination that contributed to Kirk’s program of cultural critique,” which
Whitney (prompted by Kirk’s The Sword of Imagination) has articulated as imaginative
“swords.”58 For those persons of “humane letters” “who would embark on a crusade to
fight the errors of their time,” Whitney has explained:
They need the historical imagination to understand what humankind has
been. They need the political imagination to know what humankind can
do. They need the moral imagination to discern what the human person
ought to be. They need the poetic imagination to perceive how human
beings should use their creative energies. And they need the prophetic
imagination to divine what human beings will be, given the choices they
make. (“The Swords” 312)
According to Russello, “For Kirk the imagination was clearly more than a passive
experience; it was a central feature of the human outlook, critical to understanding the
past, selecting among political compromises, or bringing about any social change […]”
(53). Russello, like other writers, has led with Kirk on “the moral imagination” (this
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predominates in Kirk’s corpus as developed from Irving Babbitt and Edmund Burke) as
against “the idyllic imagination,” which seeks a clean break with custom and convention,
and the “the diabolic imagination,” which enters to fill the void of this disillusioned total
departure.59 As “another corrupted form,” Vigen Guroian has added “the idolatrous
imagination,” encompassing “[i]dolatry,” which “in biblical terms, is the giving of one’s
highest loyalties and devotions to objects and things other than God”—this sort of
relativism is, in Guroian’s account, indicative of the postmodern condition (Rallying x,
50-58).
Like Russello did in his own way regarding a postmodern affinity (The
Postmodern), one must work within and beyond Kirk’s phraseology on such a matter as
imagination. According to Russello, “While figures as diverse as politicians and
historians could promote the moral imagination, Kirk found its presence most evident in
literature,” which “releases us from Eliot’s provincialism of time […]” (58). He also
mentioned Bruce Frohnen’s application of “‘the insights of the seer,’ […] which provides
another approach to the imaginative.”60 As follows, Kirk provided one description of
“moral imagination” within a positive discussion of Ray Bradbury’s writings (Enemies
116-124):
The moral imagination is the principal possession that man does not share
with the beasts. It is man’s power to perceive ethical truth, abiding law, in
the seeming chaos of many events. Without the moral imagination, man
would live merely from day to day, or rather moment to moment, as dogs
do. It is the strange faculty—inexplicable if men are assumed to have an
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animal nature only—of discerning greatness, justice, and order, beyond
the bars of appetite and self-interest. […] (119)
Kirk’s treatment of “moral imagination,” which is a contribution to the ongoing question
of the relationship between poetry and reality, challenges “the notions of relativism and
‘cultural constructionism’ that rule much of the academy today” in looking “beyond ‘the
barriers of private experience and events of the moment’” (Lockerd xx). Guroian has
seemed to argue that the imagination as such is distinctly human and particularly
religious (Rallying 49-79). However, St. Thomas has explained that both human beings
and other animals (both relying upon sense perception) have imagination, yet it is the
rationality of humans that allows for the exercise of their imaginative capacities beyond
the “moment to moment” of life—to borrow from Adler, humanity is “different in kind”
than other animals.61
So, how might one consider “moral imagination” in a way that is explicitly realist
in terms of a philosophical account? Drawing upon the work of Jacques Maritain, to
discuss the aesthetic aspects of “moral imagination,” James P. Mesa has emphasized that
“methodological purposes determine the formal distinctions made and the vocabulary
used in the analysis of different modes of knowing.”62 From Maritain, he also
distinguishes “a moral science midway between moral philosophy and prudence, a
practically practical science, “not to be confused with prudence but is more closely tied
to contingent circumstances than moral philosophy,” which is encompassed in “the work
of the practitioners of moral science—the moralist or moral counselor, and the
psychologist insofar as the work is directed to the development and implementation of
moral pedagogy […]” (237). Inconsistency “in different modes of analysis” is not
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necessary “so long as the truth of the various distinctions made and relations identified
are grounded in the complex unity of the object analyzed,” yet “the division of
imagination into the moral and aesthetic need not be strictly held for purposes of a
practically practical science” (237).
Blending “the moral and the aesthetic is common in art, literature, and conversion
experiences” (Mesa 237). In view of “the complex and incommunicable nature of
concrete moral judgments,” he has directed the reader to the psychological “matter of
seeing.”63 From a Thomistic point of view, Mesa has argued that even as “the senses are
the foundation of all knowledge,” the “subjective conditions” of one’s personal history
gives parameters to his or her “personal possession of a shared reality that the human
mind did not create,” which is relevant to the practical spheres of life, such as with
“morality, where the intellect is operating in the heat and stress of the situation and not in
the comfortable cool of a conversation in a friendly pub” (239). Against “the reduction
of moral judgment and rational action to propositional thinking,” he has given a
Thomistic account where the truth of prudence “is the reality of the person in the
existential situation”—“a properly-discerning-reason-in-action” (239-240). This
necessitates “the proper fusion of reason, appetites, and senses” (240). Mesa has
clarified, “The simultaneously properly-oriented-appetites-here-and-now provide focus
for correct discernment of the situation and impetus for proper action,” which contrasts
with “the imprudent person” (drawing from McInerny) seeing “‘through the lens of his
disordered appetites’”—for a “prudent person,” “a special, concrete sensory knowledge”
is indispensible (240).
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Mesa has taken this discussion of sense and practicality into the conversation on
“moral imagination” (including Kirk’s contribution) (240-241). “[G]ood moral
imagination […] is subordinate to recta ratio,” while “bad moral imagination […] is not”
(241). Mesa has explained, “Idyllic imagination confused fantasy with reality, pleasure
with the good, and feelings with knowledge. Moral imagination is grounded in an
already established reality and recognizes that there are goals that ought to be realized
regardless of feelings” (241). From Maritain, he has highlighted the notion that
“preceding conceptual and logical expression,” human reason “‘is enveloped, immersed,
unconscious, embodied in images and inseparable from sensory experience,…[and]
operates like a pattern for our inclinations.’[…]” (241). Looking to Aquinas’s
discussions of memory for the life of human beings, Mesa has argued:
[…] I would have us consider moral imagination as that undirected,
spontaneous portion of memory as it relates to the goods known though
inclination and the senses. The moral imagination is not preconscious but
conconscious […] intelligence shaping, texturing experience and seeing,
but is itself unnoticed. It is a pattern which serves as a kind of concrete
universal through which possible goods available to choice are recognized
and made more or less interesting to the person. It highlights familiar
features congruent with the person’s full range of experiences.64
Mesa has emphasized William Kilpatrick’s call to “return to a more traditional pedagogy
which presents moral values to children through lessons in history and literature” (242).
He explained:

109

Memory is crowded not only with objects given in direct sense experience
but also with those vivid images induced through the arts. Powerful signs
and images in drama, storytelling, and literature provide a kind of
dramatic rehearsal for the moral life. Such memories operating in
imagination either aid or hinder moral life. The proper development of
moral imagination enables the child to locate his acts within the context of
traditions which have ennobled human dignity. In contrast with teaching
which is abstract and propositional, this type of education promotes a
visualization of the moral life […] The moral imagination is an essential
element in the proper focusing of the moral lens and it is important that its
adjustment begin early in life. (242)
Chapter Three will consider some of these elements as regards Kirk’s discussion of the
“roots” of order for America. Yet regardless of one’s view of moral pedagogy (abstract
or visual), the theoretical centrality of experience is here relevant, especially for a larger
consideration of a realist rhetoric of order.
For St. Thomas, according to Mesa, the appetite rests upon the good, yet with the
beautiful, the appetite rests at an intellectual level (242-243). However, he has argued
that although one might make analytical distinctions between the aesthetic and moral
dimensions of life, as “there is but one imagination,” for the “concrete living person”
there is a remembering of “images from the distinct orders of goodness and beauty,”
which is where “a practically practical moral science takes interest” (243). So, regardless
of the type of imagination that one speaks of (moral, historical, poetic, etc.), ultimately,
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the human imagination as such must be central, which is at first a matter of various types
of experiences. In Enemies of the Permanent Things, Kirk wrote:
[…] My endeavor is to help to refurbish what Edmund Burke called “the
wardrobe of a moral imagination.” When the moral imagination is
enriched, a people find themselves capable of great things; when it is
impoverished, they cannot act effectively ever for their own survival, no
matter how immense their material resources. I am suggesting in these
pages no panacea, then, but am attempting to point the way to first
principles. Most of these principles are very old ones, obscured by
neglect. (16)
Also, regardless of how one “reads” Burke or Kirk (philosophically), strictly speaking,
one could take “a moral imagination” as the “moral imagination,” which is a “pattern”
extending into the sphere of moral choices, or as an imagination that “is subordinate to
recta ratio,” which is typically “the moral imagination” within the writings of Kirk and
others in the same camp, implicitly or explicitly. The former is the framework (as a
noun) while the latter is an adjectival distinction with respect to the good.
With Mesa, one can see a connection between “the context of traditions” and the
role of imagination, like with Russello’s developing his “participant” notion of history in
regards to Kirk (The Postmodern 67-103). Russello has observed that conservatives have
held “a declared fidelity to ‘tradition’ or ‘history,’” which looks to either the normativity
or utility of the historical past.65 Russello explained (in reference to Whitney) that “[t]he
historical imagination attempts to trace the change and continuity that humankind has
experienced over time,” which allows an historian “to examine historical circumstances
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to separate ephemera from lasting conditions, to find answers to present problems in the
past, and to provide a counterweight to two dangers: a narrow provincialism and a
preoccupation with novelty, which Kirk thought a dangerous modern temptation” (68).
According to Russello, “Kirk did believe in a reality outside of any given text; history is
one way to determine the norms of that reality. Nevertheless, he shared certain
postmodern historical sensibilities” (70). I will take up this “participant” notion of
history within Chapter Three. Here, the matter of “logocentrism” remains.
In this project, skepticism has been one main focus regarding the spectrum of
modern to postmodern thought (see Introduction and Chapter One), yet Centore has taken
this into the realm of being and becoming (Being 21, 26-27)—“the modern thinker is
forced to choose one and reject the other.” “‘Being that can be understood is language’”
is very much tied to Gadamer’s linguistic view of human understanding, inclusive of our
encountering tradition—he saw language as much more than a “tool.”66 According to
Kirk:
We live by myth. “Myth” is not falsehood; on the contrary, the great and
ancient myths are profoundly true. They myth of Prometheus will always
be a high poetic representation of an ineluctable truth, and so will the myth
of Pandora. A myth may grow out of an actual event almost lost in the
remote past, but it comes to transcend the particular circumstances of its
origin, assuming a significance universal and abiding.
Nor is myth simply a work of fancy; true myth is only represented,
never created, by a poet. Promethius and Pandora were not invented by
the solitary imagination of Hesiod. Real myths are the product of the
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moral experience of a people, groping toward divine love and wisdom—
implanted in a people’s consciousness, before the dawn of history, by a
power and a means we never have been able to describe in terms of
mundane knowledge. (“The Dissolution” 32)
Kirk’s approach to “moral imagination” is closer to Mesa’s account of “moral
imagination” as a “pattern” that is both guided by and guiding of our experiences in and
of the world, even with the high import of language as part of that experience. However,
with either realism or hermeneutics, one is taken to the question of words, thoughts, and
things, or more specifically, “logocentrism.”
Thompson has argued that for “literary and historical studies in American
universities,” “logocentric English” and “dialectical thinking” constitute “a difference
between two languages,” as the former “implicitly preserves the distance between subject
and object, or between the observer and the observed; which assumes that language in
some way represents reality; and which posits that one can test the truthfulness of a
hypothesis but subjecting it to logical scrutiny” (“Dialectical” 10). These two linguistic
frameworks “cannot be reduced to ‘approaches’ or ‘insights’” (10). According to her,
“Logocentric thinking implies the existence of an absolute order, in the mind or in reality,
which gives rise to meaning […],” which “discovers similarities in differences, and
builds on similarities, correspondences, and continuity rather than on contrast, negation,
and discontinuity.”67 Because of an implicit acknowledgement of “the possibility of
thinking in a logical fashion and because it takes experience into account,” it “does not
always demand that criteria be spelled out in the definition of a concept or idea […]”68
Thompson explained, “Logocentric thinkers exercise man’s fundamental drive to give

113

names to things and articulate the notion of the human subject. They use language as a
tool rather than yielding to the idea of being used by language” (10). More recently,
Thompson has argued that conservatism “in our pragmatic country” often entails
“quoting the Fathers of the Republic, without reflecting on whether these sentences have
acquired new meanings owing to disappearance of their philosophical foundations”
(“Ways Out” 196). However, “logocentrism” now needs a “more fundamental” defense
as “the centering of discourse” cannot be so easily assumed (196-197). Thompson has
observed, “The conservative discourse in America is so pragmatic and so given to the
Enlightenment assumption that language is a translucent place of glass through which the
subject matter is clearly visible that to try to dislodge this assumption has to be the work
of many writers over a long period of time” (197). Conversations on epistemology need
more regularity “if any progress is to be made” (197).
In the West, according to Thompson (building from Derrida), as “philosophers
have been substituting ‘center for center’” for meaning they, along with “ordinary
people,” assumed “a center or presence” in language, including those persons of an
atheistic viewpoint.69 Thompson has written, “Indeed, it is this mysterious ‘something’
that gives language its range and beauty, and makes it the most astounding tool at the
service of human beings. The seemingly unlimited creativity of language points to Life,
or Center, at its inception” (“Ways Out” 198). She has also argued, “At a certain level, it
does not matter how we name the concepts we accept as fundamental. If we do accept
one or more of them, the project of postmodernism fails, for its discourse is one
continuous argument against presence in language of a telos” (199). Because of the
common “assumption that language is self-referential, or that any kind of identity is
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‘constructed’ and has no core,” traditional theological, philosophical, and poetic
terminology has been eclipsed by “the assumption that the idea of origin or the idea of
core lie at the basis of meaning,” although, at times, poetry is resistant to “the trimming
off of the roots of language, the breaking off of that mysterious connection between
literal and anagogic of which Dante spoke” (199). There is, according to Thompson, a
breakdown in meaning between conservatives and postmodernists (199). She has argued,
“These Pollyannas do not notice that a fierce battle took place in the city of language
itself, and that taking leisurely walks among the ruins is inappropriate. What has been
successfully assaulted by postmodern thought are the fundamentals of language and not
the Constitution or family values” (199). In her estimation, amid this breakdown in
meaning, conservatives must engage postmodernism with an eye toward the contributions
of “logocentric” scholars—with Thompson, it is here where one can turn to some of
Adler’s “bodyguards of truth.”70
In view of “the insoluble paradoxes and puzzlements” that have a basis in
considering “our subjective ideas—the ideas that each has in his own mind—as not only
objects that we directly apprehend, but also as representations of the really existing things
that we cannot directly apprehend, but about which, nevertheless, we seek to acquire
knowledge” (“The Bodyguards” 128-130), Adler has explained:
Those […] can be avoided or resolved in terms of the Thomistic insight
that ideas are neither objects apprehended nor representations of things
unapprehended, and in terms of the Thomistic distinction between our
apprehension of objects, which is neither true nor false, and our
knowledge of things by judgments which are either true or false.
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I would add that the modern dichotomy of things existing outside
the mind (often mistakenly referred to as having objective rather than real
existence) in contradistinction to ideas existing inside the mind (regarded
as having subjective existence) should be replaced by the Thomistic
trichotomy of the real existence of things, the intentional existence of
objects, and the subjective existence of ideas. (130)
Our ideas of objects are the formal signs that signify the “objects of thought” that we as
human beings think and talk about in common, for an idea (a formal sign) is “that by
which” we apprehend an object, not “that which” we apprehend (Adler, “The
Bodyguards”; Adler, The Difference 112-190, 340-347n41; Adler, The Four 106-123;
Adler, How to Think 1-10, 284-293; Adler, Intellect 126-133; Adler, Some Questions).
In reference to his book Ten Philosophical Mistakes, Ewa Thompson has argued
that Adler’s realist account (particularly “that by which”) counters both modern
(Enlightenment) and postmodern assumptions regarding the “subjectivity of thought” and
the “objectivity of the world” with the practical reality that we think and speak of the
same objects, even if we have differing ideas about such objects, which points beyond
language alone for a consideration of meaning (“Ways Out” 200-201). The philosophical
notion of ideas as “that by which” we apprehend objects, at a “fundamental” level,
“provides ground for an essentialist and logocentric use of language, and it makes
communication possible” (201). With Adler’s assertion that we derive our ideas
(“meanings”) “from our mental faculties and from the senses,” which provides for our
thinking and talking about “objects of thought,” not “meanings” (201), the following,
according to Thompson, is theoretically relevant:
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[…] Ergo, it is not true that we all live in separate worlds filled with ideas
constructed by ourselves only (here Descartes begins to beckon); and it is
not true that language and discourse are merely an exercise in which
meanings are arrived at by referencing other meanings. Language is not a
cat chasing its own tail. While our ideas (meanings construed by us on the
basis of sense experiences and with the help of our own mental faculties)
may differ, the objects of thought to which these ideas refer are the same
for all of us. It is against this essentialist approach that postmodern
thought is directed, with its denial of Ur-meaning being a prime example.
(201)
In Intellect: Mind Over Matter, Adler explained that each of our ideas “is a single
meaning, which is its reference to the object perceived, imagined, remembered, or
understood” (130). The words that we use “get their meaning by being imposed upon the
objects referred to by ideas as formal signs” (130). Hence, “words express the meanings
that ideas are,” while “[t]he radical difference between words and ideas is the difference
between having a meaning or many meanings and being a meaning and just one
meaning,” for “[i]f the world did not contain entities that simple are meanings, each one
just one meaning, then the world could not contain entities that have meaning, meanings
they acquire, lose, and change.”71
One’s idea of something (as a meaning) cannot be changed or lost “without
ceasing to be the meaning that it is” (Adler, Intellect 131). Nor can it be “ambiguous,” as
“it would have to be several diverse meanings, which is impossible because that is
tantamount to saying that one idea can become two or more ideas” (131). Meanings are
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located in our human minds, “which are the meanings that words acquire when they are
imposed on the objects referred to by ideas,” so it is not possible “that the different
languages human beings use cause them to have fundamentally different minds and
intellects” (131). If human communication is the “sharing of meaning” (as one definition
of it within the discipline goes), it is with respect to the similarity of formal signs (ideas)
by which we apprehend objects of thought.72 From Chapter One herein, one might recall
Adler’s likening of “[t]he psychologizing of common experience” to the “‘way of
ideas,’” which “makes experience subjective, rather than objective” (The Four 248).
Both the import of “logocentrism” and “‘the way of ideas’” are at the crossroads of
conservatism and postmodernism. Marion Montgomery brings one back to the question
of tradition as it relates to our common experience of reality.
In view of Richard Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences (published in 1948),
Montgomery has recalled the contending of Weaver and others with “idea reduced to
ideology” toward “a recovery of idea to the perspective of human intellectual limits,”
which commenced “the endless sorting of the concept of idea which we inherit as our
own task, an obligation to our intellectual inheritances in a stewardship of intellect itself”
(“Consequences” 165-167). A resistance had begun against “Modernism” that would
include, among the publication of other important works, Kirk’s The Conservative Mind:
From Burke to Santayana in 1953 (167-168). While “these attempts to recall intellect to
known but forgotten things” were not in such agreement so “as to have allowed the
emergence of a common metaphysical position to intellectual awakening,” there was
common opposition to “the reductionist intent of those Modernist doctrines triumphantly
devoted to intellect as autonomous,” which constituted “a new religion” (168). Through
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the 1960s and beyond, alliances developed and decayed among the differing types of
conservatives, resembling those who would be connected in the 1940s, “for all of whom
Christian orthodoxy was important,” which entailed “a recovered orientation” that goes
further than the “immanent horizon of history in an affirmation of the transcendent” (168169). What emerged was “not a common vision but a common opposition to the
dominant spirit of our age” that was at times an “ad hoc […] resistance to Modernism”
(169). In view of Eliot, drawing from the Southern Agrarian writer Allen Tate,
Montgomery has set modernity’s “‘provincialism,’” which dwells only in the present in
disregard of the past against a “‘regionalism’” that links the past to the present.73
“The sense of an ending” within an “exasperated circumstance” (by the 1990s) is
a result, according to Montgomery, “of our inattention to the necessity of a metaphysical
understanding of the givenness of creation, including the limited givenness of man
himself” (“Consequences” 171-172). Even with the metaphysical efforts of those such as
Weaver, “our actions of resistance, however heroic, too often prove only ad hoc,” which
“means that we contend on the grounds chosen by the radical antagonists of being itself,
whereby (the transcendent denied) attention must be focused upon the immanent, upon a
closed world” (172). The present attack on “the old vision of being itself” is at bottom a
“provincialism” of individual intellects as “autonomous and therefore sovereign” to the
ultimate peril of “whatever is,” for “creation becomes the unexamined provender to the
appetitive sovereignty of the alienated person” as “that object under destruction (or in a
Modernist term of camouflage deconstruction) is the body of creation, which body
includes nature and nations, things and persons” (173). Concerned about “our
metaphysical weaknesses as traditionalists,” Montgomery turned to Weaver, whose
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version of idealism he ultimately sought to correct, yet he would also provide a reminder
of Eliot’s words regarding gained and lost causes (174).
From Eliot, Montgomery has pointed “to that equipment necessary against those
opposing weapons of false ideas established by Modernism—ideas themselves partially
dependent upon truth, but transformed by ideological partiality into absolute ideology.”74
Beyond the terms “liberalism” and “conservatism,” he went to that term appropriate to
the larger battle that he had described—“tradition,” yet this “is possibly a self-wounding
sword if not carefully repaired for each encounter” (“Consequences” 175-176).
According to Montgomery, “traditionalism” can help us recover a notion of persons in
community, yet “the viability of traditional man” rests on each “person seeing before and
after but also seeing within and above,” which points to the following:
[…] Through orthodoxy, let us say, our concern must become paramount
that tradition orient itself to the truth of things beyond mere tradition taken
as current residue in intellect, carried in the blood of “feeling” but
unpurified by thought. For “good habits” are good insofar as they are
oriented by the ultimate truth of things, which for Eliot, as it would be
presently for Weaver, requires a vision of the immanent in relation to the
transcendent.
It is through orthodoxy, then, that community in the world
maintains “a consensus between the living and the dead,” and so stands
witness to whatever truth may be thus rescued, an inheritance we are to
bequeath to those not yet born. […] 75
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If we are both formed by and transformative of tradition (as Russello has argued) then we
must with Montgomery go beyond “what others have thought” to “how the truth of things
stand” for both direction and correction, even amid “the sacrifice now made to political
expediency in pursuit of desired power disguised by signs, though those signs may
residually carry a lingering tradition older than the moment’s expediency” (177-180).
According to Montgomery, “Rather, what is required is a devotion to the truth of things
as the measure of the validity of those things we say,” even as we utilize of the writings
of St. Thomas Aquinas, which in Montgomery’s view, St. Thomas himself would support
(179-181). Although “[w]e are born traditionalists […] original and regional, […] we
may make ourselves provincials in false pursuits of self-declared originality,” yet in
resisting “that deconstruction of our natural gifts as created intellectual soul incarnate, we
must first of all accept responsibility for those gifts,” as traditionalists have the “abiding
responsibility” to “the winnowing of” their “historical and natural inheritance in a
continuing rescue of those permanent things of which Eliot spoke” (181).
How did “the truth of things stand” for Russell Kirk? Within a larger discussion
on Kirk and religion, Dermot Quinn affirmed that “[t]he permanent things of which Kirk
so often spoke—order, harmony, even, for that matter, sorrow and grief—are, first and
foremost, things” (219). Yet, according to Quinn, Kirk’s epistemology, because of his
affirmation of Cardinal Newman’s notion of the “Illative Sense” in The Conservative
Mind, Kirk was not just “an expositor of patristic or scholastic thought,” but “now
involved in an encounter with ideas that have shaped modernity—even post-modernity—
in the last century or so” (222-223). The eventual trends from empiricism and positivism
to “Heideggerian phenomenology, which offered a very different account of knowing, the
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perceiver now restored to something like centrality, perception itself understood as
freighted with cultural, historical, personal significance,” as “[o]bjectivity, newly
problematic, began to seem unattainable, even undesirable,” even with the ensuing
excesses, “surely has a place in Kirk’s story” (223-224).
With Kirk’s understanding of Newman, “a strikingly modern thinker,” he “was
able to offer a newly persuasive account of history that appealed beyond the usual
denominational or philosophical categories” (Quinn 224). Quinn has argued that the
historical “emphasis on the local, the finite, the culturally unique could now be seen as
part of this new phenomenology of man,” for as our knowledge is engaged “in the
complexity of the personal and the particular, the inescapable here-and-nowness of our
lives, are not to be seen as forms of limitation but as radical apprehension of the variety,
indeed the infinitude, of things,” which “was a creative response to created order; a new
way of perceiving the intelligibility of the world” (224). Regardless of realism or
conservatism, Kirk “was also curiously […] modern enough to speak a language of signs
and symbols, of culture and cult, of intuition and imagination, of reason’s power and
reason’s limits,” so “Edmund Burke seems not so very far from Edmund Husserl, Froude
closer than might be thought to Freud” (224-225). Yet, this must not eclipse “a deeper
realism” in Kirk’s corpus (225). Quinn wrote:
[…] what was the reality he claimed to know? […] Realism has its small
satisfactions […] We should not willingly give up these pleasures. Nor,
however, should we become addicted to them. Honest empiricism may
keep our feet on the ground but without idealism, without some
metaphysical principle, we would deny ourselves the sky above and the
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sun beyond. If Kirk held to solid things, he also held, more firmly, to the
solidity of their meaning. Their deeper intelligibility had to do with order
and freedom, with which conservative schemes—any human scheme, for
that matter—may not survive. (225)
However, as Joshua Hochschild as indicated, interpretations of Newman’s work do vary,
as he has, for instance, ultimately argued for “Newman the Aristotelian, aware of both the
power and limits of theoretical reason, neither relativist nor rationalist,” whose approach
to tradition was “not an ad hoc traditionalism.”76 Regardless, Newman’s notion of the
“Illative Sense” would bear some relationship to Kirk on imagination, yet it would be
Eliot’s influence that would move Kirk’s approach away from the “New Humanism” of
Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More (Beer, “The Idea”; Guroian, Rallying 31-45), both of
whom Kirk always highly regarded for American thought and letters.
Weighing Kirk alongside of Gadamer does necessitate the question of
phenomenology. Kirk certainly favored the “personal” dimensions of knowledge (he
often recommended the writings of Polanyi), yet even as there are some mixed accounts
of Kirk’s philosophical influences in the secondary literature with regard to Thomists and
Thomism (Beer, “The Idea”; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Quinn; Zoll, “The Social”), his
key realist assumptions should not be eclipsed. Clinton A. Brand has emphasized Kirk’s
debt to Eliot, particularly regarding the “vitality” of tradition through “translation and
assimilation” (357-361). With this, because of Gadamer’s arguments “for the solidly
historical character of knowledge” along with his rehabilitation of “the concept of
‘prejudice’ to help reclaim the resources of authority and tradition as means of creative
insight and rational participation,” Brand has brought Gadamer’s philosophical
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hermeneutics to Eliot’s corpus, making reference to Kirk’s Eliot and His Age along the
way.77 However, regarding Eliot, in this same book, Kirk provided some intellectual
history from Montgomery as follows:
“The science of the mind that Eliot studied proved insufficient […]
Phenomenology is after all a development of subjectivity as if it were self
sufficient. What it leads to is a separation of subjective being from any
Other. The possibility of any dialogue, that word used so desperately in
our time, is doomed. For phenomenology, as that branch of learning had
developed by the time of Prufrock, was a heresy to the orthodox family
relationship of minds very like the Albigensian in its effective isolation of
the individual. So considered, one sees how such a heresy is destructive to
the sanity of the artist no less than to other men, for a part of the definition
of the artist is that he communicates vision, whether simple simile or
complex metaphysical system. The pure application of phenomenology
means not only that the poet cannot write for others but that he cannot
even write for himself.”[…] 78
At a later point in the book, Kirk provided some of his own thoughts regarding Eliot’s
ongoing relevance:
To demand that Dante be didactic after the system of Aquinas would be to
efface The Divine Comedy; to demand that Eliot, in little more than a
thousand lines of verse, should refute modern rationalism—that would be
to deny the function of poetry. So it is through a diversity of questing
insights, through abstractions illustrated by concrete representations, that
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Eliot renews the moral imagination. The rest must be left to theological
studies, and to one’s own experiences of reality.
All that such a poem as Four Quartets may accomplish is to relate
one remarkable man’s vision of time, self, reality, and eternity: to describe
one person’s experience of transcendence. Because there does exist a
community of souls, it is possible for some other human beings to
apprehend the poet’s symbols of transcendence; and to draw analogies
between those symbolic images and their own fleeting glimpses, in the
journey of this life, of permanent things not knowable through the
ordinary restricted operation of five senses. Phenomenology
notwithstanding, it is possible for a conscience to speak to a conscience,
and for the interior perceptions of a man of genius to quicken and order
another man’s moral imagination.79
In my estimation, these elements of the book are significant for the general question of
Kirk and postmodernism, including a comparison between him and Gadamer. It is
arguable that phenomenology (even with its variant forms), at least in some accounts, is a
major link among the multiple lines of postmodern thought.80
Beyond a “‘pure application of phenomenology’” (to recall Montgomery’s
words), Gadamer expressed an appreciation for transcendental phenomenology yet
demonstrated an assimilation of existential phenomenology—aspects of the latter clearly
inform his approach to hermeneutics (Philosophical Hermeneutics). If phenomenology
takes us “to the things themselves,” realism works from the things themselves—truth is
the correspondence between the mind and reality.81 Yet even as existential
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phenomenology is attentive to the plight of our everyday lives “in the world,” Gadamer
had argued for an envelopment of our grasp of the “‘nature of things’” (a consequence of
correspondence) into the “‘language of things.’”82 According to Centore, with the unity
of “the knower and the known,” there is “an intentional relationship,” as “[t]he thing as
known possesses an intentional being […],” for “[k]knowledge intends, tends to, or
contains, other beings”—“the knower becomes the thing known.”83 He has explained:
[…] In direct contrast to Aquinas’s realism, which recognizes that the idea
of something and the something are indeed one and the same thing (which
is the only way to avoid Epistemological Idealism), Gadamer claims that
only through the medium of language can human beings be related to the
world. Finite, historical man meets the world in language.84
In light of Adler’s “bodyguards of truth,” an individual human being holds a subjectively
existing idea that signifies an intentionally existing “object of thought” that corresponds
to a really existing thing.
Staying with Adler, by convention, humans impose instrumental signs (of a
particular language) onto “objects of thought,” which as commonly known or understood
are communicated among peoples, while their ideas (formal signs) are prompted by both
their “common experience” and “special experience” of reality. To take a classical realist
step beyond Donald Ellis’s realist arguments for “coherentism” (made against
“contextualism” and “historicism”), people “share” meanings when they have similar
ideas (formal signs), which as “that by which” they know or understand “objects of
thought,” comprise the meaning of a spoken or written “message,” both within and across
time and place.85 Contra Gadamer (Centore, “Classical Christian”; Gadamer,
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Philosophical Hermeneutics 102-103), the mens auctoris stands as primary for a study of
meaning, or more precisely, what “objects of thought” are or were signified by the
meanings (formal signs) as conventionally expressed in words, even with the challenges
for a “meeting of the minds” in conversation and the difficulties of “interpretive reading”
for books (Adler, How to Speak; “Signs in General”; Adler and Van Doren). In addition,
the “laws of thought” are founded in our “common experience” of reality, or more
specifically, being, which takes us beyond language as primary for the logical
communication of meaning.86 The “‘deep common accord’” (Gadamer, Philosophical
Hermeneutics) between and among human beings for communication is at one important
level a composite of experiential commonality that includes, but is not limited to,
language.
Communicative understanding is a result of two minds in accord at the level of
ideas, even if those ideas as linguistically expressed are from a different time and a
different place. The degree to which minds are not in accord is the degree to which there
is misunderstanding. Individually, for “objects of thought” that are under study, one can
understand more in relation to what is known through experience and language, yet at a
philosophical level, one can understand (not know) an “object of thought” such as
“equality,” “liberty,” or “justice,” which may be followed by judgment and inference
toward the clarification of “conceptual understanding” (Adler, Intellect 156; Adler, We
Hold). Gadamer has stated, “It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that
constitute our being […]” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 9). In his study of Thomas
Paine’s “rhetorical leadership” from the vantage point of “perceptual framing,” David C.
Hoffman has pointed out that Hans Gadamer, Richard Weaver, and Russell Kirk had
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continued “the semantic alignment of prejudice with custom and its opposition to
individual reason” from the usage of Edmund Burke (Weaver’s contribution, for instance,
focused upon clarifying the scope of judgments previously made).87 However, if Joseph
Pappin is correct in arguing for Burke’s classical realism (The Metaphysics), then
ultimately, one would have to take “prejudice” as a repository of both individual and
communal experience (which began at some point with sense perception) that governs the
conceptual “framing” of politics and rhetoric, even amid the influence and import of
language.
A major theme of Kirk’s in Enemies of the Permanent Things is “normative
consciousness,” which linked for Kirk to the significance of tradition (Russello, The
Postmodern). Kirk wrote, “But I do propose to assist in the rescue of normative
consciousness from the clutch of ideology. For it ought to be the moral imagination
which creates political doctrines, and not political doctrines which seduce the moral
imagination” (Enemies 20). For a “restoration of a proper vocabulary,” he would go on
to discuss “norms,” ultimately to define them as standards “against which any alleged
value must be measured objectively” (20-21). After an extended discussion on
“normative consciousness” (21-27), Kirk would look back to the “common patrimony” of
Europe and America (27-34). However, he would also inquire as to “the sources of the
enduring norms” along with their authoritative standing for us (34). One answer in
particular is germane to Kirk’s “logocentrism.”
Kirk indicated that there are “three doors of normative perception: revelation,
custom or common sense, and the insights of the seer” (Enemies 34). He proclaimed his
embrace of religious orthodoxy, yet because of the predominance of unbelief, he would
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turn to David Hume to write, “The standards of morality are shown to us by the study of
the story of mankind, and the arbiters of those standards are men of strong sense and
delicate sentiment, whose impressions force themselves upon the wills of their fellowmen.”88 Among the sources of “norms,” Kirk would “turn first to custom, or what we call
common sense” (35). He explained:
The good citizen, Virgil remarks, is a law-abiding traditionalist: that is, a
man governing himself by custom, deferring to the habits formed among a
people through their painful process of trial and error, their encounters
with gods and men over a great many years. Custom is the expression of a
people’s collective experience, some of it accumulated before that people
had a history. […]
Custom is closely allied with common sense, “those convictions
which we receive from nature, which all men possess in common, and by
which they test the truth of knowledge and the morality of actions; the
practical sense of the greater part of mankind, especially as unaffected by
logical subtleties or imagination, as the old Century Dictionary puts it.
Common sense is “consensus,” or general agreement on first principles—a
word somewhat tarnished by politicians in recent years. In the vast
majority of our normative decisions, we defer to the consensus of
mankind—that is, we feel ourselves bound to think and behave as decent
men always have thought and behaved. Conformity to custom—call it
prejudice, if you will—makes a man’s virtue his habit, as Burke expressed
this idea. Without the power of custom to control and instruct us, we
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should be involved perpetually in “agonizing reappraisals,” endeavoring to
decide every question upon its particular merits and advantages of the
moment; we would be unnerved incessantly by doubt and vacillation.
Common sense and custom, then, are the practical expressions of
what mankind has learnt in the school of hard knocks. There exists a
legitimate presumption in favor of venerable usages; for your or my
private experience is brief and confused, but the experience of the race
takes into account the consequences suffered or the rewards obtained by
multitudes of human beings in circumstances similar to yours and mine.
Custom and common sense constitute an immemorial empiricism, with
roots so antique and obscure that we can only conjecture the origins of any
general habit. One thing we do know: it is dangerous to break with ways
that have been intertwined so intricately in human longings and
satisfactions. Those who toss the cake of custom into the rubbish-bin may
find themselves supperless. And if common sense is discarded—why, it is
supplanted not by a universal intellectualism, but by common nonsense.
(35-37)
In view of the influence of contemporary philosophical idealism, one might not be so
quick to dismiss the “universal intellectualism” resulting from a discarding of “common
sense” (at least in academia) (Adler, Intellect 79-89; Adler, Ten 5-107, 191-200; Gilson,
Methodical; Gilson, Thomist Realism; Montgomery, “Consequences”), yet the
consequent “common nonsense” would still hold in general.
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Regardless, although there is perhaps some congruity between Kirk and Gadamer
on the “dogmatic acceptance” of authority and tradition through “reflection,” Kirk’s work
did not suggest “that […] reality happens precisely within language,” even for “societal
reality” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 3-58). Regarding the origins of “folk-wisdom”
(37), Kirk continued in Enemies of the Permanent Things:
The answer may be that at the beginnings of anything resembling a true
civil social order, individual men possessed of genius—obscure men
whose very names have perished—were the discoverers of the truths
which we now call custom and common sense. Hume’s men of strong
sense and delicate sentiment, or their primitive forerunners, presumably
existed when man was becoming true man; and their insights were
impressed upon their primitive fellows. […] originally these may have
been the intuitions or the empirical conclusions of gifted individuals, who
were emulated by the common man; but as the elapse of centuries has
hidden the original authorship of folkways and popular convictions, so
mankind has come to assume that the multitude itself always apprehended
these truths, much as the ant-hill and the hive seem to be governed by a
collective consciousness without the direction of commanding intellects.
Such reflections—perhaps impossible to demonstrate or to
disprove—lead us to the third principle door to normative understanding:
the astounding perceptions of the seer—“the blind man who sees,” like
Homer. A few men mysteriously endowed with a power of vision denied
to the overwhelming majority of us have been the Hammurabis of our
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moral and political and literary codes. We know their names, although
sometimes we know little but their names and some appended scanty
legends. […] We accept such men of genius as authorities because we
recognize, however imperfectly, that they see farther than you or I see.
[…] Their authority in part is vindicated by the immense influence
which their words have exerted ever since those words were uttered; and
in part by the fact that intelligent men in every age, upon reflection, have
assented to the truths exerted by these prophets and poets and
philosophers. You and I see as in a glass, darkly—the riddle of a mirror;
but those few men of vision saw something of the real nature of things.
(37-38)
As we will see with the impending study of The Roots of American Order in Chapter
Three, although Kirk’s general emphasis on experience in relation to reflection is
somewhat congruent with classical realism, such speculation (and it was just that it
seems) about this ancient source of “common sense” would be problematic, to some
extent, at the level of philosophy. However, unlike Gadamer, Kirk embraced the notion
of “genius,” even as extending into the realm of the literary arts, which does have a
notional standing for aesthetics within the history of classical realism.89
If the “moral imagination” provides a “pattern” of and for experience, including
that of literature, Kirk certainly did display an awareness of the high important of
imaginative language for the ongoing life of “norms” for humanity, even as “the man of
letters […] holding up the mirror to nature […] in his appeal of a conscience to a
conscience […] may row with muffled oars […] aware only dimly of his normative
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function” (Enemies 42). Hence, here, with Kirk, the subjectivity of the mens auctoris is
not left behind in history. According to Kirk, “The better the artist, one almost may say,
the more subtle the preacher. Imaginative persuasion, not blunt exhortation, commonly is
the method of the literary champion of norms” (42). In his discussion of Bradbury
(Enemies of 116-124), Kirk argued:
In Bradbury’s fables of Mars and of the carnival, fantasy has become what
it was in the beginning: the enlightening moral imagination, transcending
simple rationality. The everyday world is not the real world, for today’s
events are merely a film upon the deep well of the past, and they will be
swallowed up by the unknowable future. The real world is the world of
the permanent things, which often are discerned more clearly in the
fictional dead cities of Mars or the fictional carousel of Cooger and Dark
than in our own little private slice of experience. […]
The trappings of science-fiction may have attracted young people
to Bradbury, but he has led them on to something much older and better:
mythopoeic literature, normative truth acquired through wonder.
Bradbury’s stories are not an escape from reality; they are windows
looking upon enduring reality. […] (123-124)
As relevant to rhetorical argumentation, Russello has helpfully pointed to our intuitive
capacities toward a consideration of both the originality of the human imagination for
“discernment” and our apprehending of the natural law in community (The Postmodern
62-64, 151-157). There is though, admittedly, a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian
tendencies across Kirk’s corpus, yet one might also look to his work in terms of a
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Thomistic understanding of “poetic knowledge,” which is an intuitive grasp of truth (still
through an experience of reality) that goes to “wonder” as the beginning of philosophy
and is certainly communicable to some extent in language.90 Within his treatment of
“poetic knowledge,” James S. Taylor wrote, “We have to frequently remind ourselves in
our utilitarian age that poetry, and all art, for the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, was
considered a means of real and valuable knowledge, a knowledge of the permanent
things” (12). From a realist point of view, one must be careful not to disconnect our
literary and imaginative considerations or our use of reason from our experiences of
reality (Montgomery, The Trouble; Montgomery, Virtue). A realist rhetoric of order
ought to account for the integration of our human capacities, even amid the varying
communicative contexts that we encounter.
Is there a realist way of taking “historical man” meeting the world? For a proper
balance between “history” and “nature” in appraising of “the truth of things,” one must
be careful of the elevation of history “through Historicism,” the raising “of history to
some sort of agency,” and the error of making history “an entity, as if it were at least
coequal to being itself,” even amid the contingencies of human life (Montgomery,
Romantic xii-xiv, 208-212; Montgomery, “Tradition and”). According to Centore,
Classical Christian Philosophy (CCP), which entails classical realism, has been
downgraded by a variety of philosophical currents (“Classical Christian”), including
Gadamer’s “radical historicism” (398-399). CCP encompasses claims of truth, yet
required for entry into “the postmodern philosophy club is the denial that one has some
exclusive claim on the truth,” yet to genuinely do this “one must actually let loose the
flux and admit that the universe is only becoming, or that being, if one still wishes to use
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such outmoded language, is becoming; that reality is process” (400). Yet, without
compromising to “process philosophy or theology,” one can recognize that “CCP, as
found in those, such as Saint Thomas Aquinas, who accepted the truth of Scripture and
Church teachings, does in fact have a deep and sincere appreciation of temporality,”
while humankind’s “immersion in becoming, a deep sense of the transitory nature of
things, and time-consciousness have always played a central role” within Classical
Christian Philosophy (401). As will be seen in the next chapter, Kirk leaned toward this
“out-dated and classical form of interpretation” (as described by its detractors in
Centore’s account) (398), yet one will be able to ascertain Kirk’s sensitivity to
temporality in terms of both history and nature, which of course pertains to rhetoric.
However, both Alasdair MacIntyre and Frederick Wilhelmsen have indicated that
Thomists have kept at a distance from the relationship of philosophy to history.91 In a
highly appreciative essay on Gadamer, MacIntyre contended that although we have “no
standpoint outside history to which we can move, no way in which we can adopt some
presuppositionless stance, exempt from the historical situatedness of all thinking,” there
is no incompatibility in arguing “that a great deal turns on the nature of our awareness of
the contingencies of our historical situatedness and that a certain kind of awareness, while
not providing a standpoint outside of history, can transform our relationship to it” (“On
Not”). In our learning from older texts of philosophy, we reach “conclusions that
presuppose an appeal to standards of rationality and truth that do in some measure
transcend the limitations of historically bounded contexts,” for we don’t “escape from our
particular historical situation into some extrahistorical realm of timeless judgment,” yet
“we come to recognize that our historical situation is itself partly constituted by the
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possibility of appealing beyond and even against that situation” (158). MacIntyre rested
these contentions on the “standards of argument” that are necessary for genuine study and
correction in philosophy across contexts, even finding a recognition of these standards
within Gadamer’s own work (158-166).
Contra Gadamer, according to MacIntyre, “philosophical progress” is possible if
reconceived in a way that entails, assisted by Gadamer’s insights, an interpretively
practical focus guided by phronesis (“On Not” 166-168). Yet this must allow for, in
accord with Aristotle’s corpus, “someone who is practically directed through habituation
into the virtues and thereby toward the human good but also of someone who”
occasionally can, “by reflection upon his own and others’ activity […] arrive at some
degree of theoretical understanding of the virtues, including phronesis, and their relation
to the human good,” which has individual as well as political implications.”92 “The
question of language,” according to MacIntyre, likely provides for his most profound
departure from Gadamer’s work, as follows:
The natural languages, on the view that I am taking, may not in their
earlier stages be adequate to, but can become adequate to the tasks of
metaphysical inquiry, and both poets and philosophers have played key
and complementary parts in making them into what they originally were
not. And it is sometimes dangerous to be too respectful toward what is
taken to be proper usage. At any given stage in the history of a natural
language, the rules of usage that are accorded respect by contemporary
users of that language may turn out to be obstacles to further inquiry,
metaphysical, scientific or moral, and poets and philosophers may
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therefore have to move beyond them—to violate them—in order to
express questioning thoughts that it would not previously have been
possible to express. The natural languages are not in origin, but later
become in part at least works of art, made what they are by, among others,
poets and philosophers.93
As MacIntyre’s writings have been a reference point among those conservatives
confronting modernity or discussing postmodernism, I will return to MacIntyre within the
concluding section of this dissertational project.
Frederick Wilhelmsen took his own stand against “presuppositionless
philosophy,” but strongly turned toward the realm of experience as related to both faith
and reason (“Faith and”). Wilhelmsen wrote, “Experience, involving—as it does—man’s
sensorial marriage with a world whose being is saturated in time and the restlessness of
matter, is a ‘going through’ a kaleidoscope of what originally are isolated impressions for
the sake of ‘coming out’ with a patterned whole whose symbolic structure can be
penetrated intelligently” (27-28). Both everyday people and academic philosophers
reason within their experience of reality, while the philosopher speculates on “questions
and then tries to answer them,” as this “questioning stance is consubstantial with the
wonder from whence philosophy begins” (27-31). With Kirk’s emphasis upon the
communicative significance of “myth,” Frederick Wilhelmsen’s “post-modern
articulation of Thomistic wisdom” (The Paradoxical 192) could be a helpful guide toward
a realist rhetoric of order, especially as he considered both the mythical and (to some
extent) rhetorical dimensions of cultural life (The Paradoxical 73-211). Some of his
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philosophical and cultural considerations will assist in looking at The Roots of American
Order in Chapter Three.
Gadamer has contended, “Being that can be understood is language”
(Philosophical Hermeneutics). However, regardless of one’s realist standpoint on
philosophy and history, one can modify this as follows: With our common experience of
things, we can express meaning by the use of language toward a commonality of
understanding.94 This is “logocentrism” in the classical sense that Ewa Thompson has
indicated (“Ways Out”)—language with a “center” in reality. Even in genuinely seeing
Hans Gadamer as more moderate among the postmodernists for our important encounters
with “myth” as against the “prejudices” of the Enlightenment (Philosophical
Hermeneutics 3-17, 44-58), he ultimately takes us and reality as “centered” within
language.
To return to Russello (The Postmodern 7), Kirk did base his view not only on
“familiarity,” but also on some degree of “superiority,” at least for the traditions of
America and England, which will be evident in the next two sections of this project.
According to Pappin, “In effect, both for the realist Aquinas and for Burke the
development of a second nature, shaped by habit, custom and tradition, is not only
consistent with, but a natural outgrowth from, our first or essential human nature” (The
Metaphysics 115). Notwithstanding the way in which one “reads” Edmund Burke, in
view of The Roots of American Order, one might add Russell Kirk to this list. It is Kirk
the “logocentric” and realist historian that points his readers outside of the “provincialism
of time,” which is relevant to the formative role of the human imagination for our
perspectives within and across “rhetorical situations.” Specifically, for this larger
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argument, the question of human nature as such can assist in ascertaining a realist
rhetoric of order.
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Notes
1

Kirk wrote, “In this book, we examine the roots of order in the United States of

America” (The Roots 5). Praising and defending, in the rhetorical sense of these terms, is
will be further elaborated in Chapter Three and in the concluding section of the project.
2

As Ryan Holston indicates for a discussion on Edmund Burke and historicism,

the term “‘historical consciousness’” is varied in its bases and applications (37). Here I
am using it in a general sense with an eye to Kirk’s engagement with the term,
particularly within his discussions of the historian John Lukacs (“History and”;
“Regaining Historical”).
3

In his presentation entitled, “Recovering Rhetoric: How Ideas, Language and

Leadership can Triumph in Most-Modern Politics,” Whitney makes reference to an
important essay by Kirk regarding rhetoric, “Rhetoricians and Politicians,” which is a
review of the book, The Language of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke by James
T. Boulton. Russello works from this article regarding Kirk on rhetoric within a larger
discussion of the significance of “the statesman” in Kirk’s work (104-145). Whitney has
made some reference to Weaver on rhetoric in this particular presentation.
4

This is a somewhat favorable review of W. Wesley McDonald’s, Russell Kirk

and the Age of Ideology, yet with encouragement to further types of study (Beer, “The
Idea”).
5

Concerning the essay, “Russell Kirk and the Conservative Heart” by Mark

Henrie (which I will reference at later points in this project), Beer has argued:
Henrie’s essay shows, I think, that the way to truly see Kirk afresh is not
only, like McDonald, to have the courage and good sense to step outside
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the conventional historiography by looking at Kirk against a background
of something other than the conservative political tradition, but also to step
outside of Kirk’s own idiom so that one doesn’t get bogged down in the
vagaries of terms like “permanent things” and even the “moral
imagination.” That, perhaps, is the analytical tool that will allow us to
destroy Kirk the icon and recover Kirk the man. (49)
6

Lewis 456-457. Lewis has noted that Adler “even expressed disgust for the

conservative movement” and cited an interview by Mike Wallace where Adler regarded
“‘that right wing as the most reactionary and subversive force of good government you
could have in this country’” in relation to unlimited capitalism (456n14). Adler certainly
had strong leanings toward political modernity (Haves Without; The Common; We Hold)
and even world government (Adler, The Common; Hochschild, “Globalization” 48),
although he did not buy the notion of a “state of nature” (Adler, The Common 179-189;
Adler, Ten 167-177). For those of the classical realist view, a discussion of “truth” and
“error” might take one to Mortimer Adler’s “The Bodyguards of Truth,” in which he also
spoke to the matter of “error” in philosophizing. Therein, as in his larger body of work,
he granted legitimacy to some contemporary philosophical questions (the question of
liberty and equality in relation to justice, for instance) in light of some principles of
classical realism, which in Adler’s estimation, have been ignored or misunderstood
among modern philosophers (125-128). He concluded with Aristotle’s words regarding
the mixed ease and difficulty of investigating truth, which is better served as a “collective
pursuit,” according to Adler, by Aristotle’s suggestion of accounting for the
achievements and mistakes of preceding generations (133). From Adler’s standpoint, this
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accounting of the past has been disregarded in modern times, unlike the line of study
within the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, which “is a sustained example of
conscientious observance of this recommendation” (133). These items above by Adler,
of course, pertain to his frequent notion that “philosophy is everybody’s business” (The
Four vii-xxvii, 224-261). Adler’s “bodyguards of truth,” as remedial for the
contemporary circumstances of philosophy, are still relevant for if one considers the
ongoing plight of realist philosophy, for it would be more than plausible to state that a
major shift toward classical realism has not occurred in academia, especially for the field
of communication and rhetorical studies, where even contemporary realisms have not a
high standing.
7

Of interest here is “The Great Books Idolatry and Kindred Delusions” in

Hayakawa’s Symbol, Status, and Personality (154-170). Hayakawa wrote:
I should add here in fairness that Hutchins and Adler, along with Time,
Life, and Fortune, while sharing the metaphysics of the Neo-Scholastics,
do not share the antidemocratic views of the more rabid types among
them. They every-man-a-philosopher program of the Great Books
Movement is profoundly democratic in spirit, however mistaken in
educational philosophy. […] (169)
8

Wilhelmsen, “The Great” 326-331. A distinction between textual meaning and

philosophical truth, in my view, is evident in Adler’s work (Adler, The Four; Adler, “The
Philosopher”; Adler, “The Philosopher […] Continued”; Adler and Van Doren), even
with his years of advocacy for “great books” programs. In a commemoration of M.E.
Bradford (“Melvin E. Bradford”), Wilhelmsen wrote, “Although Bradford read more than
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anybody I have known—I made the judgment seriously, after having pondered it
carefully—he was no partisan of some ‘Great Books’ theory of education which would
abstract a dozen or so texts from the context of history. Both Adler and Hutchins gave
off the stench of rationalism for Bradford […]” (4). For one discussion by Kirk of the
Great Books approach and its applications, see Decadence and Renewal in the Higher
Learning (334-339). Relevant here, Kirk wrote:
[…] it seems to me that the Great Books method tends to neglect historical
continuity somewhat; also that it does not include quite enough
imaginative literature. Moreover, despite the claim of Mortimer Adler and
Robert Hutchins that their well-known list of Great Books was
scientifically and impartially drawn up, still the unconscious prejudices of
Adler and Hutchins are revealed by the conspicuous omissions from their
list: no Cicero, no Burke, no Newman, but instead a good many writers
inferior in power and influence to those. I am not wholly easy with other
people’s lists of Great Books. (334-335)
Kirk was not a big fan of Hutchins’s leadership as it related to educational and scholarly
matters, including his views on Edmund Burke (Beyond 44, 110-111, 157-161, 178, 317;
Decadence). In a review of Great Books: The Foundation of a Liberal Education by
Hutchins, Weaver is positive on Hutchins’s work, yet argued that he lacked a connection
to the general public and that he had relied too much on dialectic (“Mr. Hutchins”).
9

Please see the following: Beer, “Science”; Byrne; “Captain Kirk”; Guroian,

Rallying; Malvasi; McWilliams; Poulos; Quinn; Russello, The Postmodern; Russello,
“Russell Kirk and the Critics”; Russello, “Time and”; Whitney, “Recovering Rhetoric”;
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Whitney, “Seven Things.” Like Vigen Guroian in Rallying the Really Human Things:
The Moral Imagination in Politics, Literature, and Everyday Life, James E. Person, Jr. in
Russell Kirk: A Critical Biography of a Conservative Mind and W. Wesley McDonald in
Russell Kirk and the Age of Ideology, Russello provides scholarly conversation that
would enhance the sort of deeper analysis that was suggested by Medhurst for the study
of conservatism as a movement. All four authors, within their respective lines of study,
point to the significance of Kirk’s famous attentiveness to human imagination. For a
fairly positive appraisal of Person, McDonald, and Russello’s books, please see “Russell
Kirk Redivivus” by Federici. He also reviewed The Essential Russell Kirk: Selected
Essays, which was edited by George A. Panichas. With his highly critical comments
regarding the overall work of Kirk as a conservative, Alan Wolfe has initiated a larger
discussion in view of Panichas’s book (Berkowitz, “Conserving”; “Captain Kirk”;
Gottfried, “Wolfe’s”; Potemra; Reno; A. Wolfe). This volume by Panichas is not
covered in this dissertation, yet it seems to be another significant contribution, as
Panichas apparently provided some commentary with each essay (this is certainly a
source for future study). In his dissertation, “A Rhetoric of Moral Imagination: The
Persuasions of Russell Kirk,” Jonathan Leamon Jones deals with Kirk and
postmodernism, yet I do not examine any of his arguments in this project (this another
source for future study of course). The application of Beer’s suggestion here to
Russello’s book, as far as I know, is my own connection.
10

Russello, The Postmodern 1-3; 3n3; Zoll, “The Social” 112, 116-117, 118.

Wesley McDonald has pointed to the significance of this earlier study of Kirk’s thought
by Zoll for conversations today regarding Kirk on order, natural law, etc. (Russell Kirk
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55-79). According to Russello, the Republican and Democratic Parties “have largely
accepted the same beliefs in the benefits of the free market, global trade, and exporting
democracy, all subjects about which Kirk had deep suspicions,” while “the contemporary
Right has adopted some of the intellectual underpinnings of liberalism, such as a belief in
equality, the primacy of individual rights, and the universality of American political and
popular culture” (3-4)
11

Russello, The Postmodern 1-2. Russello relates the following:
As Rossiter noted, even in the 1950s Kirk’s alliance with mainstream
political or economic conservatism was probably always best left
unexamined: “Kirk, it seems to me, maintains contact with the
conservatism of Goldwater and General Motors only because most of his
friends refuse to pay him the compliment that most of his critics have paid
him richly: the chewing, swallowing and digesting of his books.” […]
(Russello, The Postmodern 4, 4n5; Rossiter, Conservatism in America
221).

These thoughts are relevant to those by Ernest Wrage in “The Little World of Barry
Goldwater” from the 1960s (who along the way referenced the McBurney article that I
noted earlier [208, 208n3]), where he recognized that Kirk and others, seemingly
“untouched by the Industrial Revolution and widespread democratization,” provide an
intellectual basis for conservatism in eighteenth century ideas that is “largely
unintelligible to a modern mind that is essentially secular and pragmatic,” while “the
Great Audience” is commanded by “the politicos and pulpit pitchmen” (208). On such
person, in his view, was Barry Goldwater, who as influenced by Russell Kirk and
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Edmund Burke faced “the charge that conservatism is an ill-concealed rationalization for
acquisitiveness” by insisting “that the ultimate object of individualism and competition is
character-building […] the message of Andrew Carnegie, William Graham Sumner,
Russell Conwell, and Horatio Alger—heroes all in the heyday of Social Darwinism”
(212, 212n16). Kirk did have interest in and give support to the Goldwater campaign, yet
one would certainly have to consider his own involvement, the political circumstances of
that time, and his own political principles as distinct along the way (Kirk, Confessions
284-292; Kirk, The Sword 254-260, 285-288, 293-295, 298-303). Of interest for today,
Russello also stated, “The editorials in Harper’s or alternative outlets such as the New
York Press or the Baffler now are as likely as any conservative publication to contain
Kirk-like assessments of political utopianism or consumer culture” (4).
12

Please see the following: Chapel; Gottfried, The Conservative; Kuypers,

Hitchner, Irwin, and Wilson; Lewis; Nash, The Conservative; Rowland and Jones;
Russello, “How the”; Weiler; Wrage; Zagacki.
13

Please see the following: Federici, “Russell Kirk”; Holtsberry; McCarthy, “The

Pomo”; Potemra; Purcell; Wegierski. In his favorable review of Russello’s book,
Michael P. Federici has explained, “Kirk’s work is an effort to get beyond modernity and
to restore an older way of conceiving of life that has its roots in the classical and JudeoChristian tradition” (255). Because of Kirk’s reliance upon Edmund Burke, Kirk argued
“that the past provides the historical experience that is necessary” for understanding the
parameters of “human affairs,” while “a universal moral order” is reflected within history
and literature that is relevant to “contemporary efforts to know what is prudent in
political and social life” (255-256). According to Federici, “In short, historical context
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matters because it creates inescapable contingencies that modern thinkers tended to
overlook due to their faith in science and the perfectibility of human nature.[…]” (256).
In a review of The Essential Russell Kirk (“Ghost Over”), W. Wesley McDonald wrote
the following:
Panichas incorrectly believes, however, that postmodernism is just another
insidious form of ideology. “There is no doubt in [Kirk’s] mind,” that
those, “who are known as post-modern intellectuals were held fast in ‘the
clutch of ideology.’” But there are both left- and right-wing
postmodernists, as Peter Augustine Lawler and Paul Gottfried have
pointed out. Kirk was himself a postmodernist, as Gerald Russello
demonstrates in his important forthcoming book The Postmodern
Imagination of Russell Kirk. Contrary to Panichas’ argument, then, it is
possible to be a postmodernist who acknowledges the existence of an
ethical ultimate.
Notwithstanding McDonald’s high standing for Kirk scholarship, this chapter and
Chapter Three offer a few ways to consider this claim, pro and con.
14

This review by McCarthy is available from the online version of Reason

Magazine. It is the most challenging review of Russello’s book that I have read to date.
It is entitled, “The Pomo Mind: Was the Conservative Intellectual Russell Kirk a
Postmodernist?” Although I think that Russello’s book is an important contribution,
McCarthy echoes some (though not all) of my own reflections. From this point forward,
aspects of this project will encompass some cultural and philosophical dimensions of
McCarthy’s review. Drawing from the book, McCarthy therein mentions Kirk as “an
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icon to traditionalist conservatives” since the 1953 publication of The Conservative
Mind. There is one other consideration that I will mention here and not pursue further in
this project. At this point, from my own biases as expressed in this project, it seems to
me that Daniel McCarthy’s separate discussion of Kirk as a “high church conservative”
in light of Burke’s influence might ultimately be a better direction to go than some notion
of a postmodern conservatism, especially as against the “low church” varieties that do
tend to dominate the present conservative discourse (“What Would”). For instance, one
could consider this framework alongside of John Derbyshire’s discussion of “lowbrow
conservatism” as against earlier intellectual movement conservatism in “How Radio
Wrecks the Right,” or alongside of George Packer’s, “The Fall of Conservatism,” from
The New Yorker.
15

McCarthy’s libertarianism is evident upon a reading of his review of Russello’s

book (“The Pomo”). He has concluded his review as follows:
And as a book showing Kirk to be a more eccentric, unorthodox figure
than most conservatives imagine him to be, the book is delightful. But for
all the connections Russello finds between Kirk and postmodernism, the
strongest impression it leaves is that Kirk and the pomos are at best allies
of convenience against liberalism. And that may be the least attractive
element in either camp’s thought.
A strong case is available for at least this convenient alliance, as Kirk’s strong stance
against the principles and trends of modernity (rationalism, standardization, etc.) is highly
evident within the relevant primary and secondary sources (Beer, “Science”; D. Bell 127;
Federici, “Russell Kirk”; Frohnen, “Has Conservatism”; Henrie, “Opposing”; Henrie,
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“Understanding”; Kirk, Confessions; Kirk, The Politics: Potemra; Purcell; Reno), even at
times apart from discussions of postmodernism or identifications of Kirk as postmodern.
16

Kirk, The Sword 474. As the book is more a set of memoirs, for this epilogue,

Kirk provided no references for the authors that he had in mind as positively influential.
However, considering the names and some of Kirk’s previous work, this is yet another
line of possible study, as there has been some interdisciplinary convergence between
contemporary scientific thought at the level of physics and postmodern philosophy—
Russello has more or less pointed in this direction.
17

McCarthy’s summary on this matter is categorically handy is it relates to

Russello’s chapter on “Participant Knowledge and History,” particularly as regards to the
meaning, conceptualization, and construction of history (“The Pomo”). He wrote:
[…] Kirk, like the postmodernists, did see history as unfinished and
imaginative, something that could not be understood by piling up facts in
chronological order. But this understanding of history is not peculiar to
postmodernists or to Russell Kirk, and few contemporary historians would
find much to argue with in Russello’s other points. Who doesn’t
recognize perfect objectivity as a chimera? And among today’s historians,
who really believes history has an overarching “meaning”? (“The Pomo”)
Although Russello does not explicitly mention the “meaning of history” within the
quotation I have provided at the beginning of this paragraph, it is a related point in his
treatment of Kirk (our conceptualization of the past is significant for this chapter and
Chapter Three of this project, which is relevant to one’s squaring of realism and history).
Russello is preparing the way for his eventual discussion of Kirk in relation to Lukacs,
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which I will cover in Chapter Three. He will more or less blend these lines of argument
(which are related), including the question of a meaning of history. I will not be saying
that Russello evades realism totally, but it seems that it might have been more helpful if
the matter of realism was more at the forefront of the book, especially considering the
way in which postmodernism is a departure from realism (see Introduction and Chapter
One herein).
18

McCarthy is complimentary to Russello’s discussion on natural law (“The

Pomo”), which is probably the most explicit aspect of the book in terms of realism. The
observation about Russello’s discussion regarding natural law with respect to realism is
my own. Please see the following for insights into Kirk’s sort of realism: Federici,
“Russell Kirk”; McCarthy, “The Pomo Mind”; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk; Quinn; Zoll,
“The Social.” In his review, Federici has written:
[…] Where Kirk tends to separate from most postmodernists is that he
argued for the existence of a normative reality that was known from
historical experience and tradition. If Kirk’s imagination is postmodern, it
is so because it attempts to reconstitute the older classical and JudeoChristian tradition in a way that will carry the West beyond modernity to
an age of moral realism. Kirk was engaged in an act of recovering order
that creatively integrated the past with the specific challenges of order in
the contemporary world. The Burkean tension of change and continuity
was at the root of his efforts to make the past a living force on the present.
(“Russell Kirk” 256)
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19

Please see the following: Hayward; Lawler, “Conservative Postmodernism”;

Molnar, “Philosophical Disorder”; Montgomery, The Trouble 75-83; E. Thompson,
“Ways Out”; Wilhelmsen, “Israel and”; Wilhelmsen, “Modern Man’s”; Wilhelmsen,
“Technology and”; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical. Some of these sources might not
mention postmodernism explicitly, but contain what is more or less part of or indicative
of postmodernism. Wilhelmsen was using the term “post-modern man” as far back as the
1950s (“Israel and” 182). He would write in 1980, “[…] Contemporary man ought not to
be identified with post-modern man (a term I invented some years ago) because postmodern man was still-born. He became a mummy practically before he climbed out of
the womb of history” (“Modern Man’s” 39). Russello’s highlighting of Bernard Iddings
Bell’s use of the term “postmodernism” in the 1920s, which in my view, is a significant
scholarly contribution by Russello. The book that Russello discussed is Bell’s
Postmodernism and Other Essays. Another related book by Bell was Religion for Living:
A Book for Postmodernists, which was published later. Interestingly, an issue of Modern
Age from 1961 contained an essay by Martin Buber entitled, “The Word That Is
Spoken.” Modern Age was founded by Russell Kirk in the 1950s.
20

Lawler, “Postmodern Conservatism”; Lawler, Postmodernism Rightly;

Russello, The Postmodern 10-11, 11n17, 190-191, 191n30; Russello, “Russell Kirk and
the Critics” 10, 13n66. With authors either speaking directly of the terminology of
postmodernism or treating of ideas that are in some way relevant to postmodern thought,
it should be noted that appraisals of postmodernism/postmodernity alongside of realism
do vary within the literature of conservatism and/or by conservatives. For instance,
please see the following on this matter: Caiazza 31-32; Henrie, “Reason, Unreason”;
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Molnar, “Philosophical Disorder”; Quinn; Thompson, “Postmodernism”; Thompson,
“Ways Out”; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical.
21

Please see the following: (regardless of whether the terminology of

“postmodern,” “postmodernism,” etc. is utilized): Beale, “Richard M. Weaver”;
Bradford, “Strategies of” 99; Chaves, “Soul and Reason” 830, 834-835; S. Crowley;
Czubaroff 168, 184n2; Duffy and Jacobi; Genovese; Guroian, Rallying; Jacobi,
“Professional” 111-112, 116-117, 126n8; López-Garay 27; Montgomery,
“Consequences”; W. Sullivan 118; Whalen. Relevant to this project, Beale wrote:
The happiest result, I believe, of a renewed dialectic between the
discourses of the First and Second Rhetorical Awakenings would be to
raise the question of whether an effective and responsible rhetoric or an
effective and responsible cultural criticism can be promulgated from the
standpoint of alienation—either the alienation of the individual from the
structures of society and history or the alienation of language from reality.
A more proximate goal would be a continuation of the investigation
already begun here into the question of right relations among theory,
practice, and ideology. In such an investigation Richard Weaver should
be put forward as a good example of how to be ideologically interested
without being an ideologue. (“Richard M. Weaver” 638).
A major dimension of Beale’s article is the similarities and differences between the “First
Rhetorical Awakening,” of which Weaver was a part (with persons such as “Kenneth
Burke on the left, and Wayne Booth in the liberal center”), and the “Second Rhetorical
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Awakening,” which is to some extent related to postmodernism (although he does not
really speak with that specific terminology).
22

This is my own appraisal of the literature here, which in some ways apart from

specific political biases, has been influenced by my study of works by F.F. Centore,
Jonathan Chaves, Marion Montgomery, and Ewa Thompson. The phenomenological and
hermeneutical terminology here is indicative of my view that the phenomenological lines
of thought in the 20th century are significant for the development of contemporary
postmodern thought. Discussion of this will follow. Weighed against Cherwitz and
Darwin’s parameters (“Beyond Reductionism”; “Toward a”; “Why The”), although they
have made a case for a strong epistemology in rhetorical studies to counter what is more
or less postmodernism, my specific argument here might entail what they would see as an
unnecessary “either/or” realism at a theoretical level. Regardless, that philosophical and
rhetorical territory has been covered in Chapter One.
23

Michael Calvin McGee’s article, “Suffix it to Say that Reality is at Issue” is

available in the first issue of the American Communication Journal, which is published
online. Please see Chapter One regarding his connection to the “critical rhetoric”
movement. The scholar that he is speaking of as responsive to “rhetorical situations”
within “postmodernity” is Jean Baudrillard (“Suffix”).
24

I am here anticipating discussion from this chapter and from Chapter Three.

My own thinking on the question of human nature in relation to conservatism has been
furthered by my study of James Dimock’s articles on Weaver and my involvement with
him on a panel at the 2007 convention of the National Communication Association that
focused on a discussion of his articles. Lawler’s writings have been helpful, and of
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course, many of Adler’s books and articles have prompted considerations on the
importance of the question of human nature as essentially constant, regardless of
conservatism. Deal Hudson’s introduction to a recent edition of Adler’s The Difference
of Man and the Difference It Makes is quite insightful on the matter of the important
implications of Adler’s discussion of the constancy of human nature for the present day
political and academic discourse.
31

The connection of philosophy to rhetorical studies (from various points of

view) has decades of history in the contemporary field of communication and rhetorical
studies (Cherwitz, Rhetoric; Cherwitz, Rhetoric and Philosophy Bibliography; Natanson;
Natanson and Johnstone; W. Thompson; Walter). Elements of what would be considered
a part of postmodernism in the field were under discussion and application as far back as
the middle of the 20th century (the late 1950s and early 1960s). Of note for this project,
Michael Leff, who had participated in discussions of “critical rhetoric” (on the rhetorical
criticism side) moved in the past decade or so to a “hermeneutic” approach to rhetorical
criticism (Arthos, “Where There” 343-344n147).
32

Kirk, The Sword 332. James E. Person, Jr. began Chapter One of his book,

Russell Kirk: A Critical Biography of a Conservative Mind, with a recounting of this
notable story that is inclusive of this quote (1-2). Kirk and Nixon had communicated on
more than one occasion, but in this instance, President Nixon requested a meeting with
Russell Kirk to seek Kirk’s advice (Kirk, The Sword 328-334). In The Sword of
Imagination: Memoirs of a Half-Century of Literary Conflict, Kirk wrote in the third
person. In “Russell Kirk and the Conservative Heart,” Mark C. Henrie has analyzed the
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significance of various aspects of style in the work of Russell Kirk, including Kirk’s use
of the third person within this book.
33

Chapter Three contains discussion and references regarding Bitzer and realism,

yet please see note 34 immediately below.
34

In light of some disciplinary discussion, Brummett has written:
[…] Bitzer’s position stems from an unwillingness to see rhetorical
influences in how the “objects” or reality are manifested; he assumes those
objects objectively exist, and allows rhetoric to enter the picture insofar as
we talk about what is there. Scholars will continue to argue at cross
purposes on the rhetorical situation until they realize that their positions
stem from conflicting ontologies. (“On to” 426n7)

Available scholarly discussions (often though not exclusively or always with respect to
Bitzer) explicitly or implicitly portray the significance of philosophical suppositions for
the question of “situation” with regard to rhetoric (Baxter and Kennedy; Biesecker;
Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Toward a
Relational”; Cox, “Argument and”; Croasmun and Cherwitz 11-12; Fisher, “A Motive”;
Hunsaker and Smith; Gorsevski; Johnstone, “Rhetoric and”; King; A. Miller; C. Miller;
Patton, “Causation”; Patton, “Patton on Tompkins”; Patton, “Patton on Vatz”; Scott,
“Intentionality in” 56-58; Sharkey and Hikins; Smith and Lybarger; Phillip Tompkins,
“Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,” 1980; Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton and
Bitzer,” 1981; Vatz, “The Myth”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton”; E. White 13-18; Wilkerson;
Young; Zhao 259-265).
35

Russello has cited Gadamer’s Truth and Method (The Postmodern 25, 25n56).
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36

Russello has cited Gadamer’s Truth and Method (322-324) (The Postmodern

206, 206n71). He also wrote:
As Daniel Ritchie noted in a perceptive review of a Burke biography, the
Irish statesman shared this understanding of tradition with Gadamer, as
did Kirk. Against the revolutionary view of self as an entity abstracted
from tradition, for Gadamer as well as for Burke, one always acts from
within a “hermeneutical circle,” defined by community and tradition […].
Russello’s reference (206, 206n72) to Ritchie’s “Remembrance of Things Past: Edmund
Burke, the Enlightenment, and Postmodernity” (21, 24) is beyond the scope of this study,
but it is indicative of the point that will recur regarding the various ways of “reading”
Burke’s legacy, which varies within and without the conservative movement.
Interestingly, Pappin, in his book The Metaphysics of Edmund Burke, who “reads” Burke
as within the classical realist legacy, argues for some connections between Burke’s
thought and an existential account of Thomism (52-101, 130-131). For this project, I am
not addressing the existential questions surrounding contemporary Thomistic studies.
However, for a source that is careful on the matter of giving an account of Thomism with
respect to questions of existence in general and existentialist currents in particular, please
see Fr. Dominic Bourmaud’s, One Hundred Years of Modernism: A Genealogy of the
Principles of the Second Vatican Council. Finally, Pappin’s work in some ways provides
for a stronger realist consideration of Burke and Burke’s conservatism with respect to the
question of postmodernism (“Edmund Burke’s”; The Metaphysics), and his work might
be a more helpful guidepost with respect to Gadamer, existentialism, postmodern theory,
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etc., at least from my own view of realism (again, apart from the specific matter of
existential Thomism).
37

Kirk, “The American Scholar.” Gadamer’s depth and dexterity with classical

and contemporary authors is highly evident in his work. In a highly complementary
essay (with some philosophical departures), Alasdair MacIntyre has argued for the 20th
century significance of Gadamer’s work on philosophy as a contribution to contemporary
philosophy and for the interpretation of classical texts (“On Not”). Regarding my
statement here, please see Gadamer’s collection of essays entitled, Philosophical
Hermeneutics. The Editor’s introduction by the translator and editor, David E. Linge, is
insightful regarding Gadamer’s corpus.
38

E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 195. She has here made reference to Jacques

Derrida’s essay, “Structure, Sign, and Play” (195, 207n1). Derrida’s work, among that of
others (not including Gadamer), will be a main focus for Thompson, yet her aiming back
at reality is still significant for my present discussion. I recognize what some would see
as distinctions between Derrida and Gadamer’s work, yet the question of “logocentrism”
is still of import here.
39

E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 195-196. Thompson’s discipline is Slavic Studies

(195). She is here recounting her study of Russian colonialism in view of
postcolonialism. Thompson explained, “This ‘construction of identity’ is one of the
significant phrases students learn in the humanities and social science courses in the early
twenty-first century […]” (196).
40

The following is the entire quotation as provided by Russello from Kirk’s

essay, “The Rediscovery of Mystery” (4) (5, 5n7):
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The average sensual man and the average sensual woman, though bored
with mechanism and materialism and frightened by the loss of self-image,
never will get beyond the tricks of Simon Magnus—not unless the prophet
and the man of genius open the way for them. The crowd perceives by
means of images, false or true. But the discoverers or shapers of images
are persons of extraordinary perceptions, not governed by the idols of the
tribe or of the marketplace.
Images are representations of mysteries, necessary because mere
words are tools that break in the hand, and it has not pleased God that man
should be saved by abstract reason alone.[…]
41

Russello, The Postmodern 5-6. Russello here has in mind Samuel P.

Huntington’s article, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” from 1957, which has continued as
a point of discussion regarding conservatism (Henrie, “Opposing”; Henrie, “The Road”).
I will briefly revisit this in my concluding section of the project.
42

This is my own observation of Gadamer’s writings. Waddell wrote:
Perhaps the greatest value of promoting the rhetorical or contingent nature
of knowledge—particularly of scientific knowledge—is that this position
challenges the “masculine,” airtight model of argument of logical
positivism and replaces it with the “feminine,” open ended model of
argument of constructivism. That is, an appreciation of the rhetorical
nature of knowledge discourages the pursuit of “the ultimate position,”
which closes off all further inquiry, and encourages a plurality of positions
and continued discourse. The self-exempting fallacies in some
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constructivists’ arguments, however, lead these constructivists to believe
that constructivism itself is absolute, rather than simply another
construction. The dialectical approach taken by Gadamer draws upon
both constructivism and positivism and, thus, avoids both self-exempting
fallacy and the extremes of the two positions. (114)
This is likely an accurate coupling of Gadamer’s work toward a more moderate
epistemological approach, yet it would seem that the “masculine” and “feminine” labels
(although an application by Waddell) are debatable extensions of Gadamer’s work with
respect to Gadamer’s own application of the hermeneutical framework to the
communication and interpretation within the lives of human beings.
43

Russello provided (9, 9n14) the following from Kirk’s “Imagination against

Ideology”:
We seem to be entering upon the Post-Modern Age…and new thoughts
and new sentiments and new modes of statecraft—or re-newed thoughts,
sentiments, modes—may take on flesh soon. The Post-Modern Age surely
will be an epoch of big battalions and Napoleonic figures; possibly it may
be also a time of renewed poetic imagination, and of the reflection of
poetry in politics. Thus Americans may learn for instance that the
sanguine response to the dreary abstraction called Marxism is not a dreary
counter-abstraction called Capitalism (embracing Marx’s own jargon), but
rather a reaffirmed poetic vision of the splendor and misery of the human
condition. […] (1578)
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44

Russello, The Postmodern 25. I have omitted here to follow aspects of his

account that are portraying the more extreme versions of postmodernism. My
assumption for this part of the project is the Gadamer’s approach can be considered a
more moderate approach as regards postmodern thought.
45

Please see in particular Kirk’s Confessions of a Bohemian Tory (33-124; 252-

258, 270-273). Gadamer wrote:
The consciousness of art—the aesthetic consciousness—is always
secondary to the immediate truth-claim that proceeds from the work of art
itself. To this extent, when we judge a work of art on the basis of its
aesthetic quality, something that is really much more intimately familiar to
us is alienated. This alienation into aesthetic judgment always takes place
when we have withdrawn ourselves and are no longer open to the
immediate claim of that which grasps us. (Philosophical Hermeneutics 5)
Also, according to Gadamer, “A genuine artistic creation stands within a particular
community, and such a community is always distinguishable from the cultured society
that is informed and terrorized by art criticism” (5). As Gadamer has in other essays
discussed linguistic art in a similar way in Philosophical Hermeneutics, one is here
reminded of Kirk’s appraisals of contemporary literary studies as terrorized by a variety
of approaches, often ideological (Enemies 41-152).
46

Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 8-9. Regarding “futurity” with respect

to historical studies, Gadamer has stated, “Here we have all learned from Heidegger, for
he exhibited precisely the primacy of futurity for our possible recollection and retention,
and for the whole of our history” (9).
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47

Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 9. According to Gadamer, “Heidegger

worked out this primacy in his doctrine of the productivity of the hermeneutical circle. I
have given the following formulation to this insight: It is not so much our judgments as it
is our prejudices that constitute our being […]” (9). Gadamer here (9) pointed the reader
back to his Truth and Method (261).
48

Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 13.

49

Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 16-17. Vigen Guroian has emphasized

the role of theology as a basis for the various aspects within Kirk’s corpus (Rallying 3132).
50

Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical. Please see notes 46 and 47 above. Although

strongly a Catholic and a Thomist, Wilhelmsen had an engaged working knowledge of
continental philosophy, such as existentialism. Based upon this, he speaks, for instance,
as to the care needed for a genuine study and appreciation of history (The Paradoxical
174-175). Please see also his article, “Technology and Its Consequences.”
51

Philosophical Hermeneutics 3-43, 59-68, 130-181. I here have in mind in

particular Gadamer’s discussions of Habermas and Wittgenstein.
52

O’Callaghan 275-298. The context of O’Callaghan’s book, Thomist Realism

and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, is in large part his
addressing of contemporary analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein, interpretations of
Wittgenstein, analytic Thomism, etc.
53

O’Callaghan 285-298. He is addressing the work of John Haldane here

regarding concepts and words in light of interpreting the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.
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54

I am here referring to Gadamer’s appropriation of an Aristotelian example of an

army taking a stand with respect to acting and speaking as regards “the universal” for his
own view of humans in language, the acquisition of language, etc. (Philosophical
Hermeneutics 14-15, 63-64).
55

O’Callaghan 291-292. The following from Centore is here relevant:
To be what we are as human persons we must act, and the more we act in
conformity with our nature the more we become what we are, and as a
consequence, the closer we grow to God and to other human persons. We
must become what we are. The fixed and the variable are not mutually
exclusive; eternity and time, nature and esse, male and female, and so
forth, are complementary. (Being 227)

One might also here consult Adler’s writing on the nurturing of human potentialities,
even as we share a constant human nature across time and place (Ten 156-166).
56

McAllister notes the following:
Any extensive discussion of Kirk’s book, and his ideas, requires some
discussion of his use of the word “imagination,” which stands in some
tension with his more reified label “mind.” Among other sources, Kirk
drew his understanding of this useful word from Irving Babbitt […].
Imagination is a human way of understanding just as is reason. Especially
important, humans make sense of the whole, which they experience
indirectly, in relation to the part, through the faculty of imagination. The
whole is invisible to one’s reason alone since reason is bound to existing
things. With regard to the arguments I’m making in this essay about the
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relationship between the partial and the whole, the particular and the
universal, one must understand the way Kirk used “imagination” to bridge
the gap. (“The Particular” 198n2)
My concern here is not so much on the emphasis upon imagination, but with the
downplaying of “mind.” We must rescue some concept of “mind” in Kirk’s work as
regards to both imagination and reality. As indicated within this chapter and the next,
there is an essential relationship among experience, “mind,” and imagination in bridging
the gap of which McAllister speaks.
57

Russello, The Postmodern 52, 52n53. He cites here Kirk’s Redeeming the

Time, p. 131.
58

Russello, The Postmodern 53-64; Whitney, “The Swords.” According to

Whitney, “There was something undeniably quixotic about Kirk’s life-work. He was,
after all, a conservative writing in a liberal nation; a premodern tilting at the modern.
There was also a self-deprecating quality about his manner” (311). In light of a
comparison to Quixote, Whitney wrote, “the knight-errant Russell Kirk imagined his role
in existence, set out on a modern-day crusade, and wielded the sword of imagination to
defend the permanent things” (311).
59

Please see the following: Guroian, Rallying.

60

Russello, The Postmodern 59, 59n74, 222. Russello referenced Bruce

Frohnen’s, Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism: The Legacy of Burke and
Tocqueville, University of Kansas Press, 1993, p. 172.
61

Adler, The Difference of Man; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica.
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62

Mesa 237, 237n1, 237n2. Mesa has here looked to Maritain’s, The Degrees of

Knowledge, translated by Gerald B. Phelan, from The Collected Works of Jacques
Maritain, Notre Dame, IN, U of Notre Dame P, 1995. Also relevant for my chapter here,
he also drew from (among other sources) McInerny’s Art and Prudence, Notre Dame, IN,
U of Notre Dame P, 1988, p. 106 (Mesa 240, 240n11) and William Kilpatrick’s Why
Johnny Can’t Tell Right from Wrong, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1992 along with various
sources from Maritain and various sections of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas
Aquinas.
63

Mesa 237-239, 238n3-6. In particular, for the issue of “seeing,” he has in mind

here Bernard Nathanson’s The Hand of God, Chicago, Regnery, 1996, with respect to
abortion.
64

Mesa 241-242. According to Mesa, “Moral imagination is not explicitly in

Aquinas, but it is in effect described by Maritain” (241). Mesa references St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 49, a. 1, resp. and ad 2 (243n22). According to
Mesa, “It is reasonable to suggest that there is a connection between Kilpatrick’s
imagination, Aquinas’s memory and Maritain’s quasi-biologically operating intelligence”
(241-242). Regarding “conconscious,” Mesa notes, “I use this expression with a
reverential bow to Maritain’s use of connaturality” (242n19).
65

Russello, The Postmodern 67-74. Russello’s point holds well, as a review of

the literature of intellectual conservatism reveals interests in both tradition and history
(with divergent theoretical standpoints) as far back as the days of Weaver’s Ideas Have
Consequences. See also Francis G. Wilson’s discussion of conservatism and history in
“The Anatomy of Conservatives” (274-276).
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66

Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 31. Gadamer references this statement

back to his Truth and Method. Truth and Method in large part carries Gadamer’s
contentions and assumptions regarding language, understanding, being, etc.
67

E. Thompson, “Dialectical” 10, 21n2. She referenced The Concept of

Structuralism: A Critical Analysis by Philip Pettit, Berkeley, CA, The University of
California Press, 1975, p. 39.
68

E. Thompson, “Dialectical” 10, 21n3. She referenced The High Tide of

Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath, volume 2 of The Open Society and Its
Enemies by Karl Popper, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 369-396.
69

E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 197-198. She is here drawing from Derrida’s

“Structure, Sign, and Play” in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism
and the Sciences of Man, Eds. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, Baltimore, 1970,
p. 249 (198, 207n2, 207n5).
70

Adler, “The Bodyguards”; E. Thompson, “Ways Out.” As mentioned in my

introduction, Ewa Thompson recommends the work of Adler, Maritain, and MacIntyre.
What follows is a very common discussion across Adler’s work. Thompson does not
make reference to this as one of Adler’s “bodyguards of truth.”
71

Adler, Intellect 130-131. I provide the following note from Adler here because

Thompson is discussing Derrida—again, I am not necessarily equating all aspects of
Gadamer’s work with that of Derrida:
Jacques Derrida’s doctrine of deconstruction, as applied to the
interpretation of the words on a page, is as self-refuting as the skeptical
assertion that it is true (or that it is false) that no statement is either true or
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false. Because of that fact, I have paid no attention to the doctrine of
deconstruction, but I would like to call attention to the fact that the
account in this chapter of the relation of language to mind as the realm in
which meanings exist goes a long way toward explaining the profound
mistake made by the deconstructionists. (131)
72

Thanks to my former colleague at the University of Mary, Jamie P. Meyer,

Associate Professor of Communication, for prompting me to ponder this phrasing as a
disciplinary phrasing of communication via our conversations and his teaching. It is a
somewhat common definition of communication in the field it seems. Apart from my
conversations with Professor Meyer, upon my own reflection, it seems that this definition
of communication can certainly be understood from a classical realist point of view,
especially in light of Adler’s philosophical framing of communication between and
among human beings (The Four 106-123; How to Speak; How to Think 1-68, 204-213,
284-293; Intellect 126-139; Some Questions).
73

Montgomery, “Consequences” 169-171. He wrote here in view of Tate’s essay,

“The New Provincialism,” and Eliot’s, After Strange Gods. In this essay, as he
approaches Weaver, Montgomery has in mind Eliot’s observations regarding the
Agrarian writers on society and literature with respect to provincialism versus
regionalism. It is a regionalism that Montgomery is arguing for in this selection. Weaver,
the Agrarians, and Eliot were all influential on Montgomery.
74

Montgomery, “Consequences” 174-175. Montgomery also looked to Eliot’s

East Coker here for these thoughts.
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75

Montgomery, “Consequences” 176-177, 249n13, 249n14. Montgomery is also

building here from Eliot’s, After Strange Gods. Relevant here, according to Shively, “I
call the realist approach orthodox simply because it recognizes a progressive
accumulation of objective moral knowledge. Thus it looks to a certain traditional body of
knowledge as authoritative” (78). She also stated, “Thus the orthodoxy, or authoritative
body of knowledge, is taken to be the best approximation of truth established thus far. It
is not certain or final truth, for that is not available to the flawed and finite mind; rather, it
represents what the participants in the tradition agree on as the best—most clearly,
objectively, and rationally established—conclusions that their methods and minds can
justify” (79).
76

Hochschild, “The Re-Imagined” 333-334, 337-338, 340. Please see also the

following regarding Newman: Caiazza; R. McInerny, Characters 90-120, 124-126; Wise,
138-157. Caiazza has given an appraisal that is in some respects similar to Quinn
regarding Newman on certain matters of phenomenology. One might here also consider
Mesa’s mentioning of Newman in regards to a consideration of subjectivity with respect
to reality and our knowledge of reality.
77

Brand 357-358, 361-365, 365n2-8. Brand focuses primarily on Eliot and not

Kirk. Brand wrote this article in an issue of Modern Age dedicated to revisiting some of
the personages within Kirk’s Conservative Mind (Henrie, “Conservative Minds”).
Hochschild’s article on Newman appears in this same issue (“The Re-Imagined”).
78

Kirk, Eliot 60, 373n17, 374n21. This is from Montgomery’s T.S. Eliot: An

Essay on the American Magnus, 1970, p. 89.
79

Kirk, Eliot 243.
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80

Although it would eventually develop into distinct schools and areas of

application, phenomenology was one major influence upon the development of
postmodern thought on the continent and then eventually in the United States of America.
Thomists have varied in their considerations in aspects of phenomenological scholarship,
but the question of starting points in terms of persons and reality is certainly going to
always be on the table.
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Please see the following: Montgomery, “The Abandonment” 58-59;

Montgomery, Romantic xxxi; Caitlin Smith; Wilhelmsen, “Faith and” 28; Wilhelmsen,
“Modern Man’s” 43-44. According to Caitlin Smith (in an article on Husserl), “For
Aquinas, I do not as a knower constitute the world, I constitute my knowledge of the
world” (32).
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Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics 69-81. Waddell has explained (113):
Hence, although prejudice is prerequisite to understanding, our
understanding is also shaped “by the things” themselves, for it is our
experience of the things themselves that determines which of our
prejudices are arbitrary or inappropriate and which are not. […] Thus,
although Gadamer expresses a notion of correspondence between
understanding and “the things themselves,” he emphasizes that the effort
to achieve correspondence is a constant task; hence, correspondence is
never achieved. The motivation behind interpretation, then, is not to
establish correspondence—a futile task—but to create meaning. Yet our
notions of correspondence serve as constraints on the making of meaning.
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Hence, in Gadamer’s speculative hermeneutics, understanding is
dialectical in nature—it is shaped neither by prejudices alone nor by the
things themselves alone but by “the fusion of horizons” of the two. […]
83

Centore, Being 219-222. According to Centore, “As mentioned earlier, this

uniting of the knower and the known, in philosophical language, is called
Epistemological Realism. I personally become the other as other; i.e., not physically, for
the other is not physically changed or destroyed as would happen, for instance, in the
digestion of food” (221).
84

Centore, Being 225. In his book, Centore references Gadamer’s Truth and

Method when discussing Gadamer.
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Donald Ellis’s article, “Fixing Communicative Meaning: A Coherentist

Theory,” is a helpful selection from the communication discipline from the standpoint of
realism. He addresses Gadamer and a series of other thinkers. Ellis is not a classical
realist, as he works from an epistemological framework that has a particular focus on
coherence in a different way. There are certainly points in his article, though, that are
conducive to classical realism.
86

Please see “Signs in General and Linguistic Symbols: Hermeneutics and the

Philosophy of Language” (no author is given), which employs Adler’s work, among that
of others, for the sorts of discussions at this point in the present chapter of this project.
As Centore has argued, for “the ordinary human being,” who is precursory to the
philosopher, it is of “basic common sense” that within “the real world” one cannot eat
their cake and have it too, which “is reflected in the logical world” (Being 179). To
revisit Ralph McInerny (from Chapter One herein), “Since our knowledge is of reality—
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we do not first know our thinking or our expression of it […] [l]ogic and epistemology
recapitulate ontology […]” (Characters 49).
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In terms of some of the connections here, Hoffman’s article, “Paine and

Prejudice: Rhetorical Leadership through Perceptual Framing in Common Sense” is an
interesting read, especially in terms of rhetorical theory and criticism in conjunction with
epistemology. I would differ with him on some philosophical points, but it is another
source linking Kirk to Gadamer. The sentence that follows here is written with
Hoffman’s article in mind. Regarding Weaver, please see Weaver’s essay, “Life Without
Prejudice,” which Hoffman does reference.
88

Kirk, Enemies 35. I will postpone some additional brief discussion of Kirk on

Hume to Chapter Three. Kirk provides no specific reference to Hume here, but he does
provide a general flavor of Hume’s thoughts as applicable to Kirk’s discussion.
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Please see Philosophical Hermeneutics (95-104) and Truth and Method by

Gadamer. Regarding the possibility and role of genius from a Thomistic perspective,
please see Gilby.
90

See in particular Kirk’s discussions of Eric Voegelin in Enemies of the

Permanent Things regarding Plato and Aristotle (274-281), although in The Roots of
American Order, Kirk exhibits a respect for both of these classical figures. Some of
Zoll’s points of discussion within “The Social Thought of Russell Kirk” are relevant here
regarding this mixture of influences (114-115, 132). Please see the following regarding
“poetic knowledge” from the Thomistic standpoint: Kramer; S. McInerny; Taylor.
Thanks to Father Scott Gardner for prompting in conversation this consideration of poetic
knowledge.
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Please see the following: MacIntyre, “On Not”; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical.

For additional discussion on the relationship between philosophy and history, please see
Three Paths in Philosophy by James Collins, Metaphysics and Historicity by Emil L.
Fackenheim, and History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education by Etienne Gilson.
See also On the Philosophy of History by Jacques Maritain. Regarding Gadamer,
MacIntyre explained:
In my own case one obstacle is that the tradition within which I have
worked for almost twenty years is one that Gadamer had rejected
dismissively from the outset, finding no merit in what he took to be “the
dogmatic overlay superimposed on Aristotle by […] neo-Thomism.” […]
Although Gadamer has discussed particular theses of Aquinas with his
characteristic sympathy and accuracy, he has never entered into dialogue
with a distinctively Thomistic Aristotelianism. This is not surprising, and
not only because of Gadamer’s own preconceptions.
For modern Thomism only exhibited an awareness of the
importance of the historical turn and the hermeneutic turn in philosophy
relatively late in its history. And Thomistic Aristotelians have still
perhaps not taken adequate measure of the implications of these turns. So
part of the importance of Gadamer’s work lies in the help that it can afford
in understanding the bearing of hermeneutics on the Aristotelian tradition.
It has often been thought by Thomists, for example, that to acknowledge
the historically conditioned character of philosophical—or for that matter
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of scientific or historical—inquiry is to make a certain kind of relativism
inescapable. […] (“On Not” 157-158)
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MacIntyre, “On Not.” He here follows up with Gadamer’s focus on Aristotle,

but with respect to the import of Aristotelian suppositions on metaphysics regarding
phronesis. In my estimation, this would be relevant to discussions of phronesis in the
communication discipline for rhetorical criticism, communication ethics, etc.
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MacIntyre, “On Not” 170-171. The basis for his disagreement with Gadamer on

language pertains to Gadamer’s “Heideggerian view” (169-170).
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My formulation here was prompted by my reflection upon Wilhelmsen’s “Faith

and Reason,” especially his words on judgment, meaning, being, and propositions with
respect to experience (31), in conjunction with the larger picture of classical realism
(including other items from Wilhelmsen) that is put forth within this project.
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Chapter Three
Human Nature: The Linchpin of Order for Rhetoric
Richard Weaver’s contention that “a conservative is a realist” (“Conservatism and
Libertarianism” 477-478) is a major assumption of this dissertation project. So as to
build a foundation for a realist rhetoric of order, extending the framework for Kirk on
“imagination” from the previous chapter, a rhetorical study of The Roots of American
Order as regards to human nature can assist in contending with “historical man” meeting
the world from the vantage point of classical realism. To some extent, the question of
postmodernism and conservatism encompasses the matter of realism as against
philosophical skepticism in general along with social constructivism in particular. Within
a comparison of Kirk’s work to specific ideas of Hans Gadamer, Kirk was identified as a
realist and “logocentric” historian. The following was stated as one realist departure
from Gadamer’s philosophical statement that “being that can be understood is language”
(Philosophical Hermeneutics): With our common experience of things, we can express
meaning by the use of language toward a commonality of understanding. In view of the
scholarship on the intersections of rhetoric with history, coupled with the varying stances
among realists on philosophy as related to history (such as Adler, MacIntyre, Maritain,
and Wilhelmsen), this human experience of things with respect to the historical scope of
communal and individual life is significant for the line of argumentation within this
chapter.1 Rhetorically and philosophically, realism is at the crossroads of the question of
conservatism and postmodernism.
From his standpoint of “rhetorical perspectivism,” James Hikins has suggested to
me a consideration of the constitutive function of “perspectives” alongside of Lloyd
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Bitzer’s model of “rhetorical situation,” particularly as regards the matter of “fitting
response” (Telephone). Recalling Chapter One’s modifications of “rhetorical
perspectivism” toward classical realism, from a perspective, a rhetor associates and
differentiates in view of the evaluative judgments of audiences within the sphere of
“prescriptive” truth, possibly toward the preservation of virtue. To now expand, in light
of the “prescriptive” judgments of rhetoric as evaluative, one might consider a speaker or
writer’s “prejudice,” “bias,” “framing,” or “point of view” (academic and everyday
terms), yet at the level of rhetorical discourse, this perspective, for which our “common
experience” of reality is always a factor, can also be informed by one or more of the
following: 1) dialectical reasoning; 2) poetic, dramatic, and literary discourse; 3) the
spectrum of mere opinion to probable opinion; 4) beliefs on general matters; 5) differing
national or cultural experiences; 6) philosophical suppositions; 7) the “special
experience” of an academic discipline; 8) religious beliefs.2 In a certain sense, since
“words express the meanings that ideas are” (Adler, Intellect 130), rhetorical perspective
entails meaning as it is communicated to an audience (in spoken or written words) by a
communicator.3 Like the “rhetorical perspectivists,” one can maintain the import of
situational relevance for the rhetorical communication of perspectives, while not
embracing epistemological skepticism or ethical relativism.4 To revisit Chapter One’s
application of Ruth Lessl Shively’s realist arguments against social constructivism (4685), rhetoric is to some degree “supracontextual.”
Even beyond the question of conservatism and postmodernism, how might
Russell Kirk as historian theoretically inform rhetorical studies with respect to the human
imagination? To begin a longer line of argumentation for this question, Bitzer’s model of
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“rhetorical situation,” which is somewhat conducive to realism, was mentioned in the
previous chapter.5 Therein, as a departure from Michael Calvin McGee’s epistemological
suggestions (“Suffix”), the following was stated: The sociality of humanity is real
because it is natural to human beings who, sharing a common human nature, are uniquely
a part of reality as they think and talk about reality. Francis M. Crowley, in his editorial
introduction to Fr. John Wise’s book, The Nature of the Liberal Arts, wrote, “Man is
properly the subject of the trivium, as nature is of the quadrivium,” while in reference to
his title, Fr. Wise explained that “the word nature connotes a principle of action,” yet
“essence, while identified with nature, has reference more to the principle of being;
hence, one learns not “what the liberal arts should be from the analysis of man, but […]
from the analysis of practice,” which leads to the conclusion “that their elements are
based on human nature, and are, therefore, enduring.”6 Although rhetoric deals with
specific spheres of practical judgments, rhetorical discourse is not exempt (as with
grammar and logic) from the typical integration of human capacities that generally occur
for intellection and communication across contexts. However, as indicated by Cherwitz
and Darwin, realists must also account “for the fact that rhetorical utterances are situated,
which is to say that reality (e.g., physical objects, experiences, ideas, feelings, and
language itself) constrains rhetoric,” while also accounting “for the simultaneous
potential of symbols to shape reality” (“Beyond Reductionism” 316). From the
standpoint of “rhetorical perspectivism,” they have placed “context” and “history”
alongside of “substance” as “relational constituents of meaning” (“Toward a” 21-24).
Hence, one can affirm that even as approaches such as McKerrow’s “critical rhetoric”
might provide pragmatic and contextual insights on the use of language, it is necessary to
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ascertain rhetorical practices with respect to knowledge and reality both within and
across contexts (Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism”; Cherwitz and Darwin,
“Toward a”; Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”).
F.F. Centore has argued that when forming, embracing, or evaluating a
worldview, we must “put first things first,” which means going from things to thinking by
not starting with ideas, which we don’t know directly anyway, as ideas “are always the
means by which we know the world.”7 According to Kathleen Jamieson, “One’s
Weltanschauung, intimately tied to one’s epistemology, psychology, axiology and
metaphysic, colors rhetorical choice” (“The Rhetorical” 4). She wrote, “Rhetorical
visions develop and decay in response to exigencies perceived through the filter of a
worldview. Weltanschauung assigns value to exigencies, determines their certitude,
assesses their relation to man, nature and society and having cast them in perspective,
determines whether a rhetorical vision will be created in response to them” (4). Apart
from rhetoric specifically, Emil Fackenheim has treated the philosophical question of
metaphysics or historicity as primary in relation to the “situation” of human beings as
“situated” for the creation of their own natures, which is of consequence to one’s stance
on the constancy and commonality of human nature through history.8
In Fackenheim’s account, the ongoing human dynamic of living within history
while struggling to strive beyond history is now felt more in the West “in part because of
the breath-taking swiftness of contemporary events,” which is backed by “an ever
increasing historical self-consciousness” since the 19th century (1-3). This has provided
for “grave spiritual effects,” for in the past people “could simply accept religious beliefs
or moral principles, as unquestionably true,” yet with “this historically self-conscious
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age, few men can ever forget that what seems unquestionably true to one age or
civilization differs from what seems unquestionably true to others” (3). According to
Fackenheim, “And from historical self-consciousness there is but one step—albeit a long
and fateful one—to a wholesale historical scepticism: to the despairing view that history
discloses a variety of conflicting Weltanschauungen, with no criterion for choice between
them anywhere in sight. But when events move as they do today this step is easily taken”
(3). A philosophical notion of “situation” was significant for Michael J. Hyde and Craig
R. Smith in their arguing for a theoretical link between Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics and rhetorical studies, which from their phenomenological standpoint is
theoretically pertinent to both epistemic rhetoric and Bitzer’s model.9 This inclusion of
“rhetorical situation” by Hyde and Smith would be an earlier instance within a gradually
visible postmodern conversation on Bitzer’s work.10 From the vantage point of classical
realism, however, at bottom is not a “[…] showing what the basic mode of human
understanding is and how it structures the experience of existential reality […] itself a
disclosure of the human experience of language,” but a more deliberate appraisal of how
our understanding is both structured by and structuring of our experience of reality,
which is not primarily linguistic, yet certainly involves the use of language at an
important level.11
The question of Kirk and postmodernism portends Kirk’s relevance for and
interest in rhetorical discourse, inclusive of the workings of “moral imagination,”
“historical imagination,” and “political imagination” (Russello, The Postmodern 52, 104145; Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics” 10-11). “Moral imagination” has taken on
significance for such areas of study as communication ethics (Paula Tompkins),
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administrative leadership (Stephenson), and moral pedagogy (Mesa). Not surprisingly,
the role of imagination and imagery has in general been present within the disciplinary
literature on the theoretical and practical makeup of the “situations” of rhetoric (Bitzer,
“Functional”; Fisher, “A Motive”; Gorsevski; Larson; Patton, “Causation”), with
Gorsevski making specific reference to the relevance of “‘moral imagination’” for
participants within a “rhetorical situation” (172). In his 1982 look back at the journal
Philosophy and Rhetoric, philosopher Eugene Garver suggested that discussants on
“rhetorical situations” would provoke greater interest by comparing “the relation of
rhetorical situation to rhetorical act with the relation between ethical situation and ethical
act, because they would find the same problems: ethical acts must be appropriate to
circumstances, but the ethical agent acts from a vision that transcends the objective
givens of the situation and doesn’t merely ‘react’” (“Philosophy and” 147-148). He is, of
course, making reference to the larger disputation that was initiated by Richard Vatz on
Bitzer’s model, which continues to this day, even recently by Vatz himself.12 Within his
own work, Garver has grappled with the relationship between rhetoric and history, like
for instance with his extensive studies of Machiavelli’s political theory and American
legal discourse.13 Also, the role of a philosophy of history and a notion of “situations” as
historical are both apparent within the “rhetorical situation” literature (Patton,
“Causation”; Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,” 1980; Wilkerson).
With these precedents in mind, the larger argument linking the previous and present
chapters continues here as follows: As a realist and “logocentric” historian, with respect
to the constancy of human nature, Russell Kirk provided significant scholarly coordinates
as to the formative and informative role of the imagination for perspectives across
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“rhetorical situations.” After establishing these coordinates, which are indicated in The
Roots of American Order, I will return to the disciplinary discussion regarding
“situation” with an eye toward bringing this larger argument squarely back to rhetorical
theory.
As argued in Chapter Two, Kirk’s approach to “moral imagination” is somewhat
akin to Mesa’s account of “moral imagination” as a “pattern” that is both guided by and
guiding of our experiences in and of the world (241-242), with language taking on a high
place for Kirk within that experience. While “good moral imagination” is in accord with
right reason, it “is grounded in an already established reality and recognizes that there are
goals that ought to be realized regardless of feelings” (241). Kirk wrote in Enemies of
the Permanent Things:
“Art is man’s nature,” said Burke, playing upon Aristotle’s remark that art
is the imitation of nature. We are not wholly subject to Fate and Fortune:
for the art of the man of letters, and the art of the statist, determine in large
part whether we become normal human beings, or are perverted into
abnormal creatures. In erring Reason’s spite, as Samuel Johnson knew,
the will is free. All argument may be against it, but all necessity is for it.
Personal and social decadence are not the work of ineluctable forces, but
are the consequences of defying normative truth: a failure of right reason,
if you will, resulting in abnormality. When we distort the arts of literature
and statecraft, we warp our nature before long. (16)
To reiterate from the previous chapter, regardless of the type of imagination that one
considers, it is ultimately the human imagination as such that must be central, which is
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then a matter of the various experiences (both literary and everyday) within and for these
specific areas of study. Although The Roots of American Order is not a direct treatise on
the human imagination, it is both practically and theoretically relevant to Kirk’s overall
imaginative approach to such areas as conservatism, order, and history (W. McDonald,
Russell Kirk; Person, Russell Kirk; Russello, The Postmodern; Whitney, “The Swords”).
Over the years, Russell Kirk has been commemorated with various designations
because of his visible focus upon truth and his multiple contributions to conservatism.14
For instance, within a look back in 1982 at the journal Modern Age (a publication that
Kirk founded), M.E. Bradford recognized The Conservative Mind as “Kirk’s most
influential book.”15 Yet, Bradford argued that The Roots of American Order alone “rivals
the original traditionalist manifesto” as significant “to the status of American intellectual
conservatism and its serious outreach toward a vast general audience concerned with
defending the responsibilities of the Right in a specifically American context” (295).
Kirk clearly communicated that conservatism in America, to be successful, needs to go
beyond economic theorizing to “stand in some positive relation to the Party of the Right
as it has appeared in moments of crisis throughout the history of Western civilization”
(295). In recalling “that what was English or European is often what has become
American,” one holds to “the premise that the best way to defend the free market is to
argue for it as a part of a more inclusive proposition, with reference to its human
consequences” (295). According to Bradford, “Kirk is our American Cicero, the
repository of our common membership of the ancestral things, who knows who we are by
knowing from whence we have come. He is the central figure in any account of the
conservative revival at which we here rejoice” (295). In his essay, “Russell Kirk: The
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American Cicero,” Forrest McDonald stated that Bradford’s “appellation seems entirely
fitting” (15). McDonald concluded that “Kirk’s mission […] has been to enrich the
conservative intellectual tradition” through communicating ancestral wisdom, which
“moves us closer toward a whole from which internal contradictions and tensions are
entirely absent,” yet “[w]e shall never get there, of course, for what Kirk is seeking,
ultimately, is the Truth; and it is inherent in the conservative way of viewing things that
the Truth is not for man to know”—“[…] he continues to search and to find, and we
continue to be enriched.”16 Is “Truth” for man to know to any extent, and if so, how does
this work in terms of history, especially as regards “the permanent things,” which
McDonald described in a foreword to a later publication of The Roots of American Order
as those “perduring conditions and needs that must be met if human society is to function
well”17?
In large part because of Gerald Russello’s recent efforts, “postmodern” is a fairly
recent designation for Kirk, yet McCarthy wrote, “Still, Kirk doesn’t seem at first blush
like a postmodern figure. Premodern would be more like it” (“The Pomo”). According
to McCarthy, beyond his eighteenth century style, Kirk’s “ideas echoed various dead
white Anglo-Saxon males who defended established institutions of church and state,”
unlike postmodernists, who “tend to embrace the marginal, the ‘Other,’ and the genuinely
or putatively oppressed, while condemning the ‘cultural hegemony’ of men and
institutions that Kirk admired.”18 However, in light of the work of certain scholars
(Stephenson; Paula Tompkins), “moral imagination” is pertinent to the philosophical
concept of alterity, which will have some bearing on the return to rhetorical studies that
follows toward the end of this chapter. Pertinent to this and more, amid McCarthy’s
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critiques of Russello’s book, there is one other philosophical item that he could have
explicitly mentioned regarding the question of conservatism and postmodernism.
James Patrick Dimock’s call in the journal Modern Age for a revised
interpretation of Weaver’s book, The Ethics of Rhetoric, prompts one to reconsider the
discourse of Abraham Lincoln as both evidentiary for the rhetorical theory of the book
and exemplary for the conservative argumentation of the 1950s (“Rediscovering […]
[Part One]”; “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”). Contra Dimock’s unique interpretation
of Lincoln as a defining yet “evil” rhetorician in the book (to Weaver then, not a genuine
conservative), it is highly arguable that, as the standard reading goes, Weaver’s message
to the “New Conservatives” of the 1950s regarding definitional parameters for questions
of reform and governance was with respect to, not in spite of, our 16th President.19
However, in putting forth the question of Weaver on Lincoln, Dimock identified a key
philosophical issue in Weaver’s work—human nature.20
In view of Weaver’s corpus, it is arguable that, by his analysis of Lincoln’s
discourse, one message to conservatives from Weaver was the philosophical significance
of the constancy of human nature in essence for discussions of both individual morality
and social distinction.21 To open a lecture of 1960 entitled, “Conservatism and
Liberalism,” Weaver argued the following:
I begin with two words: conservatism and liberalism. People who are
willing to accept the name “conservative” are not infrequently asked, as if
it were an overwhelming question, “What is it that you wish to conserve?”
The more I meditate upon this, the more it seems to me that the answer is
an obvious one: the conservative wishes to conserve man—the human
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being. The implications of that answer, however, are not so obvious, and
perhaps that is why the question is so often raised.
When one says that he wishes to conserve man, he signifies, for
one thing, the he knows what man is. That is to say, he believes that man
has an essential being, a definable nature, and a proper end. The program
of conservation must seek to know that being better, to understand the
capacities and limits of that nature, and to help man attain that end. I shall
repeat this, for I think it is a cardinal point for any intelligible conservative
position. The conservative thinks that man has a definable nature, that he
is happiest in the true sense when he is following the laws of that nature,
and that he has a unique and transcendent destiny.
In second place, the conservative believes that there are forces in
this world which are inimical to these and which militate against all of
them. There are forces which tend to confuse him about the reality of his
being, voices which tell him that he has no nature except what is exhibited
historically from day to day, and there are theories which deny the idea of
a destiny. These forces and ideas are disintegrative in the sense that they
leave man puzzled and at loose ends. The thinking conservative feels that
this man needs help, and to the extent that he is engaged in combating the
disintegration—in conserving what otherwise might be lost or dispersed—
his is an activist program. Here I suggest lies the germ of the movement
of the “new conservatism” in this country and elsewhere.22
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A concept of human nature was significant for Kirk’s “traditional” brand of
conservatism, especially as against the truncated or ideological versions given by
modernity (Henrie, “Understanding”; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 42-138). Kirk’s
essentialist approach to human nature, which is evident within his larger body of work,
might be rhetorically conducive to “an image of traditional society as a natural, desirable
order” that is teleological in scope along with “a motif of ‘continuity,’” both of which
Martha Solomon has critically identified for the STOP ERA and Right to Life
movements, respectively.23 At bottom, with his own focus upon continuity, Russell Kirk
aimed for the conservation of “the human being.”
The onward march from modernism to postmodernism has entailed, in one form
or another, a frequent denial of the essential constancy of human nature (Centore, Being;
Shively), which according to Adler (not speaking directly of “postmodernism”) is a
“philosophical mistake” of contemporary times (Ten 156-166). Although it is arguable
that a more explicit treatment of this matter might have been given by Russello, certainly
along the way he indicated and emphasized Kirk’s essentialist approach to human nature
as such for religion, politics, history, and literature (The Postmodern). Among those who
have grappled with the question of a postmodern conservatism, Peter Augustine Lawler,
for instance (whom Russello referenced), has given a high degree of focus to the
important implications of holding to the fixity and ends of human nature as properly
postmodern in view of the visible deficiencies of modernity—it is for him an aspect of a
genuinely conservative postmodernism.24 Russello also flags the import of human nature
as such by drawing from Vigen Guroian, who also as a part of the conversation on Kirk
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and postmodernism has emphasized the reality and continuity of humanity through
history.25 In contrast to the typical lines of postmodern thought, Guroian has argued:
[…] A Burkean or Kirkian would say that cultural facts and circumstances
are not accidents of place and time, but grow out of human nature itself.
In other words “art is man’s nature” and morality is an inevitable
concomitant of that “nature.” What constitutes human culture and
distinguishes it from the beehive or the wolf pack are images and symbolic
articulations that interpret reality, including, inevitably, images of
religious and transcendent signification. Human culture is itself the
product of the very sorts of ultimate questions raised by countless
generations of humanity […].26
Continuing from Chapter Two, as reality is the inescapable basis for thought and
communication, the question of conservatism and postmodernism must ultimately rest
either upon a postmodern quest “to the things themselves” or a realist endeavor from
things to thinking and speaking, including a consideration of both the personal and
general aspects of human nature that Kirk’s corpus brings forward as the linchpin for a
realist rhetoric of order.27
The Roots of American Order is an historical account. From an Aristotelian
standpoint, rhetoric as an art is distinct from historical study, with the latter being more
directly aligned with politics.28 According to Weaver, for whom history had a significant
place for rhetorical theory (Bliese, “Richard Weaver’s Axiology”; Guroian, Rallying 189200; Irwin), even in Aristotle’s Rhetoric there are elements of rhetorical discourse that
are to be derived from history (Visions 63). Weaver wrote that the design of rhetoric is
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for the movement of “feelings in the direction of a goal” to be “concerned not with
abstract individuals, but with men in being” (63). He clarified, “Moreover, these men in
being it has to consider in relation to forces in being. Rhetoric begins with the
assumption that man is born into history. If he is to be moved, the arguments addressed
to him must have historicity as well as logicality” (63). For instance, regarding
Aristotle’s argument from example, Weaver argued that it “bears out our idea that
rhetoric must be concerned with real or historical situations, although dialectic can attain
its goal in a self-existing realm of discourse,” as examples are “taken from life, and the
force of the example comes from the fact that it is or was” (63). According to Weaver,
“It is the thing already possessed in experience and so it is the property of everyone
through the sharing of a common past. Through examples, the rhetorician appeals to
matters that everybody has in a sense participated in. These are the possible already
made the actual, and the audience is expected to be moved by their historicity” (63).
Also, as various scholars have shown, an historian is not exempt from using the rhetorical
art along the way, whether it be epideictic rhetoric regarding virtue or vice within the
landscape of the past and present or judicial rhetoric on the justice or injustice of some
aspect of the past.29
From the vantage point of rhetorical criticism, one might designate Kirk as a
spokesperson for American order in light of his praise and defense of its “roots” across
his corpus.30 In view of those historical approaches (in the 1970s) that took the United
States as either invented or revolutionary, Bradford had explained in a review:
[…] The Roots of American Order presupposes, as a piece of rhetoric, no
other state of affairs, no less formidable adversaries to confound. I use the
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word rhetoric advisedly. Praise of discontinuity, rupture, and drastic
innovation is ever the song of the new ideological historians—of helpful,
not baneful change: but change identified as good by being identified as
radical. Kirk, however, writes no Tory apocalypse. He contends that our
roots run deep and remain intact, that to know them is to recognize both
their antiquity and their present hold upon us. His book is a calculated
inquiry into the genesis of our national character which looks behind
events and documents to remote antecedents and attempts to encourage a
modest estimation of its originality, a thoughtful appreciation of how
much and how far it was brought to these shores, and a quiet rejoicing that
we remain, in our essential qualities as a people, so well and so anciently
grounded in the funded wisdom of the ages. Kirk’s amiable but
unremitting determination is to require of our generation a grudging
admission that America has a religious, a moral, and therefore a political
genealogy: a patrimony that could be called unrevolutionary and not at all
modern, whose order-giving strength owes, by accident or omission as
much as by design, to continuities so axiomatic that we have rarely, until
of late, felt any need to speak of them at all.31
So then, one might take The Roots of American Order as an exercise in epideictic
rhetoric in terms of the people and principles that were formative and foundational to the
American Republic. Within a positive review of the book, Harold F. Alderfer has
explained, “Kirk posits no overall theory or pattern of life, but in these times of doubt he
offers a wonderful pageant of progress and good works” (181). In view of Kirk’s lack of
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admiration for either selfishness or envy, Fr. Francis Canavan wrote, “His conservatism
was that of a society guided by a sound tradition and maintained by the moral character
of good men and women. America had had such a society, whose tradition he elaborated
in his book The Roots of American Order, and he devoted his life to conserving and
reviving it” (45). Kirk’s later book, America’s British Culture, might be seen at some
level as a forensic defense of the justice of that same legacy of Israel, Greece, Rome, and
England against the attacks of multiculturalism on the West within the sphere of
American education.32
From one angle, it is arguable that Kirk’s communicative efforts within The Roots
of American Order was part of a larger attempt to inform the potential “‘renewal’”
toward “‘the exigency to common action and reform’” that he once spoke of to President
Nixon, for this book, at various levels, encompassed and reinforced a potentially
persuasive message to the American citizenry that was at times, as Mark C. Henrie has
pointed out, visible within his overall corpus—“life is worth living.”33 As one of many
carriers of this persuasive message, the book certainly reinforced Kirk’s observable view
that history is everybody’s business. Within a written historical book, an author narrates
a story of events from a viewpoint, often including a philosophy of history, to configure
the “special experience” of research, which can influence the “prescriptive” judgments of
readers.34 While keeping in mind Aristotle’s explanation of poetry as more philosophical
than history in terms of universals, Adler and Van Doren have indicated that to this extent
(influencing “prescriptive” judgments”), the particulars of the past can be universal in
scope.35 Richard Weaver has explained that historical study is “a sobering discipline
because it presents the story not only of man’s achievements but also of his failures,” for

188

it “contains many vivid lessons of what can happen to man if he lets go his grip upon
reality and becomes self-indulgent; it is the record of the race, which can be laid
alongside the dreams of visionaries, with many profitable lessons” (Education and 191).
One might also here consider the rhetorical dimensions of history as related to
deliberative rhetoric, possibly informed by an epideictic type of discourse.36
Particularly in view of the book, Enemies of the Permanent Things, Russello’s
work points to what would be, for the most part, Kirk’s philosophy of history at the time
of The Roots of American Order, which will be germane along the way to the present
textual examination.37 Kirk opened the book with a call for a renewed “understanding of
the beliefs and the laws which give form to American society,” which “like that of any
other people, is held together by what is called an ‘order’” (The Roots 3). He wrote,
“The character of that order is the subject of this book. What is ‘order’?” (3). According
to Kirk:
Imagine a man traveling through the night, without a guide, thinking
continually of the direction he wishes to follow. That is the image of a
human being in search of order, says Simone Weil, a woman who suffered
much: “Such a traveller’s way is lit by a great hope.” Order is the path we
follow, or the pattern by which we live with purpose and meaning. Above
even food and shelter, she continues, we must have order. The human
condition is insufferable unless we perceive a harmony, an order, in
existence. “Order is the first need of all.”[…]
Before a person can live tolerably with himself or with others, he
must know order. If we lack order in the soul and order in society, we
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dwell “in a land of darkness, as darkness itself,” the Book of Job puts it;
“and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where light is as
darkness.”38
In view of Weil’s book, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward
Mankind, Kirk likened this traveler to Weil as regards her searching for “spiritual order”
in her own life and her “thinking of social order in the modern world” (3-4). If one were
doing a rhetorical criticism of this particular book, Kirk’s philosophy of history would be
a major element of his perspective as operative at the level of rhetoric. However, to
adaptively borrow for this dissertation project from Cherwitz and Darwin,
communicative knowledge of what order does necessitates both common and theoretical
knowledge of what order is, particularly as regards human nature.39
Grace Goodell implicates what was a major theme in Kirk’s corpus for a
“conservative realism” that should take seriously the realist assumptions of the various
world cultures as a contrast and corrective to ideological planning (6)—the relationship
between personal and communal order. Kirk argued that to apprehend “‘order,’” one
might look to “‘disorder,’” which is “confused and miserable existence,” for with social
disorder, “many of its members will cease to exist at all,” yet “if the members of a society
are disordered in spirit, the outward order of the commonwealth cannot endure” (The
Roots 5). Even in coupling “the words ‘law and order,” they are not the same (5).
According to Kirk, “Laws arise out of a social order” as “the general rules which make
possible the tolerable functioning of an order,” yet “an order is bigger than any laws, and
many aspects of any social order are determined by beliefs and customs, rather than being
governed by positive laws” (5). The term “‘order’ means a systematic and harmonious
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arrangement […] in one’s own character or in the commonwealth,” yet it also “signifies
the performance of certain duties and the enjoyment of certain rights in a community,”
like with “the phrase ‘the civil social order’” (5). Kirk will “examine the roots of order in
the United States of America, which “give life to us all” with the intertwining of “the
roots of moral order, of order in the soul; and the roots of the civil social order, of order
in the republic” (5). He then continued:
Although to some extent we trace the history of civilization when we
describe the origins of our order, this book is not a comprehensive survey
of culture—that work having been done by others. Rather, this book
emphasizes certain institutions and customs, and certain ideas and beliefs,
which continue to nurture order in the person and order in the republic,
down to our time. No study could be more relevant to our present
discontents. (5)
In this book, Kirk would provide an examination of “the legacy of order received” from
the Hebraic, Grecian, Roman, and European (particularly British) cultures as well as from
“America’s colonial experience” to “discuss both the beliefs and the institutions out of
which American order has grown” (5-6).
“Seeking for the roots of order” leads to “Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, and London,”
as the “order which Americans experience is derived from the experience of those four
old cities” (The Roots 6). Disorder in the soul tends toward “abnormality,” as we are
“unable to control our impulses,” yet “[i]f our commonwealth is disordered, we fall into
anarchy, every man’s hand against another man’s.”40 According to Kirk, “This saving
order is the product of more than three thousand years of human striving” (6). Kirk
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continued, “The ‘inner order’ of the soul and the ‘outer order’ of society being intimately
linked, we discuss in this book both aspects of order. Without a high degree of private
moral order among the American people, the reign of law could not have prevailed in this
country. Without an orderly pattern of politics, American private character would have
sunk into a ruinous egoism” (6). The primary “need of the soul” is order, as one must
“recognize some principles of order by which to govern ourselves” so as “to love what
one ought to love,” yet it also “is the first need of the commonwealth, for “unless we
recognize some principle of order by which to do justice,” living peacefully in society is
impossible (6). According to Kirk, “The good society is marked by a high degree of
order, justice, and freedom. Among these, order has primacy: for justice cannot be
enforced until a tolerable civil social order is attained, nor can freedom be anything better
than violence until order gives us laws” (6). W. Wesley McDonald has indicated that this
idea of a relationship between order in the soul and the commonwealth is indebted to
Platonic and Aristotelian political theory, which view the “well-ordered soul” having “its
natural impulses under the discipline of the higher will,” not shaped in character by
“economic or social forces external to the will of man, as “[t]he roots of social and
personal disorder always lie in the defects of the soul; that is, they are found in the
characters of persons. […].”41 Kirk had recounted the words of a Russian-born friend,
who as a Menshevik during the Russian Revolution learned “through terrible events that
order necessarily precedes justice and freedom” (6-7). Looking to escape the Bolsheviks
in St. Petersburg, he encountered the anarchy of Odessa, which was a lesson for this
friend that even a bleak Communist order was better than no order at all (6-7).
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Although “order and justice and freedom have developed together” in the United
States, “they can decay in parallel fashion” (The Roots 7). Kirk argued, “In every
generation, some human beings bitterly defy the moral order and the social order.
Although the hatred of order is suicidal, it must be reckoned with: ignore a fact, and that
fact will be your master” (7). Adapting a phrase from William Butler Yeats regarding
“what had become the torment of much of the modern world,” Kirk observed that “in the
past half-century, the center has failed to hold in many nations.”42 He explained that
“once a revolution or war has demolished an established order, a people find it imperative
to search for principles of order afresh” for survival (7). With the undoing of “an old
order, revolutionaries proceed to decree a new order—often an order harsher than the
order which they had overthrown” (7-8). Never has there been a perfect order, and it is a
temptation to think that humans have the ability to “create a new order nearer to our
hearts’ desire” (7-8).
Kirk would then recount the story of that “freshman” who argued “that we have
no need nowadays for the beliefs and institutions of yesteryear” while also claiming to be
able to “outline a better moral system and a better political pattern than those we have
inherited” (The Roots 8). Kirk recounted:
I asked him if he could build a gasoline engine, say, without reference to
anything mechanical now existing. He replied that he could not. I
observed that moral and social concerns really are more delicate and
complex than a mere mechanical contrivance—and that even should his
novel order be superior, apparently, to the old order, still no one would
accept it but himself and a few followers. For people take the proofs of
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mankind’s experience as evidence of some soundness, and they tend to
resist any new creation of some living person not conspicuously a better
authority than themselves. (8)
Building from the Aristotelian account of the human capacity for reasoning from sense
experience and previous understanding, Frederick Wilhelmsen provided some insights, as
follows, which are somewhat appropriate for consideration at this point:
[…] But the concept of experience can be broadened to include the whole
spatial-temporal world in which man exists. Experience need not be
limited to evident judgments made about the here-and-now. The
continuum of life is woven out of a pattern of immediate judgments,
mediated judgments, evident judgments, self-evident judgments, and
judgments made in faith or belief. All of this accumulated knowledge
constitutes a history, a culture. Understood broadly, this corporate
experience is traditional wisdom, the inheritance of a populous. Every
people has its presuppositions: let us think only about the Western
technical presuppositions that permit us all to move about in an ordinary
day’s work; they may have been demonstrated rationally by learned
gnomes lurking in distant laboratories, but they are given credence by men
at large because society imposes its own authority and validates that
authority, so to speak, sensibly. The man buying a new car ought to read
carefully the manual instructions the manufacturer gives him with his
purchase. Prudent faith in the authority might avoid breakdowns and
subsequent drain upon the wallet. Hume can teach us something here.

194

Reason, all reason, operates within the prescriptions and
suppositions of some social order because reasoning cannot take its point
of departure from itself: the act of a man, reasoning is lodged in him;
and—very profoundly—is his product: we produce our own conclusions;
we do not capture them on the wing as though they were Platonic ideas
floating in a void. In life, reason is always operating on faith and faith is
always operating on reason, and both of them are stirred out of the broth
of experience.43
Kirk would of course look to Hume “to persuade the heterodox” in Enemies of the
Permanent Things and as against John Locke for The Roots of American Order, and
admittedly, one might take Kirk’s appropriation of Hume’s “Skeptical Realism” as
another angle of contemporary affinity (potentially postmodern), at least in terms of
epistemology.44 Yet, according to Kirk in The Roots of American Order, even as Hume’s
critiques of rationalism toward custom and experience had a place in the Enlightenment
context, his “ideas had their revolutionary consequences” as gentlemen and scholars
(such as Hume) lost influence on morality at large, while with Europe’s losing faith and
forgetting revelation, “religion might need the Schoolmen’s bulwark of reason” (365).
This “undergraduate was not singular in his repudiation of the experience of a
civilization” as “[o]ur times resemble those of the concluding years of the Roman
Republic, the age of Marcus Tullius Cicero,” for “[a]s disorder washed about him, Cicero
examined the causes of private and public confusion” (The Roots 8). According to Kirk,
“Like Plato before him, Cicero understood that the problem of order is simultaneously
personal and social: Roman men and Roman justice had declined together. It is so still.
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That is one reason why Plato and Cicero remain relevant to our present condition” (8).
Philosophically, this proposed relevance points back to something even more basically
human. In part because of the constancy of human nature, we can study and weigh the
arguments of persons in history (like those within the “great books”) as relevant for
today, such as in the case of Aristotle, who did not face all of our current ethical and
political dilemmas, yet as a human being, regardless of time and place, he could have
(Adler, The Four 43-48, 124-141, 229-237; Adler, How to Think 444-445; Adler, Ten
xiii-xx, 156-166, 191-200; Hudson). Wilhelmsen has argued that as humankind exists
“within history, man’s playing out of being historically precedes and conditions his
understanding of being itself,” for one’s “bringing of meaning to the order of being is
itself eminently historical,” made possible because of an active grasp of “the real,” which
is preceded by the experience of reality (The Paradoxical 49-104). In this type of
account, the metaphysician might transcend history for the science of being, yet even
philosophy is influenced by the realm of meaning as related to the historical and cultural
framework in which it is operative—Wilhelmsen indicated that rhetoric certainly is.45
Because of Kirk’s focus upon “exemplars” for learning within his corpus, Eugene
Garver might classify Kirk’s rhetorical approach as Ciceronian rather than Aristotelian.46
However, one must not neglect Cicero’s realism when looking at what might said to be
the positivist, pragmatist, historicist, and existentialist aspects of his communication of a
“public orthodoxy” in and for his time in Roman history (Wilhelmsen and Kendall),
regardless of rhetorical theorizing. Linking back to his reference to Cicero above, Kirk
explained:
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“To freshen the colors of the picture” is the purpose of this book. We are
concerned here with the social experiences and the ideas that blended in
America to form a pattern of inner and outer order, still enduring. The
popular demand for “relevance” in college and university, nowadays, has
some justification; and this book is meant to be relevant to the disputes of
our present hour. Those who ignore history, says George Santayana, are
condemned to repeat it. Those who neglect the roots of order, one may
add, are compelled to water those roots desperately—after wandering in
the parched wasteland of disorder.
Upon our knowledge of those roots may depend what sort of order
America and the world will have by the end of this century. It may be the
order of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, rich and dehumanized; it
may be the garrison-state controlled by ferocious ideology, as in George
Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-Four; or it may be an order renewed and
improved, yet recognizably linked with the order that arose in Jerusalem,
Athens, Rome, and London.47
In terms of learning by “exemplars,” Kirk indicated in Decadence and Renewal in the
Higher Learning that The Roots of American Order was something like his proposed
historical “course that would commence with revelation and social order,” which “would
be a study of moral philosophy […] as related to social institutions” that would offer
“something for the parched imagination,” as “American society cannot be properly
understood, or preserved, or improved, without an apprehending of its sources” (289290). As the both the primary and secondary literature illustrates, Kirk aimed for The
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Roots of American Order to be an historical textbook in a time of recognizable social and
educational disorder, yet it actually attained more of a general readership than actual
pedagogical use.48
Vigen Guroian has classified Kirk along with G.K. Chesterton and Flannery
O’Connor as Christian humanists who are relevant for the postmodernism our time
(Rallying 3-45). Kirk argued in The Roots of American Order:
The higher kind of order, sheltering freedom and justice, declares the
dignity of man. It affirms what G.K. Chesterton called “the democracy of
the dead”—that is, it recognizes the judgments of men and women who
have preceded us in time, as well as the opinions of people living at this
moment. This higher kind of order is founded upon the practical
experience of human beings over many centuries, and upon the judgments
of men of vision and intellect who have preceded us in time.49
One point of strength, according to Guroian, was Chesterton’s interest in returning to
dogma, properly understood (not as alarmist or forceful), but as “religious truth affirmed
in consensus, established in authority, and declared as norm in public debate,” which is a
necessity of human life (14-17). From Chesterton, he has argued that “[a] postmodern
world requires a Christian humanism grounded in philosophical realism,” which as
extending into religiosity, “a return to dogma” portends “the rally for the really human
things.”50 In terms of the importance of dogma for social and educational life, Kirk had a
somewhat similar view to what has been described Guroian, also emphasizing at a basic
terminological and etymological level that which is dogmatic for both science and
politics (Decadence 247-257). Kirk was no advocate for a civic religion to replace real
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religiosity within the community, as dogmas could be transmitted in balanced way,
particularly through the traditional approaches to learning, which are attentive to both the
good and bad of human nature through history (Russello, The Postmodern 44-45; W.
McDonald, Russell Kirk 170-200). Although Kirk’s work might be somewhat conducive
to a “rhetoric of restoration” that entails “a recognition of the importance of tradition and
continuity” alongside a defense of terminological propriety, Kirk did not necessarily
adhere to the somewhat negative view of human nature that James Campbell seems to
indicate in setting up his arguments for “conceptual reconstruction” for contemporary
political and communicative life.51
Bringing Chesterton to postmodernism is not a novel idea, as it was from
Chesterton’s notion of “paradox” that Frederick Wilhelmsen built a realist case (with
Thomism) regarding the philosophical relationship among metaphysics, existence, and
history for “[a] post-modern articulation of Thomistic wisdom.”52 To extend the realist
implications from Guroian’s book, when bringing Chesterton to the table, even with the
focus on imagination and “paradox,” one must also look to Chesterton’s strong
statements on classical realism within his biography of St. Thomas Aquinas (118-157).
Therein, Chesterton set the “common sense” realism of Aquinas against a reigning
skepticism in his time, which now arguably persists into postmodernism generally.
Broadly speaking, although Christian humanism (beyond maybe the sphere established
by Guroian) might be susceptible to an accusation of a germinating postmodernism (in
regard to both religion and reason), it is quite difficult to accuse Chesterton on this count
because of his clear arguments for realism.53 The larger 20th century conversation on
Christian humanism and Thomistic realism had included some contest as to the roles of
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philosophy and history for such areas as education, politics, and religion, such as with the
divergent standpoints of philosopher Jacques Maritain and historian Christopher
Dawson.54 Regardless, it is likely more accurate to straight away designate Kirk as a
Christian humanist than a postmodern conservative, although that depends, it seems, on
one’s handling of the terms “postmodernism” and “postmodernity,” such as within the
communication literature, where the terminology of “posthumanism” has emerged near
the influence of postmodernist philosophy.55
As previously mentioned, Kirk saw conservatism as a “negation of ideology” that
should be open to reality as it was created and had developed (Cribb, “Why”). “Ideology”
has been and continues to be a word of varying utilization across disciplines, including
communication and rhetorical studies, yet as W. Wesley McDonald has pointed out, in
contrast to its frequent use, for Russell Kirk, the term was not a catch-all term for any
framework of beliefs.56 Kirk wrote in The Roots of American Order:
Against this higher kind of order, there contend in our age various
ideologies—fanatic political creeds, often advanced by violence. By
definition, “ideology” means servitude to political dogmas, abstract ideas
not founded upon historical experience. Ideology is inverted religion, and
the ideologue is the sort of person whom the historian Jacob Burckhardt
called the “terrible simplifier.” Communism, fascism, and anarchism have
been the most powerful of these ideologies. The simplistic appeal of
ideological slogans continues to menace the more humane social orders of
our time.57
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According to W. Wesley McDonald, as against ideological notions of reform, Kirk’s
remedy here is Edmund Burke, which from one vantage point across the varying
philosophical interpretations of Burke’s writings and speeches, brings to the table a deep
respect for historical conventions alongside of a continual attentiveness to present
circumstances, not excluding the constancy of human nature as such across time and
place.58 A James J. Person has emphasized in discussing Kirk the historian, Bradford
designated The Roots of American Order a Burkean preliminary to historical studies per
se.59 If one were to take on Pappin’s classical realist interpretation of Burke, one can here
look to “the development of a second nature, shaped by habit, custom and tradition, is not
only consistent with, but a natural outgrowth from, our first or essential human nature”
with respect to reason, imagination, and reality.60 Across the “situations” of rhetoric, with
respect to human nature, rhetoric can be preservative of virtue in communities.
As highlighted in Chapter Two, Russello has helpfully emphasized “imagination
against ideology” in Kirk’s corpus, which portends, alongside of “moral imagination,”
the import of “historical imagination” (The Postmodern 53-64). According to Kirk:
The American order of our day was not founded upon ideology. It was
not manufactured: rather, it grew. This American order is not immutable,
for it will change in one respect or another as the circumstances of social
existence alter. […] As Edmund Burke said, change is the means of our
preservation.
But also we must have permanence in some things, if change is to
be improvement. Americans generally retain a respect for their old moral
habits and their old political forms, because those habits and forms express

201

their understanding of order. This attachment to certain enduring
principles of order has done much to preserve America from the confused
and violent change that plagues most modern nations.
No order is perfect: man himself being imperfect, presumably we
never will make our way to Utopia. (If ever we arrived at Utopia, indeed,
we might be infinitely bored with the place.) But if the roots of an order
are healthy, that order may be reinvigorated and improved. It its roots are
withered, “the dead tree gives no shelter.” Permanence and progression
are not enemies, for there can be no improvement except upon a sound
foundation, and that foundation cannot endure unless it is progressively
renewed. The traveller in the wasteland seeks the shelter of the living
order. This book is meant to water roots, for the renewing of order and the
betterment of justice and freedom. What Patrick Henry, in 1776, called
the “lamp of experience” is our hope of order refreshed.61
With the oft discussed influence of T.S. Eliot upon Kirk, one might also go to Marion
Montgomery’s admonitions regarding the experience of reality for imaginative propriety
along with a sound balance between nature and history for weighing the “truth of things”
across contexts for “orthodoxy”—one must be attentive to “the given” within reality,
inclusive of the achievements and limitations of human beings.62 Even with Russello’s
employment of the language of construction in a way that is more adaptive than
reductionist, one must ultimately get beyond both constructivism and idealism in order to
ascertain and negotiate ideologies with respect to reality (especially the constant reality
of human nature), for otherwise, one is out of the realm of moral accountability and under
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the arbitrary control of political power—might then would be the standard for what is
right.63
Within a framing of what Russello calls “participant history” for Kirk’s approach
he leads the way to Enemies of the Permanent Things (The Postmodern 67-103). Upon a
reading of this particular book, readers would observe that there was a type of
philosophical and religious blueprint already in place for the sort of extended historical
conversation that would be communicatively lived out in The Roots of American Order
(although Kirk had written previously on American history on various occasions in such
works as The American Cause). As against the evolutionary, positivist, and cyclical
views of history, in Enemies of the Permanent Things Kirk indicated with a discussion of
Eric Voegelin his own historical approach, as follows:
These three schools have dominated so thoroughly the discussion of
historical problems for the past century that many people seem unaware
that a fourth interpretation of history exists. That fourth interpretation,
nevertheless, is a venerable theory, long known to the higher civilizations,
though most thoroughly developed in Christian civilization. I mean the
belief that history is the record of human existence under God, meaningful
only so far as it reflects and explains and illustrates the order in the soul
and in society which emanates from divine purpose. The aim of history,
in the eyes of this school, is not antiquarian, nor yet programmatic: that
purpose is to reveal to existing men and societies the true nature of being.
Without this history, indeed no society long endures. “The order of
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history,” so Voegelin’s first sentence in Israel and Revelation runs,
“emerges from the history of order.”
In the view of this last school of historians, history is not law, in
the sense of fixed fate, foreknowledge absolute; nor does it have
“meaning” in the sense of providing a Grand Design for immanent
improvement. A study of history reveals the general principles to which
men and societies, in all ages, are subject; but it cannot confer upon the
scholar a prophetic afflatus; it cannot describe the wave of the future. […]
64

Frederick Wilhelmsen, who called this statement by Voegelin on order and history a
“paradox” that is “itself consubstantial with human existence in time and history,” would
have us reappraise the terms “objective” and “subjective” toward an older set of
meanings that would allow for both personal involvement and communicable truth
(similar in some ways to another discussion by Kirk in Enemies of the Permanent
Things), contrary to the analytical idealism of modernity.65
For his notion of “participant history,” Russello has turned to the work of
historian John Lukacs, whom Kirk admired and recommended (The Postmodern 82-87).
In some ways insightful for this project, McCarthy has written
[…] Russello relates the dubious idea that Werner Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle in quantum physics, which Russello says “struck a
terminal blow to the idea of scientific objectivity,” tells us something
about historical knowledge. What does our inability to observe
simultaneously the velocity and position of a subatomic particle have to do
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with our ability—or lack thereof—to understand what happened at, say,
the Battle of Hastings? Even if there is uncertainty about both kinds of
events, we are not talking about the same kind of uncertainty. We may not
know whether King Harold was really killed by an arrow to the eye, but if
he was, we can say with certainty that both the position and velocity of the
arrow could have been observed simultaneously, if anyone had been in a
position to do so.
There is indeed common ground here between Kirkian
traditionalists and postmodernists. Both camps try to conscript the
uncertainty principle, mathematician Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems, and Einstein’s relativity into attacks on objectivity in other
fields. The Kirkians and postmodernists share a fallacy, and ironically it is
a species of scientism: They wrongly apply the ideas of advanced physics
and mathematics to history. It turns out that when “science” casts doubt
on objectivity, the otherwise science-skeptical Kirkians and
postmodernists are all for it. (“The Pomo”)
Particularly as regards the relationship of historical studies to “moral imagination,” Kirk
had positively reviewed Lukacs’s writings on a few occasions with an emphasis on
various key ideas, including the Heisenberg application (“History and”; “Regaining
Historical”). He also saw elements of Lukacs’s historical approach in terms of the
primacy of words over “facts” as an appeal “not to linguistic analysis nor semantics, but
to rhetoric in its original signification,” which for Lukacs made words more than just
tools.66 In light of Chapter Two herein, what of this contrast with other aspects from
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Russell Kirk (words as “tools that break in the hand”)? Well, Kirk often showed a wide
appreciation for the work of various scholars, often highlighting key elements of their
work as valuable contributions, yet there is no real employment of Lukacs in The Roots
of American Order or Enemies of the Permanent Things, although positive discussion is
certainly available elsewhere in Kirk’s corpus.67
From some realist accounts, Heisenberg’s arguments (or at least certain
interpretations or applications of it) might not tell the whole story about what we know
and do in reality for the various levels of reality.68 Patrick Allitt has well outlined the
views of various thinkers on history, including a discussion of the question of
Heisenberg’s work in relation to history, yet in response to one of Allitt’s articles on
Lukacs as historian, Jonathan Chaves has written regarding Lukacs, “How delightful to
find that there is a major historian who still thinks great men can in fact change the
course of history, and that we need not always see hazy ‘forces’ in accordance with the
new superstition.”69 However, for “orthodox Christians,” Chaves reminded readers
(mentioning the insights of Gilson and Chesterton) that “good epistemology starts
precisely with the solidity of the physical world around us” (“Scientism, Subjectivist
Epistemology” 53). Drawing from Fr. Stanley Jaki, he argues that it is ultimately not a
question of changing matter as such with investigation, but of the precision of
measurement and knowledge with respect to what can be known within the spheres of
science and metaphysics.70 Here and elsewhere, Chaves has affirmed (as against
subjectivism and postmodernism) the necessity of defending reason, properly understood,
for both science and religion.71 Russello certainly portrayed Kirk’s devotion to truth for
life and in discourse. Also, Lukacs himself was committed to truth, even with this
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particular understanding of epistemology (he did not by the way write well of
postmodernism as a subjectivist intellectual movement), yet he was certainly a proponent
of a constant human nature through history, particularly as regards the common and
academic choices of persons (“Putting Man”). It is probably an open question as to what
extent Kirk embraced Lukacs’s epistemological approach to history, although he
certainly embraced its scholarly value concerning the centrality of human nature in terms
of historical continuity (“History and”; “Regaining Historical”).
Michael E. Meagher has written (with a significant focus on The Roots of
American Order), “Kirk is generally recognized as a prominent contributor to modern
conservative thought from a decidedly religious perspective” (136). Within a comparison
between Russell Kirk and Daniel Boorstin as regards religiosity and politics in America,
Meagher has emphasized that by assigning “special importance to Moses and his
relationship to God,” they “begin their analysis of American political thought and
development in an unlikely area,” which is of consequence in confronting moral
skepticism, religious minimalism, and Enlightenment liberalism within the United States
(137-143). Kirk opens Chapter Two of The Roots of American Order as follows:
The tap-root of American order runs deep into a Levantine desert; it began
to grow some thirteen centuries before the birth of Jesus of Nazareth.
Through Moses, prophet and law-giver, the moral principles that move the
civilization of Europe and America and much more of the world first
obtained clear expression.
To a wandering people of obscure, the Hebrews, or Children of
Israel, occurred then a tremendous “leap in being”: that is, by an
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extraordinary perception, the Israelites came to understand the human
condition as it had not been understood before. Even earlier than the time
of Moses, the Israelites had experienced the moral workings of an unseen
power, which had spoken to the consciousness of Noah and of Abraham.
But through Moses, the Hebrews learned more distinctly that there
watched over them an all-powerful intelligence or spirit which gave them
their moral nature. In their sacred book called Exodus, later, the Jews who
were the Israelites’ descendants would set down the revelation which
Moses received from Yahweh, or Jehovah, the unseen Lord of all. (11)
Out of “‘[r]evelation,’” which is “the unveiling of truths that men could not have
obtained from simple experience in this world” entailing “a communication of knowledge
from some source that transcends ordinary human perception,” namely that of the
Israelites “have grown modern ethics and modern social institutions and much besides”
(12). The Roots of American Order itself, alongside of the scholarship of Guroian and
Russello, for instance, support what one might call a customarily strong view of Kirk and
religion, that is to say, these works counteract the notion that Kirk took somewhat of a
utilitarian approach to religion, which Dermott Quinn in part resolves anyway with an
eye to Kirk’s view of human nature.72
A notion of “myth” was poetically, pedagogically, and rhetorically significant
within Kirk’s corpus (“The Dissolution” 32-42; Enemies 109-115). To reiterate from my
introduction, Shively has argued (in view of anthropological studies) “that what has
enduring moral meaning for most people is that which bears this mythic sensibility,”
bringing “suprahistorical or unconditioned reality to bear on historical or conditioned
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reality,” which “can be seen as essential the imaginative side of realist philosophy: the
manner in which the abstract idea of unconditioned truth in conditioned experience is
given concrete significance and imagery in human life” (111). She explained that “all
cultures and peoples see themselves in some such mythic sense: as creatures of, and yet
above, history; as material and yet immaterial in their ends and insights” (112). Hence,
“The most common and enduring elements of mythology offer evidence for the common
and enduring importance of realist self-understandings, that is, for the claim that people
generally see themselves as both immanent and transcendent […] and that these selfunderstandings are irreplaceable modes of moral thought” (112). According to
Wilhelmsen (The Paradoxical 139-211), “myth” plays a role as related to nature and
being for the linguistic and cultural life of a community as well as for the dynamic of
experience and cognition as it relates to the formal signs that signify the objects in reality
that we experience and know in common, which then even impact (positively or
negatively) the operations of philosophy.
This notion of a “‘leap in being’” is from Voegelin, which Wilhelmsen upheld as
a necessary starting point for history as such in terms of history as a “form of being.”73
According to Kirk, “Even the simplest human communities cannot endure without some
form of laws, consciously held and enforced. Ants and bees may cooperate by instinct;
men must have revelation and reason” (The Roots 13). He would later argue, “All the
aspects of any civilization arise out of a people’s religion: its politics, its economics, its
arts, its sciences, even its simple crafts are the by-products of religious insights and a
religious cult,” yet “until human beings are tied together by some common faith, and
share certain moral principles, they prey upon one another” (14). Communities are
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formed with “the common worship of the cult,” for the core “of every culture is a body of
ethics, of distinctions between good and evil; and in the beginning, at least, those
distinctions are founded upon the authority of revealed religion” (14). In Kirk’s view:
[…] Not until a people have come to share religious belief are they able to
work together satisfactorily, or even to make sense of the world in which
they find themselves. Thus all order—even the ideological order of
modern totalist states, professing atheism—could not have come into
existence, had it not grown out of general belief in truths that are
perceived by the moral imagination.
This religious origin of private and public order has been described
afresh in the twentieth century by such historians as Christopher Dawson,
Eric Voegelin, and Arnold Toynbee. The first social organization, beyond
mere family groups, is the cult that seeks to communicate with
supernatural powers. (14)
Culture from the cult is an idea of Dawson’s, and as indicated in Enemies of the
Permanent Things, the view of history that Kirk is advocating at this point in his career is
also within the legacy of St. Augustine, who within his own theological framework, as
Fackenheim has noted, held a view of human nature as essentially constant.74
Kirk’s larger point in this discussion of the Ancient Israelites is that, regardless of
the extent to which Israel had a direct political influence on the American Republic, there
was a moral and imaginative influence in large part because of the ongoing questions of
human conduct that linger across time and place (The Roots 11-50). As one of Kirk’s
imaginative insights for contemporary persons of letters, Whitney has made reference to
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the necessity of the “prophetic imagination to divine what human beings will be, given
the choices they make” (“The Swords” 312). In view of the discussion of the prophet
Amos within this part of the text, Whitney explained:
To make this past-future linkage comprehensible is one of the great tasks
of the prophetic imagination. That is why modern civilization in particular
has need of its voice. The modern mind tends not to look back; it is in a
state of perpetual denial; every day in every way things are supposed to
get better. The smug disposition of the modern mind prompted Kirk to
remind readers of Hegel’s line: “We learn from history that we learn
nothing from history.” […] Countless lessons are there in history books,
but are, alas, ignored. The prophet, by contrast, knows the consequences
of history.75
There is, of course, a close connection between the “historical” and “prophetic”
imaginations (319). One has experience toward imaginative formation across and above
our everyday experiences through the oral and literary communication of history (Mesa).
Like with Kirk’s travels to various places that he would write about (Russello, The
Postmodern; Whitney, “The Swords”), of course, formation occurs too through one’s
direct experiences of the world.
The constancy of human nature and the consequence of human decisions are
themes that remain on the table throughout The Roots of American Order. As Greek
thought would positively influence the West in general and be revisited politically in
more liberal times in particular, the Roman legacy would eventually play a more direct
role in the formation of the American Republic, yet the ups and downs of these cultures
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in terms of religion, philosophy, and politics were ultimately connected in the book to the
relationship between communal and individual order (51-136). Christianity, which to
some extent plays a guiding role for Kirk’s work in this book, had a supernatural message
that addressed order for persons with consequences for order in the community.76
Through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and the Renaissance, great thinkers and
everyday people according to Kirk had grappled with the problem of order as it relates to
the community and to individual, even amid theological and political differences (Kirk is
careful, in my estimation, to not conflate the various points of view) (177-300). A
dynamic of authority, reason, and imagination would provide a spectrum for the large
purview of Western thought as it would eventually impact the American “founding,”
which in Kirk’s stance, differed from the French Revolution—it was not a “revolution”
(374-440). This of course is a major element of Kirk’s influence from Edmund Burke, as
Kirk would himself give favor to the Constitution over the Declaration of Independence,
which is part of a larger controversy anyway, for in fact, across disciplines, Kirk certainly
was a part of a larger and debatable discussion for conservatism and beyond as to the
connection of Europe to America.77
Regardless, this theme of the delicate relationship between personal and social
order with respect to human nature is an evident component of the book. According to
Kirk, “To live within a just order is to live within a pattern that has beauty. The
individual finds purpose within an order, and security—whether it is the order of the soul
or the order of the community. Without order, indeed the life of man is poor, nasty,
brutish, and short. No order is perfect, but any tolerable order may be improved” (The

212

Roots 474). For Kirk, ideologues and “extremists” are not the preservationists of order
(474-475). He concludes the book as follows:
To protest against the existence of order is to protest against well-being,
justice, freedom, and prosperity. Happiness is found in imaginative
affirmation, not in sullen negation. Gratitude is one form of happiness;
and anyone who appreciates the legacy of moral and social order which he
has inherited in America will feel gratitude. The pursuit of happiness is
not altogether vain. One finds happiness in restoring and improving the
order of the soul and the order of the republic—not in acts of devastation
that make a desert of spirit and of society.
America’s order rose out of acts of affirmation, from what Thomas
Carlyle called “the Everlasting Yea.” Upon the classical and theological
virtues, upon the social experience of the Old World and the New, there
was built by self-sacrifice and high imagination the intricate structure of
personal and public order. Although no single human mind planned this
order of ours, the wisdom and the toil of countless men and woman have
gone into its making.
Two hundred years after the ferment which produced Declaration
and Constitution, America’s order is in ferment still—but in a ferment of
renewal, for change is the means of our preservation. This book has
sketched the principal features of the order that the United States inherited
and developed. Other hands may renew that order’s structure and improve
it with prudence and love, in God’s own good time.78
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From the classical realist point of view, regardless of where one stands on the connection
of America’s legacy to political modernity, the constancy of human nature allows for the
continuous grappling with the relationship between personal and communal order.79 As a
realist and “logocentric” historian, Kirk offered human nature as such as a linchpin of
order, which is significant for one’s consideration of the study and practice of rhetoric.
Kirk was critical of the “Situationalism” of the late 1960s and early 1970s for
education and ethics (Decadence 137-149). Of course, it should be evident at this point
in the project that Kirk portrayed sensitivity to context, notwithstanding one’s view of the
question of conservatism and postmodernism. There might be some congruities between
Kirk’s overall framework and Bitzer’s notion of “public knowledge,” although it should
be mentioned that Kirk, like Weaver, was not an intellectual fan of the philosophical
pragmatism that was a basis of some of Bitzer’s rhetorical theorizing (Bitzer did warn,
however, against the discarding of tradition for progress).80 Ralph S. Pomeroy had once
written that Bitzer formulated “a new general theory of rhetoric, applicable to all oral and
written discourse, in contrast to the many special theories now proposed for a Rhetoric of
Agitation and Control, of Civil Rights, of Black Power, of Warmongering, and even of
Desecration.[…]”81 In a certain sense, with this, one can say then that Bitzer aimed to
avoid ideology too. To establish rhetoric as “situational,” Bitzer went beyond the
generalities of “meaning-context and utterance” along with the various settings of a
possible “persuasive situation” as follows:
Finally, I do not mean that a rhetorical discourse must be embedded in
historic context in the sense that a living tree must be rooted in soil. A
tree does not obtain its character-as-tree from the soil, but rhetorical
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discourse, I shall argue, does obtain its character-as-rhetorical from the
situation which generates it. Rhetorical works belong to the class of
things which obtain their character from the circumstances of the historic
context in which they occur. A rhetorical work is analogous to a moral
action rather than to a tree. An act is moral because it is an act performed
in a situation of a certain kind; similarly, a work is rhetorical because it is
a response to a situation of a certain kind.
In order to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-to-situation, we
should acknowledge a viewpoint that is commonplace but fundamental: a
work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of
something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or
change the world; it performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of
altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by
the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of
thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into existence a
discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action, is so
engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is
always persuasive.82
In Bitzer’s theoretical view, rhetorical communication is a more artistic and elaborate
version of primitive human speech, for in both cases, factuality and functionality are
contained within and provided by “situation,” which is basic to his original essay on
“situation,” yet more explicit in a later selection entitled, “Functional Communication: A
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Situational Perspective,” a functionalist standpoint regarding the workings of rhetorical
discourse is an evident component of Bitzer’s overall approach.83
Generally speaking, for Bitzer, as real elements in the situation “invite” rhetoric
(which are also indicative for the critic), the quality of rhetorical communication is
derived from the “fit” between a particular discourse and the situational “exigence” for an
audience who can effect change (Bitzer, “Functional”; Bitzer, “The Rhetorical”; Patton,
“Causation”)—hence, the standard of “fitting response.” Within Bitzer’s work, the
factual, linguistic, human, and customary constraints on the decisions and actions of
given audiences, which are influential on and utilized by rhetors, are all in some way a
part of reality (“Functional”; “The Rhetorical”). Intention, audience, and formality,
according to Bitzer, are not as such productive or indicative of rhetorical discourse (“The
Rhetorical” 9-13). Scholars have challenged Bitzer’s model (even in adapting it) in terms
of creativity, causality, and multiplicity with respect to communicators, audiences, and
messages, which is somewhat (though not always) linked to his view of situational
reality, as both the determinacy of meaning and action are two areas of distinct yet (at
times) connected areas of interest—some have argued that he minimized the pertinence
of creativity and intellectually of speakers and writers.84 However, it is somewhat
apparent at particular points throughout Bitzer’s work that Bitzer allows for the influence
of communicative decisions within and for “rhetorical situations” (Bitzer, “Bitzer on
Tompkins (and Patton)”; Bitzer, “Functional”; Bitzer, “Political Rhetoric”; Bitzer, “The
Rhetorical”; Bitzer, “Rhetoric and”; Patton, “Causation”; Young).
From the vantage point of rhetorical constructivism, Richard Vatz has countered
Bitzer’s model by arguing that rhetors arbitrarily chose particular situational factors
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toward “salience” and creatively translate a “salient” situation by interpretation, which as
he has argued, provides the basis for the moral responsibility of communicators—
“situations are rhetorical” (“The Myth”). As Young has pointed out, even with some of
her disagreements with his challenge to Bitzer’s model, Vatz certainly made a
contribution to this larger conversation on Bitzer as to the creative situational role of
rhetors.85 Of interest to this project, Vatz has recently looked to the prominence of
Bitzer’s model as regards the predominance of liberalism among rhetorical scholars
(“The Mythical”). Vatz has argued that because of an emphasis upon communicative
responsibility and rhetorical translation, his own approach tends toward a “more
disinterested analysis and criticism” that is not as susceptible to academic liberalism,
even with his granting that “there is nothing inherently liberal or conservative” in his or
Bitzer’s approaches “for liberal or conservative argument.”86 In terms of epistemology,
for realists, Cherwitz and Darwin have probably provided some areas of resolution
between the approaches of Bitzer and Vatz, at least at some level.
With an eye to the “situatedness of rhetoric,” Cherwitz and Darwin of course have
argued that “rhetorical perspectivism” better accounts for the impact of reality in
“constraining” language and the impact of language in “shaping” reality (“Beyond
Reductionism”; “Toward a”). While negotiating between intersubjectivism and realism,
they have addressed the challenge to the realist view, often portrayed as holding that the
meaning and constraining of language is referential and determinate, as follows:
Given that it begins with the affirmation of an independent reality, it is
easy to see why the realist theory of meaning has not been received
favorably by communication scholars. In fact, many rhetoricians have
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charged that, by granting the existence of an autonomous reality, realism
gives objects an ontological priority over language. For this reason,
realism is incapable of appreciating the contingency and complexity of
human problems, as well as the malleability of language. Realism, it is
inferred, has no way to explicate the potential of language to shape reality.
As with arguments against intersubjectivity, this objection has been
proffered as a justification for rejecting carte blanche the realist thesis
[…].
On our view, however, this critique does not provide ample
grounds for dismissing the doctrine of realism. What it may intimate is
that, in order to comprehend the constraining function of objects, which is
the project of realism, one cannot simply begin with objects and then
focus attention on the unidirectional movement of influence from objects
to language. This is because the notion of constraining assumes the
presence of a mechanism linking objects to language. Since not all objects
elicit or provoke language, and inasmuch as objects do not necessarily
prefigure a specific language choice (note that not all realists are
determinists), there must be some other factor explaining the decisions
about whether and how to communicate.
It could be suggested that what ultimately illuminates the capacity
of objects to constrain language is the intervention of specific cognitive
faculties. For example, one’s awareness of objects and events may be
what constrains the decision about whether to communicate and what
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guides subsequent rhetorical choices about how to communicate.
Similarly, the perceived importance and relevance of objects and events
may be what elicits and influences particular linguistic determinations.
So, to inquire about what connects objects to language (i.e., what allows
objects to constrain language) is to ask what occasions cognitions such as
awareness and perception.
While extralinguistic objects and events per se certainly are an
essential—sometimes exclusive—part of this determination, frequently it
is the manner in which these objects are cognitively structured and
portrayed in language that makes awareness possible and accounts for the
perception that reality is important and relevant. Explaining how
perception and understanding of objects occurs, then, must encompass an
examination of how language both mediates and is the vehicle for
communicating experience. Since cognitions are embodied by and
communicated in language, the ability of perception to constrain language
is at least partially a function of language. Therefore, to comprehend
thoroughly, the constraining function of objects requires a cognizance of
the shaping power of language.87
As Bitzer’s emphasis is “situational” and that of “rhetorical perspectivism” is
epistemological, both portend the importance of reality as such, yet Cherwitz and Darwin
have provided further epistemological grounds (from a realist vantage point) to further
consider the more explicit attempts to resolve the Bitzer and Vatz dispute.88 Looking
back to Chapter One, this question of constraining and “shaping” also harkens back to
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Hikins’s arguments regarding the “macroissues” of discourse, for the facts of the
rhetorical situation can inform and constrain the argumentation pertaining to this or that
“macroissue” as treated as a problem of future, past, or present interest within
discourse.89
Regardless, Cherwitz and Darwin have pointed to the human element of
situational involvement. Arguably, with his focus on moral responsibility, Vatz is
probably not a constructivist writ-large, at least in terms of the possibilities of human
nature as such as continuous through rhetorical situations (contrary to Biesecker’s
provisionally constructed audience identities, for instance).90 Certainly within Bitzer’s
model, human beings as such are explicitly a part of a “situation,” as this is evident
within his own corpus and recognized in the secondary literature (such as with his own
discussions of particular “cognitive faculties”).91 According to Bitzer, “Not the rhetor and
not persuasive intent, but the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity—
and, I should add, of rhetorical criticism” (“The Rhetorical” 6). However, although the
various approaches to rhetorical criticism (Bitzer’s model, the close reading approach to
rhetorical criticism, “critical rhetoric,” etc.) are quite significant for analyzing practice
amid various real contexts, from a realist point of view, human nature as real, within
reality, and through history is the ultimate theoretical ground for rhetoric.92
Cherwitz and Darwin have emphasized the historical, contextual, and substantive
elements of linguistic meaning as related objects, communicators, and audiences.93 They
concluded their discussion of the “situatedness” of rhetoric with “two interrelated
qualities of discourse” (“Toward a” 24). Cherwitz and Darwin have explained that
“discourse, as itself a body, necessarily is constrained by the substance, context, and
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history of existing relationships among bodies […] controlled and influenced by the
dynamic interplay within, between, and among objectively instantiated relational
constituents” (24). Yet, it “has the capacity to shape and create relationships among
bodies,” affecting “the dynamic interplay within, between, and among substance, context,
and history (the relational constituents of meaning)” (24). They argued, “[…] these two
qualities of discourse are not logical opposites. From a relational perspective, they are
two sides of the same coin. Hence, by simultaneously recognizing both qualities of
discourse, a relational theory of meaning does not compel the extreme conclusion that
meaning (and language) is either deterministic or entirely subjective and arbitrary” (24).
Bitzer’s comparison of rhetoric to morality quoted above (seen within the literature as
having ethical and practical import), from the view of Classical Realism, points beyond
“situation” alone, for moral questions pertain to circumstances along with actions and
intentions, at least from the classical realist point of view.94 By implication, from this
vantage point, with Fr. Grimaldi’s discussion of the practical intellect as relevant to the
centrality of judgment on contingencies for rhetorical discourse, the intellectual virtues of
both art and prudence are germane.95 In Garver’s view of Aristotle’s corpus, the artistic
function of rhetoric as observing and discovering “the available means of persuasion” is
linked in a parallel way to prudence via deliberation on contingent matters, as one in the
realm of argument and the other in the sphere of action—for Aristotle, rhetorical
discourse is a “civic art” (Aristotle’s). More strongly than Bitzer’s focus on
“adjustment,” Weaver’s notion that “rhetoric is advisory” captures the artistic function of
rhetorical discourse as proximate to the domain of prudence, which as Garver’s overall
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study of the Rhetoric indicates, pivots as a philosophical matter on one’s standpoint of
the polis as natural or not.96
In framing rhetoric as both “praxis” and “situational,” Shanyang Zhao has done
well by moving the rhetorical epistemology debate into the purview of human action with
respect to contingency and potentiality, yet contra Zhao’s move into this area, the truth of
“normative knowledge” (or “norms”), even amid intensive advocacy, deliberation, and
learning, is not ultimately a matter of construction and consensus.97 According to Ralph
McInerny, the liberal arts as arts (virtues) are internally productive within the mind, yet
these particular arts are only partially perfecting of the human being as connected to
one’s “total good” by the virtue of prudence (“Introduction: ‘A Bracelet’” 5-6). To apply
some basic distinctions from within Adler’s work (Desires; Intellect 149-161), one might
consider rhetoric as proximate to or in terms of “praxis,” which pertains to “doing,” for
the rhetorician artistically is involved in “making” that which is relevant to the prudential
sphere of judgment and action. From varying philosophical vantage points, rhetorical
scholars have privileged prudence (“practical wisdom”) for discussions of rhetoric,
custom, and history (inclusive of Bitzer’s notion of “public knowledge) (Eubanks, “On
Rhetoric”; Mackin), as a corrective to “critical rhetoric” (Kuypers), and for discussions of
“performance” (Hariman, “Prudence/Performance”). From a realist point of view,
rhetoric as advisement and argument accounts for the intellectuality and emotionality of
the “whole person” in terms of “prescriptive” judgments in given cases of action, where
practical truth is the correspondence between human judgment and proper desires. For
now, though, what of the human imagination?
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With her collective approach to Bitzer’s notion of “situation,” Ellen Gorsevski has
centralized the experiential reality of emotions among situational participants as relevant
to the “rhetorical climate” that stems from the exigencies of “situations.”98 She has
explained, “Thus while culture may reside in unconscious thought and behavior that
occurs in a given value system of a given society group, climate resides palpably and
very consciously among members of that group” (137). She also mentioned, “Rhetorical
climates exist throughout history” (147). A “rhetorical climate” can open analysis
beyond the “text” or “context” of a “lone persuader” to the handling of “multiple texts”
with “a more dynamic, embodied sense of context” (164). While concluding her article,
Gorsevski mentioned “‘moral imagination’” as rhetorical alongside of emotionality and
feelings within a “climate” (172). Kirk’s prompting of “common action and reform” in
America might have some parallels to Gorsevski’s call for a “collective orientation” for
situational study, yet as Russello has demonstrated, Kirk tended to accentuate the import
of imaginative leadership for the rhetorical discourse of politics, even as he rejected the
autonomous individualism of modernity.99 Gorsevski’s situational elements, however, are
distinctly human, which corresponds in a certain way to Kirk’s attentiveness to both the
sadness and joy of human life in reality (Quinn). Yet, the “good moral imagination,” to a
certain degree, goes beyond “feelings” to experience the difficulties in reality (Mesa).
The “felt” aspects of culture (and one might maybe add “climate”), which bear some
connection to tradition, must ultimately be weighed against “orthodoxy” as encompassing
of the “truth of things” (Montgomery, “Consequences”).
For the realm of public and nonprofit leadership, Max Stephenson has argued that
Kirk’s focus upon Eliot’s “‘permanent things’” and Burke’s “moral imagination” are
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significant for encountering “alterity” within the diversity of the present postmodern
landscape, particularly as regards dignity and community, whether one holds to
“permanent moral truths” like Kirk and Eliot or not.100 The link, according to
Stephenson, is “that leaders share a responsibility to identify the norms and traditions that
join the population and thereafter, to act upon them,” which takes leaders beyond
“popular sentiments” toward an attentiveness “to the assumptions and customs of the
populace they serve if they are to attain and retain the legitimacy to act” (270-271). Yet
for “morally imaginative action,” a commonality of “norms and claims” is necessary,
which in his view could rest in “alterity” (271). According to Stephenson, “Alterity,
predicated on respect for the other simply because they are also human” and “recourse to
some variant of the permanent things” each can provide “shared norms and principles”
for the fair treatment of human beings across the various national and economic
boundaries of the world (271). Stephenson has done well in pointing to the human
elements of community and for communication as regards to postmodern conceptions
“alterity” (271-274), yet he has not eclipsed Kirk’s own brand of essential humanity as
such (261, 263, 265-271, 274). Amid the various postmodernist concerns about race,
class, and gender (Hudson xxv-xxvii), our essential similarity is precursory to any
consideration or negotiation of human difference, for it is the basis of a virtuous approach
to ethics and politics (Adler, The Difference 259-280; Adler, Ten; Hudson xxi-xxviii).
This precursory notion of human nature is discernable with Kirk’s corpus, even with his
embrace of “variety” and “diversity” within and across nations (Federici, “The Politics”;
Frohnen, “Redeeming America’s”; Malvasi; McAllister, “The Particular”; Quinn;
Woods).
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In Stephenson’s view, while “ethical imagination” can distinguish public and nonprofit leaders “from for-profit organizational leadership if not wholly in kind, then surely
in degree and in relative significance for the organizations affected,” it might also help
these leaders navigate between circumstantial and discretionary views of leadership
actions, while securing “the ongoing legitimacy of their organizations and the civil
society of which those entities are a part” (275). The human imagination as informed
historically and morally through reality helps one navigate practical and rhetorical
“situations.”
A realist rhetoric of order should point one toward ethical considerations of the
communicative life of human beings. Although not drawing directly from Kirk, Paula S.
Tompkins has provided a framework for communication ethics that encompasses “moral
imagination.” She has explained
Moral sensitivity is a process of recognizing and being cognitively
responsive to the interests of Others. It is influenced by the moral
imagination. Moral imagination is the ability to recognize and consider
ethical issues and topics from various points of view, including viewpoints
that differ from those of the actor […] Moral insensitivity can be a failure
of moral imagination. Listening, particularly what I call rhetorical
listening engages the moral imagination, prompting moral sensitivity. The
practice of moral listening stimulates the moral imagination by facilitating
recognition of the existence of Others whose interest to thrive would be
affected by the actor’s decisions and actions.101
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Tompkins has contributed to a disciplinary consideration of the ways in which “moral
imagination” underlies one’s cognizance of the impact of communicative practices upon
the standing of persons within social interactions, including those human elements of
communication, such as rationality and emotionality. She has stated, “When rhetorical
listening helps actors imagine the possible trajectory or magnitude of the impact of a
communication act on Others, it promotes the mindful practice of ethical
communication” (63). Tompkins has also argued, “Developing moral imagination, the
ability to recognize ethical issues and consider different points of view, is a matter of
ethical practice that promotes moral sensitivity” (63-64). Understanding points of view
was a part of Kirk’s stance on “moral imagination,” but it was not the whole of it (W.
McDonald, Russell Kirk 42-138).
Both Gorsevski and Tompkins looked at specific case studies to ascertain
imaginative factors of communication, yet it is arguable that with Kirk one gets a more
definitive stance on ethics in terms of specific principles.102 On the other hand,
Tompkins’s approach might be more akin to a dialectical approach to ethics (in the
classical sense of the term) as regards the implications that would follow on this or that
ethical point of view. Of course, with Patton, one must not forget the import of
dialectical reasoning as it relates to one’s communicative involvement within a
“rhetorical situation.”103 Regardless, whether one looks to the past or to the present,
imagination will play a role in the ethical engagement of “situations”—Kirk’s work is a
reminder of this.
For Kirk, contrary to talk about “values,” “norms” had objective consistency
across time and place, which could be learned through history, custom, imagination, and
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education, even with our subjective engagement with life.104 These “norms” have a
continuity across and within the situations of life. As a realist and “logocentric”
historian, with respect to the constancy of human nature, Russell Kirk provided
significant scholarly coordinates as to the formative and informative role of the
imagination for perspectives across “rhetorical situations.” The Roots of American Order
is one book that provides such coordinates. Bitzer was certainly sensitive to the historical
elements of life across situations, yet Kirk’s work brings another layer of discussion to
the question of “situation” that places a stronger emphasis upon human nature as such
through and within history, whether one is talking about effectiveness or ethicality.
Montgomery has provided on definition of rhetoric as a liberal art as follows:
[…] one acquires, through the study of and use of the figurative language
of an experience, to be found in those monuments of unaging intellect
inherited from our fathers, those necessary disciplines of head and heart by
which men govern their relations with one another in the continuing
community of humanity, under that community’s commitment through
good will to the full light of truth. (Title ##)
Eugene Garver might say that this description is not, strictly speaking, in accord with an
Aristotelian definition of rhetoric (Aristotle’s), yet it does capture the classical realist
point of view, of which Aristotle is a founding influence. Garver, like the “rhetorical
perspectivists” in a different sort of way, points more squarely to the issue of
argumentation for rhetoric.
One can look to the topics of argument for what Scott Consigny has described as
integrity with and receptivity to the “situation” for rhetors.105 The topics pertain to
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argumentation (particularly the enthymeme), which for rhetoric is a realm of “shared
meaning” or, as Garver phrases it, “shared intention” with respect to language, culture,
and reality—this applies also to the example as a rhetorical argument.106 For the study of
history in general, topics can play a role for the understanding and communicating of
history, while one’s looking at specific topics can give insights into particular
“situations” of rhetoric.107 Within Weaver’s “advisory” approach to rhetoric, the topics
are a significant element having both ethical and practical import for the connection
among rhetorical communicators and audiences in terms of the reality of “situations”
(“Language is”). If Bliese is correct (“Richard Weaver’s Axiology” 287-288), Weaver
was moving toward a greater focus upon the role of history for arguments from defined
principles toward the end of his life. Regardless, as rhetoric was for Weaver the most
“humanistic of the humanities,” it was because real human beings across time and place
live within “historical” situations (“Language is”; Reflections of). Imaginative discourse
played some role as a part of Weaver’s own advisement for the persuasive discourse of
conservatives for their “lost cause” in his day (Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and the
Rhetoric” 318-321, 323-324).
Weaver was a “‘painful rememberer’” who appropriated the value of history for
the rhetorical and ethical aspects of life (Irwin). Roger Gilles has contrasted Bitzer’s
“situational” model and “Weaver’s foundational rhetoric” (128-129) in terms of liberal
and conservative argument. In my estimation, Bitzer’s work might or might not fall in
the line of a “focus on rhetoric’s situational, meaning-making, audience-centered
characteristics” (128), yet this prompts some reflection upon the basis of argumentation
as it relates to conservatism. Of course, one must adjust for Weaver’s idealist “shadow
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wedge” toward our “common sense” of “things” (Montgomery, “Consequences”). From
the standpoint of realism, one needs to ascertain the available facts of a “situation”
(Hikins, “Realism and” 44), yet must also keep in mind that from the view of Aristotelian
rhetorical theory, rhetoric is an art of words, not facts (Garver, Aristotle’s 18-103;
Garver, “The Political” 188-193). Kirk’s view of history was ultimately attentive to both
the factuality reality of the past and the linguistic account of a legacy. To bring Adler’s
work into rhetorical studies (The Common; “Adler On History”; “Adler On Memory and
Imagination”; “The Philosopher”; “The Philosopher […] Continued”), one can say that
whether one is a rhetorician or an historian, as a human being, they can imagine the
events of the past as recounted, yet with a proper philosophy alongside of either historical
or rhetorical studies, they can imagine the implications of future political decisions. With
Jacques Maritain, one can see the possibilities for moral and political progress in a linear
way through time amid the contingent events of history, as the examination of history is
both inductive and imaginative.108 Both the study and practice of rhetoric can be too.
With Russello’s discussion of the “age of discussion” and the “age of sentiments” as it
relates to the types of argumentation for conservatives and beyond, this project will move
to conclude with not just the basis but the practice of a realist rhetoric of order in terms of
the sources, forms, and ethics of argument.
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Notes
1

Please see the following regarding rhetoric and history (from various points of

view): Arthos, “Where There”; Bliese, “Richard Weaver’s Axiology”; Brinton, “Cicero’s
Use”; Condit, “Rhetorical Criticism”; Duffy and Jacobi 175-196; Garver, “He Does”;
Garver, “Machiavelli’s The Prince”; Garver, “Paradigms and”; Garver, “The Political”
179-180; Gehrke; Gottfried, “Historical Consciousness”; Gronbeck; Irwin; King; M.
McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’”; McGee and Martin; J. Murphy, “Knowing”; North; Ono and
Sloop; Struever; Weaver, Visions 55-72; E. White.
2

Please see the following regarding bias, prejudice, perspective, etc. in relation to

this sort of notion of rhetorical perspective (Weaver spoke specifically on “perspective”
in a way that has influenced and is somewhat conducive to my usage herein): Garver,
“Point of View”; Hoffman; Weaver, “Concealed Rhetoric”; Weaver, “Life Without”;
Weaver, “‘Parson’ Weems”; Weaver, A Rhetoric. My formulation here is based in
particular upon reflections upon the work of Adler and Weaver in conjunction with my
overall engagement of “rhetorical perspectivism” from the standpoint of classical realism.
It is important here to note that I am differentiating between religious beliefs that are
theological in scope and a notion of belief for everyday life regarding non-religious
matters. Of course, the specific relationship between rhetoric and such areas as dialectic,
poetics, etc. is always going to be a sphere of academic study and debate. In light of
these words by Wilhelmsen, one has to be careful with an appropriation of the term
“perspective”:
The discovery of perspective in early Italian Renaissance painting
gradually removed Western man from the older iconic world in which he
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had cradled himself in the bosom of God. Perspective necessarily makes
each one of us the center of his own world, a world in which left and right,
up and down, front and back, small and large, all lead out from the
physical eye and bend back as do the spokes of a wheel to its axis.
(“Modern Man’s” 41)
3

This statement was in part prompted by my participation in and reflection on a

realist rhetorical theory panel, The Now Unconventional Test of Convention: Rhetoric
and Reality, at the 94th Annual Convention of the National Communication Association
in San Diego, CA of November 23, 2008, especially Richard Cain’s presentation, “Can
We Know that We Know? An Examination of the Argument for the Recovery of
Epistemological Realism in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory.” James Hikins presented
on this panel too (“Realism and the ‘Real’ Real World: Viewing Engagement through the
Lens of Rhetorical Perspectivism,” which was co-authored with Richard A. Cherwitz,
who was not present), while Kenneth Zagacki was the respondent.
4

To compare Bitzer’s model to “rhetorical perspectivism,” the two approaches

encompass different emphases for isolating rhetorical communication (epistemology and
“situation”), yet both entail a basis for rhetoric in discursively significant elements of
reality. On the standard of “fitting response,” there would be some variance.
5

Please see the following: Bitzer, “Bitzer on Tompkins”; Bitzer, “Bitzer on

Tompkins (and Patton)”; Bitzer, “Functional”; Bitzer, “The Rhetorical”; Croasmun and
Cherwitz 11-12. Much of the discussion within the literature regarding Bitzer’s overall
work has pertained to his consideration of reality as objective (Bineham 49-52;
Brummett, “On to” 426n7; McGee and Martin; Smith and Lybarger 197, 199, 201;
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Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,” 1980; Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins
on Patton and Bitzer,” 1981; Vatz, “The Myth”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton”; Young),
sometimes with reference to realism. In reference to Bitzer’s selection entitled “Rhetoric
and Public Knowledge,” Bineham has categorized Bitzer’s epistemology with the “social
knowledge” approach of Farrell and others (49-52). Pragmatist philosophy was, to some
extent, a theoretical basis for Bitzer’s writings on rhetoric (Bitzer, “Functional” 26;
Bitzer, “Rhetoric and”; Mackin 285-287, 289; McGee and Martin). For discussions of
“situation” as well as other aspects of this project as related to pragmatism (in varying
degrees), please see the following: Bineham 49-52; Brinton, “William James”; Mackin;
McGee and Martin; Sproule, “The New” 482-484. In my estimation, Bitzer’s model of
“situation,” by upholding what we take “as given” for communication (Hikins, “Realism
and”), substantiates what Cherwitz and Hikins have identified as the “argument from
persuasive discourse” in favor of the independence of reality (Communication 122-123).
I must note here a special thanks to Mark Joseph Porrovecchio for his bibliographic
suggestions via E-Mail, which were helpful to my study of the relevant literature by and
on Bitzer.
6

F. Crowley 1-5; Wise 8. The Nature of the Liberal Arts by Fr. Wise provides

and outstanding historical overview that points to the significance of both realism and
religion for the liberal arts.
7

Centore, Being 173-174. For this discussion of worldviews, Centore drew from

Gilson’s Being and Some Philosophers regarding William James. According to Adler,
worldviews “are all products of the intellectual imagination,” yet the plurality of which
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“should never be confused with the world that we perceive” (Intellect 123-124). In his
estimation:
Nor should these worldviews or world-pictures be assessed for their truth
or falsity by their correspondence or noncorrespondence with reality and
by pragmatic, empirical tests of such correspondence or
noncorrespondence. If some are better and others worse, the only measure
of that is the degree to which they can be harmonized and made coherent
with our commonsense knowledge of reality, which, being based on the
common core of ordinary human experience, is the same for all of us.
(124)
8

Emil Fackenheim’s Metaphysics and Historicity provides a helpful comparative

overview of the implications of the variances between classical metaphysics and 20th
century continental philosophy. A major element of his discussion regards the constancy
of human nature across time and place.
9

Hyde and Smith’s “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved

Relationship” provides an interesting engagement of rhetorical studies with contemporary
continental philosophy, including Gadamer’s discussion of rhetoric from Philosophical
Hermeneutics. It is certainly another example of scholarship regarding the relationship of
rhetoric and history. Notwithstanding my philosophical disagreements with them, the
article prompts and magnifies some of the issues on the table in this project with respect
to philosophical presuppositions. See also Craig Smith’s, “The Medieval Subjugation
and the Existential Elevation of Rhetoric,” as it provides an existentialist point of contrast
to a classical realist interpretation to Aristotle’s Rhetoric in particular and to rhetoric in
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general. Finally, for another consideration of Gadamer’s work and rhetorical studies,
please see “Where There Are No Rules or Systems to Guide Us: Argument from
Example in a Hermeneutic Rhetoric” by John Arthos.
10

Please see the following: Biesecker; Garret and Xiao; Gorsevski; Hyde and

Smith; McGee, “Suffix”; McGee and Martin; C. Miller; Patton, “Causation”; Scott,
“Intentionality in” 56-58; Smith and Lybarger; Sproule, “The New” 482-483; Vatz, “The
Myth”; Young. Although only some of these sources directly deal with postmodernism or
postmodernity, others deal with assumptions, themes, etc. that are arguably to some
extent postmodernist in scope and/or indicative of a postmodern condition.
11

Hyde and Smith wrote:
Thus, to observe and disclose the relationship between hermeneutics and
rhetoric, one must describe it ontologically. Such an explication
necessitates a phenomenological investigation; as Heidegger has shown,
“Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.” […] A phenomenological
investigation of the relationship starts by showing what the basic mode of
human understanding is and how it structures the experience of existential
reality. This disclosure of understanding is itself a disclosure of the
human experience of language; it entails showing how understanding is
related to the ontological significations of “interpretation” and “meaning.”
(347)

They drew here from Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, Trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 60. With my own reframing
toward realism, I have in mind here my discussion of O’Callaghan from Chapter Two.
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12

Garver specifically wrote of Alan Brinton’s “Situation in the Theory of

Rhetoric” (“Philosophy and” 147-148) (Brinton’s article encompassed general analysis
and to some extent Vatz’s considerations in particular): “Thus Brinton wants to balance
views of the rhetorical situation that tie rhetoric to some ‘objective’ exigence with views
that make the rhetor free to set the agenda and the issues rather than merely respond to
the given. His balancing, and that whole question which has been explored since the very
first issue of P&R, would be more interesting […]” (147-148). Please see the following:
Bitzer, “Bitzer on Vatz”; Bitzer, “The Rhetorical”; Vatz, “The Myth of”; Vatz, “The
Mythical”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton”; Young.
13

Please see the following: Garver, “The Circumstances”; Garver, “He Does”;

Garver, For the Sake; Garver, “Machiavelli’s The Prince”; Garver, “Paradigms and”;
Garver, Rev. of The Rhetoric of; Garver, “Why Should”; McGowan. Garver’s work has
certainly been an influence on the direction of this project. Garver is an academic
philosopher whose work has appeared in and has been discussed within the field of
communication and rhetorical studies (Arthos, “Where There” 331, 336, 338, 342n98,
343n123, 343n143); John Angus Campbell, “Rhetorical Theory” 292, 297-298, 304; K.
Chase 256, 262n77-78; Farrell, “Philosophy against”; Garver, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a
Work”; Garver, “Can Virtue”; Garver, “Demystifying”; Garver, “The Ethical”; Garver,
“Essentially Contested”; Garver, “Eugene Garver’s”; Garver, “He Does”; Garver,
“Machiavelli’s The Prince”; Garver, “Philosophy and”; Garver, “The Political”; Garver,
“Rhetoric and”; Garver, “Richard McKeon’s”; Hariman, Rev. of; Wilson and Keith).

235

14

Please see the following: Boyd; Nelson, “An Augustine”; Nelson,

“Introduction”; Niemeyer, “Knight of”; Person, Introduction; Stanlis, “Prophet of”;
Wilhelmsen, “Mr. Conservative”; Wilhelmsen, “The Wandering.”
15

Bradford, “A Generation” 295. In Kirk’s own commemoration of the journal,

in 1987, he wrote: “If during the twenty-first century civilization enters upon an
imaginative Post-Modern era (rather than a Post-Christian era), Modern Age may be
remembered for the seed it sowed in lonely fields. (I am not mixing metaphors: the
Modern Age people have endeavored to engage in both combat and cultivation.)”
(“Obdurate Adversaries” 203)
16

F. McDonald, “Russell Kirk” 17-18. I am not pursuing Forrest McDonald’s

framing of “Truth” here, but I think that it needs to be understood in a unique way and in
context as to what he is trying to say here. In this particular essay, McDonald looks to
The Roots of American Order in terms of considering Kirk’s development in thought
regarding Adam Smith in terms of the theme of order, etc. Also, please see McDonald’s
Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution for a sense of his own
approach to American history.
17

F. McDonald, Foreword xvii. McDonald identified these as follows:
[…] a transcendent moral order based necessarily on religious faith, social
continuity, the principle of prescription or things established by
immemorial usage, prudential and natural change as opposed to change
based on abstract theories, variety and therefore inequality except in the
Last Judgment and before a court of law, and the acceptance of the
imperfectability of man. (xvii)
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From The Conservative Mind to The Roots of American Order to The Politics of
Prudence, these specific themes with respect to order were ongoing within Kirk’s
communicative framework.
18

In McCarthy’s view, regardless of any alliance between Kirk and

postmodernism against liberalism, “a more obvious benchmark for Kirk might be the
sentimentally conservative side of the 19th-century Romantic movement,” as he was “in
many ways a chip off the Walter Scott block, not only in his criticisms of progress and
industrialism but in his predilection for things Gothic and medieval” (“The Pomo”). For
future study, one could ask the question: Might a connection to Romanticism be another
line of inquiry for the question of Kirk and postmodernism?
19

This two-part article was at the center of our debate on a panel, A Debate:

Richard M. Weaver’s Ideal Orator…Not Lincoln But Milton, at the 93rd Annual
Convention of the National Communication Association in Chicago, IL of November 17,
2007. Dimock has argued that this book was a significant part of Weaver’s attempt, with
the increasing influence of the “New Conservatives” (as they were known at the time,
inclusive of Kirk and Weaver), to provide a definition and demonstration of conservatism
beyond opposition to modern liberalism and adherence to Edmund Burke. My own
position is that Weaver’s message regarding definitional parameters for questions of legal
reform and national governance was with respect to, not in spite of, our 16th President. I
am not going to recount my argument here for the standard reading of the book regarding
Lincoln. Basically, Dimock argued that Weaver was not putting forth Lincoln, but
ultimately Milton, as the heroic rhetorician in The Ethics of Rhetoric. Regardless, I do
believe that this article is a valuable contribution to ongoing scholarship on Richard
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Weaver. For examples of the standard reading of The Ethics of Rhetoric regarding
Lincoln, please see the following: Beale, “Richard M. Weaver” 630; Bliese, “Richard M.
Weaver: Conservative” 382-384; Bormann 298, 301-302; Bryant, Rev. of; Duffy and
Jacobi 192; Evans 295-299; Floyd and Adams; Gilles 128-132; Johannesen, “Richard
Weaver’s View” 141-142; Kirschke 92-93.
20

Although it is my view that Dimock partially misreads Weaver on human

nature, he has done a valuable scholarly service by highlighting this issue along the way
in his overall argumentation. Regarding Weaver on human nature, please see note 21
immediately to follow.
21

Please see the following: Weaver, “Conservatism and Liberalism”; Weaver,

“Language is”; Weaver, “The Prospects”; Weaver, Visions.
22

Weaver, “Conservatism and Liberalism” 483-484. The editor of this selection,

Ted J. Smith III, identified this as follows: “The text of a lecture delivered to a group of
seminarians at Holy Name College in Washington, DC, on October 15, 1960 […]”
(483n1).
23

The constancy of human nature and the theme of continuity were both evident

in and across Kirk’s body of work (Federici, “The Politics”; Frohnen, “Redeeming
America’s”; Kirk, Eliot 1-7, 357-368; Kirk, Rev. of; Kirk, “Tragedy and”; Malvasi;
McAllister, “The Particular”; Quinn; Woods). Please see the following: Solomon,
“Redemptive Rhetoric”; Solomon, “The Rhetoric of”; Solomon, “Stopping ERA.” There
is no discussion of Kirk in these articles, for this is my application. Solomon’s focus on
continuity was helpful in my considerations of this theme within Kirk’s writings. Of
course, Solomon has found problematic certain communicative aspects of order and
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continuity within the conservative movements that she has studied in these articles. Also,
for some relevant discussion on conservatism, continuity, and human nature, please see
Zoll’s 1974 article, “The Future of American Conservatism: A New Revival?”
24

Please see the following: Lawler, “Conservative Postmodernism”; Lawler,

Postmodernism Rightly; Russello, The Postmodern 10-11, 11n17, 190-191, 191n30;
Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics” 10.
25

Please see the following: Guroian, “Moral Imagination”; Guroian, Rallying;

Russello, The Postmodern 52, 60, 65-66, 200; Russello, “Russell Kirk and the Critics”
10.
26

Guroian, Rallying 75. Guroian here is discussing Richard Rorty (75-77).

27

The following words from Montgomery’s The Truth of Things: Liberal Arts

and the Recovery of Reality are here relevant:
What we realize, as “conservatives,” at the end of our century is not only
how lost to Modernists are those grounds on which we find ourselves
embattled, but most immediately how lost they are to ourselves. This is to
say that we must more thoroughly recover the intellectual authority of our
position. We must reassociate the “thought and feeling” to a viable effect.
It is also to emphasize how considerable a beginning has been made
already by a conservative intelligentsia, a community of mind, diverse
among themselves but united in opposition to the illusions of Modernism.
It is upon these works that a successful recovery of those permanent things
always depends, since permanently fundamental thing is man’s given
nature as rational creature. As for works by that conservative
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intelligentsia, we may name some of them as important to what will prove
a continuing “battle of the books,” remembering as we do so what they
have in common, lest their differences exacerbate factionalism in the face
of that common necessity: the opposition to Modernist reductionisms.
Contending with the aspects and implications of a constant human nature is an
identifiable element of conservative thought (Harbour), particularly traditional
conservatism (Harbour; Henrie, “Understanding”; Woods).
28

Please see the following: Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, Section 3; Garver,

Aristotle’s 76-103, 156-162.
29

Please see the following: Duffy 90-91, 93n22; Duffy and Jacobi 175-196;

Gottfried, “Historical Consciousness”; North.
30

According to Wilhelmsen, Kirk would be “not only a spokesman but an

intelligence and imagination capable of forging into unity a new cause which was both a
banner around which men could gather despite their differences and an intellectual
strategy capable of guiding its tactics for more than forty years” (“Mr. Conservative” 18).
He explained, “The spokes of the wheel were dispersed throughout the nation […] But
Kirk and Kirk alone was the hub into which the spokes were fixed, and the wheel lifted
from the ground and fitted into place” (18). In view of The Conservative Mind, Henry
Regnery wrote, “Now, forty years later, there is indeed a vigorous conservative
movement and Kirk must be recognized as its leading spokesman” (“Russell Kirk: The
Last Word” 77). The rhetorical application of Kirk as spokesperson for American order
is my own here in light of the present mentioning of forensic, deliberative, and
ceremonial rhetoric.
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31

Bradford, “A Proper ” 71. Some preceding words by Bradford are here

relevant:
It is nowadays the fashion to think of these United States as a wholly
“invented” polity, as the pure and miraculous handiwork of those gifted
political craftsmen who were our honored forefathers and whose high
achievements we celebrated during the Bicentennial year. It is also the
conventional wisdom that our original revolution was the genuine
revolution, the paradigm for all serious and progressive rebellions, early or
late, and the fulcrum upon which the modern world has since been obliged
to turn. […] A corollary premise is that such a revolution is destined to
continue on and on, perpetually unfinished, perpetually at war with
whatever remains of the older world turned upside down when Lord
Cornwallis marched out from his works.
What I have been describing is, to be sure, the basis for a variety of
impious readings of the American past. […] When told that the France of
Robespierre, the Russia of Lenin, and the China of Mao are close relations
to the America of 1776, that our “political religion” is a position defined
by reaction against the structures, customs, and feelings which had
informed the long record of Western man prior to the inception of our
adventure with independence, they offer no objections. And even though
the same solid citizens will, in all likelihood, act in their everyday affairs
to belie such infamous analogies, the pressure of distortion gathers
continuously in the absence of vigorous refutation. The results, in our
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contemporary social and political discourse, are something we experience
with ever growing dismay.
Thus we face the paradox that what we are taught from authority
concerning the American Revolution is the measure of our confusion on
that subject. […] (70-71)
32

Although it reiterates on some items that can be found in The Roots of

American Order, America’s British Culture takes a strong stand against multiculturalism
within the context of its time (the early to mid-1990s). Russello explained, “Many years
later, Kirk drew the lessons of Roots in miniature with America’s British Culture, which
concentrated exclusively on the British contributions to American society” (The
Postmodern 76).
33

Henrie, “Russell Kirk and the” 22. See Chapter Two herein regarding Kirk’s

conversation with Nixon to which I am here referring. The consideration of this specific
theme in particular, observable across Kirk corpus, alongside of The Roots of American
Order is my own. My considerations in this project regarding Russell Kirk in general and
The Roots of American Order in particular were to some degree influenced by specific
lectures at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal during my time there (this
influence of includes the questions, answers, and discussions that followed by Mrs.
Annette Y. Kirk, other Wilbur Fellows, and others in attendance) (Birzer; Kalthoff,
Lecture; Pafford; Whitney, Lecture, 20 January 2006; Whitney, Lecture, 8 April 2006).
34

Please see Adler and Van Doren (234-254). A discussion of the academic study

of history as “special experience” is available in Adler’s The Four Dimensions of
Philosophy (8-48). Hikins also suggested to me a consideration of Walter Fisher’s

242

“narrative paradigm” with respect to realism (Telephone). In light of Russello’s focus
upon narrative in his treatment of Kirk and postmodernism, the concluding section of this
project will contain some discussion on narrative and argument alongside of some of
Kirk’s specific contentions about the United States in this book and beyond, including the
natural law. For now, it is sufficient to keep in mind Adler’s explanation that historical
writing in terms of an account of history is for the most part a narrative endeavor.
35

Please see the following: Adler and Van Doren (239-241); Aristotle, Poetics.

36

Please see the following: Gottfried and Broyles; Hauser; Oravec 169-171;

Sheard; D. Sullivan, “A Closer Look.” Possibly relevant here is Garver’s “He Does the
Police in Different Voices: James B. White on the Rhetoric of Criminal Law.” Although
he does not frame the particular discussion around these Aristotelian categories, pertinent
to this sentence is John M. Murphy’s “Knowing the President: The Dialogic Evolution of
the Campaign History.” Relevant to my thought here, Person has related that Ray
Bradbury stated in 1974, “In these polarized and emotional times we need more thinkers
of excellence on both sides in order to make fair decisions concerning the future. Russell
Kirk is just such an excellent thinker. I hope his The Roots of American Order is read by
fair-minded people of both left and right everywhere in our country” (The Unbought
170). Forrest McDonald identified the book as “a cautionary as well as an educational
work” (Foreword xix).
37

Russello, The Postmodern 67-103. The book, Enemies of the Permanent Things

was published in 1969. The Roots of American Order was first published in 1974. In the
former, various themes that would appear in an extended way in the latter are evident in
terms of history, order, politics, etc.
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38

Kirk, The Roots 3. Kirk was drawing from Weil’s book, The Need for Roots:

Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind and her book, On Science, Necessity,
and the Love of God (10n1).
39

This is my own adaptation of Cherwitz and Darwin’s discussion of knowledge

and power (“Beyond Reductionism”; “Toward a”) to the present discussion of human
nature of this chapter. While still of course harkening scholars back to a realist rhetorical
epistemology, Cherwitz and Hikins have encouraged openness to the assistance of
various critical methodologies for discursive insights (Communication 161-172).
However, they have argued that although criticism can assist in the generation and testing
of “hypotheses about rhetoric,” it is with the philosophical study of rhetoric where
scholars contend with the various “definitional, theoretical, and disciplinary issues that
define the field” (Cherwitz and Hikins, “Burying the” 75). Not necessarily celebrating an
overall disciplinary emphasis upon “the study of praxis,” Cherwitz and Hikins have
cautioned against “the study of beliefs” (such as with Raymie McKerrow’s “critical
rhetoric”) for examining the consequential symbolic possession of power at the expense
of “epistemological analysis” (75-76).
40

Kirk, The Roots 6. In this section, Kirk wrote the following: “For, as Richard

Hooker wrote in the sixteenth century, ‘Without order, there is no living in public society,
because the want thereof is the mother of confusion’” (6).
41

W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 118, 118n5. McDonald has in mind here Sir

Ernest Barker’s The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, Plato’s The Republic, and
Kirk’s Enemies of the Permanent Things.
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42

Here are the words that Kirk provided from Yeats (with no specific reference

given) (The Roots 7): “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;”/”Mere anarchy is
loosed upon the world,”/”The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere”/”The
ceremony of innocence is drowned;”/“The best lack all conviction, while the worst”/“Are
full of passionate intensity.”
43

Wilhelmsen, “Faith and” 29. Preliminary to this, he wrote:
[…] We reason because we want to and because we must, because of
volitional and emotional needs […] An overarching skepticism about the
capacity of reason to achieve truth cannot be dispelled rationally. Such
skepticism can only be overcome existentially: possibly all absolute
skeptics ought to be locked in rooms and told to find the one clue that will
free them: this could shake their doubts about reason’s capacity to do what
reasoning does: conclude. Given in its own way as is experience is in its
way, reason is an absolute. This is the way we are: reasoning animals.
Experience and reasoning as delineated follow the pattern that
Aristotle sketched in describing these ontological structures in the
Posterior Analytics. […] (29)

He also explained:
The man who would drive a wedge between Reason and Faith—
capitalized—does so on the grounds that the one is not the other. This
reasoning is not very good reasoning: man is not woman but this argues no
necessary divorce. Reason is not faith but both have a common source
permitting them to nourish one another: experience. The posture which
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stakes out an opposition between faith and reason and which does so in the
name of philosophical reason is no sacred cow: the advocates of the
position advance it as philosophically sound, and hence open to rational
questioning. Therefore they can have no objection to their position being
evaluated by another philosopher who adheres to a different order of
things. (29)
44

Kirk, The Roots 286, 358-368. Kirk wrote in Enemies of The Permanent Things

(with no specific references given):
“Orthodoxy is my doxy; heterodoxy is another man’s doxy.” I subscribe
to Samuel Johnson’s profession. When the art of worldly wisdom is in
question, for all that, the modern opponent of abnormality, if he means to
persuade the heterodox, repairs to the arguments of Johnson’s “Tory by
accident,” David Hume. In morals and taste, says Hume, we govern
ourselves by custom—that is, by the habits of the human race. The
standards of morality are shown to us by the study of the story of
mankind, and the arbiters of those standards are men of strong sense and
delicate sentiment, whose impressions force themselves upon the wills of
their fellow-men. (35)
I have in mind here Donald W. Livingston’s recent article, “David Hume and the
Conservative Tradition,” which does not speak specifically in terms of conservatism and
postmodernism, but does pertain to some contemporary issues of relevance. In terms of a
classical realist view of the movement from modern to postmodern thought, please see
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also Centore’s discussion of Hume in Being and Becoming: A Critique of
Postmodernism.
45

Please see the following: Wilhelmsen, “Faith and”; Wilhelmsen, The

Paradoxical. My statement here considers Wilhelmsen’s mentioning of Aristotle’s
Rhetoric and rhetoric in general within the larger discussion of The Paradoxical Structure
of Existence (149-150, 191-192).
46

Please see the following: Garver, “Machiavelli’s The Prince”; Garver,

“Teaching Writing.” On Cicero and examples, see also Brinton’s, “Cicero’s Use of
Historical Examples in Moral Argument,” North’s “Rhetoric and Historiography,” and
“Where There Are No Rules or Systems to Guide Us: Argument from Example in a
Hermeneutic Rhetoric” by Arthos (331-332). For another discussion regarding Aristotle,
Cicero, and others on rhetoric, please see Duhamel’s “The Function of Rhetoric as
Effective Expression.” Kirk wrote:
It does not follow that an introduction to political theory and precept need
be abstract. The ethical imagination may be moved, particularly early in
life, through the tool of biography—by which I do not mean simple
panegyric. Young people need models, exemplars; and often political
institutions and historical processes are better discerned though
biographical examination of great men than through abstract or
chronological analysis. This approach has been much neglected for the
past thirty years and more. Andrew Jackson, for instance, is interesting to
high-school freshmen; the Bank and the tariffs aren’t really. But one can
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learn much about the Bank and the tariffs though a lively study of Jackson.
(Decadence 289)
Kirk recounted the following in his conversation with President Nixon:
Kirk went on to offer the example of the Byzantine Empire, which—
despite beginnings not altogether healthy—endured for a thousand years,
experiencing alternately eras of decline and eras of reinvigoration. “No
human institution lasts forever, Mr. President; but the United States is
young, as great powers go; and presumably three-quarters of our
existence, at least, lies before us. Our present troubles may be succeeded
by an age of greatness.” Such was the substance of Kirk’s reply. (The
Sword 332)
One might also here recall that Cribb stated, “In his early work, Dr. Kirk treated modern
exemplars of the conservative tradition from Burke to Eliot, but always with respect to
their insights into timeless truths” (“Recovering” 7). In a Foreword to the 2003 edition of
The Roots of American Order, Forrest McDonald concluded as follows, which is here
relevant, with respect to Kirk’s sense of humor (xix-xx):
[…] Some years ago I wrote an article about Kirk for a special edition of
National Review commemorating the early superstars of the conservative
movement. The article was titled “Russell Kirk: The American Cicero.”
Kirk never said anything to me about it, but I knew he was pleased
because of his boundless admiration for the ancient Roman Cicero. Not
long afterward I reviewed a paperback edition of the present volume for
the Detroit News. I praised the book appropriately, but said in passing
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that I had a few quibbles. When time came for yet another paperback
edition, Kirk wrote me, thanking me for the review and asking whether I
could send him any suggestions. That was not unusual for him, always
seeking to improve his work. The tone of his letter was characteristically
modest, but he signed it, “Cordially, Marcus Tullius Kirk.” In case you
did not know, Marcus Tullius was Cicero’s name.
So pay close attention to the subtleties as you read on. If you do,
you will be entertained as well as enlightened. (xx)
Of course, for insights into Cicero’s perspectives on rhetoric, one could look at, for
instance, De Oratore; or, On the Character of the Orator.
47

Kirk, The Roots 8. Kirk wrote previous to this:
That undergraduate was not singular in his repudiation of the experience
of a civilization. Our times resemble those of the concluding years of the
Roman Republic, the age of Marcus Tullius Cicero. As disorder washed
about him, Cicero examined the causes of private and public confusion.
“Long before our time,” he wrote in his treatise The Republic, “the
customs of our ancestors molded admirable men, and in turn those
eminent men upheld the ways and institutions of the forebears. Our age,
however, inherited the Republic as if it were some beautiful painting of
bygone ages, its colors already fading through great antiquity; and not
only has our time neglected to freshen the colors of the picture, but we
have failed to preserve its form and outlines.”
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48

Please see the following: Kirk, Decadence 289-290; Kirk, The Sword 308, 374,

450; Lalley 202; F. McDonald, Foreword; Person, Russell Kirk 68.
49

Kirk, The Roots 9. Kirk gives no specific reference here.

50

He has argued that “[a] postmodern world requires a Christian humanism

grounded in philosophical realism” as “a fraud has been perpetrated” by “skeptics” who
“contradict themselves” in opposing “dogma dogmatically and” denying “their own
humanity in doing it” and in claiming “to be empirical but” denying “the testimony of
lives lived in faith,” yet these “seeds of suspicion they sow can also sprout, however, into
fresh seedlings of belief” (16). Guroian wrote, “When will we know that the rally for the
really human things has begun in earnest? With the return of dogma, of course. And
Chesterton is as sure of a return to dogma as he is that birds need air in which to fly and
that fish need water in which to swim […]” (16). Keeping Chapter Two in mind here,
Hans Gadamer certainly did not articulate a “value-free” notion of dogma of the sort that
both Chesterton and Kirk had critiqued in their respective times, yet on the other hand, he
had an expressed concern about “dogmatism” that diverges in some clear ways from
Chesterton and Kirk’s public interests in dogma. The following words by Centore are
here relevant:
It may be that the world of human experience does provide a solid
foundation for a series of well-balanced doctrines on the great speculative
and practical issues of human existence and life. It may also be the case
that a certain amount of dogmatism is necessary to the preservation of the
good life in the good society. It would certainly seem to be necessary for
social stability. G.K. Chesterton once observed that those caught up in a
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state of moral confusion will never change the world for the better because
they are too busy always changing their minds. Even Freud was not
opposed to dogmatism in principle. What he opposed was the
combination of being dogmatic and being wrong simultaneously.
Toleration, justice, privacy, and so forth, are undoubtedly good things, but
how can we act on them rationally if we do not know precisely what they
mean? (Being xii)
51

I am here referring to “Politics and Conceptual Reconstruction” by James

Campbell. Although the framing of the “rhetoric of restoration” could be helpful
(regardless of philosophical point of view), I think that he overstates the negative in
making reference to the legacy that was portrayed in Kirk’s Conservative Mind (James
Campbell 156-157, 169n1). Of course, Kirk did take account of the negative elements of
human nature in general and through history.
52

Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical. In the Introduction, Wilhelmsen has written:
But if the “structure of being” is non-dialectical then it follows that it must
be paradoxical. The author understands paradox not as an alternative
standing alongside the dialectic and capable of being balanced against it as
are two boxers going into a ring. Paradox, to change the figure, cuts
through the dialectic by simply not recognizing its validity within the
order of being as being. Now paradox can be defined here, following
Chesterton, as unresolved tension as opposed to the dialectic which
commences with tensions and then resolves them. In moral terms,
paradox is chivalry whereas dialectic is cowardice. In historical terms,
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paradox is pure baroque; and this book is really an essay towards an
understanding of the act of being as the baroque heart of creation. In
theological terms, paradox is the Cross. (10)
53

My cautious thought here is in regards to questions of epistemology, the use of

reason, etc. that might arise out of the Christian humanist tradition. This is a general
notion of mine now and an area for future study, particularly as related to the Western
rhetorical tradition.
54

Please see the following: Allitt, Catholic Converts; Allitt, Catholic Intellectuals;

Collins; Jaeger; Maritain, On The. This difference between Dawson and Maritain was
discussed during and after Brad Birzer’s lecture, “Russell Kirk and Education: Word,
Story, and Purpose,” while it is also indicated by Collins in his book, Three Paths in
Philosophy, within a discussion on education.
55

Please see the following: Gunn; Hyde, Perfection, Postmodern Culture 19-37.

Of course, Christopher Lyle Johnstone has well contributed to the ongoing relevance of
both human nature and humane studies for rhetorical theory and communication ethics
(“Ethics, Wisdom”), yet one might argue (at least from a realist point of view) that his
considerations of and arguments for the possibility and availability of wisdom and
knowledge among human beings (both personally and generally) across the contexts of
“rhetorical situations” are, at points, too open. See also Edwin Black’s “The Mutability
of Rhetoric” regarding the implications for rhetoric as regards to the varying views of
human nature. With regards to Mary Poovey’s, “Cultural Criticism: Past and Present”
from College English, which has somewhat of a postmodernist bias, one would have to
put Kirk within her categorization of “humanist”: “Whereas humanists want to
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investigate origins, stability, truth, identity, mimesis, and the rational subject, poststructuralists focus on representation: language as a system of relations, the instability of
meaning, the artificiality of truth, the contradictory nature of identity, the generative
capacity of language, and the de-centered subject” (620). I am also at some level
indebted to the respondents to A Debate: Richard M. Weaver’s Ideal Orator…Not
Lincoln But Milton, (particularly G. Thomas Goodnight), for some insights regarding the
place of humanism in Weaver’s work which led to further reflections on my part for this
project.
56

W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 14-41. Please see the following from the discipline

of communication and rhetorical studies: King; McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric and”;
McKerrow, “Marxism and”; McGee and Martin; Weiler.
57

Kirk, The Roots 9. Kirk provides no specific reference here.

58

McDonald has contrasted Kirk’s classical view on the soul and commonwealth

with the ideological notion “that a just and stable order can be established merely through
economic or political reforms,” which exaggerates “the potential for creating and
maintaining order through the institutional manipulation” (Russell Kirk 118). Hyrum
Lewis has detailed the eventual adaptation of the “premodern tradition of metaphysical
realism” (what he has called “metaphysical absolutism”) in varying ways among such
American movement conservatives as Weaver and Kirk. According Lewis:
If anything, the prewar conservative political tradition had tended more in
the direction of philosophical fallibilism than metaphysical realism. The
founder of modern conservatism—Edmund Burke himself—relied on
tradition and longstanding institutions precisely because of his distrust of
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the ability of human reason to apprehend the kind of eternal truths upon
which the French revolutionaries based their political program. Hence,
many political conservatives, following in the tradition of Burke,
demanded a limitation of state growth because of a focus on
epistemological uncertainty. (453)
“The founder” is a elusive reference point here, however, for although scholars like
Joseph Pappin and Peter Stanlis have argued for Burke’s classical realism, the ways of
“reading” Burke would legitimately vary within movement conservatism as it developed,
as it has within academia generally (even among rhetoricians). Regarding Burke on
human nature as essentially constant, please see Pappin’s The Metaphysics of Edmund
Burke (111-134).
59

Person, Russell Kirk 57-80. Bradford wrote
This book is therefore not so much a dissertation on American history as a
prolegomenon to the study of discrete components of that record and a
context for such restricted inquiries: a Burkean preface to historical
research per se, and a touchstone for understanding the specious
eschatologies and mythologies which structure the narratives of our
regnant historians. Since the filter though which the general Western
prescription came into our system is a British one, the pivotal sections of
Kirk’s inquiry concern, a fortiori, the effect of that filter on the decisions
which drove British America to pursue a destiny of its own. His great
point is that the impetus was itself English, and after the Revolution
continued to be English—at least until 1860. (“A Proper” 74)
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Bradford was in disagreement with Kirk’s positive approach on Lincoln with respect to
American order (77-78). See “Dividing the House: The Gnosticism of Lincoln’s Political
Rhetoric” by Bradford for a sense of his view on Lincoln. Of course, Kirk did have a
high appreciation for America’s southern culture and history (C. Wilson), including the
work of the Southern Agrarian writers of the 20th century (The Sword 176-180).
60

Pappin, The Metaphysics 114-116. In conjunction with this, please see

Pappin’s discussion therein of “The Case for Burke’s Metaphysics” (52-101).
O’Callaghan’s discussion on the developmental character of being is here relevant, which
I will reference in the concluding section of this project.
61

Kirk, The Roots 9-10. Kirk noted: “For recent discussions of ‘order’ discussed

only briefly in this introductory chapter, see particularly Hans Barth, The Idea of Order:
Contributions to a Philosophy of Politics […] and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of
Politics […]” (10n2). No reference is directly provided for the Henry quotation. His own
historical comparison here is as follows:
American laws are not like the laws which Lycurgus gave to the Spartans,
never to be altered at all. Nor do we Americans emulate another people of
old Greece, the Locrians—whose magistrates put a rope around the neck
of any citizen who proposed a change in the laws. (If the reformer
convinced the people of his wisdom, honors were heaped upon him; but if
he did not persuade them that his proposals were desirable, he was hanged
by the neck until dead.) (9-10)
62

Russello, The Postmodern 58-60. For literature and the “moral imagination,”

Russello emphasized getting beyond the “provincialism” of time with respect to
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community, sentiment, etc. However, I think it important to keep in mind Montgomery’s
discussion here as it relates to getting beyond “provincialism” as regards realism
(“Consequences”). Please see also Montgomery’s “Virtue and the Risks of Being.”
63

Please see the following: Adler, Ten 108-190; E. Thompson, “Postmodernism.”

Also relevant to the larger question of ideology with respect to the philosophy (from a
classical realist view) is Wm. Oliver Martin’s Metaphysics and Ideology. Hikins has
explained, “The ideological argument […] contends that realism is the enemy of
tolerance—that one who claims to know will attempt to achieve rhetorical if not political
hegemony over the masses” (“Realism and” 65). Yet he has argued that a “conventionbased epistemology” such as social constructivism must account for the possibility of
communicative consensus toward intolerance. According to Hikins, “If democratic
action becomes the sole criterion of ethical decision making, there simply is no individual
moral responsibility” (66).
64

Kirk, Enemies 253-281; Russello, The Postmodern 67-103. Kirk had in mind

here Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics and Order and History. This discussion by
Russello was certainly influential on the direction of this dissertation project. Kirk’s
historical approach could be additive (and maybe corrective) to discussions within the
field of communication and rhetorical studies on the philosophy of history (Combs). The
Heisenberg question as related to Kirk and realism could be additive (and maybe
corrective) in the same academic field regarding knowledge of the past and present
(Combs 53-55; Jacobi, “Using” 275, 288n6; Waddell 103-104) and the moral possibilities
of rhetorical criticism (Klumpp and Hollihan 90, 95n22) as related to Heisenberg’s work.
Apart from the Heisenberg discussion, in terms of Kirk’s stated approach to history, one
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might look at it as an alternative account to that given by Andrew A. King on the
maintenance of power in “The Rhetoric of Power Maintenance: Elites at the Precipice.”
It is important to note that King builds in part from Bitzer in setting up his larger
discussion (128, 128n4), while later citing Kirk’s John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in
American Politics in portraying Randolph’s use of “The Official Betrayal Alibi” (133,
133n25) (that is King’s discursive category).
65

Please see the following: Kirk, Enemies 158-165; Wilhelmsen, “Israel and”;

Wilhelmsen, “Modern Man’s” 41; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical. Wilhelmsen’s
discussion of “participation” as regards to Voegelin (whom he highly regarded),
existentialism, etc. warrants further study.
66

Reviewing Historical Consciousness, Kirk wrote:
Now if the historian, together with the poet, is to supplant the novelist as
the guardian and enlivener of the moral imagination, he must learn to
write more nobly and more philosophically than he does today. “In the
beginning was the Word, not the Fact; history is thought and spoken and
written with words; and the historian must be master of his words as much
as of his ‘facts,’ whatever those might mean.”
Lukacs is appealing here not to linguistic analysis nor to semantics,
but to rhetoric in its original signification. […] (“History and” 58-59)

He then provides a quotation from Lukacs: “‘For words are not mere tools, neither are
they mere symbols. They are representative realities; they remind us of the inevitable
connection between imagination and reality… The corruption of speech involves the

257

corruption of truth, and the corruption of words means the debasement of speech which is
the debasement of our must human and historic gifts’” (59).
67

This is certainly not the crux or foundation of my argument here, but it is

supportive it seems to an extent. It is important to consider Russello’s recognition that
Dawson is mentioned not much in The Roots of American order, but that his ideas would
go on to take on more import over the years for Kirk (The Postmodern 83-84). I am not
persuaded by Russello’s claims of Lukacs on Heisenberg, at least in total, as hinted at
early in Kirk’s work, notwithstanding Kirk’s challenges to an overemphasis on factuality
for history. Of course, one might pursue this route to some extent with some of Kirk’s
discussion on science from over the years. However, again, in my estimation, Kirk might
be proximate in some ways to Lukacs, but more would need to be argued here. For a
mentioning of Lukacs as influential by Kirk around the time of the initial publication of
The Roots of American Order, please see his response to Zoll’s “The Social Thought of
Russell Kirk” in the concluding section of this project. Apart from this question
specifically, please see “An Exceptional Mind, An Exceptional Friend” by John Lukacs
regarding Russell Kirk. Also, apart from the direct question of Kirk and Lukacs, for one
critical account of Lukacs, please see “Blunders, Lies, and Other Historicist Habits,”
which is a review of Remembered Past: John Lukacs on History, Historians, and
Historical Knowledge: A Reader, edited by Mark G. Malvasi and Jeffrey O. Nelson.
68

Please see the following: Adler, The Four 32n5, 93-105; Adler, Intellect 105-

114; Adler, Six 212-219; Adler, Ten 178-190; Chaves, “Scientism, Subjectivist
Epistemology”; Hikins, “Realism and” 64-65.
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Allitt, Catholic Converts; Allitt, Catholic Intellectuals; Chaves, “Scientism,

Subjectivist Epistemology” 53. Allitt has provided interesting accounts that pertains to
thinkers including Wilhelmsen, Lukacs, Molnar, and others.
70

Chaves, “Scientism, Subjectivist Epistemology” 53-54. No specific reference is

given for the application of Fr. Jaki’s work.
71

I have in mind here “Soul and Reason in Literary Criticism: Deconstructing the

Deconstructionists” by Chaves. Of interest to this project, Chaves referenced both Gilson
(831) and Weaver (803, 834-835) along the way in that particular article. On a separate
but related note, please see “Fish’s Copernican Revolution” by Eugene M. Jones.
72

Please see the following for this larger discussion on Kirk and religion:

Bradford, “A Proper”; Guroian, Rallying; Quinn; Zoll, “The Social.” Some additional
discussion will be provided on Kirk and religion in the concluding section of this project.
73

Please see The Paradoxical Structure of Existence (155-211). Wilhelmsen on

Voegelin demonstrates Wilhelmsen’s engagement with certain lines of continental
thought, even as he would have some departures from the suppositions that guide what he
saw as certain positive insights from continental thought.
74

Please see Enemies of the Permanent Things (262). Fackenheim wrote, “Does

belief in divine action in history ipso facto commit the believer to the doctrine of
historicity?” Regarding St. Augustine and St. Thomas, he then wrote, “Both thinkers
affirm a human nature which, however affected by the fall, on the one hand, by divine
salvation on the other, nevertheless is a nature” (21-22n14). He continued:
Divine action in history, as understood in the Bible, does not rule out
freedom. Thus God’s use of Nebuchadnezzar for His purposes does not
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rule out the reality of Nebuchadnezzar’s own purposes which are, to be
sure, very different from those of God. Further, the divine purpose in this
case—the meting out of just punishment—presupposes freedom on the
part of those who are to be punished. […]
75

Whitney, “The Swords” 318. Whitney has there quoted from Kirk’s The Sword

of Imagination (Kirk, The Sword 393; Whitney, “The Swords” 320n37). Although
prophetic rhetoric is not a significant element of this project, it will in the background a
bit in the concluding section of this dissertation project.
76

In Enemies of the Permanent Things, Kirk did not deal at length with

revelation, as he wanted to “address […] doubters, as well as […] the converted” (34),
yet religion did play a role in The Roots of American Order. In concluding his critical
review of The Roots of American Order, Hoffert has written the following:
In important respects, Kirk offers a confession of faith rather than a
rigorous historical or philosophical analysis. If you come to it as a
believer, you’ll be overwhelmed. But how can you respond as an infidel?
Yet, respond you must. The heuristic stimulation of this book is
enormous, as is the danger that it may be swallowed whole. Solace may
come inadvertently. The seeds of this harvest may succumb to the sterility
of their own purity of breed. (642)
In my own observation, regarding both theology and philosophy, it would be an
interesting area for future study to compare Kirk’s discussions from The Roots of
American Order to something like Pope Pius XII’s Christmas Message of 1942, “The
Internal Order of States and People.”
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77

Please see the following: Alderfer; Berkowitz, Varieties of; Bottum; Brown;

Carey, “The Future”; Carey and McClellan; Dunn and Woodard; Federici, “The Politics”;
Fitzgerald; Freund; Frohnen, “Redeeming America’s”; Frohnen, “What We”; Gordon;
Guttmann, The Conservative; Guttmann, “From Brownson”; Henrie, “Mr. Henrie”;
Henrie, “Rethinking”; Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s”; Henrie, “Understanding”; Hittinger,
“The Unwritten”; Hoffert; Kirk, The Roots 347-477; Kurtz; J. Livingston; Malvasi;
McAllister, “The Particular”; Molnar, “Still Pondering”; Morison; J. Robinson; Rossiter;
Watson; Wheeler. Of course, this larger conversation to some extent underlies the
divergences and similarities among the varying types of conservatives. From my
viewpoint, notwithstanding Kirk’s important related contributions, it is an academically
debatable issue as to the connection between the United States and modernity, the
Enlightenment, etc. regarding such issues as religion, governance, conservatism, etc.
One would have to face both the distinctness of the American from the French
Revolution, for instance, alongside of the visible elements of influence of Enlightenment
thought upon the very early days of the United States of America (inclusive on both
counts of the varying religious, philosophical and religious points of view of the
Founding Fathers).
78

Kirk, The Roots 475-476. Kirk provided no specific citation here for Carlyle.

Within the last section of the concluding chapter of the book (“In God’s Own Good
Time”) (468-476), Kirk relied in large part (among other sources) upon the book by
Julián Marías, America in the Fifties and Sixties, Ed. Aaron Rockland, University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 412, 420-421, 441, 444 (468-469, 474-475,
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477n18; 477n22) for a notion of avoiding both reactionary and radical reforms in the
United States of America.
79

One might review the divergent political views regarding contemporary

America by Adler and Kirk, for instance, yet both have an essentialist approach to human
nature as such.
80

Please see the following: Bitzer, “Functional”; Bitzer, “Rhetoric and”; Kirk,

Decadence; Weaver, Education and; Weaver, “‘Introduction’ to.” Interestingly, Frank
Purcell has looked at Kirk’s conservatism in light of the pragmatism of Charles Sanders
Peirce, inclusive of the question of conservatism and postmodernism. In light of some of
the issues of this project, that would certainly be an area for future study.
81

Pomeroy 42, 67-68n2. Pomeroy had a variety of references in mind with regard

to these approaches.
82

Bitzer, “The Rhetorical” 3-4. Mark Joseph Porrovecchio has emphasized that

Bitzer’s work regarding “situation” is a contribution toward delineating the concrete
parameters of rhetorical discourse with respect to the types of human communication in
general (“Rethinking the” 46-47, 49-50).
83

In this original essay on the question of “situation,” Bitzer has drawn upon the

work of Bronislaw Malinowski for an example and one analysis of primitive speech
regarding a fishing expedition in the Trobriand Islands (Bitzer, “The Rhetorical” 4-5,
14n1; Bronislaw Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,”
sections III and IV, appearing as a supplement in Ogden and Richards’ The Meaning of
Meaning). Bitzer’s functionalism is apparent as basic in his original essay with his
example from Malinowski and his explanation of “situation.” The following summary
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description by Biesecker is helpful: “‘Rhetoric,’ here, is the name given to those
utterances that serve as instruments for adjusting the environment in accordance to the
interests of its inhabitants. […] In his view rhetorical discourse is an effect structure; its
presence is determined by and takes it character from the situation that engenders it […].”
(234)
84

Please see the following: Brinton, “Situation in”; Hunsaker and Smith; A.

Miller; Smith and Lybarger; Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,” 1980;
Vatz, “The Myth”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton”; Wilkerson; Young.
85

Please see the following: Vatz, “The Myth”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton.” This is a

pertinent theoretical point regarding creativity (Young), yet in terms of the practical,
ethical, and linguistic aspects of rhetoric, my point of departure from Vatz’s arguments
on this matter is certainly toward classical realism. A genuinely creative rhetor will most
certainly account for the words (instrumental signs) that are conventionally applied to
common objects of thought through the particular language of use within a “rhetorical
situation” so as to prompt ideas, or formal signs, in the minds of the audience members.
For an account of grammar, rhetoric, and logic that is grounded in classical realism,
please see Sister Miriam Joseph’s The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and
Rhetoric: Understanding the Nature and Function of Language. Also, one could look to
either the rhetorical topoi or situational exigence as related to genre criticism (Young).
Bradford’s commentary certainly points toward the realm of enthymematic
argumentation (“A Proper”). However, with his specific reference to “remote
antecedents” (71), one might consider the ongoing inquiry into the genres of rhetorical
discourse, which has been to some extent an extension of situational inquiry for rhetorical
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studies (Garret and Xiao; Jamieson, “Antecedent Genre”; Jamieson, “Generic
Constraints”; Jamieson and Campbell; C. Miller; Phillip Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton
and Bitzer,” 1980 87-88; Young). As Kirk provided an Ancient to American historical
account that encompassed matters of language, custom, and principle, The Roots of
American Order is a possible scholarly source with respect to the facets of examination
that have been under discussion with regard to rhetorical genres, such as the discursive
and political aspects of American history (Jamieson, “Antecedent Genre”; Jamieson,
“Generic Constraints”). For a discussion of “antecedent genre,” Jamieson has built from
Eliot’s notion that “a writer must actively cultivate ‘the historical sense’ which ‘involves
a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence […]’” with regard to
a literary engagement of history (“Antecedent Genre” 406). Her reference here was T.S.
Eliot’s “Tradition and The Individual Talent” from The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry
and Criticism, London: Methuen, 1920, p. 49 (406n1-2). It should be noted, of course,
that discussions of genre criticism have illustrated the relationship between rhetoric and
history.
86

Vatz, “The Mythical.” A panel that I observed at the 2008 convention of the

National Communication Association in San Diego, CA, Social Movements, Rhetorical
Situations, and the Enduring Salience of the Bitzer-Vatz Exchange (22 November 2008),
which included Vatz and others was helpful in terms of some additional insights about
situational theory in general as regards to both rhetorical criticism and rhetorical theory.
It was at this panel too where I continued to develop further considerations (by
conversation and reflection) regarding Cherwitz and Darwin as providing some
epistemological middle ground to consider the contributions of both Bitzer and Vatz.
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Please see Croasmun and Cherwitz for an earlier discussion of Bitzer and Vatz from the
vantage point of realism, which is also quite helpful in looking at the two approaches.
87

Cherwitz and Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism” 319-320.

88

Please see the following for instance: Consigny; Hunsaker and Smith; Phillip

Tompkins, “Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,” 1980. Consigny focused upon the topics of
argument, for instance, while Hunsaker and Smith discussed the “issue as an analytic unit
of conflict.” In my own observation, Cherwitz and Darwin’s realist account here
discussed could be a helpful addition to Phillip Tompkin’s earlier “new formulation” that
looked to bring together the views of Bitzer and Vatz (“Tompkins on Patton and Bitzer,”
1980 87-88). He summarized as follows: “[…] rhetorical discourse shapes, and is shaped
by, rhetorical situations […] one can also post a theory of rhetorical relativity in which
the same phenomena, depending upon perspective, can be construed as both situation and
discourse” (88). Finally, as Croasmun and Cherwitz have argued regarding the work of
Bitzer and Vatz, a focus upon the rhetorical construction of situations as reality is
ethically problematic with respect to such considerations as fallacious arguments and
dishonest presentations, for audience members often weigh discursive claims against
evidentiary standards pertaining to both rationality and reality. Their discussion
highlights the centrality of the judgments of audiences, which is of import to rhetoric as
evaluative.
89

Again, Hunsaker and Smith argued for a focus upon the “issue as an analytic

unit of conflict” with regard to disciplinary discussions on “rhetorical situations.”
Although there might be some areas within their discussion that one could contest from a
realist point of view, it is important to note that Hunsaker and Smith built from
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Aristotle’s notions of actuality and potentiality for the context of “issues” (Aristotle, The
Metaphysics, Trans. W.D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Ed. Richard McKeon,
New York: Random House, 1941, 1049b11, 1046a10-18, 1022b33; Hunsaker and Smith
145-146, 146n11, 146n12). Also, with respect to my discussion that follows regarding
“moral imagination” for situations, it is important to recognize that Hunsaker and Smith
looked at both the “logical” and “motivational” aspects of situations (148-150), although
their psychological account differs in some ways both from mine and Kirk’s. On a
separate but related note, “Inherency as a Multidimensional Construct: A Rhetorical
Approach to the Proof of Causation” by Cherwitz and Hikins with respect to Aristotle’s
four causes and argumentation might warrant further study for some of the philosophical
matters related to the question of “rhetorical situation.”
90

Please see the following: Vatz, “The Myth”; Vatz, “Vatz on Patton.” It is

important to note that Vatz cites Weaver on a few occasions in his original critique of
Bitzer (interestingly, he also accuses Bitzer of a type of Platonism) (“The Myth”).
Looking at Barbara Biesecker’s departures from Bitzer and Vatz from a deconstructionist
point of view does seem to signal that maybe Vatz is not a constructivist writ large (at
least with respect to human nature as such). In passing here I will note that Michael
Calvin McGee pointed readers to Biesecker’s “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation
Through the Thematic of Differance” within his aforementioned discussion (“Suffix”).
In contending with the factual objectivity of exigency in Bitzer’s model with respect to
creativity and values (“Situation in” 242), Alan Brinton noted, “Vatz […] rejects the
presupposition that there are objective values. Oddly, he at the same time places great
emphasis on the moral responsibility of the rhetor in defining the situation” (248n18).

266

91

Please see the following: Biesecker; Bitzer, “Bitzer on Tompkins (and Patton)”;

Bitzer, “Functional”; Patton, “Causation”; Porrovecchio. Although Bitzer clearly has
clearly held to the reality of human beings as such through “situations,” it is important to
here note some of the concerns within the relevant literature regarding an adequate
audience focus for situational theory and situational criticism (Biesecker; Garret and
Xiao; Gorsevski; Smith and Lybarger). Considering an audience focus, to some extent, is
not off base from a realist view, as Aristotle looks to the types of audiences in terms of
epideictic, deliberative, and forensic discourse in the Rhetoric.
92

Please see Weaver’s The Ethics of Rhetoric and “Language is Sermonic.”

Overall, in Garver’s treatments of Aristotle’s corpus, the question looms as to the
operative borders of rhetoric with respect to dialectical discourse (also a linguistic art),
political science, ethical practices, and philosophical ethics (Aristotle’s;)—Aristotle,
obviously, inquired into these areas as a theoretician. According to Garver:
The most noble arts are the most revealing about the human ergon and
human nature. These are practical arts. Nothing can be further from
Aristotle’s idea of practical art than the popular contemporary claim that
rhetoric is epistemic and that metaphor is the most revealing thing in
rhetoric. Today people try to find a connection between human nature and
a poetic art, sometimes even a poetic art of rhetoric, but finding links
between creativity, metaphor, insight, and essential humanity. […]
(Aristotle’s 237)
93

Cherwitz and Darwin, “Toward a” 19-24. They are, of course, considering this

terminology from the view of “rhetorical perspectivism.”
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94

Patton, “Causation”; Pomeroy 54-57; Porrovecchio. Bitzer provides some

discussion of “practical wisdom” in view of Aristotle in “Political Rhetoric.” Pomeroy’s
discussion of “rhetorical sanction” (55-57) could merit further study in terms of Bitzer’s
own work alongside of some of the questions of leadership, audience, etc. that are on the
table in this chapter. In terms of the classical realist view of ethics, please see
McInerny’s Ethica Thomistica.
95

I have in mind here Fr. Grimaldi’s discussions that are cited within this project

in general and that both Fr. Grimaldi and Weaver both look to Maritain on action and
prudence (Grimaldi, “Rhetoric and the Philosophy” 373, 375n16; Weaver, The Ethics 350).
96

Please see the following regarding Weaver and rhetoric as “advisory”: Bliese,

“Richard Weaver’s Axiology” 286-288; Fisher, “Advisory”; Johannesen, “Richard M.
Weaver on” 128-129; Johannesen, “Richard Weaver’s View” 136-139; Weaver,
“Language is.” Somewhat relevant to this are the following: Dimock, “Rediscovering
[…] [Part One]”; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Eubanks, “Axiological
Issues”; Eubanks, “Nihilism and”; Eubanks, “On Rhetoric”; Eubanks and Baker.
Garver’s Aristotelian scholarship (Aristotle’s; “Eugene Garver’s”; “The Political”; “Truth
in”) certainly upholds the evaluative component of rhetorical discourse (for
“prescriptive” judgments), yet his work provides a formidable challenge to an extension
of Aristotle’s rhetorical theorizing to the notion of rhetoric as an art as preservative of
truth both within and across historical contexts. Garver has centralized Aristotle’s
conception of rhetoric as an art of words, which portends for him the question of the
proximity or distance (for Aristotle) between the ethos of a political speaker as a virtuous
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person and the ethos of a political speaker as manifested in argument. Garver views the
polis as more contingent than did Aristotle, which leaves open another question for him
as to the direct applicability of the Rhetoric for our present times if there is now a greater
circumstantial distance between these two spheres of ethos (communal and individual)
for deliberation. For Garver, while signaling for us the importance of ethos “in
argument,” Aristotle’s Rhetoric can be indicative of what we lack in political
communities alongside of what we have gained since the time of Aristotle. On another
yet related note, for a brief take regarding insight into American audiences resulting from
an examination of rhetoric, please see William Raymond Smith’s “American Rhetoric:
The Will and the World,” which is a review of Daniel Boorstin’s book, The Image: Or
What Happened to the American Dream. Also, please see Maurice Natanson’s “The
Limits of Rhetoric” for a discussion on the roles of and relationship between rhetoric and
dialectic, which was written in part with respect to Weaver’s The Ethics of Rhetoric.
97

In “Rhetoric as Praxis: An Alternative to the Epistemic Approach,” Zhao is

fairly clear in taking a consensus view regarding practical and moral truth for the realm
of praxis.
98

Gorsevski drew upon a variety of disciplinary sources to appropriate her use of

“climate” for this discussion.
99

Russello, The Postmodern 104-145. Gorsevski built from Weaver on hope

from The Ethics of Rhetoric regarding the transfiguration of situational climate
(including Weaver’s eye to “‘human imagination and effort’”), yet departed from his
notion of singular rhetorical leadership with her focus beyond “the lone rhetor and toward
the rhetoric of a given collectivity” (Gorsevski 144; 178n30; Weaver, The Ethics 20).
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Also, with respect to Kirk and leadership, please see W. Wesley McDonald’s discussion
of Kirk on education (Russell Kirk 170-200).
100

Stephenson also discusses Charles Taylor’s work, particularly the notion of

“social imaginaries” from Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2004 (261, 269-271, 274-275, 277). In my own observation,
Stephenson’s discussion of Kirk next to T.S. Eliot’s classical approach points one to
some potential alliances for serious Kirk enthusiasts with John Angus Campbell’s “neoclassical” approach to rhetorical studies, yet Kirk’s corpus portends a more explicit
foundationalism than Campbell would seem to embrace across his own writings
(“Between the Fragment”; “Evil as”; “Rhetorical Theory”). Campbell has recommended
the work of Eugene Garver (“Rhetorical Theory”). Interestingly, Campbell has published
an article in Modern Age, which is entitled, “John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, and the
Culture Wars: Resolving a Crisis in Education.”
101

Paula Tompkins derived her definition of “moral imagination” from Jaska, J.

A. and M.S. Pritchard, Communication Ethics: Methods of Analysis, 2nd edition,
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994.
102

Gorsevski looked at a situation of racial hatred in Billings, Montana from the

early 1990s (based upon her own research) while Paula Tompkins looked at Martha
Solomon’s examination of the medical findings of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (“The
Rhetoric of Dehumanization: An Analysis of Medical Reports of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Project,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 49 [1985]: 233-247; “The Rhetoric
of Dehumanization,” Critical Questions: Invention, Creativity, and the Criticism of
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Discourse and Media, Eds. W.L. Nothstine, C. Blair, and G.A. Copeland, New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 301-306).
103

Please see the following: Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric; Patton, “Causation” 48;

Weaver, “To Write”; Weaver, Visions 55-72. In going beyond “perceptual processes
alone” to the dialectical securing of situational factors (“in the classical sense”), Patton
referenced the Platonic tradition via Weaver’s The Ethics of Rhetoric (Patton,
“Causation” 48, 48n45; Weaver, The Ethics 3-26). In terms of rhetorical creativity and
purpose, Patton would go toward both pragmatist and phenomenological considerations
(48-55), yet his highlighting of dialectic “in the classical sense” is here relevant.
According to Richard Weaver, “Dialectic is abstract reasoning upon the basis of
propositions; rhetoric is the relation of the terms of these to the existential world in which
facts are regarded with sympathy and are treated with that kind of historical
understanding and appreciation which lie outside the dialectical process” (Visions 56).
104

See Enemies of the Permanent Things in particular. Within a similar

discussion years later in The Politics of Prudence (239-252), Kirk stated, “Etienne Gilson
points out that positivists deliberately advance the concept of ‘values’ because they deny
that words, or the concepts represented by words, have real meaning.” No citation is
given by Kirk, but regardless, the following by Gilson from Methodical Realism is here
relevant:
[…] A third way of recognizing the false sciences which idealism
generates is by the fact that they feel it necessary to “ground” their objects.
That is because they are not sure their objects exist. For the realist, whose
thought is concerned with being, the Good, the True and the Beautiful are
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in the fullest sense real, since they are simply being itself as desired,
known and admired. But as soon as thought substitutes itself for
knowledge, these transcendentals begin to float in the air without knowing
where to perch themselves. This is why idealism spends its time
“grounding” morality, knowledge and art, as though the way men should
act were not written in the nature of man, the manner of knowing in the
very structure of our intellect, and the arts in the practical activity of the
artist himself. The realist never has to ground anything, but he has to
discover the foundations of his operations, and it is always in the nature of
things that he finds them: operatio seqitur esse.
[…] So we must carefully avoid all speculation about “values,”
because values are simply and solely transcendentals that have cut adrift
from being and are trying to take its place. “The grounding of values” is
the idealist’s obsession; for the realist it is meaningless.
For a relevant discussion on the relativity of “values” next to the permanence of virtues
with respect to university life, please see Mark A. Kalthoff’s, “To Tell the Truth,” from
The American Spectator. Kalthoff covered similar ground and more for education and
other topics in his lecture of April 8, 2006 at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural
Renewal.
105

Although from differing philosophical vantage points in some ways, Weaver

and Consigny both provide some similar and important considerations regarding the role
of topics with respect to rhetoricians for situations. One of the prominent discussions by
Weaver is his ethical and political ranking of the rhetorical topics (Bliese, “The
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Conservative Rhetoric” 402-416; Bliese, “Richard Weaver: Rhetoric” 210; Bliese,
“Richard Weaver’s Axiology”; Bormann; Bostdorff 15-16; T. Clark, “An Analysis” 400401, 401n5; T. Clark, “The Ideological” 27-32; Enholm and Gustainis 49-55; Floyd and
Adams; S. Foss, “Abandonment” 369-371; Johannesen, “Richard Weaver’s View” 140144; Johannesen, “Some Pedagogical” 276-277; Sproule, “An Emerging” 17; Sproule
“Using Public Rhetoric” 289-290, 296-308; D. White), with the argument from definition
being the most ethical for rhetoric and most appropriate for conservatism within his
framework (The Ethics 55-114; “Language is” 208-216). Also considered by Weaver
alongside of this ranking was argumentation based in testimony or authority, which
depended for him on the quality or standing of the source or authority in use (“Language
is” 209-210, 215-216). General accounts of the topics of argument without this ranking
are available in Weaver’s textbook, A Rhetoric and Handbook, and the essay, “Looking
for an Argument” by Bilsky, Hazlett, Streeter, and Weaver.
106

Garver, Aristotle’s 139-171. Please refer back to my discussion of the

“sharing of meaning” from earlier in this project. Please see also Martin J. Jacobi’s
“Using the Enthymeme to Emphasize Ethics in Professional Writing Courses,” in which
he discussed the sharing of ethical ground via the enthymeme (280-287).
107

Consigny; Garret and Xiao; Wiethoff 172-174, 172n3. Wiethoff focused upon

the value of specific topics of a debate for critical insights as opposed to the general
topical lines of argument, which in his view don’t necessarily lend themselves for the
study of particular controversial discourses, as their general categorizations in the
rhetorical tradition were not intended for critical specificity. With his mentioning of
Weaver (173, 173n4), though, one might need to reflect upon this further it seems, even
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as against Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in terms of the relationship between special and general
topics. As the topics are related to enthymematic argumentation, Jacobi’s “Using the
Enthymeme to Emphasize Ethics in Professional Writing Courses” is here relevant also.
Struever’s article “Topics in History” provides helpful considerations on history and
explored via the topics, particularly as against tropical explorations based upon style.
Although Struever takes some views that are conducive to classical realism in terms of a
linear notion of history and regarding human nature (see Maritain’s On the Philosophy of
History), it should be noted that in other locations within her overall scholarly body of
scholarly work, she has provided various positive discussions of philosophical
hermeneutics. Finally, apart from specific discussions of rhetoric, situation, and history,
Garver’s “Demystifying Classical Rhetoric” provides a helpful overview of the classical
rhetorical legacy on the use of topics, the categorization of issues, and the inartistic
proofs of evidence. In some ways, in my own observation, it provides some grounds for
simplifying some of the discussions of topics, issues, etc. that occur in the “situation”
literature. One might also look to Weaver’s operative and generalized use of the term
“situation” within some of the selections of The Southern Essays of Richard M. Weaver
(edited by Curtis and Thompson) and within The Ethics of Rhetoric. Finally, with respect
to the use of the topics with respect to notions of freedom and order for society
(Consigny; Medhurst, “Resistance, Conservatism”), Kirk’s corpus could provide
communicative items for both critical and theoretical study.
108

Please see Maritain’s On the Philosophy of History. For rhetorical studies, in

view of the question of Kirk and postmodernism (regarding temporality, history, human
nature, etc.), it might be interesting to consider both Maritain (On the) and Wilhelmsen’s
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discussions on history (“History, Toynbee”; “Modern Man’s”; The Paradoxical)
alongside of Raymie E. McKerrow’s “Space and Time in the Postmodern Polity.” As
related to conservative thought and discourse, one might consider Kraynak’s advice on
ascertaining the past and look to the future in his “Conservative Critics of Modernity:
Can They Turn Back the Clock?” toward not “thinking in terms of historical progress in a
rational and linear direction and to think instead in terms of cycles of civilization in
which narrow trends play themselves out over finite periods while the full range of
human possibilities remains permanently viable” (32-33).
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Conclusion
Argument and Narrative for a Realist Rhetoric of Order
The problem of this dissertation project encompassed the following four areas of
challenge and opportunity for the rhetoric of conservatism within the spectrum of modern
to postmodern thought: 1) communicating the truths of foundational principles; 2)
confronting the errors within the present intellectual, moral, and social landscape; 3)
contending with the continuing implications of the various types of and approaches to
conservatism; 4) recognizing topical affinities for persuasive impact within the ongoing
academic, culture, social, and political discourse. With respect to this problem, from the
vantage point of classical realism and as related to rhetorical studies, the project has taken
a look a Russell Kirk’s imaginative and historical standpoint toward the development of a
realist rhetoric of order. While upholding Weaver’s contention that “a conservative is a
realist” (“Conservatism and Libertarianism” 477), it is important to ascertain Kirk’s
relevance beyond the discourse of conservatism for the academic discipline of
communication and rhetorical studies. For the theory, practice, and ethics of rhetoric,
one sphere of implication for this overall conversation is the question of narrative and
argument.
For theoretical, practical, and ethical matters, “narrative” has become a prominent
point of reference within various academic disciplines (Arnett and Arneson; Condit,
“Crafting Virtue”; Coopman; Fisher, “Clarifying”; Fisher, “Narration as”; Fisher,
“Narration, Knowledge”; Garver, For the Sake; Guroian, Rallying 189-200; Leslie;
Rodden, “How Do”; Talone 328-331), including discussions of the natural law
(Budziszewski 147; Hall, Narrative; Hochschild, “Natural Law” 6-7; Rogers). Russello
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has put forth the matter of narrative discourse for Kirk’s role for the question of
conservatism and postmodernism, particularly as against the communicative trends of
modernity, inclusive of Kirk on the natural law (The Postmodern; “Time and”). Besides
his suggestion on Bitzer’s model of “rhetorical situation,” James Hikins has also
suggested to me an examination of Walter Fisher’s “narrative paradigm” in light of
realism and communication (Telephone). However, although Fisher’s “narrative
paradigm” has been central to the field of communication and rhetorical studies, one
might go to one of his own major sources along the way—Alasdair MacIntyre.1 What
follows is an attempt to offer some considerations of narrative and argument regarding
Kirk’s corpus toward a realist rhetoric of order.
As it relates to rhetorical discourse, one can look to a general notion of narration,
which often includes the recounting of real events, but could include the utilization of
poetic or fictional narratives within or as a rhetorical case.2 In view of contemporary
discussions of narrative next to argument, Eugene Garver has likened narrative to
Aristotle’s reasoning from example, yet he has written, “Narrative can create ethos. But
we shouldn’t oversell it.”3 To revisit my earlier coordinates, the question of narrative and
argument is indicative of the dynamic among association, differentiation, and perspective
as components of rhetorical discourse. From a realist standpoint, arguably, one must
embrace a “real world” paradigm that allows for the experience and rationality that are
necessary for both fictive and real narratives as well as rhetorical and dialectical
argumentation.4 According to Adler:
The ancients wisely distinguished poetic truth from scientific or
philosophical truth. The measure of the latter was its correspondence with
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the actualities of the real world in which we live. The poetic truth of a
story or narration lies rather in its internal coherence and in its conformity
with the possible, not the actual. In short, if it is a likely story, believable
because it might have happened, it has poetic truth.
Of the many different worldviews or world-versions that the
human mind has been able to construct, some have more poetic truth than
others, but none should be mistaken for on converted into the really
existent world in which we live and that we experience from day to day.
Nor should the construction of these fictions of the mind be confused with
our efforts to attain knowledge of reality, either through ordinary common
experience and the philosophical refinement of it, or through the special
experience derived from scientific investigation and the development of
scientific theories emerging about it. (Intellect 124-125)
Although there is some variance between Adler and MacIntyre’s accounts of human
cognition with respect to “narrative,” seen in the big picture of his corpus, MacIntyre has
ultimately upheld a “real world” paradigm for discourse.5 With MacIntyre, whom has
been referenced both for conservatism in modernity in particular and for realism against
postmodernism in general, one can look to history to see both narrative discourse and
rational argument as significant across and within the particularities of given societies.6
Kirk’s communicative endeavors are helpful for this sort of reflection, including those
within The Roots of American Order.
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With respect to Kirk’s status within early 20th century movement conservatism,
Russello has looked to Kirk’s The Conservative Mind as among a series of influential
books by key authors (The Postmodern 28-29). He has written:
With the publication of these books, a history of conservative thought that
was half-hidden and half-created began to come into focus. Indeed, one of
the purposes of The Conservative Mind was to compose a narrative that
placed conservative principles at the very core of Western and, with Kirk’s
later The Roots of American Order, American culture. (29)
Romantic or postmodern, Russello has well captured the “‘two Kirks’”—writer of both
fiction and non-fiction—as this relates to an imaginative engagement with the modern
and the spiritual, the flavor of which, for instance, is contained in Kirk’s 1963 book
Confessions of a Bohemian Tory: Episodes and Reflections of a Vagrant Career.7
According to Russello, after writing books on a “series of discrete subjects, Kirk once
again returned to the grand narrative style with his Roots of American Order” (39-40),
which as “his most ambitious work” was “a sweeping narrative of the evolving
understanding of the sources of American society, and their connection to the larger
Judeo-Christian civilization, which itself has drawn much of its own self-understanding
from the Greek and Roman civilizations” (75). Kirk indicated in his later memoirs that
The Roots of American Order was a part of his efforts “to point the way toward a more
imaginative politics” (The Sword 305-309).
Kirk’s approach to sentiment, in Russello’s account, is relevant to our
appropriations of both narrative and tradition (The Postmodern 52, 87-98, 177-213).
Russello wrote:
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Sentiment assumes a larger importance in Kirk’s work because of his
assertion that the coming (post)modern age will be an Age of Sentiments,
superseding the old, modern, liberal Age of Discussion. The Age of
Sentiments will be more concerned with the power of image on the heart,
rather than that of logical discourse on the mind. Kirk though that
rhetoric—the creation of an image through language—was a critical art for
conservatism to perfect. And according to Kirk, rhetoric is only effective
at creating those images if it pays careful heed to sentiments, of both the
speaker and the audience.
Kirk’s construction of the role of the sentiments, therefore, is tied
together with his qualified respect for reason. […] Thus, when writing of
education, Kirk stressed the importance of arousing students’ feelings for
or against certain things through the use of stories, only later providing a
rational explanation for those feelings.8
Echoing to some extent his own discussions elsewhere of the “Age of Sentiments,” Kirk
wrote in The Roots of American Order:
Our twentieth century, Simone Weil wrote, is a time of disorder very like
the disorder of Greece in the fifth century before Christ. In her words, “It
is as though we had returned to the age of Protagoras and the Sophists, the
age when the art of persuasion—whose modern equivalent is advertising
slogans, publicity, propaganda meetings, the press, the cinema, and
radio—took the place of thought and controlled the fate of cities and
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accomplished coups d’état. So the ninth book of Plato’s Republic reads
like a description of contemporary events.”
This analogy of fifth-century Greece with our age is too true. One
may add that our time of troubles also is like the disorder of the Roman
republic in the first century before Christ, and like the catastrophic
collapse of Roman civilization in the fifth century after Christ. As
individuals and as a civilization—like that man without a guide in the
darkness, like Simone Weil, like societies that are dust now—we people in
the closing decades of the twentieth century grope for order.9
According to Russello, “Kirk’s historical style was deliberately narrative rather than
analytical,” generally preferring “anecdote and example to extended argument” (68).
However, the communicative work of historians is in large part a narrative endeavor as a
recounting of the past, which is “written from some point of view” (Adler and Van Doren
234-237). At bottom, since Kirk was an historian, narrative should have been a major
element of Kirk’s communicative endeavors.10
However, according to MacIntyre, like the great figures of recognizable historical
accounts, we all have a “narrative history” in relation to our own personal actions and
identities, which unifies one’s life for the possibility of a “quest for the good” as guided
by the virtues that are entailed by one’s role in bearing “a particular social identity”
(After Virtue 204-221). In discussing the “given of achievement” in persuasive discourse
for “the post-postmodern world,” Hikins has explained that rhetorical theorists will need
to be attentive to cultivating “ethical dimensions of rhetorical expression, including
public moral argument” with a vigilant focus “both against those who would make
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argument merely a game of winning without regard for knowledge and the pursuit of
truth, and against those who recommend the nebulous vision of discourse as simply an
‘ongoing conversation.’”11 Regardless of one’s stance on the definition, necessity, or
status of postmodernism (conservative or otherwise), the human element of
communication continues through time and place, which means that some degree of
progress in knowledge and practice occurs through history, although regress is always a
possibility.12 Although “conversation” was in a way paradigmatic for MacIntyre’s
account of “narrative” in After Virtue (210-214), he certainly held therein for the
possibilities of either progress or regress in knowledge and practice, like in his
appreciative discussion of Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” (“On Not”).
However, whether “the narrative phenomenon of embedding is crucial” for practices
encountered within tradition or not, MacIntyre’s corpus ultimately takes “public moral
argument” into a conversational sphere that is essentialist in scope, particularly as regards
human nature, like in his book, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need
the Virtues.13
Although MacIntyre’s important critique of the “Enlightenment Project” should
resonate with readers of Kirk, on another note, with McCarthy one can ask if Kirk’s
traditionalist social view actually entailed an embrace of a “metanarrative,” as that term is
sometimes understood around postmodernism.14 Even with Russello’s use of “narrative”
terminology, his description of Kirk’s historical standpoint as encompassing
participation, construction, and discovery still tends to put Kirk among those supporting
some sort of “metanarrative” approach to theory and practice.15 Certainly, Kirk lacked
enthusiasm and support for an ideological and exceptionalist view of American
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“democratic capitalism” for the rest of the world (Kirk, The Politics 172-190; Russello,
The Postmodern 1-27, 80-81, 101-102, 104-145), which certainly puts Kirk’s view of the
United States in some tension with recent “conservative” foreign policy (F. McDonald,
Foreword xviii-xix; Russello, The Postmodern 8-27, 80-81). To revisit Chapter Two of
this project, however, for the traditions of America and England, was Kirk’s view of
tradition based primarily upon “familiarity” (6-7), as Russello indicated, or did it entail
some degree of “superiority”?
In Enemies of the Permanent Things, Kirk was for the most part making a case
against certain liberals of that time who advocated a “transcending” of American tradition
(172-196). From within that commentary, the following quotation is a bit more expanded
than that given by Russello:
Whether one wishes to preserve a tradition or to transcend it, he needs first
to make sure of what that tradition is, and of what it has done to nurture a
nation’s life. Nations do not endure without traditions. Some traditions
may grow obsolete; all require respectful scrutiny, now and then, in the
light of the age, lest they ossify. Traditions do take on new meanings with
the growing experience of a people. And simply to appeal to the wisdom
of the species, to tradition, will not of itself provide solutions to all
problems. The endeavor of the intelligent believer in tradition is so to
blend ancient usage with necessary amendment that society is never
wholly old and never wholly new. He believes that tradition is a
storehouse of wisdom; as Dwight McDonald says, tradition nourishes.
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Sudden parting from tradition, however abstractly rational, may sweep
away much that is good together with a little that is bad.16
There is no question that Kirk was here recommending a type of reckoning with the
traditions that are genuinely one’s own, or familiar to him or her. However, in
concluding this particular discussion, Kirk wrote:
The man who respects tradition prefers the devil he knows to the devil he
doesn’t; and he is not disposed to sweep away a body of beliefs that have
served us well in exchange for some new domination to which its prophets
cannot even put a name. The American political tradition has given the
American people a higher degree of justice and order and freedom—with
the possible exception of the British—than any other political tradition has
conferred upon any other people.
Like other things, tradition may be judged empirically—though
that is not the exclusive standard of judgment. Our political traditions, our
social normality, has been fruitful, and the only discernible alternative to it
is political abnormity. The prudent social reformer must make his
amendments in consonance with this tradition, for the sake of renewing his
society’s vitality. His only other course is to sweep all the pieces off the
board. But then he would not be playing the same game, or reforming the
same nation, or, conceivably, dealing with civilized human beings. (196)
Even in encouraging an increased “familiarity” with one’s tradition, Kirk was clearly
speaking a language of “superiority,” at least at some level. As Russello has helpfully
pointed out, however, Kirk was not for the exportation of the American framework
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(actually comprising various traditions) to save the nations of the global community,
which was, as Federici has indicated, to some degree connected to Kirk’s conservative
reliance upon Edmund Burke.17
Kirk’s engagement with modernity via Edmund Burke portends a “rhetorical
approach” that “required employment and development of the moral imagination to
conjure the sentiments of loyalty and affection for the ways threatened by ideology”
(Russello, The Postmodern 107-118). With respect to Burke’s influence on Kirk,
Russello explained, “Given this limited understanding of the provenance and elaboration
of rights, the role of language—which creates the political structure in which society
operates—assumes great importance for Kirk,” as it “is the means through which politics
is communicated, and that language can change.”18 Hence, “like every exercise of
imagination, rhetoric must be tied to ethical ends,” yet without them, “language will
decay into set phrases or coercive instruments” (118). Also, “rhetoric concerns the nature
of the audience and the dispersal of political ideas,” yet beyond Russello’s specific
discussion here, this has been a challenging consideration for conservative argument
anyway among the various types of conservatives of the twentieth century.19 Regardless
of the role or “multiplicity of narratives” for either Burke or Kirk’s approaches (as argued
by Russello), Kirk did point to some connection between narrative and argument, as
follows:
Perhaps most calamitous of all, the age of ideology—which commenced
during the period Mr. Boulton chooses to analyze—tends to shut men’s
ears altogether to the art of persuasion, beautiful and just. Fanatic phrases
and invincible stereotypes supplant reasoned argument predicated upon a
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common cultural patrimony. America and Britain has suffered less from
ideological illusion than have most nations, but mischief has been done.
[…] 20
In light of The Roots of American Order alongside of Enemies of the Permanent Things,
one might here key in on the phrase “reasoned argument predicated upon a common
cultural patrimony” for some link between argument and narrative.
However, to the extent the one connects “narrative” and tradition, a reading of
MacIntyre poses a challenge for those who would embrace Edmund Burke’s ideas for a
contemporary conservative framework.21 In his estimation, “such theorists have followed
Burke in contrasting tradition with reason and the stability of tradition with conflict”
(After Virtue 221-222). According to MacIntyre:
[…] For all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional
mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the
limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition; this is as
true of modern physics as of medieval logic. Moreover when a tradition is
in good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the
goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and
purpose.
So when an institution—a university, say, or a farm, or a
hospital—is the bearer of a tradition of practice or practices, its common
life will be partly, but in a certainly important way, constituted by a
continuous argument as to what a university is and ought to be or what
good farming is or what good medicine is. Traditions, when vital, embody
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continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is
always dying or dead. (222)
Modernity’s “individualism” relegated tradition as an adversarial position “to the
Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke’s own allegiance,” attempted to join “adherence in
politics to a conception of tradition which would vindicate the oligarchical revolution of
property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the doctrine and institutions of the free
market” (222). According to MacIntyre, although theoretically incoherent, “this
mismatch” was ideologically useful, yet resulting from this, “modern conservatives are
for the most part engaged in conserving only older rather than later versions of liberal
individualism,” with “core doctrine […] as liberal and as individualist as that of selfavowed liberals” (222). Although this account and analysis could certainly be contested
by those conservatives who have an intellectual allegiance to Burke, it can lead one to
what has been an ongoing dispute for both liberalism and conservatism (Bormann 298,
305; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: A Generation” 101-114; Bryant, “Edmund Burke: The
New”; Canavan; Cobban; Deane; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]” 301-302,
305; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part Two]” 13-15, 19; Eaves; Huntington; Kendall
and Carey 411-422; Kirk, “Burke and the Philosophy”; Kramnick; D. Livingston; 30, 3940; McCarthy, “What Would”; Nash, The Conservative; Noble 641-642; Panichas, “The
Inspired”; Pappin, “Edmund Burke’s”; Pappin, The Metaphysics; Ripley; Speer 310n10;
Stanlis, “Russell Kirk”)—Edmund Burke’s political legacy.
Of course, in his discussion pertaining to rhetorical discourse, Russello pointed to
Kirk and Weaver’s differences regarding the value of Edmund Burke for 20th century
conservatives, which is reflected in Kirk’s review of The Ethics of Rhetoric.22 In that
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book, Weaver wrote of definitional argumentation as indicative of and proper to a
genuine conservatism, including a critique of Burke’s discourse that entailed a
classification of Burke as a liberal because of his arguments from circumstance (The
Ethics 55-114). Kirk’s departure from Weaver’s rhetorical analysis was in part due to
their conflicting interpretations of the discourse of Burke and their varying appropriations
of the terminology of conservatism.23 Weaver did express reservations regarding Burke
for conservatism in general (The Ethics 55-114; “How to Argue” 509-510; “The
Prospects” 473-474), yet as M. Stanton Evans has explained (295-297), although
generally respectful of Burke, Weaver’s concerns pertained to the primary status of
arguments from precedent for the British Whigs as compared to a Colonial emphasis on
principles. However, throughout Kirk’s corpus, including his generally favorable review
of The Ethics of Rhetoric, Kirk did not disregard definitional propriety, as he consistently
aimed at truth.24 For this particular dispute, it could be said that while Weaver
philosophized to refine the terminology and thought of conservatism, Kirk derived from
the conventional use of the term “conservative” an argument for a correct consideration
of principles (with a “centered” view of language)—both men were “logocentric” in the
sense described by Ewa Thompson.25 Regarding definitional argumentation, it is arguable
that the philosophical differences between Weaver and Kirk were, to some extent,
differences in degree, not differences in kind, yet notwithstanding Kirk’s communicative
style at any given time, there were often references to or expressions of essential
definitions somewhere present within his discourse.26
Apart from this particular difference between Weaver and Kirk, one specific area
of study regarding Burke, especially among conservatives, has been in terms of the
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natural law (Bryant, “Edmund Burke: A Generation” 111-114; Bryant, “Edmund Burke:
The New” 332; Canavan; Eaves 128-129; Kirk, “Burke and Natural”; Nash, The
Conservative; Pappin, “Edmund Burke’s”; Pappin, The Metaphysics; Stanlis, “Russell
Kirk”). Regardless of one’s position on Burke’s appropriation of realism or tradition (I
am yet unresolved on this matter by the way), it would have to be squared with “the
development of a second nature, shaped by habit, custom and tradition” that “is not only
consistent with, but a natural outgrowth from, our first or essential human nature” to put
him within the natural law camp of classical realism, as Pappin has worked to do with
Burke (The Metaphysics 115, 139-159), even proximate to a consideration of
MacIntyre’s critiques of Burke’s approach (Pappin, “Tradition and” 291-293). Relevant
here, O’Callaghan has looked to MacIntyre’s description of an intellectually and morally
destitute “‘person outside all traditions’” to accentuate his discussion of our rational,
social, and political life as “integral to and constitutive of human nature.”27 Proximate to
this, with respect to humans as political animals, he highlighted “the Aristotelian
emphasis upon the developmental character of being, that is, potential being rooted in
prior actual being.”28 According to O’Callaghan, “Perfection of being is achieved
through the actualization of potential being (second nature) rooted in the actual being that
one already is (first nature). What one already is makes possible the perfection of what
one may become through one’s acts” (292). This notion of a “second nature,” based
upon a notion of human nature as essentially constant, is significant for both
understanding and communicating the natural law, both individually and communally.
Joshua Hochschild has granted Russell Hittinger’s contention that contemporary
challenges to natural law theory need to be addressed “on prior ground,” where
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“theological and anthropological questions thus take strategic precedence over moral
questions,” yet in view of a philosophical and cultural recovery of the natural law, he has
asked, “But what could be the role for natural law arguments in this project?”29 In
Hochschild’s account (which draws from MacIntyre), the proximity of secularism to the
abuse of technology had led to “a corrupted notion of ‘choice’ and its role in moral
agency.”30 In view of “the principle of subsidiarity” from Catholic social teaching, he has
argued, “It seems to me that Hittinger points to a helpful strategy here, which is to
articulate the naturalness of associations and activities in terms of their intrinsic
values.”31 Natural law argumentation tends to not persuade “Post-Christian” audiences
because of those who do “not view certain forms of association as ‘natural’ in not
appreciating “their intrinsic value but regard them as having at best only instrumental
value, value that can, in principle, be accomplished by some other instrument”
(Hochschild, “Natural Law” 6). Yet, persuasion “that certain activities or practices are
inherently valuable” is possible (6)—through both “narrative and argument.” According
to Hochschild:
The first strategy appeals to imagination and memory, through history,
fiction, poetry, even the media of popular culture. For those who may
have experienced healthy forms of association and their intrinsic values, it
is important to keep the memory of these experiences alive; for those,
increasingly, who do not, the artist must work to bring before the
imagination an alternative vision of social arrangement with its own
intrinsic values. […]
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The other strategy is argument. Now much of the appropriate
argument must be, as Hittinger insists, not so much moral as
anthropological and theological; and so much of the argument must also
take place where anthropology and theology are relevant but would
otherwise remain only implicit: in political theory, jurisprudence, law,
constitutional interpretation. But I think there is also a place for moral
argument in recovering the sense of the intrinsic value of certain activities
and practices. Moral argument can play this role precisely because the
anthropological and theological questions are implicit within them. But
then for natural law arguments to play an effective role in evangelizing
culture, we must think of them in their dialectical, rather than their
apodictic, function. We must remember that in making an argument we
may not intend simply to use concepts; we may intend rather to elicit
concepts. We may offer an argument not just to achieve assent to a
conclusion, by appealing to pre-existing concepts; but to illuminate new
conceptual possibilities, by displaying new concepts at work in unfamiliar
contexts. If natural law arguments alone cannot be expected to secure
moral consensus by their intrinsic logic, they can exemplify the kind of
reasoning that would be required for moral certainty.32
To argue “to a corrupt culture,” one needs an awareness “of what will be, for that culture,
‘first in cognition,’” not in the mode of Cartesian rationalism, “but Aristotelian dialectical
pedagogy” (7). Natural law argumentation can be of import now, “not in defending
particular moral conclusions, but in exhibiting genuine practical reason at work, and
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proposing the possibility of forgotten values,” for “in a post-Christian world our intention
for the public use of a natural law argument must be, not to end a debate, but to start a
conversation.”33 Kirk’s corpus as it relates to the natural law can be a contribution to the
questions of “prior ground” along with the operations of both narrative and argument,
which is relevant for ethical considerations of rhetoric.34
The Roots of American Order is significant for scholarly study of Kirk’s notions
of the operative and epistemological elements within the human relationship to the
natural law (Kirk, The Roots; Russello, “The Jurisprudence”; Russello, The Postmodern
146-176; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk and the Age 55-85). In the Seventh Revised
Edition of The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, Kirk writes the following
regarding the first of his “six canons of conservative thought”:
Belief in a transcendent order, or body of natural law, which rules society
as well as conscience. Political problems, at bottom, are religious and
moral problems. A narrow rationality, what Coleridge called the
Understanding, cannot of itself satisfy human needs. “Every Tory is a
Realist,” says Keith Feiling: “he knows that there are great forces in
heaven and earth that man’s philosophy cannot plumb or fathom.” […]
True politics is the art of apprehending and applying the Justice which
ought to prevail in a community of souls.35
Reflective of the development of Kirk’s standpoint regarding the natural law, an earlier
edition of the book rendered this idea as follows:
Belief that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience, forging an
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eternal chain of right and duty which links great and obscure, living and
dead. Political problems, at bottom, are religious and moral problems. A
narrow rationality, what Coleridge calls the Understanding, cannot of
itself satisfy human needs. “Every Tory is a realist,” says Keith Feiling:
“he knows that there are great forces in heaven and earth than man’s
philosophy cannot plumb or fathom. We do wrong to deny it, when we
are told that we do not trust human reason: we do not and we may not.
Human reason set up a cross on Calvary, human reason set up the cup of
hemlock, human reason was canonised in Notre Dame.” […] Politics is
the art of apprehending and applying the Justice which is above nature.36
With reference to Kirk’s moral epistemology as it relates to reason and tuition (inclusive
of “moral imagination), W. Wesley McDonald has challenged the placement of Kirk
within the Thomistic natural law tradition.37 Within his treatment of Kirk on the natural
law, Russello has addressed this challenge, which is a helpful contribution to a realist
consideration of Kirk’s corpus.38
In Russello’s account, one has to see Kirk’s notion of “moral imagination”
beyond Enlightenment rationalism against the backdrop of the classical and medieval
natural law tradition in terms of the relationship between moral truth and human reason,
particularly as regards to “Cicero’s natural law theory as a system of justice that grows
out of human recognition of enduring natural laws, a recognition that enables choice
between justified and unjustified claims.”39 Such “recognition is an operation of reason,
informed by a body of normative imaginative literature and tradition, which is
conditional,” as “sources can change over time in response to consideration of its claims
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to authority. […]”40 Relevant to McDonald’s challenge, according to Russello, is the
medieval distinction between ratio (logical and discursive thinking) and intellectus (basic
intuitive understanding), both of which are involved in knowing.41 Russello explained,
“Reason, therefore, is only the active mode of knowing; it is interpenetrated by
intellectus, the passive capacity to receive truth that Kirk calls “‘intuition.’”42 So, with
Russello’s account, Kirk’s view of the dynamic of legitimate governance, community
history, and individual application portend the pertinence of “narrative and context” as
regards the “construction of the legal environment,” although Russello has highlighted
both the communicative possibilities and drawbacks for “narrative” as recognized within
the academic field of law.43
For his appraisals of literary engagement and community life, Marion
Montgomery has upheld this distinction between the rational and intuitive aspects of
knowing.44 He has written:
[…] But one holds an opinion through a complexity of knowing that
includes the exercise of both rational and intuitive intellect. Intuitive
intellect we operate upon; all thinkers do. But we have been taught to feel
guilty about the intuitive, unless we may be excused because we call
ourselves poets. If in addition we fail to develop the rational support of
the intuitive, it is perhaps well that we do feel guilty. […] (Virtue and 139140)
Although he has built from the constructivist side of the rhetorical epistemology debate to
a Thomistic account of the natural law as a framework for rhetorical ethics, Jeffrey
Maciejewski has demonstrated the pertinence of human teleology, even in postmodernity,
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for that sort of argument.45 One must here consider that Kirk had an ongoing focus upon
the proper ends of human life (Enemies; The Politics), which is essential to the theory
and practice of the natural law.
From another angle, the natural law is a significant topos, or source, for moral
argumentation; hence, it supplies a practical foundation for an ethical use of rhetoric.46 It
is arguable that scholars of rhetoric should account for natural law, for in the Rhetoric,
Aristotle stated:
[…] Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to
its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten.[…] Universal
law is the law of nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent
divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on
those who have no association or covenant with each other.47
According to St. Thomas, in view of both Revelation and reason, “It is therefore evident
that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal
law.”48 Keeping in mind some of the earlier epistemological discussions in this project,
one might consider the following from Aquinas: “[…] The precepts of the natural law in
man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of
demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are
also several precepts of the natural law.”49 That is to say, “the precepts of the natural law
are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the
speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles.”50 So, for example, “being”
is apprehended simply (providing for our experience on contradiction and noncontradiction), while “good” is firstly apprehended by the practical reason, as we all act
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“for an end under the aspect of the good.”51 This leads to “the first precept of law,” which
is the basis for the “other precepts of the natural law”: “good is to be done and ensued,
and evil is to be avoided.”52 Of course, a Thomistic account provides for reflection upon
both the “prior ground” and persuasive communication of natural law theory and
practice, both of which are necessary for rhetorical ethics, while Kirk’s corpus can assist
in developing a contemporary realist rhetoric of order as it relates to the question of
narrative and argument.53
As indicated earlier in this project, even amid the difficulties of defining terms
such as “conservatism” or “postmodernism,” one can confidently grant Kirk’s strong
stance against modernity. Russello’s discussion of Postmodernism and Other Essays,
which was published by Kirk’s conservative and Episcopalian friend Bernard Iddings
Bell in the 1920s, certainly points to the matter of Kirk and religion, although there are
specific aspects of Bell’s book that I think are not conducive to Kirk’s overall religious
point of view.54 Regardless, Kirk on religion has become a recent scholarly issue. Since
the 1950s, many have arguably taken what one might classify as a view on the place of
religion as somewhat strong for Kirk (even before his conversion to Catholicism), yet
some have more recently entertained the view that Kirk treated religion primarily in its
utility for conservatism.55 An important contribution of Russello’s book, The Postmodern
Imagination of Russell Kirk, is that it gives ample ascendancy to the role of religion in
Kirk’s corpus, such as with The Roots of American Order. It is arguable that the
narration and argumentation within this particular book by Kirk demonstrates to a reader
that religion had a pertinent status for Kirk’s approach beyond utility for conservatism.
Of course, conservatism was never distant from Kirk’s communicative sphere in general,
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yet it is important to consider that there really is no substantive discussion or mentioning
of conservatism in The Roots of American Order, although religion plays a prominent
role.
So, in view of getting beyond the “situational definition” of conservatism that
Samuel Huntington discussed years ago, has Russello stressed “narrative” at the expense
of argumentation?56 Maybe. Although the various scholarly discussions on history and
tradition that he covered have great standing and merit, Russello might have
overemphasized the conservative reliance on narrative discourse (as against modernity) at
the expense of the importance of rational argumentation in terms of the role of rhetoric.57
In her advocating a “logocentric” engagement with postmodernism, Ewa Thompson
wrote:
[…] Of course it is impossible to write about anything intellectual without
injecting one’s own humanity into the argument. […] However, the
illusion of objectivity which the Enlightenment proffered should not lead
us to a rejection of the thesis that about laborious arguments and
discussions based on syllogistic thinking and conducted in an atmosphere
as free from pressure as possible, one can arrive at an approximation of
truth. […] 58
Obviously, tradition is on the table alongside of “narrative” at this point in the project.
The question of “tradition” has been a focus of conservative intellectuals for decades,
especially as it relates to moral conduct and human epistemology (Carey, “Traditions
At”; M. Clark; Cutsinger; Hindus; O. Jones; Hochschild, “The Re-Imagined”; Molnar,
“Tradition and Social”; Molnar, “Tradition and the”; Montgomery, “Tradition and”;
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Niemeyer, “In Praise of”; Panichas, “The Case”; Pappin, “Tradition and”; Parry; Tonsor;
Walsh; Wilhelmsen, “History, Toynbee”; Zoll, “On Tradition”). However, in light of
Russello’s intersection of conservatism and postmodernism (The Postmodern 7, 177213), one might still want to know to what extent one must engage one’s tradition and to
what extent one can “escape” one’s tradition.
In view of the social planning and Enlightenment rationalism of modernity,
epistemological dilemmas regarding rationality, aesthetics, experience, and religiosity for
conservatism and among conservatives have been on the table for decades (Henrie,
“Opposing”; Henrie, “Reason, Unreason”; Hochschild, “The Re-Imagined”; Hoeveler; D.
Livingston; J. Livingston; Phillips; E. Thompson, “Ways Out”), including in regards to
the components and operations of human nature. This project has upheld Weaver’s
contention that “a conservative is a realist” (“Conservatism and Libertarianism”), yet
toward the classical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas, which ultimately encompasses due
considerations of both context and tradition as a part of and in relation to the real world
in which we live (Montgomery, “Consequences”; Shively). People have acted for and
against tradition in the work of reform through history, yet it must be respected along the
way, but not at the expense of our knowledge of and life within reality (Molnar,
“Tradition and Social”; Molnar, “Tradition and the”). Weaver himself had concerns
about those conservatives, including Kirk, who would be insufficiently “speculative” and
“theoretical” when weighing tradition and authority, although Weaver certainly embraced
the study of history, even in an imaginative way.59 In the big picture, however, as Kirk
was a realist of some sort, he should be seen as one who saw “narrative” and “tradition”
as both a part of and accountable to the reality that we experience. Russello does not
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always take his reader far off of this “logocentric” course, yet in view of realism as
related to postmodernism, it is probably still an open question as to Kirk’s role as a
postmodern conservative, which leads one to a larger question of course. In general, to
what extent should conservatism embrace the terminology of postmodernism? Inquiry
should certainly continue on these two questions, especially as related to rhetorical
studies.
To borrow a term from the critical rhetoric literature, Mortimer Adler likely
provided some sort of “‘hermeneutic realism’” with his dialectical approach as it
developed over the decades alongside the “great conversation” of his Great Books
approach to learning.60 Those who study history are accountable to proper philosophizing
and philosophical truth when they go beyond the purview of the “special experience” of
research (Adler, “The Philosopher”; Adler, “The Philosopher […] Continued”). For
Adler, dialectical neutrality is to some extent possible when examining the varying
standpoints on this or that question from the past or the present, while he certainly saw
the study of history as significant for the education of peoples for their own lives and for
the quality of political action.61 Specific political differences notwithstanding, Kirk’s
work as a “logocentric” historian could enrich this sort of “great conversation,” especially
as it relates to the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic.62
Eugene Garver has done well to bring forward the contemporary value of rhetoric
as argument, particularly as and for deliberative discourse (Aristotle’s; “The Arts”; “Can
Virtue”; For the Sake; “Truth in”), although he has also highlighted the role of epideictic
rhetoric along the way. However, he has challenged the deliberative merits of an
essentialist view of human nature, although his treatments of rhetoric allow for this sort
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of view (religious or philosophical) as encompassed in rhetorical deliberations and
celebrations about both means and ends.63 From the vantage point of classical realism,
though, debates about human nature as such (inclusive of human ends) would probably fit
more into something like Adler’s dialectical framework, as these sorts of debates are not
necessarily a matter for rhetorical treatment.64 An ethical rhetoric entails an openness to
“noble ends,” while in a balanced relationship with dialectical discourse (Weaver, The
Ethics 3-54; Weaver, “Language is”; Weaver, Visions 55-72)—rhetoric is potentially
preservative of virtue. In light of Kirk’s essentialist approach to human nature, his
corpus is theoretically and practically significant for a realist “vision” of public
discourse.
For conservatism and beyond, studies of Kirk can be informative to discussions
of judicial, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric with respect to narrative and argument,
both at the theoretical and practical levels, which from the realist point of view, concerns
questions of human nature as such.65 It seems that conservatives (including those
traditionalists like Kirk) must grapple with the question of privileging either epideictic or
deliberative rhetoric as they shift in focus between legacy and policy (Broyles; Gottfried
and Broyles). Bruce Frohnen has written:
Mr. Kirk’s vision does not lend itself to systematic analysis of discrete,
specific policy positions. His primary concern always has been with the
order of our souls, not with any one particular policy, save as it affects the
permanent things. Yet certain policies are more likely than others to
protect what ought to be the immutable aspects of the American character.
[…] (“Has Conservatism” 62)
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According to Zoll, “models” pointing toward an “ethical mandate” are revealed in Kirk’s
work “from moral actions of notable men in which a certain consistency and continuity
can be witnessed” (“The Social Thought”). And of course, as it captured Kirk’s ongoing
message that “life is worth living,” The Roots of American Order pointed Americans to
look to specific people of the past as presently relevant.
To here apply one of Adler’s “bodyguards of truth” as found within one of his
own discussions on America (We Hold), one might have ideals related to order, yet
strictly speaking, one cannot understand directly the idea of order, but he or she can
understand order as an “object of thought,” which is then objectively discussable among
human beings (even amid disagreements) in terms of philosophical principles and as
related to past actions. Kirk’s historical examples and political arguments can inform
discussions of “order” as regards to communication ethics and rhetorical criticism, both
theoretically and practically. Of course, Kirk is not the only or final word on “order”
through history, for a study of his corpus might prompt one to examine with depth the
work of such scholars as Christopher Dawson, John Lukacs, and Eric Voegelin,
especially in light of the sorts of issues that have been raised within this project.66
As mentioned earlier in this project, proponents of “critical rhetoric” have pointed
toward the important relationship between the rhetorical critic and the greater
community, which is relevant to conservative argumentation in general. According to
Gleaves Whitney, conservative critics of culture must present a calm, clear, and coherent
opposition to cultural decadence (“Decadence” 23). He has explained:
Here aptitude—a sense of aptness—is needed. For the critic must use
logic and evidence appropriate to whatever assertion is being made. There
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are a number of different levels at which the decline of the West can be
argued: sobering social data, knowledgeable testimony of the
psychological and spiritual poverty of post-modernity, suggestive
historical analogies, inferences drawn from the fine arts and popular
culture, intuitive visions of what the decline of the West involves in its
most subtle workings—all provide the means to make a compelling case
that decadence is a threat we need to take seriously. (23)
Aristotle has defined rhetoric “as the faculty of observing in any given case the available
means of persuasion […]” (Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 2). For conservatives to concretely
confront errors, then, a diligent appraisal of the accessible resources of argument is
necessary. However, Whitney also emphasized that for conservative critics to
demonstrate decadence within a difficult setting, they must initially communicate, in a
persuasive way, principles as points of reference.67 He has suggested that along the way,
conservatives should strive to discover the redeemable aspects of the age while
maintaining a focus on the “vision” of the West (24-25). Whitney has argued:
Hence decadence ultimately entails the process of falling away from the
vision that orders man’s relation to the divine, to the community, to the
self, to nature. In the Western context, it signifies a lessening of the hold
on the imagination of all that inspires human beings to be devout in their
religion, of service to their fellows, true to their conscience, and
conscientious in their stewardship of nature. (24-25)
Whitney’s communicative advisement here encompasses points of evidence and focus
that could entail the use of both narrative and argument as understood from the realist
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point of view. In his appraisal of “Thomistic Ethics in America,” John Haldane has
explained:
[…] the restoration of serious moral thinking in American public life and
in the culture more widely might be advanced by a systematic effort with
regard to two tasks. First, that of identifying and exposing invalid
reasoning, inconsistency, confusion, misrepresentation, and false values;
and second, that of presenting ethical claims in terms that show their
ground in commonly known facts of human nature. Of course it is part of
the cultural problem that those facts have themselves become somewhat
obscured. I think the effort to bring them back into view and to render
them vivid in phenomenological consciousness is best pursued by those
possessed of literary and artistic imagination, rather than by academic
philosophers. […] (165)
Kirk’s brand of “moral imagination” was ultimately a “pattern” guided by and guiding for
experience, while his own communicative and imaginative endeavors accounted for these
“commonly known facts of human nature” as he aimed to enhance the imagination of his
readers toward the good (in both fiction and non-fiction). Yet beyond conservative
discourse, there is one final area where Kirk’s corpus could be a contribution to the field
of communication and rhetorical studies as well as for the culture in general with respect
to a realist rhetoric of order.
Understood in a realist sense of the term, Kirk’s work could supplement the type
of “performance” of natural law arguments that Hochschild recommended above, which
is relevant to epideictic, deliberative, and judicial rhetoric.68 Discussions of prudence
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have emerged in the communication literature alongside of discussions of “performance”
as it relates to such areas as public discourse (Hariman, “Prudence/Performance”) and
“critical rhetoric” (Kuypers). Notions of prudence were consistently operative within
Kirk’s corpus for individual and communal action (The Politics), while prudence or
“practical wisdom” is proximate to considerations of the natural law in the Thomistic
tradition (R. McInerny, Ethica Thomistica; M. Murphy; Rhonheimer). For theoretical,
critical, and practical matters within a realist rhetoric of order, Russell Kirk’s provides
some ethical prospects for persuasion that can be both applied and exemplified toward
the preservation of virtue, not just for conservatives, but for the public at large.
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Notes
1

MacIntyre is a significant source for Fisher’s development and extension of the

“narrative paradigm” (“Narration as” 266, 268-269, 273, 275, 279, 282; “Narration,
Knowledge” 169). Please see the following with respect to Fisher’s “narrative paradigm”
within the field of communication and rhetorical studies: Arnett and Arneson; Condit,
“Crafting Virtue”; Leslie; Rowland; Warnick, “The Narrative.” The direction of this
chapter with respect to argument, narrative, and tradition was to some extent influenced
by my ongoing personal communication with Dr. Gregory Gillette and Professor Richard
Cain.
2

Please see the following: Hikins, “Realism and” 43-44; Leslie; Rodden, “How

Do”; Rowland; Warnick, “The Narrative.” Book III of Aristotle’s Rhetoric covers
narration in one sense of the term that I am using here. Discussions of “narrative” are
going to exhibit a favoring of the use of the term in the paradigmatic or technical sense
(the latter what Rowland referred to as a “mode of discourse”), or both together. It
should be obvious in this concluding section of the project that I would lean toward
viewing narrative as a “mode” of discourse. In his paradigmatic framing of narrative,
Fisher of course acknowledges the communicative tradition of looking at narrative as a
“mode” of discourse (“Clarifying”; “Narration as”).
3

Please see the chapter entitled, “Rhetorical Argument and Ethical Authority,” in

Garver’s book, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and The
Ethics of Belief. An area where Garver sees this interest in “narrative” is within the law
literature. One of his main points here is that inductive reasoning has no superiority over
deductive reasoning. In my estimation, an area of future study would be looking at
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Garver’s work on ethos in discourse (Aristotle’s; For the Sake; “Truth in”) alongside of
John Rodden’s article, “How Do Stories Convince Us? Notes Towards A Rhetoric of
Narrative,” such as with the relationship of rhetoric, grammar, and logic to narrative
discourse. On a separate note, for an insightful account of Kirk on George Orwell (built
from Rodden’s interviews of Kirk), please see Rodden’s “A Young Scholar’s Encounter
with Russell Kirk.”
4

The phrase “real world” paradigm as applied to this conversation is, as far as I

know, my own, and it is my realist adaptation of Fisher’s language (“Clarifying”;
“Narration as”). Hikins’s discussion (“Realism and” 43-44) on factuality and narrative
(and Fisher), including his reference to Rowland (43), helpfully reminds one that stories
must be evaluated “in relation to the world” (Rowland 270). I anticipate here my
discussion of MacIntyre’s realism and essentialism.
5

I have in mind here Adler’s discussion in Intellect: Mind of Over Matter of

“About What Exists Independently of the Mind (Including a Note About Reality in
Relation to Quantum Mechanics” (90-114) and “What the Mind Draws from Experience”
(115-125) next to MacIntyre’s discussions in After Virtue. One might also consult
Adler’s Truth in Religion: The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth with respect
to the question of narrative and argument. Of course, Thompson has recommended both
thinkers (along with Maritain) to conservatives for a “logocentric” engagement with
postmodernism. For a generally negative appraisal of the “virtue ethics” movement in
general and MacIntyre’s work in particular that works primarily from a theological
standpoint, please see “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas” by Fr. Thomas F.
O’Meara.
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6

Please see the following: Brand 361, 365n19; Craycraft 33; W. Frank; Gottfried

and Broyles 47; Guroian, Rallying 194, 211-213, 222; Hayward 12; Henrie, “Rethinking”
9, 16n2; Hochschild, “The Re-Imagined”; Neiman; Pappin, “Tradition and”; Ritchie 4041; Russello, The Postmodern 89, 117, 150, 200; E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 197, 204205; Walsh. Both MacIntyre (After Virtue 204-225) and Fisher (“Narration as”) point
one to consider narrative alongside of history. In terms of arguments having a history
(for both conservatives and liberals), please see Garver’s review of The Rhetoric of
Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy by Albert O. Hirschman.
7

Russello, The Postmodern 33-41. This notion of the “two Kirks,” which

Russello drew from Kirk’s own look back on his career, is employed to illustrate the
social/historical and literary confrontation that Kirk provided with respect to modernity,
which also pertains to Kirk’s dexterity of style. For instance, along the way, Russello has
reminded readers of Kirk’s interest in writing fiction, such as the horror story, “There’s A
Long, Long Trail A-Winding.” He has written, “Kirk used stories such as this one to give
narrative form to his arguments about human nature and society” (32). Russello makes
reference to Confessions of a Bohemian Tory, but any reader of Kirk’s writings knows
that this book reflects the flavor of the “two Kirks.” McCarthy has written, “Russello’s
overview of Kirk’s politics is insightful, and his take on Kirk’s spiritual background is
even more revealing” (“The Pomo”). Yet, according to McCarthy, while Kirk’s
“playfulness” seems conducive to a postmodern “sense of the playful,” it remains that
Kirk “sounds more like an old Romantic than a contemporary postmodernist” (“The
Pomo”).
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8

Russello, The Postmodern 52. Russello helpfully pointed out that Kirk was

opposed to reductive rationalism as well as sentimental reductionism as emancipated
from thought (52). Earlier in the project, I indicated that I thought that realism could
have taken more of a center stage in this book. Here is one example. Along the way in
his discussion of Kirk, sentiment, and imagination (52-64), it is my view that he could
have emphasized more Kirk’s pre-modern and realist understanding of “origination” as
regards to experience and imagination (although he is hinting at it). With his emphasis
on “discernment,” one would have to ask the questions: discernment of what and by
what? Possibly relevant here are discussions of “poetic truth” from a Thomistic
standpoint (Kramer; S. McInerny; Taylor). However, to be fair, Russello did seem to
balance out his overall case on this matter at a later point in the book in terms of Kirk’s
“strong strain of individualism,” optimistic viewpoint, and “belief in free will” as regards
to postmodern views on the historical and contextual dimensions of art (207).
9

Kirk, The Roots 4. Kirk drew here from Weil’s The Need for Roots: Prelude to

a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind. Please see “The Age of Sentiments” in
Redeeming the Time and Kirk’s article, “The Age of Sentiments,” which was published
in Modern Age in 1983. Russello has highlighted Kirk’s recognition of and entrance into
the “age of sentiments,” privileging to some extent the “image,” which has arguably
followed the failures of modernity’s “age of discussion” (The Postmodern). Such a view
has some confirmation in the communication literature, at least on one count. J. Michael
Sproule has put the purveying of popular images for “social power” and “the increasing
importance of interpersonal attraction and identification” as indicative of a new
“managerial rhetoric” (“The New”). Kirk had a very reserved view of television as a
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medium of communication, although he thought some positive communicative effects
could be had. Interestingly, there was even some planning to make The Roots of
American Order into a single episode for television.
10

Of course, much of Russello’s work supports this notion that narrative is a

significant part of the historian’s communicative endeavors (The Postmodern 68-82, 98103; “Time and”). As an historian works from a point of view (Adler and Van Doren
234-239), in view of some relevant scholarly discussions (Garver, “Machiavelli’s The
Prince; Garver, “Paradigms and”; McAllister, “Of Ideas”; McAllister, “Re-Visioning”;
Russello, “Time and”; Struever), one might consider how both narrative and argument
work for the bringing forth of history to either general audiences or academic historians.
11

This quotation is from, “The Given of Achievement and the Reluctance to

Assent: Argument and Inquiry in the Post-Postmodern World,” by James Hikins (157158). He also added to this, “If we pursue a vigorous, invention-centered, marketplace of
ideas conception of argument in the post-postmodern world, we may finally attain the
vision of Quintilian, Cicero, Bacon, Burke, Ehninger, and others of a genuine rhetoric of
social amelioration.” For the sake of clarification, I here note that it seems that Hikins is
referring to Kenneth Burke, not Edmund Burke. In his proposed “Tenets of PostPostmodern Theory of Argument” (153-156), Hikins contended that argumentation “will
be increasingly ‘scientistic’”; “will be both epistemic and ontologic”; “will be
represented centrally in pedagogy.” There are aspects of the essay with which I differ,
yet I think that his contribution here is certainly this notion of the “given of achievement”
with respect to a realist view of argumentation. With respect to Hikins’s essay here, of
course, the issue of “scientistic” argumentation would need to be confronted in terms of
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Kirk’s corpus in particular (Beer, “Science”) and pre-modern philosophy in general
(Federici, “Logophobia”; Wellmuth). Please see also “Rhetoric, Objectivism, and the
Doctrine of Tolerance” by Hikins and Zagacki in The Critical Turn: Rhetoric and
Philosophy in Postmodern Discourse. Both Russello’s book (The Postmodern) and
McCarthy’s review (“The Pomo”) prompt one to consider future inquiry on Kirk in
relation to the “rhetoric of science” and the “rhetoric of human inquiry,” both of which
sometimes intersect with the literature of either “critical rhetoric” or rhetorical
epistemology.
12

Please see the following: Adler, The Common; Adler, How to Think 435-445;

Adler, “The Philosopher”; Adler, “The Philosopher […] Continued”; Adler and Van
Doren 234-254; Hikins, “The Given”; Hikins, “Realism and”; Hikins and Zagacki,
“Rhetoric, Objectivism”; MacIntyre, “On Not”; Maritain, On the; Wilhelmsen, “History,
Toynbee”; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical. As indicated by Adler, although historical
context is certainly significant (particularly for political philosophy for him), we can and
must weigh the philosophical arguments of the past within, for, and against the
framework of the present, as truth and error can happen in and across any period of time,
although corrections do happen and progress is possible.
13

MacIntyre, After Virtue 204-225. In using the term “conversational sphere”

here, I have in mind discussions of narrative, conversation, and/or discourse that are to
some extent postmodern in scope (Cherwitz and Darwin, “Why The”; Hikins and
Zagacki, “Rhetoric, Philosophy” 201-212). One must recognize the realist implications
of MacIntyre’s work (MacIntyre, “On Not”; Shively 3-6; E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 197,
204-205). In particular, as Haldane has emphasized (154-155), significant is MacIntyre’s
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shift toward a more essentialist view of human nature in Dependent Rational Animals:
Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. For discussions of MacIntyre on “narrative” in
regard to moral discourse, from varying points of view, please see the following (also
providing for some connections between narrative and argument): Condit, “Crafting
Virtue”; Fisher, “Narration as”; Leslie. Condit focused, in a somewhat critical way, upon
the “conversational model” of moral theorizing across academia (“Crafting Virtue”).
Guroian writes of MacIntyre’s stance toward modernity, focus upon context, etc., yet
departs from MacIntyre on the question of an essential human nature across contexts
(Rallying). However, it looks like Guroian is relying more upon the views of MacIntyre
as given in After Virtue, which have changed in regards to human nature as such.
14

I have in mind here references by conservatives to MacIntyre (please see note 6

above). McCarthy has argued that to define “postmodernism” is challenging, but if it is
“‘incredulity toward metanarratives,’ or skepticism toward grand stories like the
Enlightenment account of scientific and moral progress,” then traditionalists might
embrace this disposition, “depending on whether Kirk’s belief that ‘society is a spiritual
reality, possessing an eternal life’” is its own metanarrative, yet “they find rationalistic
system building equally distasteful, fearing that it strips the mystery and feeling from
life” (“The Pomo”). McCarthy mentioned Lyotard here for this definition of
postmodernism (“The Pomo”). Russello referenced Lyotard’s work in The Postmodern
Imagination of Russell Kirk (183, 183n15, 206, 211). At another point in his review,
wishing for a more systematic approach from Russello, McCarthy reminded readers that
“Kirk put a high premium on narrative integrity” (“The Pomo”).
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15

Russello, The Postmodern 28-103. Russello does portray aspects of Kirk’s

corpus as that of a “metanarrative” approach, and at times, he does not totally buy the
“narrative”/”metanarrative” distinction, at least in its usual postmodernist varieties.
16

Kirk, Enemies 181. Kirk provided no citation information for his Dwight

Macdonald reference. Here is the quotation as provided by Russello (The Postmodern 6,
6n8):
Some traditions may grow obsolete; all require respectful scrutiny, now
and then, in light of the age, lest they ossify. Traditions take on new
meanings with the growing experience of a people. And simply to appeal
to the wisdom of the species, to tradition, will not of itself provide
solutions to all problems. The endeavor of the intelligent believer in
tradition is so to blend ancient usage with necessary amendment that
society is never wholly old and wholly new.
17

Please see the following: Federici, “Russell Kirk”; Russello, The Postmodern 1-

27, 80-81, 101-102, 104-145. According to Federici:
[…] Kirk was content living in a diverse world, and he was skeptical that
American values and traditions could be transplanted to foreign lands.
After all, American values were not themselves one monolithic set of
beliefs; they were multiple sets of local and regional customs and
traditions that may only be appropriate in certain parts of the U.S., not
across national boundaries. This was one instance in which Kirk had
profound disagreements with neoconservatives. (“Russell Kirk” 257)
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Beyond differences with the neoconservatives, McCarthy looked to Kirk’s “animosity
toward” the libertarians (even amid some common ground) as a point of interest as “his
attitude could be fruitfully compared with the disdain many postmodernists feel for
capitalism and classical liberalism” (“The Pomo”). This probably has some comparative
merit with respect to certain rhetorical scholars (of rhetorical criticism or “critical
rhetoric”) having this sort of “disdain,” although I think that Kirk’s corpus would break
ranks eventually in terms of politics, philosophy, and theology. Regardless, one might
search for some topical similarities concerning modernity’s notions of “freedom,” which
has been front and center within the “critical rhetoric” literature.
18

Russello, The Postmodern 117-118. Russello proceeds here with an overview

that pertains to Kirk’s view of rights as more limited (derived by the historical experience
of a given society) than a typical universalistic approach.
19

Russello, The Postmodern 119. Russello here is basically looking at Edmund

Burke’s focus upon the aristocratic and educated elements of English society as not from
an unnecessarily elitist point of view. Regarding the audiences of conservatism, please
see the following: Beale, “Richard M. Weaver”; Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver and the
Rhetoric”; S. Crowley 69-73; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]”; Dimock,
“Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; Johannesen, “A Reconsideration” 3-6, 9-10;
McAllister, “Re-Visioning” 45-46; Weaver, “The Prospects” 475.
20

Kirk, “Rhetoricians” 767. Russello worked in part from Kirk’s article,

“Rhetoricians and Politicians,” which is a book review of The Language of Politics in the
Age of Wilkes and Burke by James T. Boulton (114-124). Russello does not utilize this
particular quotation from this review by Kirk that I am giving here.
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21

In light of MacIntyre’s critique of Burke and admiration of Newman,

Hochschild has looked to Cardinal Newman regarding tradition, reality, phronesis, etc. in
“The Re-Imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman.” MacIntyre’s critique of
Burke to follow herein was one springboard and point of discussion within Pappin’s
imaginary exchange between Burke and Sartre (“Tradition and” 286-287, 291-293).
Within this exchange developed by Pappin, one here then has a possible defense of
Edmund Burke against MacIntyre’s critique.
22

Russello, The Postmodern 106, 118-119. Please see Kirk’s review of The

Ethics of Rhetoric (reviewed alongside of The Quest for Community, a Study in the
Ethics of Order and Freedom by Robert A. Nisbet), which is entitled, “Ethical Labor,”
which later appeared in the book, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice (79-100). Please see
the following regarding this matter of difference between Kirk and Weaver regarding
Edmund Burke: Beale, “Richard M. Weaver” 629, 634; Bliese, “Richard M. Weaver:
Conservative” 382-384; Bliese, “Richard Weaver’s Axiology” 285; Bryant, “Edmund
Burke: A Generation” 110-111; Bryant, Rev. of; T. Clark “An Analysis” 401; Kendall
79, 79n13-15; Sproule, “Using Public Rhetoric” 290, 290n2, 297-298, 297n33, 308,
308n55.
23

Stanlis indicated that Weaver shifted to a more positive understanding of

Edmund Burke’s argumentation after reading a version of a manuscript of Stanlis’s
Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Stanlis, “Russell Kirk” 42). Stanlis mentioned
Weaver’s openness to a more positive appraisal of Burke in the discussion that followed
George H. Nash’s presentation at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal of
October 31st, 2009 (this presentation is available for viewing on the Internet at
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http://kirkcenter.wordpress.com/). Please see note 25 below regarding my terminological
point here.
24

Although one could look at a variety of works here, one might study closely his

later memoirs, The Sword of Imagination. Please see also the tribute essay by Gerhart
Niemeyer, “Knight of Truth.”
25

In “Ethical Labor,” Kirk pointed back to the original signification of the term

“conservative” in Europe. Basically, his view was that (in view of Burke) a conservative
is grounded on principles as it relates to circumstances. To the point made by Evans,
apart from any shift in Weaver’s negative view from The Ethics of Rhetoric (see note 23
above) or elsewhere, Weaver did demonstrate in some instances a respect for Edmund
Burke, even with regards to conservatism (Weaver, Ideas 48; Weaver, “The Southern”
211). I have in mind here Ewa Thompson’s “Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse”
and “Dialectical Methodologies in the American Academy.” Evans is not an
academician, but a journalist, yet he knew Richard Weaver (286-287). He wrote:
A word that appears over and over again in his writings, and I think is
indicative of what made him so powerful, is the word “center.” There
must be a center by which all other things are brought to scale and made
coherent. If that center is not there, then all you have is random facticity.
This is opposed to the moderns who work from the outside in, from the
periphery. He talked about that: just taking the facts on the periphery and
focusing on them, working from the outside in. Richard Weaver worked
from the inside out. And his reasoning on this, it seems to me, is
incontestable. Without that center, without that core of absolutes, then
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nothing else is possible. There is no right, there is no wrong, everything is
flux, everything is random, everything is opinion. There is no
intelligibility. (292)
26

Please see the following regarding Kirk’s style or argumentation: Davis;

Henrie, “Russell Kirk and the”; McAllister, “Of Ideas” 60-61; Russello, The Postmodern;
Wilhelmsen, “The Wandering.” One must consider here that Kirk began The Roots of
American Order as follows: “Our own society, like that of any other people, is held
together by what is called an ‘order.’ The character of that order is the subject of this
book. What is ‘order’?” (3). See also Kirk’s book, Academic Freedom: An Essay in
Definition. Certainly, in light of the overall discussion within this project (including
Garver’s thoughts on Aristotle and style), questions of style and delivery could be
pursued further including and beyond Kirk and Weaver’s endeavors in light of certain
relevant discussions across disciplines (Beale, “Richard M. Weaver”; Bliese, “Richard M.
Weaver and the Rhetoric” 318-324; Bliese, “Richard Weaver: Rhetoric”; Bradford,
“Weaver”; Broyles; Crider; Dimock, “Rediscovering […] [Part One]” 303-309; Dimock,
“Rediscovering […] [Part Two]”; S. Foss, “Rhetoric and”; Geiger; Gottfried and Broyles;
Guroian, Rallying 189-200; Hoffman; Jacobi, “Using”; Johannesen, “Attitude”;
Johnstone, “Communicating in”; Kirschke; McLuhan; Struever; Vivian, “Style,
Rhetoric”; Weaver, The Ethics 115-185; Weaver, “Individuality and Modernity” 84-85;
Weaver, “‘Parson’ Weems” 274-276, 283-298; Winterowd). Finally, I must here
mention that my reflections upon the philosophical differences between Weaver and Kirk
were influenced by Dr. Michael M. Jordan’s question to me after my guest lecture at
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Hillsdale College, “Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Rhetorical Ethics: The Question
of Natural Law,” of January 27th, 2006.
27

O’Callaghan 291, 334n39. O’Callaghan referenced MacIntyre’s book, Whose

Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1988, p. 367.
28

O’Callaghan 292.

29

Hochschild, “Natural Law” 1-2. With “Natural Law Argument in a Post-

Christian World (Or, Why Catholic Moralists Need the Agrarians, and Vice Versa),”
Hochschild is considering Russell Hittinger’s book, The First Grace: Rediscovering the
Natural Law in a Post-Christian World, which provides helpful discussion on Thomistic
natural law theory and its relation to contemporary questions, particularly in and for the
United States of America. My reading of this article by Hochschild certainly provided
direction for the concluding section of the dissertation project. In view of Hittinger’s
book, Hochschild emphasized that natural law arguments, even beyond “the strict liberal
standards of ‘public reason’ […] just don’t happen to be rhetorically effective for a ‘postChristian’ audience” as consensus is lacking on “the anthropological and theological
premises to which Hittinger turns our attention” (3). Hochschild explained:
There are those who would argue that the failure to secure universal assent
is evidence that there is no such thing as natural law. Of course classical
examples of universalistic morals always include accounts of why some
people happen to fail to know what is in principle available to everyone;
the grasp of moral truths in principle available to anyone may not be in
fact available to those who are poorly educated (e.g. Plato’s Republic) or
especially disobedient to God (e.g. Romans 1). Indeed one could even say
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that it is a precondition of any good natural law theory that it include the
resources for accounting for the conditions of its failure to achieve
consensus; and I am inclined to agree with Alasdair MacIntyre who, in
explicitly taking up this challenge, has argued that Thomistic natural law
theory does account for the precise sort of failure to appreciate natural law
exhibited by “the dominant cultures of advanced modernity.” […] (3)
Hochschild noted here MacIntyre’s “Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced
Modernity,” from Common Truths: New Perspectives in Natural Law, Edward B.
McLean, ed., Wilmington, DE: ISI, 2000, pp. 91-115. Drawing from other sources from
MacIntyre also, MacIntyre’s work will be a significant point of reference along the way
forward in this article by Hochschild.
30

Hochschild, “Natural Law” 3-5. Helpful alongside of Hochschild’s discussion

here might be Wilhelmsen’s “Technology and Its Consequences.”
31

Hochschild, “Natural Law” 5-6.

32

Hochschild, “Natural Law” 6-7.

33

He ends his article here then as follows: “That kind of conversation can head

down many paths; and happily, we can see much farther down those paths thanks to the
illumination of The First Grace” (7). For a negative appraisal of contemporary times
with respect to the natural law, please see Wilhelmsen’s “The Natural Law, Religion,
And the Crisis of the Twentieth Century.”
34

Straight away, one could go to “The Unwritten Constitution and the

Conservative’s Dilemma” by Russell Hittinger, or Hittinger’s introduction to Kirk’s,
Rights and Duties: Reflections on Our Conservative Constitution, both of which contain
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discussions of the natural law in view of the written and unwritten principles of countries.
As regards Kirk’s “six canons” of conservatism from the 7th Revised Edition of The
Conservative Mind (Hittinger, “The Unwritten” 61-62):
If one hesitates to affirm that these cannons still constitute the unwritten
principles of our legal and political order, then one can appreciate the
conservative’s dilemma. In The Roots of American Order, Kirk
concluded that: “whatever America’s incertitudes today, it is difficult to
find American citizens who can sketch any convincing ideal new order as
an alternative to the one long rooted here.” […] The conservative agrees
that there is no “convincing” alternative. Unfortunately, the flesh and
blood of culture has a life of its own, and there is no guarantee that the
conservative’s understanding of right reason will be en-rooted in the body
of unwritten propositions. The conservative finds himself in the rather
awkward position of having to defend the traditional order not only in
more abstract terms and arguments, but perhaps even in the mode of
prophesy. (62)
For discussions from or on Kirk’s corpus in relation to the natural law, please see the
following: Aeschliman; Henrie, “Russell Kirk’s”; Kirk, America’s British; Kirk, “Burke
and Natural”; Kirk, “The Case”; Kirk, Rights and 126-138; W. McDonald, Russell Kirk;
Person, Russell Kirk; Russello, “The Jurisprudence”; Russello, The Postmodern. Some
words from Henrie’s “Russell Kirk’s Unfounded America” are relevant to the
considerations of this concluding section, particularly with respect to Hochschild’s
recommendations. He wrote:
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Finally, it must be admitted that Kirk’s view of American order may be
too optimistic. Kirk argues in effect that America is well-founded because
it is not really “founded” so much as “grown”—from the healthy soils of
Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. But what then accounts for the obvious
pathologies which have of late “grown up” in our society? […] (55).
Later, he concluded his article by writing, “Kirk’s work is an attempt at the recovery of
tradition from the diremptions of the eighteenth century. The success of the attempt
remains uncertain” (56).
35

Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, Seventh Revised Edition 8.

Kirk’s use of the term “realist” here might entail the practical use of the term as realistic
rather than a “realist” in a philosophical sense. Kirk noted a reference to Feiling’s
Toryism, pp. 37-38 (503n3).
36

Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana 7-8. This is a revised

edition of his original edition (published in 1953) that was in print in the 1960s. He noted
a reference to Feiling’s Toryism, pp. 37-38 (449n3). Regarding the development of
Kirk’s thought on the natural law, please see the following: Hittinger, “The Unwritten”;
W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 55-85; Russello, The Postmodern 146-176; Stanlis, “Russell
Kirk.” The work of Peter Stanlis was a significant influence on Kirk’s development in the
area of natural law. Stanlis has studied Edmund Burke with respect to the Thomistic
tradition of natural law.
37

W. McDonald, Russell Kirk 55-85. To anticipate what will follow on Kirk and

religion, McDonald does not so much see Kirk as a conservative utilitarian on religion as
much as he downplays the influence of Catholicism on Kirk (including in regards to the
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Thomistic natural law tradition). However, in looking at some of Kirk’s religious
influences (mostly Catholic), Beer has stated, “[…] that Kirk was no Neo-Scholastic does
not mean that his Catholic Christianity was extrinsic to his basic commitments” (“The
Idea” 48). Also, I think that maybe distinctions between morality from the natural law
and morality from Divine Revelation could be brought to McDonald’s discussion. Of
course, theology and philosophy are related, and the natural law is congruent with Divine
Revelation, but I think he overlooks this to some extent as he looks at Catholicism and
Kirk.
38

Russello, The Postmodern 151-154. Russello initially addressed McDonald’s

challenge in “The Jurisprudence of Russell Kirk.” In The Postmodern Imagination of
Russell Kirk, Russello primarily focused upon McDonald’s discussion regarding Kirk
next to the Thomistic natural law tradition from Russell Kirk and the Age of Ideology,
while mentioning McDonald’s dropping therein of a specific critique of Kirk’s intuitive
approach for legal and moral issues from McDonald’s “Reason, Natural Law, and Moral
Imagination in the Thought of Russell Kirk” from Modern Age 27.1 of 1983, pp. 15-24,
specifically p. 23 (Russello, The Postmodern 152, 152n24-26, 232). McCarthy wrote in
his review of Russello’s book:
The chapters on Kirk’s political thought and jurisprudence are on firmer
ground than the chapter on history. Russello brings his talents as a legal
thinker to bear in discussing Kirk’s views on natural law, common law,
and positive law. He clarifies a contentious issue among Kirkians:
whether, and to what extent, Kirk was a natural-law thinker. Russello
argues convincingly that for Kirk, the common law—built up over
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centuries upon the ad hoc decisions of judges and juries—should be
preferred over consciously constructed legislative law or abstract natural
law. He feared the revolutionary potential in natural law and disliked its
absolute and rational qualities; he wanted it tamed and codified by
common law or, failing that, legislation. There is a plausible pomo
dimension to Kirk’s thought here. The bottom-up and participatory
common law does have qualities congruent with postmodernism—
certainly relative to the rationalistic, top-down approach of legal
positivism and the universalism of natural law. (“The Pomo”)
39

For this aspect of this discussion, Russello referenced The Roots of American

Order, pp. 111-112, 209, 352, of an edition from 1974 (Russello, The Postmodern 152,
152n27, 216).
40

Russello, The Postmodern 152-153. Russello points the reader to pp. 285-286

of Enemies of the Permanent Things (The Postmodern 153n28), which is a book that
does in a few places provide some good discussion by Kirk regarding the natural law.
41

Russello, The Postmodern 153. For this aspect of the discussion, Russello

noted Josef Pieper’s Leisure: The Basis of Culture, pp. 26-27, New York: Mentor, 1963,
and Gregory Wolfe’s “Russell Kirk—The Catholic as Conservative,” pp. 25, 28-29, from
Crisis, 11.9 (October 1993) (The Postmodern 153n29, 153n31-32, 226, 235).
42

Russello, The Postmodern 153.

43

Russello, The Postmodern 153-157. Noting pp. 111-112 of a 1974 edition of

The Roots of American Order (153n33, 216), Russello wrote, “Imagination is a necessary
condition to a rational and human application of the law, both customary and salutary
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[…]” (153). This particular discussion by Russello is helpful in seeing the pros and cons
of narrative alongside of the standards of argumentation, which are quite important in the
area of law. This could be read alongside of Garver’s For the Sake of Argument, which is
discussed in note 3 above.
44

Montgomery, The Trouble 63-123; Montgomery, Virtue and 139-143;

Montgomery, “Virtue and” 22.
45

Please see the following from Maciejewski: “Can Natural Law”; “Natural Law

as an”; “Natural Law as the Right”; “Natural Law, Natural Rhetoric”; “Reason as.” One
major entrance for Maciejewski into the sphere of natural law for communication ethics
is rhetorical epistemology, yet he builds from the constructivist side of the conversation
(Scott, Brummett, etc.) to the issues at hand. As should be obvious from this project, my
own approach would be to enter in from the realist side of the rhetorical epistemology
debate. Maciejewski’s overall approach and his applied discussions are quite helpful, my
differences notwithstanding. See also “Natural Law and the Right to Know in a
Democracy” by Maciejewski and Ozar. Finally, regarding teleological considerations of
political frameworks (145-147), J. Budziszewski wrote:
Am I barking up the wrong tree in dragging formal and final causes into
the matter? Some followers of Alasdair MacIntyre might protest that the
home truths of a constitution lie not in its form or finality, but in its story.
I answer that this alternative is false. By all means let us tell its story. As
I hope that MacIntyre himself would agree, classical metaphysics doesn’t
mean not telling stories; it means looking into them more closely. We tell
a thing’s story when we tell how it comes to be, how it comes into its own
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or fails to come into its own, and how it dies or changes into something
else. But to ask such questions is to ask about forms and finalities. How
can we tell the story well, if we refuse to look into them? (147)
46

My classification of natural law as a topos was initiated and influenced by

Robert L. Frank’s article, “Reason and Religion in Rerum Novarum” before I even began
this dissertation project (during my time in coursework) (Grabowsky, “Thomistic Natural
Law”). Frank discusses Pope Leo XIII’s use of Thomistic natural law philosophy within
the modern age along with some ongoing implications beyond that time in history.
Robert L. Frank, through E-mail communication to the author, encouraged further
research, provided relevant sources, and suggested scholarly directions with respect to St.
Thomas Aquinas, natural law, and rhetorical ethics (“Re: Aquinas” 24 June 2003; “Re:
Aquinas” 25 June 2003). I had subsequently discovered that Kathleen Jamieson
identifies natural law as a topos for various instances of rhetoric (“Natural Law”).
Jamieson analyzes the rhetorical use of the natural law in general as a topos with respect
to various natural law theories. She explained, “The persistence of the topos, natural law,
may be attributed to its ability to satisfy both rhetorical and psychological needs of men.
This paper will argue: 1) that certain recurring rhetorical situations solicit appeal to the
topos and 2) that the topos responds to man’s need to believe in a just and ordered
universe” (“Natural Law” 235). Jamieson concluded the article as follows:
[…] Across eras and languages this topos has functioned as first premise,
assumed to be true, because it satisfies such human needs as: filling gaps
in positive law, allowing appeal from “unjust” positive law, offering an
inviting foundation for international law, but perhaps most importantly,
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allowing an assertion that there is order behind what appears to be flux.
(241)
Obviously, even with Jamieson’s helpful historical sketch, I would take this framework in
the direction of a realist approach to rhetorical ethics with respect to the natural law.
Jamieson has written of natural law elsewhere too (“Interpretation of”; “The Rhetorical
Manifestations” 8-9). For additional natural law discussions in the communication
discipline (from varying philosophical and theoretical points of view) besides those of
Maciejewski and Jamieson, please see the following: K. Foss; Hasian; Krois; Masugi;
Pedrioli; Rieke 48-53; Rodgers. In my estimation, with respect to the discipline of
communication and rhetorical studies, a realist approach to the natural law would provide
some helpful alternatives to discussions such as Hyde and McSpiritt’s “Coming to Terms
with Perfection: The Case of Terri Schiavo.”
47

Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 13, 1373b (215, 217). I say “arguable”

here because there are points of view that would tend to distance this notion (to some
extent at least) as found in the Rhetoric from the natural law tradition (Adler, “A
Question” 235, 409n100a; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 10, 1368b7 [187]; Garver,
Notes 186, 214).
48

For this section, I am utilizing Treatise on Law (Summa Theologica, Questions

90-97), published by Regnery in 1965, which was reprinted from within an earlier
Benzinger Brothers edition of the Summa Theologica. Parenthetical page references here
and to follow (notes 48-52) are to this particular publication from Regnery. Please see
Question 91, Second Article (14-16).
49

This is taken from the Second Article of Question 94 (58).
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50

This is also taken from the Second Article of Question 94 (58). St. Thomas

refers the reader back to the Third Article of Question 91 (17-19).
51

This is taken from the Second Article of Question 94 (59).

52

This is taken from the Second Article of Question 94 (59-60).

53

In approaching the natural law as an “object of thought” for study (Adler, The

Four 149-156, 204-206), one would need to have an understanding of natural law
theorizing since the times of antiquity, as carried forward by Catholic thought, and as
impacted by the Enlightenment (Hittinger, The First; Jamieson, “Natural Law”). Various
theoretical and applied discussions on the natural law are available across academic
disciplines (Adler, “A Question”; Budziszewski; T. Burns; Cornish; Finnis; Fleischauer,
Stanlis, and Greene; Goerner, “On Thomistic”; Goerner, “Response to”; Goerner,
“Thomistic Natural”; Goyette, Latkovic, and Myers; Greene and Stanlis; Greene; Guerra;
Hall, “Goerner on”; Hall, Narrative; Hibbs; Hittinger, The First Grace; Hochschild,
“Natural Law”; Kolakowski; Kunz; D. McInerny; Mills; M. Murphy; Nardin; Porter,
“Natural Law”; Porter, “A Tradition”; Rhonheimer; D. Robinson, “Antigone’s”; Rogers;
Tozzi; Velasquez and Brady; Weatherby 809-815; Wilhelmsen, “The Natural Law”) that
are relevant to considerations of the natural law for rhetorical ethics as related to a realist
rhetoric of order. Regarding Kirk and the natural law, please see note 34 above.
54

I have in mind certain aspects of this book (and Bell’s later book, Religion for

Living: A Book for Postmodernists) that would conflict with Kirk’s Catholicism. Of
course, with regard to the question of conservatism and postmodernism, Russello has
pointed out some congruities with Bell’s work that are clearly visible. Although Kirk
was highly respectful of his friend Bell, I am aware of no place in his writings or
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speeches where he mentioned or recommended this particular book. In my estimation,
Kirk’s corpus could offer a Catholic and essentialist dimension to discussions within the
field of communication and rhetorical studies that pertain to religion, the humanities, etc.
(Christians, “Christian Scholarship”; Christians, “Cross-Cultural Ethics”; Johannesen,
“The Greek”; Johannesen, “Ronald Reagan’s”; Johannesen, “Theistic Reference”; Lessl;
Wilkins and Christians; Zulick). Russell Kirk was an adult convert to Roman
Catholicism, for he entered the Catholic Church in 1964 (Person, Russell Kirk 13).
55

For instance, this first view has been behind formidable challenges to Kirk and

others’ work from such scholars as Allen Guttmann, who questioned the plausibility of a
genuinely conservative tradition in a fundamentally liberal (in terms of the
Enlightenment) country like the United States (The Conservative; “From Brownson”).
Various sources support a view that religion was highly important for Kirk’s
conservatism (Bradford, “A Proper”; Ericson, “Christian, Therefore”; Guroian, Rallying;
Pafford; Quinn), ultimately overtaking the notion that religion was for Kirk of utility for
conservatism (Pafford; Quinn), even as Kirk was “no Hot Gospeller” (Kirk, The Sword
474; Pafford). As W. Wesley McDonald has indicated (Russell Kirk), Zoll seems to have
articulated the earliest overt assessment regarding Kirk on religion, morality, etc. With
his analysis of Kirk’s appropriation of metaphysics and doctrine, Zoll situated Kirk
outside the currents of both Catholic philosophy and Catholic conservatism up through
the early 1970s, yet he did observe that it was evident “that Kirk’s theistic convictions
deepened and expanded over the course of his career” (“The Social Thought”). Zoll
contended that Kirk’s work demonstrated “a lack of philosophical precision” along with
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an “unabashed theism” (much like, he emphasized, Edmund Burke) (“The Social
Thought”). In a response to this article by Zoll of 1974, Kirk explained the following:
As Mr. Zoll has perceived, I think in images, rather than in abstractions.
Ontology I leave to my betters in that field, like him. In part, nevertheless,
my choice of method is strategic: for human beings are more moved by
images than by formulations: Even today, picture and parable are the most
powerful forms of argument, neglected though they are by most writers on
society. If I have enjoyed any success in persuading people, it is owing to
my renewal of half-forgotten devices of persuasion: in the realm of the
blind, the one-eyed man is king. I suppose that “evocative” is the
adjective to describe my rhetoric-though I took to that style blindly and
naturally, and came to understand my own approach only after the
publication of my early books.
Mr. Zoll shrewdly recommends a nearer attention to natural
science, as distinguished from unhappy and incompetent scientism in
society. He is quite right. My own neglect of such possibilities results
from my relative ignorance of the natural sciences, awed though I am by
quantum mechanics, say, and by genetics. It seems to me that Arthur
Koestler, in The Ghost in the Machine, The Case of the Midwife Toad,
The Roots of Coincidence, and other books, gives us a glimpse of the true
visions that issue from the gates of horn: that is, high promise lies in the
application of scientific methods to the study of phenomena wondrously
neglected by the mechanists. The present tendency of such studies is
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toward teleology and the ground of spirit; all this, in the long run, may
exert upon society in the twentieth- or the twenty-first century so strong an
influence as did Newton’s theories in the eighteenth century or Darwin’s
in the nineteenth.
My “historicism” (something of a devil-term), or my repairing to
historical sources of understanding of the human condition, is not really
produced by a belief that everything grows out of process; rather, I began
to relish historical studies, particularly of a philosophical bent, quite early
in life-and I write about what I know. I agree with John Lukacs, in his
Historical Consciousness, that historical writing may become the chief
mode of literary expression in the dawning age-and may work a renewal
of our apprehension-of the inner order and the outer order. The future is
unknowable, and the present escapes as I sit at this typewriter: so the past,
including past revelation and the insights of dead men, is our principal
source of wisdom. We work within our limitations, and I never have
obtained the prophetic afflatus. (“Comments on” 343-344)
56

Russello returns to his discussion of Huntington’s 1957 article, “Conservatism

as an Ideology” from earlier in the book (The Postmodern 179-180). Basically,
according to Huntington, “situational” conservatism recurs through history to protect the
established order, with some openness to change on secondary matters. Relevant here, he
notes in his article, “Hence any theory of natural law as a set of transcendent and
universal moral principles is inherently nonconservative. […] The efforts of
contemporary publicists such as Russell Kirk to appear conservative and yet at the same
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time to espouse a universal natural law are manifestly inconsistent” (459n6). For a
somewhat fair appraisal of conservative positions from around that time, please see
Francis G. Wilson’s “The Anatomy of Conservatives,” which was published in 1960.
57

Regarding history and tradition, I have in mind Fr. Stanley Parry’s “The

Restoration of Tradition” and Josef Pieper’s “Tradition: The Concept and Its Claim Upon
Us,” both utilized by Russello in The Postmodern Imagination of Russell Kirk. Please
see the following: Russello, The Postmodern 177-213; Russello, “Russell Kirk and the
Critics”; Russello, “Time and.” In terms of argument and narrative, I have in mind
Russello’s discussion of Genovese’s analysis of Bradford, conservative discourse, etc.
from the book, The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an
American Conservatism (The Postmodern; “Russell Kirk and the Critics”), which would
probably require more discussion as to the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic
(considering Genovese’s discussion of Weaver and Bradford). Also, Russello at times
downplays the significance of Kirk’s canons of conservatism from over the years (The
Postmodern). In my estimation, Kirk’s canons of conservatism play a role in his
contribution to argumentation in general. For another account of these canons in relation
to Kirk’s overall discourse (similar in certain respects to that of Russello, but with a bit of
a different take on the canons), please see Henrie’s “Russell Kirk and the Conservative
Heart,” which is also relevant for looking at Kirk’s work in terms of narrative and
argument together. One might look to Montgomery’s “Richard Weaver Against the
Establishment: An Essay Review” in considering Weaver’s contribution to the question
of rhetoric and dialectic for conservatism. Again, in the bigger picture, I do think that
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Russello has made a valuable contribution to the natural law conversation with respect to
Kirk as it relates to narrative and argument.
58

E. Thompson, “Ways Out” 196-197. Please see also Ewa Thompson’s recent

article, “Postmodernism and European Memory,” which pertains to the import of
ascertainable truth in historical studies in general and for conservatism. In a Modern Age
symposium of 2007, “Why I Am a Conservative: A Symposium” (with various
contributors), with her own story of embracing conservatism (265-270), Ewa Thompson
provides some operative evidence as to the import of both narrative and argument for
conservative discourse. She explained, “My notion of being a conservative excludes any
permanent attachment to a political party or a public policy. In my view, ‘conservative’
is a philosophical term, and it designates an attitude grounded in philosophical and
existential premises” (265). Philosophically, she became a conservative because of
conservatism’s tendency toward a “logocentric” view of language, while the “existential
reason” for embracing conservatism pertains to her story as a person from Eastern Europe
(265-270).
59

Please see the following: Person, Russell Kirk 188; Weaver, “How to Argue”;

Weaver, Ideas 50-51, 148-187; Weaver, “The Prospects”; Weaver, “Up from
Liberalism”; “Which Ancestors?” One might also suggest “Richard M. Weaver and the
Rhetoric of a Lost Cause” and “The Conservative Rhetoric of Richard M. Weaver:
Theory and Practice,” both by Bliese. Regarding Weaver on language, truth, metaphor,
etc., please see Whalen’s presentation that is documented below.
60

Please see, for instance, Adler’s How to Think About The Great Ideas: From

the Great Books of Western Civilization, edited by Max Weismann. I am appropriating
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the term “‘hermeneutic realism’” as explained by S. Mailloux (“Rhetorical
Hermeneutics,” Critical Inquiry 11 [1985], p. 630) as quoted within McKerrow’s
“Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis” (455). See, for instance, Adler’s “The Human
Equation in Dialectic” and “The Great Idea of Dialectic,” along with Aristotle’s Topics.
Regarding history, please see Adler’s book, The Common Sense of Politics. Although I
don’t confront his article in this project, for one account of Adler’s approach to history
with respect to philosophy, historical studies, dialectic, etc., please see Tim Lacy’s “The
Lovejovian Roots of Adler’s Philosophy of History: Authority, Democracy, Irony, and
Paradox in Britannica’s Great Books of the Western World.” Relevant here also, please
see Weaver’s essay, “Mr. Hutchins as Prophet,” regarding dialectic and rhetoric in terms
of the Great Books approach. One might weigh the approach to dialectical discourse that
I am describing here alongside the various trends on dialectic within the field of
communication and rhetorical studies (Mifsud and Johnson). Finally, relevant here might
be Boileau’s complimentary review of Adler’s The Paideia Proposal: An Educational
Manifesto.
61

Please see note 60 immediately above. It should be noted, however, that Adler

would not have one dwelling in dialectic discourse forever, as one would be accountable
in his view to philosophical truth, especially in light of his own movement from
dialectical discourse to more specific philosophical writings through his own life as a
philosopher (The Four vii-xxvii). In terms of Adler’s relevance for moral and political
matters, I would also look to his discussion of ethics in “The Bodyguards of Truth” (he
also discusses “prescriptive” truth there along the way) in terms of some problems with
contemporary moral and political philosophy (130-132).
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62

I have in mind here Adler’s “Challenges of Philosophies in Communication”

alongside of “The New Conservatism and the Teacher of Speech” by Malcolm Sillars.
On another note, I might differ a bit from discussions by Sillars regarding objectivity,
values, and argumentation in his “Audiences, Social Values, and the Analysis of
Argument.” The liberal arts of rhetoric, grammar, and logic provide a basis for
examining “narrative” (Rodden, “How Do”), while the significance of a liberal education
as promoted by Adler and others points to the genuine purpose of education with respect
to the past and the present (Dougherty). Guroian’s chapter, “The Narrative of Freedom,”
contains some discussion that points to Weaver’s relevance for my overall discussion
here (Rallying 189-200).
63

One major tenant of Garver’s work is that deliberative rhetoric is central in

Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric (Aristotle’s; For the Sake). Regarding religious questions
in public life please see Garver’s “Why Should Anybody Listen? The Rhetoric of
Religious Argument in Democracy” and “The Ten Commandments: Powerful Symbols
and Symbols of Power.” To characterize Garver’s overall endeavors, one might say that
he is an Aristotelian scholar with a pragmatist dimension for contemporary matters with
an eye toward hermeneutical considerations that is influenced by both the former and the
latter (“Aristotle’s Genealogy”; “Aristotle’s Natural”; Aristotle’s; “Can Virtue”;
“Essentially Contested”; “The Ethical”; For the Sake; “He Does”; Machiavelli’s The
Prince; “Paradigms and”; “Philosophy and”; “Point of View”; “The Political”; Rev. of
Beyond Moral Judgment; Rev of Burdens of Proof; “Rhetoric and”; “The Rhetoric”;
“Truth in”; “Why Pluralism”; “Why Should”). There are some points of both theory and
application where I would depart from his discussions, yet I do think that his work is a
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significant contribution to the contemporary study of rhetoric across disciplines. Arthos
does bring some of Garver’s ideas to his own discussion regarding rhetoric and
hermeneutics (“Where There” 331, 336, 338, 342n98, 343n123, 343n143), yet it should
be noted that while Garver is open to a certain type of historicism, there are areas where
he departs from the sort of hermeneutics of Gadamer.
64

My thoughts here regarding the question of human nature with respect to

dialectical and rhetorical discourse are informed by my personal communication with
Eugene Garver in conjunction with my reflection upon both Adler and Garver’s writings.
65

Please see the following: Beale, “Rhetorical Performative”; Broyles; J. Chase;

Duffey and Croft 151-208; Duffy; Duffy and Jacobi 175-196; Garver, “Aristotle on”;
Garver, Aristotle’s; Garver, “Comments on”; Garver, For the Sake; Garver, “Richard
McKeon’s”; Garver, “Truth in”; Garver, “Why Should”; Gottfried and Broyles; Hauser;
Jacobi, “Using” 288-289n11; Nichols; Oravec; Perelman 19-20, 147; Rosenfield; Sheard;
D. Sullivan, “A Closer Look”; D. Sullivan, “The Epideictic”; D. Sullivan, “The Ethos”;
Vivian, “Neoliberal Epideictic”; Zeytinoglu. I am taking no specific position on some of
the controversies on the types of rhetoric here for theory, criticism, pedagogy, and
practice. However, in view of Russello’s book and beyond, studies of Kirk’s corpus
could enhance such discussions. Of note for this project, in light of her interpretation of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Oravec argued for the role of epideictic rhetoric for the advisement
of audiences toward virtuous action (which is then deliberative in scope) (169-171).
Also, for some realist considerations for epideictic rhetoric, please see Daniel N.
Robinson’s book, Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. Relevant to a
major theme of this project, according to George Michos (in encouraging conservative
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involvement in the mainstream of politics and academia), “The debate we must pursue
with liberals concerns human nature itself; and there is no subject with more immediate
practical consequence than this. If we are to have a healthy public philosophy, it must be
predicated upon a realistic conception of man, ignoring neither his capacity for noble
achievement nor his capacity for evil” (9). Finally, I should note here that Paul Gottfried,
in speaking of epideictic rhetoric (Gottfried and Broyles 46-47), wrote the following:
“The invoking of epic heroism has served to nurture and preserve social virtue in
traditional communities. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that in the absence of an education
based on epic literature and epic models societies cannot teach or practice virtue” (47).
66

A study of Eric Voegelin’s writings in light of some of the matters of this

project regarding realism, history, and postmodernism is prompted by my reading for this
project (Federici, “Logophobia”; Montgomery, “Eric Voegelin”; Montgomery, “Tradition
and” 267-268, 271n2; Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical 11-46, 103-104n10, 166-170, 174175, 204-206). Apart from this specifically and in general, I have in mind here my
conversations with Dr. Joseph Devaney when we resided at the Russell Kirk Center for
Cultural Renewal, as he had a focused interest in Voegelin (I must also thank Joseph here
for our conversations with respect to his general focus on history). In addition, along the
way I encountered some discussions (Brummett, “Perfection”; Fisher, “A Motive”;
Fogarty; Garver, “Machiavelli’s The Prince”; Johannesen, “Richard M. Weaver’s Uses”;
C. Miller) that might prompt my examination of Kenneth Burke’s work with regard to
“situation” and realism. Interestingly, Kenneth Burke published an article in Modern
Age entitled, “Art—and the First Rough Draft of Living.” Of course, as a general
philosophical and rhetorical matter, future study of Gadamer in light of classical realism
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contains many avenues potential interest (Arthos, “The Word”; MacIntyre, “On Not”).
Both a realist rhetoric of order and Kirk’s corpus in particular would be relevant, in my
estimation, to developing what M.E. Bradford has discussed as a “rhetoric of the common
good” for conservatism (“Rhetoric and”). With this, one might look at Kirk and Burke
with respect to “prescription” (Canavan; Eaves; Kirk, “Burke and the Philosophy”; Kirk,
The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot 12-70; Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From
Burke to Santayana 11-61; Kirk, Edmund Burke; Stanlis, “Russell Kirk”) as against the
notion of “prescriptive truth” that is employed within this project. Certainly the work of
both Stanlis and Pappin would be helpful in this endeavor. Finally, Allitt’s writings
(Catholic Converts; Catholic Intellectuals) provide for additional consideration on the
question of history, reality, knowledge, religion, etc. as it relates to authors mentioned in
this project and others.
67

Whitney, “Decadence” 23-24. For his overview of principles, he draws in part

from the insights of Russell Kirk (23,25n6).
68

When using the term “performance” here, at one level, I am using it in a certain

ordinary or classical sense as related to communication, like what was employed in
Adler’s How to Speak, How to Listen (4, 9). This might be conducive (as might be
Hochschild’s suggestion regarding natural law arguments) to Garver’s sense of
“performance” (implied or stated) when he is writing of the enactment of public
deliberation, etc. (“Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a Work”; “The Arts”; “Machiavelli’s The
Prince; “Paradigms and”; “Philosophy and”; “The Political”; Rev. of Beyond Moral
Judgment; “Richard McKeon’s”; “Teaching Writing”; “The Ten”). One would have to
observe though that Garver might approach the instructional value of history and

336

literature in some ways differently than did Kirk. Please see Johnstone’s
“Communicating in Classical Contexts: The Centrality of Delivery” for a more classical
and/or ordinary use of the term “performance.” For discussions of “performance,” please
see also “Jurisprudence as Performance: John Brown’s Enactment of Natural Law at
Harper’s Ferry” by Marouf Hasian Jr. and “Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New
Theory of Epideictic” by Walter H. Beale. Cherwitz and Darwin have provided critiques
of the use of the term “performance” as applied with respect to postmodern perspectives,
especially as against, as a replacement of, or overshadowing epistemological
argumentation (“Why The”). It should be noted here too that in a general sense, narrative
is pertinent to matters of rhetorical “performance” also. As it should be expected, I am
trying to avoid here a postmodernist use of the terminology in my own application herein.
Apart from this matter of “performance,” the following commentary by Hayward is here
relevant:
The effects of modernity on politics are most evident in the dissolution of
practical moral reasoning. To a significant extent, the triumph of the
“fact-value” distinction means moral questions are not susceptible to
rational deliberation. In place of moral reasoning is historicism. Moral
judgments today are based on a notion of the unfolding of history. Alas,
too many conservatives accept this historicism of our time as a given, and
do not, for instance, have a principled objection to legal positivism, except
that they would prefer a different current of history to prevail in
jurisprudence. […] The recovery of moral reasoning based on “the laws of
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nature and nature’s God” must rank foremost among the tasks for
conservative thinkers in the next generation. (13)
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